Preamble

The House met at Half past Two o'Clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

ILFORD CORPORATION BILL (By Order)

Read a Second time, and committed.

LUTON CORPORATION BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Thursday next at Seven o'clock.

Oral Answers to Questions — WAGE INCREASES (FOOD SUBSIDIES)

Mr. Osborne: asked the Minister of Labour the total annual wage increases for each of the six years before any reductions were made in food subsidies; and the causes of these wage increases.

The Minister of Labour and National Service (Sir Walter Monckton): Complete statistics showing total annual increases in wages are not available. For manual workers whose wages are mostly determined by voluntary collective agreements between employers' and workers' organisations or by statutory boards, councils etc., estimates are made of the aggregate increases per week in rates of wages. The aggregate increases so computed were about £2 million per week in 1948, £1 million in 1949, £2 million in 1950 and £6½ million in 1951. Comparable figures for 1946 and 1947 are not available. About 6 per cent, of the total increases in these years resulted from the operation of agreements with sliding scales under which wages vary with the movements of the Index of Retail Prices. I am not able to analyse the remainder by reference to the factors which may have given rise to the increases.

Mr. Osborne: I apologise for not having heard the first part of the Minister's reply. Is it not clear that there

were quite a number of wage increases in the 1940s, before there was a cut in the food subsidies, and can the Minister say what adjustment, if any, has been made in the cost-of-living index which takes account of the increased pensions and family allowances which have been granted since the food subsidies were cut?

Sir W. Monckton: In answer to the first part of that supplementary question, I would point out that there were substantial increases, as I have indicated, between 1948 and 1951. Of course, there were some changes of food subsidies in 1951, but the principal changes began in 1952 I should require notice of the second part of the question.

Mr. Jay: Would the Minister not agree that import prices were rising in the earlier years, and that had a great deal to do with rises in the cost of living, and consequently in wages?

Sir W. Monckton: There were these rises in prices, but I find it very difficult to isolate particular prices.

Oral Answers to Questions — NATIONAL SERVICE

University Graduates

Mr. Short: asked the Minister of Labour if he will arrange for university graduates with high honours in science and mathematics to be given the option of doing two years' teaching service in a school or university instead of the normal National Service with the Armed Forces.

Sir W. Monckton: No, Sir. I have no power to do this.

Mr. Short: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that the present shortage of graduates in science and mathematics is having a disastrous effect in our schools and universities, and very shortly that effect will be felt in industry, and more particularly in the armament industry? Does he not think that this idea is worth thinking about and discussing with his right hon. Friend?

Sir W. Monckton: I think that I can say that the subject will be included in those matters which will be considered by the Technical Personnel Committee, the revived Hankey Committee, when it meets on 23rd March. I have had no representation from other bodies advising this change.

Mr. Langford-Holt: Can my right hon. and learned Friend say whether there is any intention to review the whole question of the universality of the call-up, as to whether it is a good thing, generally speaking, to call up, in peace-time, at considerable expense, people whom we have no intention of calling up in the event of war?

Sir W. Monckton: It is very important, in my view, that we should retain the universality of the call-up. Whenever an attempt is made to alter it, the danger is that we shall open the door to many other alterations.

Mr. Peart: Will the Minister give this matter very careful consideration? As he knows, I submitted a case to him in which a student of Leeds University is unable to follow an honours course in metallurgy because arrangements cannot be made for his service outside the normal procedure. It is very important that we should not lose these technicians.

Sir W. Monckton: I am well aware of the importance of this subject. One thing which I want to make clear is that I cannot contemplate in any event the change which is the subject matter of this particular question. That would make two years of teaching service in a school or university equivalent to all the service which a National Service man is called upon to do.

Mr. Keenan: asked the Minister of Labour if his attention has been directed to the efforts being made to persuade students in their final year at the universities and colleges to accept offers to go to Canada, before they are called up for National Service; and if he will take steps to ensure that by so doing they will not escape doing their National Service.

Sir W. Monckton: I am aware that opportunities for employment overseas, in Canada and elsewhere, are offered to such students, but, wherever possible, the men are called upon first to discharge their liability under the National Service Acts.

Mr. Keenan: I thank the Minister for that answer, which is rather different from what I expected. Does he remember that a few months ago his Ministry gave me figures showing that there were 525,000 deferments in the last five years, from

which only 239,000 were called up in the same period? I suggest to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that his Department should at least make an inquiry, because this kind of evasion should not take place.

Sir W. Monckton: I do not recollect those precise figures. The number of deferments cannot be related to the number of people who are called up in any one year. I am satisfied that there is no considerable evasion on the lines suggested in the Question.

Oral Answers to Questions — EMPLOYMENT

Engineering and Shipbuilding Inquiries (Evidence)

Mr. Pannell: asked the Minister of Labour whether he will have placed in the Library a complete transcript of the evidence placed before the court of inquiry in the engineering and shipbuilding industry disputes.

Sir W. Monckton: No, Sir. The hearings of the courts of inquiry were held in public and were described at length in the Press. The reports of the courts, which have been laid before the House, contain detailed accounts of the submissions of the parties.

Mr. Pannell: Will the Minister think about this matter again, and bear in mind that the inquiry was conducted at great expense to the parties themselves? It is the only full-scale inquiry that I can remember into this most important branch of the private sector of industry. The evidence which was offered must be of great value to economists and to people who want to inquire into this kind of thing. Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman consider that all this expenditure should result merely in a series of documents being pigeon-holed?

Sir W. Monckton: I very much hope they will not simply be pigeon-holed. As the hon. Member knows, the arguments are very fully set out in the reports. If there is any disposition to see the transcript of the 10 days' proceedings, I have no objection in principle. I was doubting whether it was required on a large scale.

Mr. Robens: May I add my plea to that of my hon. Friend? It may well


be that not a large number of Members would want to go through the evidence, but quite a number would like to see the transcript, and if it can be placed in the Library, if only for a short period, it will be of great advantage.

Sir W. Monckton: In view of the interest of the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friend, I will reconsider the matter.

Scotland

Mrs. Mann: asked the Minister of Labour if he is aware that Scotland bore 35,000 unemployed who were on the register more than eight weeks, while the next nearest regions were London and South-Eastern, 21,000, North-Western, 23,000, Northern, 16,000 and Wales, 14,000; and, in view of the higher percentage in Scotland of prolonged unemployment, what steps are being taken to deal with this situation.

Sir W. Monckton: Yes, Sir. I am keeping a careful watch on the position, and my officers are co-operating closely with other Departments concerned so that every effort is made to increase employment opportunities in Scotland.

Mrs. Mann: Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman not indicate in what particular way he is concentrating in Scotland, where the unemployment is in the heavy industries? Scotland has contributed 38 per cent, of the United Kingdom shipbuilding total. Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman concentrating on shipbuilding and the heavy industries?

Sir W. Monckton: As the hon. Lady knows, the Glasgow and Lanarkshire areas are within the Development Area. I recognise—it has been the case for a considerable time—that there is proportionately more unemployment in Scotland than in the United Kingdom as a whole. Therefore, we pay particular attention to Scotland. On the other hand, the comparable figures for recent years show that there is no marked change. What we are trying to do is to see whether we can bring about a change in the other direction.

Iron and Steel Industry, Coatbridge

Mrs. Mann: asked the Minister of Labour if he is aware that the unemployment register in Coatbridge is showing a

disturbing upward trend, due to a recession in iron and steel re-rolling; and if he will take steps to reduce the unemployment in this industry.

Sir W. Monckton: Yes, Sir. I am aware that a number of workers in the iron and steel industry in this area have recently been registered as temporarily stopped, and I understand that this is due to a falling-off in orders for the home market which have been placed with local firms. I will continue to watch the position and keep in touch with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply about it.

Mrs. Mann: Is the Minister aware that in this instance there is a marked change in comparison with the years 1950 to 1953? Compared with last year, there is an addition of 200.

Sir W. Monckton: In February that was so. It was much less in January, when there was practically no change, but February, with its bad weather, was a difficult month for the whole country.

Mr. Bevan: Might not the fall in employment in the rolling and re-rolling industries indicate that we are at last faced with the same influences as have produced such a reduction in steel production in America and in Germany? Will net the right hon. and learned Gentleman look at the question from that point of view?

Sir W. Monckton: I will certainly look at it from that point of view with my right hon. Friend. I hope there is no reason for a pessimistic view yet, at any rate.

Factory Inspectorate (Equal Pay)

Miss Ward: asked the Minister of Labour on what date equal pay commenced to grade II factory inspectors.

Sir W. Monckton: In 1929.

Miss Ward: Is it not absolutely ridiculous that a concession which was rightly granted to grade II women factory inspectors in 1929, presumably with the connivance of the Treasury and unknown to my right hon. and learned Friend, should not now, by the exercise of the justice for which my right hon. and learned Friend is famed, be extended to the grade III and, if there are any, grade I factory


inspectors? Is the Minister aware that the whole House will be hanging on his action?

Sir W. Monckton: I ought to make a further admission to my hon. Friend. Although the position was not exactly the same before 1929—that was when grade II began—as far as my researches go, substantially the same pay and starting salary were to be found as long ago as 1893.

Dr. Summerskill: What factors influenced the Minister's predecessors in granting this favourable discrimination?

Sir W. Monckton: I should prefer to ask the right hon. Lady to ask two of her right hon. Friends on the Front Bench what factors induced them to retain it during their time in office.

Personal Case

Mr. Blenkinsop: asked the Minister of Labour what further action he proposes to take to secure suitable employment for Donald Wardhaugh, aged 20, of Walker, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, about whom he has received representations, in view of the fact that this poliomyelitis sufferer was trained as a bookkeeper and accountant over a year ago without result.

Sir W. Monckton: My local officers will continue to do all they can to assist Mr. Wardhaugh to find suitable work, but his field of employment is much restricted because he cannot negotiate steps or stairs and is unwilling to leave home. He is at present receiving tuition in commercial subjects on two evenings a week to enable him to become qualified in bookkeeping and accountancy.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Is the Minister aware that in the tragic case of this young man efforts have been made to place him in the Ministry of National Insurance and in other places but that they say they cannot make provision for him because he cannot move out of his chair? Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman not do something to find a vacancy in either his own Ministry or the Ministry of National Insurance, where facilities exist for cases of this sort to be employed?

Sir W. Monckton: I assure the hon. Member that I have done all I could to inquire into this case. We offered this

man an opportunity of going to Remploy, which might have been suitable, but he was not able to accept.

RETAIL PRICES INDEX

Mr. Lewis: asked the Minister of Labour what effect the recent rise in cost of television licences will have upon the Interim Index of Retail Prices.

Sir W. Monckton: None. Wireless licences, but not television licences, are included in the present Interim Index of Retail Prices.

Mr. Lewis: I am obliged to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. Are telegrams and telegraph services also included?

Sir W. Monckton: I do not think so. But I have made a further inquiry and I find that if television licences were included in the index, on the basis of the number now current the recent rise in the cost would mean a difference in the index of 0.05 of one point.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH

Water Supplies (Fluoridation)

Mr. Dodds: asked the Minister of Health what progress has been made in arranging with selected local authorities for experiments in the fluoridation of water supplies.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Miss Patricia Hornsby-Smith): Exploratory discussions are proceeding.

Mr. Dodds: In view of the fact that the Minister of Health said on 3rd December that all the recommendations had been accepted, cannot the hon. Lady say when these discussions will be completed, because they seem to be taking a long time?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we are not trying to delay or hold up this matter in any way, but many detailed investigations have to take place in regard to relevant areas before a decision is finally taken.

Mr. Bevan: But did this investigation not start many years ago, as far back as 1948–49, and ought there not to be some definite results now?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: That was more in the nature of an inquiry than the detailed experiment in an area.

Mr. Baird: Were not inquiries made into an experiment carried out in America, and what is the result of those inquiries?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: This was based on the report of the mission that went to America.

Dr. Stross: asked the Minister of Health what consideration he has given to the fluoridation of water supplies in industrial areas.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: Before any area is selected for fluoridation the nature of its industries will be taken into account.

Dr. Stross: Will the Minister bear in mind that in Stoke-on-Trent, and in places like Salford and Manchester, we are already condemned to inhale a good deal of fluorine compounds and the last thing in the world that we want is to have more fluorine compounds in the water?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: That is one of the very important points which are under consideration.

Artificial Limb-Fitting Facilities, West Cumberland

Mr. Peart: asked the Minister of Health if he will arrange for the setting up of an artificial limb-fitting centre at Carlisle to serve the needs of Cumberland.

Mr. Hargreaves: asked the Minister of Health if he will consider the establishment of an artificial limb-fitting centre at Carlisle as a measure of decentralisation.

The Minister of Health (Mr, Iain Macleod): I am considering this, but I am not sure that the amount of work would justify the additional money and manpower involved.

Mr. Peart: Will the Minister reconsider this matter, and will he bear in mind that the present arrangement causes considerable hardship in West Cumberland, where many of our limbless people have to travel long distances to Newcastle? If he can do something, it will be greatly appreciated.

Mr. Macleod: I am aware of the position. It does involve long and extremely difficult journeys from the Carlisle area to the Newcastle area, but the difficulty is that there are only about nine or 10 limb cases a week, and it is difficult to conceive a limb-fitting centre for a number of that sort. But I am considering this matter.

Mr. Simmons: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the limbless are very concerned about the facilities being given in out-of-the-way areas, that the old Ministry of Pensions was only a Cinderella Department, and that his Department is the blue-eyed boy of the Treasury? Could he not press for something to be done, and if he cannot get a regular centre open, could there not be one opened on one or two days a week?

Mr. Macleod: One of the sentences in that supplementary question would seem to be in conflict with some of the later Questions on the Order Paper. I am very much aware of the interest which B.L.E.S.M.A. has taken in the suggestion of a centre at Carlisle, and I am bearing its representations in mind.

Typhoid Germs (Tinned Food)

Mr. Steele: asked the Minister of Health if he is now in a position to state the result of the inquiries he has made into the recent case of typhoid germs being discovered in tinned food.

Mr. Iain Macleod: Inquiries are still proceeding and I am not yet in a position to make a full statement of the results. No case of typhoid attributable to this source has been notified.

Mr. Steele: Could the Minister tell us at this stage if, in fact, this milk was processed in accordance with what was advertised on the labels?

Mr. Macleod: I cannot at the moment. There is a complication, as I am sure the hon. Member realises, in that inquiries into this matter are being made in Ireland. I have to await the results of the local health authority investigations there. I will inform the hon. Member privately as soon as the investigation is complete, and he might like to put down a Question.

Executive Council, Lancashire (Staff)

Mrs. Castle: asked the Minister of Health why the Lancashire Executive Council has been instructed by his Department to cut its staff from 130 to 129½.

Mr. Iain Macleod: This is an involved and rather absurd story but in fact no such instruction have been given.

Mrs. Castle: But is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I have in my hand a copy of a letter from his Department to the clerk of the Lancashire Executive Council dated 19th February, calling for this cut? Is he aware that this policy of Mau Mau mutilation as far as the hospital and health services are concerned is causing great distress in the area, and would he advise the Lancashire Executive Council whether the cut is to be made vertically or horizontally, and what is to be done with the other half?

Mr. Macleod: I was so fascinated by the hon. Lady's Question that I sent for all the papers and read them, including the letter she has referred to. What happened was that it was agreed a couple of years ago to make a reduction of six in the Executive Council establishment, which it was thought to stand at 135½, the half being a part-time member of the staff. That reduced the number to 129½, and when Lancashire wished for 130 someone in my Department, with admirable dogged devotion to duty, pointed that out in the letter which the hon. Lady quoted. It has since been discovered that the original allocation was 136, and, therefore, the reduction of six has now been made. So the position is that the reduction has been achieved, the Lancashire Executive Council has now got its establishment and everybody is happy, including the half-man who never was.

Maternity Beds, North-West Region

Mrs. Castle: asked the Minister of Health what representations he has made to the North-West Region Hospital Board with regard to the reduction of maternity accommodation in the area.

Mr. Iain Macleod: In addition to the circular of August, 1951, which I have already sent to the hon. Member, this and all other boards were asked in September last to review their arrangements in areas where the proportion of hospital confinements is high to see whether

accommodation could be better used to meet more urgent needs.

Mrs. Castle: Would the right hon. Gentleman tell the House if this means that there is now a new policy in his Department with regard to maternity accommodation, and is he taking deliberate steps to reduce the number of cases in which mothers can have their babies in hospitals? If that is so, is he aware that it will cause profound fury among the womenfolk of the country, and will he please reverse his decision?

Mr. Macleod: I am sorry, but that is just not the position. In September last year I drew attention to a circular dated August, 1951, sent out by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Middles-brough, East (Mr. Marquand) which stated that in general, in the ordinary areas, the sort of target should be 50–50. As far as Blackburn is concerned, as the hon. Lady knows, the percentage of confinements was running last year at 77 per cent., which is an extremely high figure. The decision about Springfield was taken, I understand, as a result of a review by the hospital management committee in January, 1953, before I drew the attention of boards to the previous circular. The hon. Lady knows—and this is most important—that Springfield, which was an unsatisfactory maternity home of 20 beds, is now housing 30 of the chronic sick and is playing a splendid part in the National Health Service. There has been no change of policy beyond the circular sent out by my Socialist predecessor.

Mrs. Castle: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that even with the 77 per cent, figure operating in Blackburn there are cases which I brought to his attention and the attention of the House where mothers urgently needing to have their babies in hospital have not been given a bed because it was a second child, or for some other reason? There is a stringency operating, and the regional hospital board pointed out last month that the Minister was urging restrictions on maternity beds. Will he review that policy?

Mr. Macleod: Of course, I shall be happy to look carefully into any cases and I have two which the hon. Lady brought to my attention, but there is no new policy on this matter. I think that the position of Blackburn is that for the first child the mother is automatically


accepted, and I believe she is, too, for the fifth. In all other cases mothers are accepted where the home conditions are unsatisfactory or where complications are expected.

Hospitals, Dartford (Powdered Milk)

Mr. Dodds: asked the Minister of Health, in view of the increasing use of manufactured powdered milk in the place of fresh milk in the Dartford group of hospitals, what precautions are taken to ensure that all powdered milk is suitable for human consumption.

Mr. Iain Macleod: Powdered milk is manufactured under high standards of safety and is used by the Dartford group of hospitals only in bulk cooking. I am advised that there is no reason to suppose that it is not safe for human consumption.

Mr. Dodds: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Kent county analyst has been active in condemning samples of powdered milk, and it would be of some comfort to the people concerned with hospitals if it were known that a similar precaution was taken with some of the powdered milk in the Dartford group of hospitals?

Mr. Macleod: Perhaps the hon. Member will have a word with me as to what is in his mind. I am fairly confident that none of them refers to the Dartford group of hospitals.

Mr. Dodds: They have not been submitted yet.

Mr. Macleod: As far as the powdered milk manufacture there is concerned, if the milk is dried by the roller process it is absolutely safe in all forms, even raw, and if any other processes are approximately less safe, anything wrong would be completely destroyed in the cooking.

Mr. T. Williams: Can the right hon. Gentleman say if this milk was home-produced or imported?

Mr. Macleod: I should like notice of that question.

Mental Nurses (Retiring Age)

Mr. Blenkinsop: asked the Minister of Health what proportion of the fully-trained mental nurses on the staff of hos-

pitals and institutions are over the minimum retirement age for superannuation purposes.

Mr. Iain Macleod: I regret that this information is not available.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Does not the right hon. Gentleman feel that it would be worth while to try to make some inquiries about this matter, because it would much influence our judgment upon the seriousness of the shortage of mental nurses, as there is a general understanding that a 'high proportion of the fully-qualified mental nurses have very nearly, or have already, reached ordinary retirement age?

Mr. Macleod: It means a separate inquiry of each of the employing authorities. Perhaps we can leave the matter this way, that if the hon. Gentleman convinces me that there will be any real value in such an inquiry taking place, I will make one.

Hospital Out-Patients (Waiting Time)

Mr. G. Jeger: asked the Minister of Health whether he is aware of complaints that out-patients at hospitals often are kept waiting unduly long by consultants arriving late for their appointments; and whether he will issue instructions to remedy this.

Mr. Iain Macleod: I am aware that there are complaints from time to time and, of course, in the event of any serious alleged mismanagement I am always prepared to look into it. But generally I regard these matters as primarily for the hospital authorities themselves to manage.

Mr. Jeger: But does not the Minister agree that the hospital authorities would be loth to have any bad feeling between themselves and the consultants, and consequently they take no action although they grumble privately? Would not the right hon. Gentleman look further into this matter, because it is no use hospitals having appointments systems if the consultants do not keep to them?

Mr. Macleod: As I told the House last week, I am looking into this matter to see if we can collect any useful information which we might send in the form of a circular to the hospitals.

Mr. K. Robinson: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that what normally happens is that patients are summoned at least a quarter of an hour before the first can be seen by the consultant if he arrives on time, and that they always arrive a quarter of an hour before they are summoned, so that there is a minimum delay of half an hour before any can possibly be seen?

Mr. Macleod: From his great experience, the hon. Gentleman knows that there are a number of other complications as well. To mention one, some of the places—this is an excellent thing and I am not criticising it—are so pleasant and attractive, and the canteen is so delightful, that many patients arrive early and treat the place as a club.

Mr. Rankin: Is not the root of the trouble that the consultant is also in private practice?

Children's Hospitals (Out-Patients' Departments)

Mr. G. Jeger: asked the Minister of Health whether he will advise the regional hospital boards to see that all out-patients' departments in children's hospitals are adequately supplied with furniture and decorations designed to interest children.

Mr. Iain Macleod: It is quite common practice for hospitals to do this already, so far as their resources allow, and I feel that it is essentially a thing to be left to the hospital authorities' good sense to look after it.

Doctors (Excessive Prescribing)

Mr. G. Jeger: asked the Minister of Health how many cases of excessive prescribing by medical practitioners have been reported to him each year since the National Health Service commenced; and in how many of these cases was action taken.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: Prima facie evidence of excessive prescribing was reported to my right hon. Friend in respect of 300 doctors in 1950–51, 263 in 1952, 320 in 1953. Of these, 852 were visited by his medical officers and substantial reductions of cost resulted thereafter. The prescribing of 17 was referred in accordance with Regulations

to the local medical committee. So far, in nine cases sums ranging from £25 to £250 have been withheld from the doctors' remuneration.

Mr. Jeger: What was the proportion of cases in which no action was taken?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: In about 80 per cent, of the cases after investigation it was thought that there was no evidence of excessive prescribing; in the case of the remaining 20 per cent., 17 were referred out of 852 investigated, and in nine of those action was taken—about 1 per cent.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Could the Minister say whether they are intending here in England to follow the excellent example, in this case, of Scotland in setting up an area average for prescribing in order to encourage doctors to check between one and another?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: That matter must be looked at when we have caught up with the general prescribing.

Nursing Staffs (Salaries)

Mr. Marquand: asked the Minister of Health his estimate of the increased expenditure incurred by the regional hospital boards in the financial year 1952–53 in respect of salaries of nursing staffs.

Mr. Iain Macleod: About £4½ million over the corresponding figure for 1951–52.

Mr. Marquand: As the cost of salaries is about 60 per cent, of the cost of the hospital service, does not this suggest that an additional £13 million for the entire Health Service will only be sufficient to keep pace with the rise in salaries and other costs?

Mr. Macleod: As a matter of fact, there is quite a substantial offset from board and lodging charges. I am not sure if the right hon. Gentleman put the right year down in his Question, but the figures I have given are for the financial year 1952–53. They were, therefore, fully taken into account as a known commitment in the financial year 1953–54.

Hospital Boards (Finances)

Mr. Marquand: asked the Minister of Health by how much the money spent for capital purposes by regional hospital


boards in the years 1952–53 and 1953–54 taken together fell short of the amount so spent in the financial years 1950–51 and 1951–52 taken together.

Mr. Iain Macleod: I expect that the figure will be about half a million pounds.

Mr. Marquand: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the figures which he gave me previously for allocations suggested a shortfall in the same period of no less than £2,600,000, and how is it possible to say that the expenditure was almost the same while the allocations were so widely divergent, unless it be explained by the action of his predecessor in failing to use the money which we provided for building hospitals?

Mr. Macleod: On the contrary, it is explained by the action of the right hon. Gentleman, who has fallen into his own pit. It is one thing—and it may look quite impressive—to put allocations into an Estimate and to underspend them considerably, as the right hon. Gentleman did. It is another thing to do as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House and I have done, to give accurate figures, as far as possible, and to spend fully up to them. That explains substantially the difference between the allocations. If the right hon. Gentleman will look at his own Question, however, it asked for the money spent. The difference in the money spent is only £500,000.

Mr. Marquand: Yes, but is it not true that the money allocated for 1951–52 could only have been spent by his predecessor and could not have been spent during my term of office?

Mr. Macleod: The underspending of the larger part of the allocations made for 1951–52 was in respect of the term of office of the right hon. Gentleman.

Miss Ward: May I ask my right hon. Friend if he is aware that the North-East coast makes a magnificent contribution to the general welfare and productive effort of the nation? [HON. MEMBERS: "Wrong Question."] No, I do not think I am referring to the wrong Question. May I say to the Minister that I think it is about time we had our fair share of what is going?

Mr. Pannell: asked the Minister of Health the financial allocation to the Leeds hospital board for the last financial year, the current financial year, and for the next financial year.

Mr. Iain Macleod: As the reply contains a number of figures I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mr. Pannell: Can the right hon. Gentleman say in advance of my seeing the figures whether there is any truth in the statement of the chairman of the board, which I have here? It is:
We cannot find any money for development …We are having to economise to the uttermost and use up any reserves we have to carry on during the next 12 months.

Mr. Macleod: The figures are higher for this year. It is true that I have sought, and am still seeking, for all possible economies in the National Health Service. It is right to say, because it is relevant to many Questions on the Order Paper today, that it is virtually impossible, for a variety of reasons, to look at a figure for one year and a figure for another year and say that the difference represents the extra amount available for the hospital services. One can only do that if one knows the assumptions—and they run into dozens— which have been made by the Minister in framing the Estimates.

Following is the reply:

The sums allocated to this board for each of the years in question, and also the actual expenditure for the last financial year, are as follows:


—
Allocation
Expenditure



£
£


1952–53
14,588,000*
13,894,336


1953–54
14,845,000†
—


1954–55
15,022,000‡
—


Notes:


*Included £222,869 in respect of salary and wage awards which was not required.


† Includes £128,170 in respect of salary and wage awards which was not required by 31st December, 1953.


‡Includes £57,000 in respect of salary and wage awards which may be announced between 1st January, 1954, and 31st March, 1955.

Dr. Stross: asked the Minister of Health the sum allocated to the Birmingham Regional Board for the present year and for the past three years.

Mr. Iain Macleod: As the reply contains a number of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Dr. Stross: Is the Minister aware, however, that the Stoke-on-Trent Hospital Management Committee is dependent upon the Birmingham Regional Board for its funds, including money for capital expenditure; for improvements and renovations, that the management committee is short of money and that there is a very real need for further capital sums? Has the right hon. Gentleman now considered whether it may not be desirable to change the system and see that these sums do not come through the region at all but come directly from the Ministry, so that we can look after our own accountancy and bring our own grievances to the Minister's notice?

Mr. Macleod: The hon. Member's Question relates, of course, to the Birmingham Regional Board and not to the Stoke-on-Trent Hospital Management Committee. If he has any points to make on that subject, perhaps he will put a Question on the Order Paper or bring them otherwise to my notice. The other question involves the difficult matter of major financial policy and that is perhaps the first matter of all that is under the purview of the Guillebaud Committee at the present time.

Mr. I. O. Thomas: Why is it so difficult to give the figures for the four years now? Why say that they will be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT? Surely the Minister can mention the totals for four years without undue mental strain?

Mr. Macleod: I can certainly do it. There are four years of allocation and three years of expenditure, but in addition to that—and this is part of the answer which I gave to the hon. Member for Leeds, West (Mr. Pannell)—it is wholly misleading to give figures in that way. I have, therefore, tried to help to some extent by providing notes which will be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT SO as to explain the figures in the list.

Following is the reply:

The sums allocated to this board for the maintenance of its services during each of the years in question, and also the actual expenditure for each of the years up to 1952ߝ53, were as follows:


—
Allocation
Expenditure



£
£


1950–51
15,114,800
15,025,903


1951–52
16,940,050
16,729,720


1952–53
18,940,000*
18,377,963


1953–54
19,691,000†
—


Notes:


* Included £205,761 in respect of salary and wage awards which was not required.


†Includes £136,893 in respect of salary and wage awards which was not required by 31st December, 1953.

Miss Ward: asked the Minister of Health if he is aware that the total revenue and capital allocations for the Newcastle region and teaching hospital were £2,800,000 less on a population 'basis than the average amount spent by, the country as a whole on the hospital (Service; and if he will take steps to readjust the position.

Mr. Iain Macleod: I do not think that a population basis would be an equitable method of distributing the sums available for hospital running costs, but it is taken fully into account in distributing the sums available for hospital capital works.

Miss Ward: Is my right hon. Friend aware that this is not the view taken by the regional hospital board, and that the board is seeking to send a deputation to the Minister to repudiate emphatically that we should have less on a population basis for our hospital services than other parts of the country? Is it not time that my right hon. Friend paid a little more attention to the north-east and gave us what we are entitled to have?

Mr. Macleod: That argument does not appear to me wholly logical because, by definition, maintenance and running costs are given to establish and keep going the services and hospitals which are already there—

Miss Ward: But we have not enough hospitals.

Mr. Macleod: It would clearly be impossible to have maintenance costs on a population basis, but I fully recognise that there is a case for taking population into account in respect of capital allocations. Indeed, capital allocations are made as to 95 per cent, on population and 5 per cent, on special needs. Newcastle, in the financial year 1954–55, as a result of that allocation, received £50,000, or 12 per cent, more than would have been received on a population basis alone.

Miss Ward: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there are more nurses nursing in London hospitals than there are in the north regional hospitals? Why should we have fewer nurses nursing our patients than there are in the hospitals in the south? Will my right hon. Friend look into that aspect? Is he also aware that the regional hospital board is not satisfied even with his additional allocation to it?

Mr. Chetwynd: asked the Minister of Health the reasons for his cut of nearly £1 million in the estimates of the Newcastle Regional Hospital Board for 1954–55.

Mr. Iain Macleod: The total sum available for 1954–55 to meet the running costs of hospital boards was less than the total amount requested in the boards' estimates, and the allocation to this board represents what is in my view a fair share of that total.

Mr. Chetwynd: Is the Minister aware that the very minute increase in the funds available for next year compared with this year will be quite inadequate for the hospital board to improve its standards and keep pace with the rise of pay and prices which it will have to meet? Will he reconsider this, otherwise we shall be in a worse position in the north-east compared with other parts of the country?

Mr. Macleod: There again we are in the sort of difficulty that I indicated earlier because the figures do not indicate, for example, what provision has been made and kept back for any Whitley awards that may arise. It is virtually impossible to make comparisons figure by figure and year by year in the hospital service, but I do not deny that the regional hospital boards will have to work very closely to the Estimates I am laying in detail before the House.

Mr. Marquand: In view of the special requirements of the north-eastern area— the rapidly increasing population, heavy incidence of industrial injury, heavy incidence of tuberculosis and so on—will the right hon. Gentleman watch with special care to see that no beds are closed in that region? The hospital board is really afraid, as it has said, that the right hop. Gentleman is making some change in policy by this small allocation.

Mr. Macleod: I am certainly not making any change in policy in this matter. I think that if the figures I gave the House a few weeks ago are studied, that becomes quite clear. As a matter of fact, the percentage increase over the last few years in the Newcastle region has-been substantially higher—I will not say than that of any other part of the country, 'but a long way above the average.

Mr. Chetwynd: asked the Minister of Health how many of the proposed additional hospital beds in the Newcastle hospital region will be removed from the development programme as a result of the cut in the financial estimates for 1954–55.

Mr. Iain Macleod: Firm provision has been made by the board for 263 extra beds during 1954–55. Final decision on the remaining beds, which total 138, has not yet been taken.

Mr. Chetwynd: Are not those beds for which firm provision had been made now in jeopardy because of the cut in estimates? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the very grave need for additional 'beds in the north-east? Is he further aware that the whole of the plans of the regional board will have to go into cold storage if it cannot get more funds?

Mr. Macleod: No, I am assured that the answer which I gave is accurate, and the firm provision for the 263 beds stands. It is, of course, true that this region, like every other region, would like to do more. I should be more than ready for them to do more if it could be done within the allocation. But, as I have said, beyond the 263 beds there are 138 beds which will have to be considered in the light of the allocation.

Mr. J. Johnson: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. What defence have we against a loquacious Minister who makes


such long answers? We have only reached Question 37, and have nearly reached the end of Question Time.

Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order.

Sir H. Williams: Will my right hon. Friend say what grant would have to be made to the Medical Research Council in order to allow hon. Members to draft shorter supplementary questions to which the Minister can make shorter answers?

Mr. Popplewell: When he was in the north-east the Minister agreed that there was a very severe shortage of beds; will he look into the matter again in order to get the north-east up to an equal strength with the rest of the country in regard to the number of beds?

Mr. Macleod: If the hon. Member studies the answer which I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Miss Ward), he will see that special attention is paid to Newcastle in regard to capital.

Mr. Blenkinsop: asked the Minister of Health if he is aware that the revenue funds made available for the Newcastle Regional Hospital Board for 1954–55 represent an increase of only £ per cent, over the current year; and whether he will review the matter in view of the need for more hospital beds in the region.

Mr. Iain Macleod: The answer to the first part of the Question is "Yes," but the sum allocated to the board for hospital running costs in 1954–55 represents, in my view, a fair share of the total sum available, and its capital allocation takes account of the region's need for hospital beds.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that he might have saved some time by answering the last three Questions together? Do they not also show how urgent the problem of the north-east is?

Hospital (Closing of Beds)

Mr. Marquand: asked the Minister of Health how many regional hospital boards will have to close beds as a consequence of insufficient allocation of funds in the coming financial year.

Mr. Iain Macleod: I am not aware of any, except that in one locality the

regional board, as I told the House last week, is considering with the hospital management committee concerned the possibility of closing two units which are in any event not fully used.

Mr. Marquand: Will the Minister agree that the closing of any beds would be most regrettable, and will he undertake that, if there is any danger of it, he will come to this House with a Supplementary Estimate?

Mr. Macleod: No, I could not possibly give that undertaking. These matters should be, and are at present being, discussed between regional boards and hospital management committees. I have said that I am only aware of one locality; there may well be others, but so far they have not come to my notice at the Ministry.

Full-time Consultants (Domiciliary Visits)

Dr. Stross: asked the Minister of Health whether he will permit consultants who are engaged on a full-time salaried basis, to make domiciliary visits when requested, and receive payment on the same scale as now applies to consultants working part-time.

Mr. Iain Macleod: Under the arrangements agreed in 1949, additional payment may not be made for domiciliary consultations by whole-time officers. Any alteration of this provision would be a matter for the Medical Whitley Council.

Dr. Stross: Whilst recognising what the Minister has said to be quite true, may I ask whether he is aware, however, that these men working full-time on consultant service have no perquisites and no allowances, and that on average their income is somewhat less than the income not only of part-time men but of general practitioners nowadays? Will not the right hon. Gentleman do something to see that their status is recognised?

Mr. Macleod: I recognise the justice of a good deal, if not necessarily agreeing with all, of what the hon. Member has said. He will realise that part of these complications arise out of an agreement negotiated in 1949 and part indeed by the ordinary operation of the Income Tax laws of this country relating to whole-time appointments. It is precisely these kinds


of matters—and I take note of what the hon. Member has said—that will come before the Whitley Council.

Mr. Bevan: May I express the hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not solve the problem by converting all the full-time salaried staff to part-time, because that might be the consequence of my hon. Friend's suggestion?

Mr. Macleod: There are varied trends and different views in different regions of the country in relation to this matter.

Dr. Srross: Is the Minister aware that 1 put this Question down because people like myself recognise the very excellent work that is done by these full-time men but the last thing that we want is to reduce the status of the part-time people?

Mr. Macleod: I recognise that, but do not let us pretend that the standard of conduct or anything else is higher or lower among part-time men or full-time men. They are all members of the same profession.

Mentally Defective Children, Wales (Training)

Mrs. White: asked the Minister of Health the number of mentally defective children in each of the Welsh counties and county boroughs in which no local provision is made for their training.

Miss Homsby-Smith: As the answer is in the form of a table I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mrs. White: Though the number of children concerned may be small, does not the hon. Lady agree that the present position is most unsatisfactory when in 10 counties in Wales and in one of the four county boroughs there is no local provision at all for the training of these children, and parents have sometimes to wait for years before places can be found in institutions outside their own counties where these children can be trained?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: I appreciate what the hon. Lady says, and I know that she recognises that the real difficulty is the small number of children spread over large areas. There are 260 children in the 10 counties and not more than 50 are living in one area, but we are trying to encourage reasonable and responsible developments to meet the situation.

Following is the table:

Number of mental defectives under supervision or guardianship under 16 years of age according to returns made by certain Welsh local health authorities at 31st December, 1953.


Authority.
Number of Defectives.


Anglesey
26


Brecknockshire
8


Caernarvonshire
42


Cardiganshire
21


Denbighshire
40


Flintshire
20


Merionethshire
4


Montgomeryshire
9


Pembrokeshire
48


Radnorshire
7*


Merthyr Tydfil
35


*This figure relates to 31st December, 1952.

Hospital Capital Expenditure (Non-Exchequer Funds)

Dr. Bennett: asked the Minister of Health his policy on projected hospital capital works which are to be financed from non-Exchequer funds.

Mr. Iain Macleod: Yes, Sir. The position has been reviewed and I am glad to say that it is no longer necessary for me to require that capital expenditure from non-Exchequer funds should count against capital allocations made to hospital boards. It will, of course, still be necessary for me to scrutinise proposals to incur such expenditure by reference to any Exchequer maintenance expenditure that may be involved, the effect on the development of the hospital concerned and the needs of the hospital service.

Dr. Bennett: Does my right hon. Friend appreciate that this reply will give the greatest possible pleasure and relief to every hospital and regional board and authority in the country because of the privilege of once more being allowed to spend money which is, after all, their own? Could he give any indication of what will be the total amount involved in the course of one complete financial year?

Mr. Macleod: I cannot quote the exact figure. It depends to a great extent upon the class into which the applications that come forward will fall. As I indicated in my answer, it will clearly be much easier on general grounds to approve capital expenditure which may not increase, and may even save, maintenance costs in future, rather than capital expenditure which may carry a heavy maintenance burden in future years.

Mr. Bevan: As the statement of the Minister is singularly obscure, may I ask if it is now the intention that funds which originally belonged to the voluntary and teaching hospitals, and which were to be put into a special classification for research, experiment and amenities for patients, are to be raided for those forms of expenditure directed by the Treasury?

Mr. Macleod: No, Sir, there is no such suggestion. There is no intention, of course, of raiding the capital of the Hospital Endowment Fund, but there are three sources from which hospitals have money. The first is the endowments of teaching hospitals, the second the comparatively small amount issued annually as income from the Hospital Endowment Fund to non-teaching hospitals and the third is gifts which they may have accumulated since the Act came into force under the provisions made by the right hon. Member, including such possibility, for example, as the use of funds made available by the King Edward Hospital Fund, or anything like that. But there is no intention at all of raiding the capital of the Hospital Endowment Fund.

Mr. Bevan: As the situation still is very obscure, may I be allowed to ask what changes the right hon. Gentleman proposes to make? At the moment these funds are available only for the amenities of patients and the other uses I have described. What changes precisely does the right hon. Gentleman propose to make?

Mr. Macleod: No, that is not so. The only funds that are available in that sense are those covered by the second category to which I have referred. The moneys for this sort of expenditure will be those coming in either the first or the third of the categories I have indicated. They have, in fact, been used from time to time but, as my predecessors know, it has always been insisted, as a matter of Government policy, that any moneys so used for capital investment shall count against the total allocated to the Ministry of Health and sub-allocated to the regions. It is that provision which has been removed.

Personal Case

Colonel J. H. Harrison: asked the Minister of Health what steps his Department has taken, or will take, to see

that employment as a State registered nurse is offered to Nurse Capon, either in the Eastern Area Hospital Region or elsewhere, following her appeal to the Eastern Area Committee which upheld the action of the Ipswich Management Hospital Committee in quashing her summary dismissal in July, 1953, and terminating her engagement in the normal way.

Mr. Iain Macleod: I understand that about two months ago the regional board told this lady about vacancies for staff nurses under a certain management committee in their area, but that so far she has not applied for a post there.

Colonel Harrison: Will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that this nurse —whose case has been given a great deal of publicity—if she applies for a post in a hospital nearer her home than the one referred to, will receive fair and just consideration?

Mr. Macleod: I obviously cannot undertake on behalf of someone else to give a post, but I am certain that the matter will receive full consideration.

Plymouth Area Hospitals

Mr. Foot: asked the Minister of Health when he proposes to start his investigation into the administration of the Plymouth, South Devon and East Corn wall Hospital Management Committee.

Mr. Iain Macleod: I propose to await the result of the discussions between the committee and the regional hospital board.

Mr. Foot: Would it not have been better for the right hon. Gentleman to await the result of these discussions instead of making the reflection he made on the management committee last week, and suggesting that there should be an investigation? Why did he not carry out the proposals for an investigation, as the management committee would like nothing more?

Mr. Macleod: I think that if the hon. Member studies the first half of my answer to the supplementary question last week, he will find that his supplementary question today answers itself.

Mr. Foot: asked the Minister of Health on what date it was decided to increase the allocation from the regional


hospital board to the Plymouth, South Devon and East Cornwall Hospital Management Committee by £15,000; and how far this amount falls short of the total required to cover the extra costs for salaries and other increments which the management committee will be called upon to cover in 1954–55.

Mr. Iain Macleod: I understand that the board notified an allocation to the committee of £915,795 for 1954–55 on 15th February, and informed the committee on 22nd February that a supplementary allocation of £10,250 would be made to meet the full-year cost of opening an extension ward at Devonport Hospital. The total allocation is intended to cover necessary extra costs next year, regard being had also to the feasibility of economies in the running of the services.

Mr. Foot: Is it not a fact that the Plymouth management committee has already made proposals for economies but that the allocation made to it by the regional hospital board does not take into account the increased burden of extra wage costs and other costs to which I have referred in the Question and that, therefore, the allocation means that the Plymouth management committee will be forced to close down its maternity homes?

Mr. Macleod: I do not think that that follows. It is perfectly true that the hospital management committee suggested economies since the allocation and I am most grateful to it, but the two sides, it seems to me, are nearer together. I hope that they will come nearer still.

VISITING FORCES ACT, 1952 (OPERATION)

The following Questions stood upon the Order Paper:

Mr. ARTHUR HENDERSON: TO ask the Secretary of State for the Home De partment whether he will now make a statement on the coming into operation of the Visiting Forces Act.

Mr. ERIC FLETCHER: TO ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is now able to state when the provisions of the Visiting Forces Act, 1952, will be brought into operation.

Lieut-Colonel LIPTON: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department when the Visiting Forces Act, 1952, will be put into effect.

At the end of Questions—

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir David Maxwell Fyfe): I will, with permission, answer these Questions.
It is the intention of the Government to bring the Visiting Forces Act, 1952, into operation in the near future. For this purpose three Orders in Council must be made and must all come into force at the same time. These Orders in Council are, first, an Order under Section 19 (2) appointing the date on which the Act shall come into operation. Secondly, an Order in Council under Section 1 (2) designating the foreign countries to which the Act is to apply—the Act applies automatically to the Commonwealth countries as soon as it is brought into force. Thirdly, an Order in Council under Section 8 applying to members of visiting forces, with the necessary adaptations, certain provisions of the law relating to the home Forces.
The Act requires that no recommendation shall be made to Her Majesty in Council to make an Order under Section 8 unless a draft thereof has been laid before Parliament and approved by a Resolution of each House. A draft Order will be laid before Parliament in a few days, and if and when this draft has been approved, this Order, and the Orders under Section 19 (2) and Section 1 (2) of the Act, will be made to take effect simultaneously. It is the Government's intention to designate in the Section 1 (2) Order only those foreign countries which have ratified the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Status of Forces Agreement.
I am informed that in the countries which have ratified the Agreement no further legislation is needed to enable effect to be given to the Agreement, except that in the United States legislation is pending to implement the provisions of Article VIII, which deals with claims against members of visiting forces. The United States Embassy has, however, given an assurance that the United States Government, in ratifying the


Status of Forces Agreement, have undertaken to meet the claims for reimbursement submitted to them under Article VIII of that Agreement.
I should also like to take this opportunity of stating that the draft Order in Council will not apply Sections 144 and 145 of the Army Act to members of visiting forces. One effect of this will be that, where an affiliation order is made by a United Kingdom court against a member of a visiting force, it will be enforceable, if payment is not made, by the ordinary process of the law. I hope, however, that payments will be secured without the necessity for enforcement proceedings in the courts, and I shall remain in close touch with the American authorities on this matter. I shall also seek to make satisfactory arrangements with the authorities of any other visiting force if this becomes necessary.

Mr. Henderson: May I ask whether all the N.A.T.O. countries have in fact ratified the Agreement?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: Not all of them. About half-a-dozen have, and they will be shown in the Order when it is laid.

Sir H. Williams: On a point of order. May I be informed of the urgency which required this answer to be read now? Could it not perfectly well have been printed in HANSARD tomorrow?

Mr. Speaker: That is not a matter for me. I was quite unaware of what the answer was to be.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: May I explain? When I was answering Questions a week ago I mentioned that this matter would be introduced, and the right hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) asked me specially if I would make a statement for the convenience of the House.

Mr. Speaker: That is the answer to the hon. Member for Croydon, East (Sir H. Williams).

Mr. Strachey: Do we understand the right hon. and learned Gentleman to say that this is being done on the assurance of the American Administration that they will secure legislation in Congress or that they will act before this legislation is passed? With the best will in the world on the part of the American

Administration, can we rely on an assurance that they will get legislation passed or that they can act without such legislation?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I am afraid I have not made it clear to the right hon. Gentleman, and I am sorry. There are two points to be considered. For all the Act, except that concerned with civil claims, no legislation is necessary and Mr. Bedell Smith made a statement to the Senate Committee to that effect. With regard to the civil claims part, legislation has been introduced but is not passed, and until it is we have an authorisation that the United States will stand behind the defendant in any such claim.

Mr. E. Fletcher: Would the Minister be good enough to clarify two points? When the Bill was being discussed he gave an assurance that if this status was given to American and other N.A.T.O. troops in this country, there would be reciprocal provisions for British troops in other countries. Is he satisfied that these provisions for British troops operate in the United States? Secondly, are we to understand that maintenance and affiliation orders against American troops may now be enforceable, either in America or here, by the act of the American Government?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: As to the first part of the question, I am satisfied that, save in the point I mentioned to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, the N.A.T.O. Agreement has been adopted as the law of the other countries and, therefore, reciprocity exists. On the second point, our processes of law apply within territorial limits. There is nothing in our law which allows enforcement of an affiliation order against someone outside the territorial limits, and there is no change in that direction.

Mr. Attlee: May I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman whether the Order which he will lay will relate to all these countries, or whether there should not be separate Orders, because the question of how far there is reciprocity, how far arrangements are satisfactory in other countries may differ a great deal, and the Order being unamendable, it would be convenient to have separate Orders for separate countries?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I considered that very carefully. I have not the draft Order before me but I think it covers five or six countries. I think it would be convenient, and would not make any difficulty, to deal with these together. But, of course, as each country ratifies the Agreement there will be a special Order for that country in the future. I think that meets the situation very conveniently.

Mr. Attlee: Is there not considerable difference between the Commonwealth countries and foreign countries?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I tried to read my answer quickly in order not to occupy the time of the House unduly, but I did point out that in Commonwealth countries the Act applies automatically as soon as it is brought into force by an Order under Section 19 (2). There is no question of an Order in that case.

Mr. Ede: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman reconsider the last part of his answer, because if it were necessary to object to some arrangements with regard to one country it would be invidious to have to do so in the form of an objection in respect of all the countries involved?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I should like the right hon. Gentleman to consider that this is draft Order procedure and no recommendation can be made lo Her Majesty in Council until the draft Order is approved. That gives an opportunity, in fact if not in theory, for meeting such a point if it should arise, but I hope it will not arise.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: Is it not clear that this so-called reciprocity on which the right hon. and learned Gentleman sets great store is quite meaningless until or unless the British Government establish large military bases in the United States of America? In those circumstances, is not the right hon. and learned Gentleman now entitled to the melancholy distinction of being the first British Minister to establish a State within a State in occupied England?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: The hon. and gallant Gentleman is wrong on both counts. Had he been right on the first point, none of the eloquence on the Bill by his right hon. and hon. Friends would have been usefully expended. Therefore he

obviously must be wrong on that point. On the second point, the application of this Bill diminishes the special powers that any other country has, and I am sure that to that extent it will be received with free consent by every hon. Member in the House.

Dr. Summerskill: Might I ask the right hon. Gentleman about affiliation orders? Am I to understand that an affiliation order can be made against an American Service man in this country but that, in the event for his returning to his own country, the American authorities are not prepared to enforce it?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: The position is that no affiliation order made in this country can be enforced against anyone who leaves the country. If a British subject leaves the country an order cannot be enforced against him when he is abroad, and that applies to every nationality. That is one of the defects of intra-territorial legislation which all countries experience.

Mr. Speaker: Mr. Collick.

Sir H. Williams: Further to my earlier point of order. Might I draw attention to the fact that back benchers have now been deprived of 11 minutes of their debating time?

Mr. Speaker: I am aware of that, but I would call the attention of the hon. Member to the fact that I called Mr. Collick.

Mr. Collick: Having regard to the statement that the Home Secretary has made, what is the position in cases in which affiliation orders have already been made by British courts against American Service men but up to now have been unenforceable? Do they remain unenforceable, or is it now otherwise?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I must have notice of that. It is wide of the Question.

Mr. Speaker: We are to have Orders in Council laid in draft, and there will be an opportunity to discuss the merits of the matter later on. We have really spent a long time on this subject.

Mr. Collick: On a point of order. Having regard to the entirely unsatisfactory statement by the Home Secretary, I propose to take the first opportunity of raising the whole matter again.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Attlee: May I ask the Lord Privy Seal whether he will state the business for next week?

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crooksfaank): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY, 15TH MARCH—Second Reading: Town and Country Planning Bill.
Committee stage: Money Resolution.
TUESDAY, 16TH MARCH—Supply [10th Allotted Day]:
Committee stages: Army Estimates, Votes 1, 2, 5, 8, 10 and 11.
Navy Estimates, Votes 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 13 and 15.
Air Estimates, Votes 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and 11.
At 9.30 p.m., under the provisions of the Standing Order, the Question will be put from the Chair on the Vote under discussion and on all outstanding Estimates, Supplementary Estimates and Excess Votes required before the end of the financial year.
Committee and remaining stages: Pensions (Increase) Bill.
WEDNESDAY, 17TH MARCH—Committee stage: Atomic Energy Authority Bill.
It is proposed to report Progress on this Bill at about 8 o'clock in order that the Prayers relating to Transport (Additional Charges) Regulations may be moved at an early hour. In view of the importance of this matter, I hope that this arrangement will commend itself to the House.
THURSDAY, 18TH MARCH—Supply [11th Allotted Day]:
Report stage: Civil Supplementary Estimates, which were taken in Committee on 16th February.
Debate on:
Class VI, Vote 10, Ministry of Supply.
Class II, Vote 1, Foreign Services.
Vote 5, United Nations.
Vote 2, Foreign Office Grants and Services.
At 9.30 p.m., under the provisions of the Standing Order, the Question will be put from the Chair on the Vote under

discussion, and on all outstanding Estimates, Supplementary Estimates and Excess Votes required before the end of the financial year.
Committee and remaining stages: British Industries Fair (Guarantees and Grants) Bill.
FRIDAY, 19TH MARCH—Private Members' Motions.

Mr. Attlee: Will the right hon. Gentleman note that we shall take an early opportunity on a Supply Day to discuss the Vote of the Ministry of Health.

Mr. Crookshank: I have noted it.

Mr. Royle: As the Press this morning published the fact that the new Constitution of British Honduras is to be suspended, as the draft of the new Constitution is not available in the Vote Office, and as elections are due in that Colony in April, cannot some time be given next week to discuss this very urgent matter?

Mr. Crookshank: I do not see any prospect of debating it next week. We have to get the various Estimates through.

Mr. C. Davies: Can the Leader of the House say when we shall have an opportunity of discussing the Motion in the right hon. Gentleman's own name which appeared on the Order Paper this morning?

[That, during the remainder of the present Session, except in such cases as the House may otherwise order—

(1) No proceedings on a motion to which this Order applies shall be entered upon at or after half-past eleven of the clock.

(2) such a motion is under consideration at half-past eleven of the clock, Mr. Speaker shall forthwith put the question thereupon to the House, provided that, if he shall be of opinion that—

(a) owing to the lateness of the hour at which consideration of the motion was entered upon, or
(b) because of the importance of the subject matter of the motion,
the time for debate has not been adequate, he shall interrupt the business and the debate shall stand adjourned till the next sitting (other than a Friday).

(3) A debate which has been adjourned under paragraph (2) of this Order shall not be resumed later than eleven of the clock, but shall stand further adjourned till the next sitting (other than a Friday), and the foregoing provisions of this paragraph shall apply to any debate which has been further adjourned under this paragraph as if the further adjournment were an adjournment under paragraph (2) of this Order.

(4) The Motions to which this Order applies are—

(a) any Motion for an Humble Address to Her Majesty praying that a Statutory Instrument be annulled, and any Motion that a draft of an Order in Council be not submitted to Her Majesty in Council, or that a Statutory Instrument be not made;
(b) any Motion that, or for an Humble Address to Her Majesty praying that, any other document which may be subject to proceedings in the House in pursuance of a Statute be annulled, or cease to be in force, or be not made.]

Mr. Crookshank: Before I say anything at all, I ought to express on its behalf the thanks of the House to the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues for the work which they put in on the Select Committee dealing with the subject.
We have considered the Committee's Report, and, in consequence, we have decided to propose to the House that as an experiment a Sessional Order be made to give effect this Session to the Committee's recommendations with regard to the discussion of Prayers. The recommendation is in paragraph 105 of the Report.
Hon. Members will be aware of the terms of the draft Sessional Order as it appears on the Order Paper. I have taken soundings in various parts of the House, and I understand that it is generally thought worth making this experiment. As to whether it will be necessary to have a debate on the actual Order when it is moved next week, I am entirely in the hands of the House, but as it is only an experiment perhaps the House would like to proceed and see how it works this Session. Next Session we can see whether it is worth carrying it on, whether we should make a change or

whether we should drop it altogether. I am sure we are very much obliged to those of our colleagues who have worked so very hard on this problem.

Mr. Driberg: Would the Leader of the House consider giving time for the Prayer on the Order Paper, signed by 125 hon. Members, relating to political discrimination against a clergyman of the Established Church, bearing in mind that this is a concern of Parliament both because a fundamental issue of freedom is involved and because this action is a clear breach of the spirit of the Incumbents' Discipline Measures which were fully and anxiously debated by this House?

Mr. Crookshank: I do not see my way to giving any time for that at present.

Mr. Ellis Smith: Will the Leader of the House consult his right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Labour about the urgent need for the House to give consideration to the Report which has been presented under the Industrial Courts Act dealing with the position in the engineering industry? The engineering industry has now been involved in negotiations for nine months. Now that the Report has been presented, it is, in the view of many of us, becoming an urgent matter that the House should give consideration to it.

Mr. Crookshank: All I can suggest to the hon. Gentleman is that a lot of time is available to the Opposition for general debates on Supply, the Consolidated Fund Bill, and so on, so perhaps he will make representations in that direction first.

Mr. H. Morrison: To revert to the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg), the Leader of the House gave his answer rather quickly and shortly and I wonder whether the subject was rather strange to him and whether he had really thought about it. There may be arguments about the merits when we come to debate the matter—I do not know—but, on the face of it, an important point of principle is involved in it. Would the right hon. Gentleman be good enough, between now and next Thursday, to think about it so that he might then give a more considered reply than he has been able to give today?

Mr. Crookshank: I spend all my weeks thinking about this sort of thing. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that I will think especially hard about this subject, but that does not alter my preliminary view that I do not think it is very likely that we shall be able to find time for it.

Sir E. Boyle: Would my right hon. Friend consider the possibility of finding time for a short debate on the proposed new Sessional Order on Statutory Instruments, in view of the fact that there were two opinions on the Select Committee about this new form of Closure even as a temporary expedient, and that it might be worth a little discussion?

Mr. Crookshank: I thought I had covered that point when I said that if there was a desire for a short debate we might find time for it.

Mr. Albu: When is it proposed to have a debate on the Second Reading of the. Industrial Organisation and Development Bill? Or is this matter still under discussion on the Government side?

Mr. Crookshank: It is still under consideration. It is not coming up next week, anyway.

Mr. Jay: Does the absence of the Television Bill from next week's business mean that it suffered the same fate upstairs as the Industrial Organisation and Development Bill?

Mr. Crookshank: The right hon. Gentleman would be among the first to object if we asked the House to discuss it in less than a week from its presentation.

Mr. Moyle: When is it proposed to lay before the House the Regulations under the Local Government (Superannuation) Act. 1953?

Mr. Crookshank: The hon. Gentleman must ask that question of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Education.

Mr. J. Johnson: Can the right hon. Gentleman find time to discuss the Teachers (Superannuation) Bill, or is that also under discussion by hon. Members opposite?

Mr. Crookshank: It is not down for next week.

Mr. Swingler: May I ask the Leader of the House a question about the rules of procedure applying to Estimates debates, with a view to eliciting—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We are now on business questions. If the hon. Gentleman will wait, I will give him an opportunity later to raise this matter.

Mr. Rankin: On a point of order, which is not on immediate business, but is for the guidance, I hope, of the House. Earlier this afternoon the Home Secretary made a statement which you, Sir, said would be the subject of discussion in the House. Following that statement, my hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Collick) gave notice that he would raise one aspect of the matter on the Adjournment. You have already ruled on many occasions that once notice has been given to raise a matter on the Adjournment no further discussion can take place on the matter until the Adjournment debate comes on. Am I to conclude that when the general discussion ensues, that aspect of the right hon. and learned Gentleman's statement cannot be dealt with until the Adjournment debate has taken place?

Mr. Speaker: There is nothing in that point of order.

NEW MEMBER SWORN

Captain Henry Briton Kerby, for Arundel and Shoreham.

BRITISH HONDURAS (CONSTITUTION)

Mr. S. Silverman: I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9, in order to call attention to a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely,
the suspension of the Constitution of British Honduras while an election is in progress.
I apologise for not having had an opportunity to give you notice of my intention to ask this leave, but I expected that events would have taken a different course.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) asks leave to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9, in order to call attention to a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely,
the suspension of the Constitution of British Honduras while an election is in progress.
I have had no notice of this at all. At first sight I do not think it is within the Standing Order. It is a matter that can be discussed at any time and not only today, and so, I should have thought, it fails to comply with the condition of urgency.

Mr. Silverman: I apologise for not having given you a better opportunity of considering the matter, Sir. I submit that the urgency lies in the last point in my notice of Motion, namely, the suspension while an election is in progress. One infers that a general election is now running and, as I understand the matter, polling day is only a week or two off. If the Constitution is suspended, one assumes that that puts an end to the election, as the election can only take place under the Constitution which is now being suspended. If that is right, the urgency of the matter is hardly arguable.

Mr. Speaker: I took it, from my reading of the newspapers, that the arrangement for the election was for some time in April—I think it was 23rd April. There is, therefore, ample time. The arrangements for the election seem to form part of the Constitution, and if the hon. Member tells me that the Constitution has been suspended my previous

Ruling holds. There is ample time to discuss it at any time. I must rule against the hon. Member. The Motion does not, on my view, comply with the Standing Order.

Mr. Silverman: I appreciate the difficulty of dealing with the matter without adequate notice or proper opportunity to consider it. Might I ask that I may be able to raise the matter with you again, after there has been further opportunity of considering it? The point that I have in mind is that if a Constitution is suspended after an election has commenced, but before the conclusion of it, during the period of that suspension the election is, as it were, dormant, and if the suspension is to be revoked then much of the time devoted to the election has been lost, with consequent great prejudice to the parties concerned.

Mr. Speaker: I do not think we can carry this discussion any further. The hon. Member certainly is at liberty to raise the matter with me and I will deal with the matter in all its bearings when he does so and give the best Ruling I can. I say definitely at the present time that to the best of my belief his Motion does not comply with the provisions of the Standing Order.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: We cannot have further discussion of this matter.

Mr. J. Griffiths: On a point of order. The Secretary of State for the Colonies is not in the country, and there has been no statement to the House on British Honduras. May I ask you, Mr. Speaker, whether permission has been asked of you by the representative of the Colonial Office to make a statement on this matter?

Mr. Speaker: I was asked to allow a Private Notice Question about the Constitution of Honduras, but not about its suspension, which is a new matter entirely. I did not think that it fell within the conditions of urgency which I have to apply for a Private Notice Question. This is obviously a matter which has just occurred, and in my view the House would be far better advised to consider the matter when it is better informed and can come to a conclusion upon it. I must ask the House to accept my Ruling.

Mr. Royle: Can we have your guidance in this matter, Mr. Speaker? This morning I asked permission to put down a Private Notice Question because of the suspension of this Constitution, and in your wisdom you decided against it. Questions to the Colonial Secretary for next Wednesday come very late on the Order Paper, and it might conceivably be three weeks before we can get an Oral Answer. The Leader of the House has stated this afternoon that it will be impossible for him to give time for a discussion of this matter next week. In view of the fact that the election is due on 23rd April, cannot a way be found by which the House can discuss the matter?

Mr. Speaker: It is a matter which hon. Members of the House can arrange for themselves. I am certain that I have not sufficient information about this matter to justify me in acceding to this request.

Mr. Attlee: Is it not clear that the Government ought to make a statement on the matter?

Mr. Crookshank: As the House is aware, my right hon. Friend is in Kenya and, therefore, could not personally make a statement on this or any other topic this week. But I will see that the points which have been raised receive immediate consideration.

Mr. Attlee: The House knows that the right hon. Gentleman is away, but there is, of course, the joint collective responsibility of the Cabinet. It is clear that a statement on a matter of great importance such as this should be made by the Prime Minister or any other Cabinet Minister.

Hon. Members: Answer.

Mr. Speaker: It is obvious to the House that a request has been made for a statement. If that matter is pursued in the ordinary way, I am sure that we shall have a statement.

Mr. J. Griffiths: May I ask the Prime Minister whether the situation in British Honduras has been considered by the Cabinet, and whether the decision announced this morning in the newspapers is the decision of Her Majesty's Government?

The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. John Foster): I have been in the House and although I did not hear the intervening questions, I heard the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) ask permission to raise a matter of public importance on the grounds that the Constitution of British Honduras had been suspended. I understand that the Constitution of British Honduras has not been suspended.

Mr. Griffiths: Will the Under-Secretary say why the Colonial Office did not at once repudiate a statement, widely publicised, that the Constitution had been suspended? Secondly, is it true that a commissioner has been sent to investigate the position in British Honduras? If so, why was not a statement made when an important step of that kind was taken?

Mr. Foster: The only newspaper report which I read did not state that the Constitution was suspended. As I say, I understand that the Constitution has not been suspended. [HON. MEMBERS: "Understand?"] Yes, I "understand" because that is the information I have been given. I am not in Honduras itself —the only way one would know at first hand. But the Constitution has not been suspended. I am speaking from memory here, but the position is that the existing Constitution goes on until some time in April. That Constitution has not been suspended.

Mr. Speaker: I would recall to the memory of the House that this discussion began with the request from the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9. That is how it all started. It cannot now degenerate into a debate on British Honduras of which we have had no notice.
On the second point which the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne raised; in addition to what I said before in declining to find this to comply with the Standing Order, I would point out that on many, many occasions it has been ruled that when the information before the House is not agreed, or is conflicting, there is no possibility of a Motion under the Standing Order until the


matter has been cleared up. When the matter has been cleared up and we are on a sound basis of fact we shall know much better how to proceed. In the meantime, I really must declare this matter at an end. We have disposed of the hon. Member's point.

Mr. S, Silverman: rose—

Mr. Speaker: I hope that the hon. Member is not going to argue with my decision?

Mr. Silverman: I do not propose to argue with it, Sir. I only want to say, further to the point that you, Sir, have now raised, that I hope that you will accept my assurance—and that the House will have observed for itself—that there was no question whatever of any doubt about the information, or any question at all that the facts on which I raised my point were true, until the hon. Gentleman spoke at this moment—at the very end of the interchanges which have taken place. I understand, Sir, that you yourself have said that this morning you were asked for permission to ask a Private Notice Question, which can only mean that the Colonial Office left you in the same ignorance about the facts as they left the House.

Mr. Speaker: If the hon. Member desires an assurance from me that I believe he raised this point bona fides, I gladly give that assurance, because I never thought otherwise.

SERVICE ESTIMATES DEBATES (MR. SPEAKER'S RULING)

Mr. Swingler: I rise to seek your guidance on a question of which I have given you notice, Mr. Speaker. I want to draw your attention to the confusion that has arisen in the two previous Estimates debates, last week and this week. The point at issue is what it is in order for hon. Members to speak about on the general Estimates debates, in particular, whether Members, when speaking on the general Estimates of the Service Departments, may refer to detailed questions arising on the particular Votes on the agenda for that day.
It has been the experience on the Navy Estimates and the Air Estimates that certain Members have been ruled out of

order by the Chair when they have referred to such detailed questions. They have been told that they must defer consideration of those questions to the Committee stage, because they were Committee points. It is also the experience that, once Vote A has been disposed of, the Government move to report Progress. There is therefore no Committee stage on that occasion when Members may raise these questions. Those Votes are then taken under a Guillotine procedure to which the Chairman of Ways and Means refers in the OFFICIAL REPORT. He there said:
It is quite clear under Standing Order 16, as it is now—and it was altered in 1948— that we have a general discussion; when Vote A have been reached the rest can be put through on the Guillotine.
At the end of that discussion the Chairman of Ways and Means made a statement about the apparent contradiction between Standing Order No. 16 and what appears in page 713 of Erskine May. He said:
I think that the trouble is that the second paragraph on page 713 of Erskine May has not been amended to bring it into line with the new Standing Order. There is a certain contradiction in what is stated there. That is my opinion. There is a certain amount of confusion, but I think if the sixth, seventh and eighth lines were taken out it would bring the paragraph into line with the new procedure." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th March, 1954; Vol. 524, c. 2201 and 2209.]
This is a question of importance since the Committee stages of these Service Estimates are now all likely to be taken under a Guillotine procedure, which undoubtedly prevents many hon. Members from raising these questions. If hon. Members are severely limited on the general Estimates debates and may not talk about the particular Votes, the result of the new procedure introduced in 1948 has been severely to curtail our discussions.
I therefore ask, with respect, if you will give a Ruling—for our guidance on the debate on the Army Estimates today and for the future procedure of the House —whether you will apply the Standing Order to the present debate and whether, in your opinion, some alteration of our rules is required in order to bring the ruling in Erskine May into line with the amended Standing Order No. 16.

Mr. Speaker: I have given some consideration to this matter in the short time before me. It is a fundamental


feature of our proceedings that when a matter goes through two stages —first, a discussion on the principle by the House, and then a further examination in Committee—it is right that the Committee stage should not, so to speak, be taken in the House, or the House stage in Committee, because neither House nor Committee should attempt to usurp each other's functions. That fundamental rule runs through our procedure and it is right that I should draw attention to it.
But I am bound to say that the introduction of the new Standing Order No. 16, in 1948, demands further consideration, because it would not be realistic to ignore the fact that it has been the custom of successive Governments since that day, when in Committee on the Estimates, to secure Vote A and leave the rest to the Guillotine. In this new situation, I have to consider the fundamental rights of the individual Member of the House. It appears to me that the way in which the Standing Order has worked has meant that hon. Members who have points of importance but, it may be, of detail to raise are frequently debarred by the operation of the Guillotine from reaching that Vote in the Committee stage, where, under the strict rules of the House, the discussion on those points would be most properly conducted.
I give it as my Ruling and opinion that so long as that Standing Order is in operation the Chair should be relieved from its obligation to prevent discussion on matters of detail on the general Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair." I hope that is the common sense of the House in the matter, and that we shall follow that principle in our succeeding debates.

Mr. Swingler: I thank you for that Ruling, Mr. Speaker, which will be of very great benefit to individual hon. Members today and in future. May I, through you, ask the Leader of the House if some consideration can be given to our rules of procedure so that, if any necessary amendment is required in order to incorporate your Ruling in our procedure, it may be considered at an early date?

Mr. Speaker: It will not be necessary to trouble the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House. I can interpret

the Ruling in that sense, because it is merely practice, and this point has not, I think, been ruled upon since the new Standing Order came into force in 1948. I am within my own province in saying what should be the practice of the House in these new circumstances.
In regard to Erskine May, which is a most admirable work of reference to us all, I shall see that the point I have made is noted and that the learned Editors take account of it when the new edition comes out.

Mr. Wigg: Your Ruling will be welcomed by all who want to take part in the Army Estimates today, Mr. Speaker, but it will help us, and it will make the debates much more orderly, if the Leader of the House or the Patronage Secretary will undertake not to move to report Progress, otherwise we shall get a mixture of Second Reading and Committee stage debates running through our proceedings. Unless the Leader of the House is able to give us that assurance, our proceedings may be unduly protracted.

Mr. Speaker: The Leader of the House cannot be asked at this stage what may or may not happen when that later stage is reached. I hope that what I have said will adapt the rules of the House to our present position and enable good debates to be held.

Mr. Foot: It would be of great convenience to the House if, in addition to the clarification which you have given us, Mr. Speaker, we also had some statement from the Leader of the House. You have stated that one of the difficulties has arisen because it has been the normal practice for Governments to move to report Progress following the discussion on Vote A, and that was the statement of the Leader of the House on the Motion to report Progress following the debates on both the Navy and Air Estimates.
That may be the ground upon which you, Sir, have stated that that is the normal practice, but it is not the normal practice. In the three years from 1949 to 1951, under the previous Government, there was only one occasion, on one Estimates Vote, when the Government moved to report Progress after the discussion on Vote A. On all the other occasions hon. Members had opportunities to


raise points on the individual Votes. Although part of the difficulty has arisen because of the conflict between the new arrangement made in 1948 and the statement in Erskine May, another part of the difficulty has arisen because the Government have insisted in both the recent Estimates debates, on moving to report Progress after the discussion on Vote A, claiming that this was the normal practice when, in fact, it is not, but is an innovation which has been practised on only one occasion in the years to which I have referred.

Mr. Speaker: It is a matter for the Committee to decide when it should report Progress. I cannot pursue the point further at this stage.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)

Ordered,
That this day the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and shall be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House.)—[Mr. Crookshank.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[9TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Orders of the Day — Army Estimates, 1954–55

Order for Committee read.

MR. ANTONY HEAD'S STATEMENT

4.17 p.m.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
The Army Estimates for this year ask for a gross sum of £628,500,100. That is a decrease of £8 million from last year's gross figure, but an increase of £9 million on the net figure. In so many words, the previous trend of an annual increase for the Army Estimates has been arrested, because in the previous years there has been a marked annual increase. The numbers of men are very much the same, although they do show a slight decrease. These combined demands of money, material and men upon the economy of the country provide a very large burden, and it is my job to explain to the House, as fully and as frankly as I can, the reasons for these very large demands.
The best way to set about it is to concentrate mainly on the chief problems which confront the Army, but in doing that I would ask the House to take into account the fact that many of these problems stem from the fact that the main burden of defence today falls upon the Army. The White Paper states that special emphasis must be placed on the Royal Air Force, and I do not quarrel with that. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary for Air, who is a member of that progressive Service, somewhat translated his speech by referring to the "pre-eminence" of the Royal Air Force, and I do not quarrel with that, either. If there is a war the Services should not bother about which of them is the most important; they should get together over it. But I would claim that in this uneasy moment of cold war, which may go on for several years, the burden on the Army is a very great one, and it is against that background that our problems should be viewed.
I hope those who consider defence matters closely will agree with me that


the main problems of the Army today are four in number. The first, I would suggest, is to build up a strategic Reserve so as to restore the balance of the Army (between forces overseas and those at home. The second is to recruit into, and to retain in, the Regular element of the Army an adequate number of Regular soliders, particularly officers and long-service non-commissioned officers.
The third is to retain in the Territorial Army an adequate number of volunteers for its administration and training. The last—and I do not put it last because it is the least important—is to ensure that the Army is thoroughly up-to-date in its methods, organisation and weapons.
I believe those are the four main problems but, having had the advantage of listening to the defence debate, I think I must also deal with two problems which were very clearly in the minds of hon. Members, particularly hon. Members opposite. I refer to the necessity to reduce commitments and a plea that we should now reduce the period of National Service. Both those points form part of the Opposition Amendment.
May I deal, first, with the question of commitments? We had a number of speeches in the defence debate from hon. Members opposite about reducing our commitments. The hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), who I see in his place, made an eloquent and, if I may say so, brilliant speech on the subject, and he nearly achieved the impossible, despite the laws of gravity, by sweeping the House off its feet without having either of his own feet on the ground throughout his speech.
The fact remains that the hon. Gentleman was far from specific about his recommendations, except those for the Middle East, where, I agree, there may be prospects; but where we have commitments now, today. Right hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition Front Bench also made speeches on this subject but again, if I may say so, they were not very specific about where we should make these economies. The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) made a tour d'horizon, but neither he nor the Leader of the Opposition was very specific about how these reductions should be made. I feel that at the back

of their minds they are perhaps thinking not so much of how we should reduce the number of divisions outside this country as of how they should reduce the number of divisions inside their party.
I do not wish to raise controversy on this question, however, for I should tell the House at the outset that no one is more anxious than Her Majesty's Government to reduce the number and extent of our overseas commitments. No one keeps a sharper eye, or is more anxious, on the subject than I. No one was more disappointed than I when our hopes of bringing back a brigade from Trieste were stultified.
No one was more disappointed than I when we got two battalions back from Austria and then had to send extra battalions to Kenya. No one is more disappointed than I about the delays, owing to Egyptian intransigence, in getting some satisfactory and lasting settlement in the Middle East. I would not say for a moment that there are not prospects of reducing our commitments, but there is no ground for making a fundamental alteration in these Estimates at present because of some anticipation that the commitments may be reduced. That, I hope and believe, may come.
The second important matter which arose in the defence debate concerned National Service. Many hon. Members said, "Have a manpower inquiry and then you will be able to reduce the period of National Service." I do not deny that there is scope, here and there, for some saving of manpower, but since I have been at the War Office we have had eight manpower inquiries. We have gone into this question time and time again and, although there may still be some savings to be made, it is not saving of a magnitude which would allow us to reduce the period of National Service. I assure hon. Members of that. We have combed the Army's tail and we are in a transitional stage so that, as far as there is any resemblance to tails, we are going away from the squirrel and getting much nearer to the guinea pig. It is our policy to continue in that direction.
Nevertheless, there are still hon. Members who say that the period of National Service should be reduced. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I see that I was right. It is therefore my duty to tell the House very briefly what the repercussions


would be. Supposing here and now we were to reduce the period of National Service to 18 months. In 1956–57, that would cost the Army 50,000 men. In addition—and I think this is fair—it would have an effect on Regular recruitment, because the choice between three years and two years is a different matter from the choice between three years and 18 months. We estimate that to mean, at a guess—and it is only a guess, although I do not think it is a bad guess—15,000 men by 1956–57. That gives a total of about 65,000 men.
In addition, the size of the Army today is running down because in one year, 1952, we had an extra big call-up—five in one year and an extra 30,000 men. We have also had Regulars "unfrozen" and Reservists released, and future prospects, from the Army's point of view, reveal a worse birth-rate and a smaller field for National Service. Between all these factors we shall run down the Army, without taking action, to about 400,000 men.
If we deduct some 65,000 men following a reduction in the period of National Service, the total is brought down to about 340,000 men, which is 100,000 fewer than the present size of the Army. However strongly hon. Members may feel on this subject, to initiate now a step which would give the Army 100,000 fewer men, when 80 per cent, of die fighting units are overseas and when we have no strategic Reserves whatever, would be an act of irresponsible folly. I am certain that we should be wrong to do it. As was stated in the defence debate on this subject, it is the Government's intention to reduce the period of National Service by as much as possible and as soon as possible but, I say to hon. Members, not at this present moment.
So much for National Service. I said at the beginning that our main problem lay in the Regular content, and I know that at least one hon. Member agrees with me in that. This is a problem into which I must go in some detail. I do not want to weary the House, but it is necessary to give some facts and figures. In trying to devise a method whereby I could avoid wearying the House I noticed a headline in a newspaper which read, "Gas Board Makes Facts and Figures Fun."
I read this item to see whether I could learn something, and I found that in their annual estimates they had published a figure of absorbing interest, which apparently is fascinating to everybody— but that is a course which is denied to me, because they had published the figure of Marilyn Monroe in the middle of their estimates.
The Regular Army comprises 180,000 Regular other ranks and 214,000 National Service men—that is to say, the number of National Service men is now larger than the Regular element. As the right hon. Member for Easington knows, that is not as the Army was planned when we introduced National Service, but it is as the Army has grown. The original purpose of National Service was to train reservists against a hot war. The right hon. Member for Easington looks puzzled, but that was the purpose. The situation overseas became such that we increased the period of National Service and its primary justification today is to increase the numbers of the active Army.
As a result, we have a much younger Army and a higher content of National Service men than was originally planned. This poses particular problems. If one compares the Army of today with the pre-war Army, I think it illustrates the point. Before the war, the annual intake was about 15 per cent.; today, it is 33 per cent. There is a very big difference. Again, in the pre-war Army the annual intake was about 27,000; in the coming years it will be 120,000. The average pre-war service was 6⅔years; to day, it is three years.
That young Army places a special strain on the Regular cadre. Therefore, this underlines more than ever the importance of retaining that cadre, and recruiting that cadre. Those two problems of recruiting and retaining the Regular cadre are the matters which make us think hardest and longest at present.
I will deal with recruiting first. There has been some criticism recently of our bringing in the three-year short-service engagement. I go back to the reason why we brought it in. After the war recruiting went down. It may have been due to the war. Mostly, I think, it was due to the introduction of a two-year period of National Service. A man who knew that he had to do two years National


Service said, "I will see how I like it; why commit myself to five years?"
Therefore, down went the figures. The year before we introduced this measure they were down to about 23,000. We found, at the same time, that the Royal Air Force who had introduced the three-year short-service engagement were coining recruits in large numbers. The reason was that a man said, "I get full pay throughout and no part-time liability. It is worth while to do the extra year." Then we brought it in and in the following year the numbers were more than doubled. They went up to about 53,000.
I agree that in the last year they have gone down to 42,000, but that fall is not the catastrophe that some hon. Members make out, because the field from which we have been recruiting has got smaller. In 1952, of the total intake into the Army we had 29 per cent, on Regular engagement; in 1953, when there has been a fall, it has been 25 per cent.; so the total fall from a percentage of the field has been only 4 per cent. I do not believe that that is catastrophic.
I hope and believe that the measures we are bringing in now, and some other measures which I shall mention, will put it right; but I am absolutely convinced that we were dead right to bring in the three-year engagement. I do not regret it for a moment.
Some hon. Members will say, "Why not have a longer engagement as well concurrently and try to get some longer-service men?" First, why should a man come in for six years when he can come in for three to see how he likes it? Secondly, men who are discontented in the Army because they have a long-service engagement cannot be a great asset.
Then, because we have a bounty now, hon. Members say, "Why not give the bounty at the start instead of after six years?" The first people to attack me if I did that would be hon. Members opposite who would protest that a boy of 17½ years could go to a local office and the sergeant could say, "Here are £40 in lovely new £1 notes, sign your name for six years." I do not believe that ethically that is quite right. I personally believe that it would be wrong for us to do it. So much for recruiting.
I agree with the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), who keeps a sharp eye on these matters, that the crux is, "Will they stay on?" We have two considerations. First, there is the bounty. I remind the House that what we say is, "After three years' service, if you like to take on from three for six, we give you £40, and if you extend from six to 12 years we give you an additional £60." These bounties are tax free and are not deductible from the terminal grant or gratuity.

Mr. R. T. Paget: What would it cost if we were to double these bounties? This is a trifling item compared with the cost of the Army.

Mr. Head: I am not enough of an actuary to tell the hon. and learned Member, but one of my hon. Friends has given the answer from behind that it would cost three times the present amount. I will try to let the hon. and learned Gentleman know, but I cannot tell him now. So much for the bounty side.
Then there is the question of staying on as regards the whole of the Regular element, and particularly the longer-service men. The cause of the drift out of the Regular element is, as hon. Members who have studied the matter know very well, due to the high proportion of the Army which is overseas; it is due to separation and the fact that of men on overseas service now no less than 60 per cent, are separated from their families. It is due to instability, to frequent changes of situation and the kind of thing I have mentioned in the memorandum—that we have four battalions which since the war have had only two months in this country.
These circumstances combined have produced a drift out of the Army. On careful analysis it is not so bad among the men with from 12 to 22 years' service because they have committed themselves, so to speak, to the Army. It is most marked in those round about the five year mark. They are 23 or 24 years of age. Being a very technical Army, the men are well qualified for civil life and their wives say, "Either get a new wife or a new job." There has been a drift out.
What is to be done about that? The easy thing to do, and the solution of all our troubles, would be to build up a


strategic reserve, to get half the Army at home and half overseas; and then half our troubles would be gone. I have explained why that is not possible at the moment. Alternatively, the thing would be to have more married quarters so as to avoid separation, but the pinch comes in two areas, the Middle East and Kenya. In the Middle East there is only a fraction of the number of quarters we need for the inflated garrison there, and in Kenya there are few. For me to embark on an expensive and ambitious scheme of building married quarters in Kenya and the Middle East when our tenure there is uncertain would be grossly extravagant. I cannot do that.
The point is that one must think of some way of meeting this. The only way of meeting it that I know is by trying to supply, while these conditions continue to obtain, something in lieu of the amenities which one should normally offer to these men. Thanks to the collaboration of my Service colleagues and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, we propose to do that.
We shall introduce measures which will become effective on 1st April to help in this situation. I should like briefly to outline them to the House. First, all Regular soldiers in Kenya and the Canal Zone who have been separated from their families and have been in the theatre for more than nine months will be allowed an annual free leave home and they will fly home and back.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: For how long?

Mr. Head: For the normal leave period, whatever they are entitled to. The time will vary, but it will be 28 days or more.
Secondly, there are quite a number of officers and men who have their wives with them overseas but who, for educational or other reasons, are separated from their children. We will allow the children to fly out to join their parents every two years, with a free flight out and home, for a holiday of not less than 28 days.
In Europe, families are not allowed to come home for their leave. They have their leave locally. Because Europe counts as a home station for the Army, that often entails long separation from this country. In future, families in

Europe will be allowed one free trip home and back during their tour of duty. There are other matters which are somewhat detailed, but I can give an indication of what they are about.
At present soldiers have to have a certain period more to serve before they can have their families out with them. We have now reduced that period to six months. We cannot make it too short a period. At present, if a wife goes out to join her husband and she has not a passage entitlement, the couple cannot draw the local overseas allowance. We have now made it that if she goes out —provided one or two minor requirements are complied with—they can have the local overseas allowance.
We have also introduced a relaxation of what is called the "disturbance allowance," where a man moves from one house to another and has to pay for the storing of his furniture. He will now get more to cover the amount of the disturbance which goes on.
Those measures for these special circumstances will, I hope and believe, do something to make the men realise that Her Majesty's Government do appreciate their difficulties and want to do something to help them. These men deserve it, and I am glad they have got it.

Mr. George Wigg: Is the free transport to be provided in the case of National Service men?

Mr. Head: No, it only applies to Regulars.

Mr. Wigg: Does it apply to the other Services as well?

Mr. Head: Where conditions are applicable, it will apply to all three Services.

Mr. Stephen Swingler: Can the Minister give us any idea of the cost of these concessions?

Mr. Head: As far as the Army is concerned, the cost will be approximately £680,000 a year.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Can the Minister say how these concessions will affect the Scottish soldiers in British Guiana and who have been a long time in Malaya?

Mr. Head: I will tell the hon. Gentleman in detail if he will meet me behind the Chair. I am glad to see that the


hon. Gentleman takes such an interest in the soldiers in British Guiana, and I hope that they are encouraged by it.
I have mentioned the question of bounties and the question of special concessions. Certain pay increases were recently announced which, I believe, were brought in on the right policy. By that, I mean that the Government were highly selective regarding the pay increases they made. It would have been a mistake to spread them wide over the whole Army, and to have had really a small increase.
These increases make an appreciable difference. For instance, a sergeant with 12 years' service and no technical qualifications gets about £73 a year extra. A lance-corporal with first-class qualifications in one of the Group X trades qualifications gets about the same rise, and a warrant officer Class I with 20 years' service gets a rise of £91 a year. These are quite worth-while rises. I noticed a criticism in one of our leading newspapers to the effect that a second-lieutenant would be getting less than the sergeant. That happened in the Army before these rises were announced. It is not a novelty.
We have only a limited amount of money, and we have put that money, as far as the officers are concerned, where we think the pinch will come, namely, where they have a family. I am sorry about the second-lieutenant, but we cannot have endless money. I believe that the sergeant with 12 years' service and the captain and the major will need it most. After all, there are four members of the Army Council who are paid more than I am, and we still seem to get along all right.
There are only two other very small items that I wish to point out to the House. First, we have set up a committee—which will shortly be reporting —to see what we can do for the wives of Service men who are left behind in this country. There are some living in their own houses or with relations, some in Government quarters, and some in hostels run by the Army. We want to do what we can to help them in their separation.
The other thing we are trying to do is to get the local authorities to help the soldier to get a house when he has finished his service. The Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Housing and

Local Government have been most cooperative in this, but it is a difficult problem. Some local authorities are good about it, but some are not so good. The difficulty is that a man cannot always put himself down for a house many years before he leaves the Service for the simple reason that he does not know what his civilian job will be. He may come from Essex and be a fitter in the Royal Armoured Corps, and may eventually get a job in Huddersfield. If he puts down his name in the wrong place, he will be in difficulty.
The trouble is that it is not a matter which can entirely be solved by any Ministry or any Government. It is dependent upon the good will of local authorities, and anybody who can say a word for all three Services will be doing a very good turn in that respect.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: War Office evictions.

Mr. Head: The War Office has been very good about evictions, and if the hon. Gentleman wants to have a row about that, perhaps he will do it again behind the Chair.
I have outlined the steps which we are trying to take for the retention of the Regular element in the Army. I think I ought to deal briefly with a problem of almost equal importance, the retention of volunteers in the Territorial Army. The Territorial Army has grown very much in the last year or two. Its present strength is 192,000 part-time National Service men, and there are 60,000 volunteers who have no compulsory obligation whatever. In addition, there are 126,000 National Service men in the Army Emergency Reserve who are compulsorily part-time, and only 10,000 direct volunteers.
May I stress here and now that the Army Emergency Reserve is a very large and very important force which is very short of volunteers. Part of the reason for that, I think, is because people do not know very much about it. Many people have never even heard of it. I appeal to all hon. Members, to the Press, to industry and to the nationalised industries to encourage and to allow people to join the Army Emergency Reserve because it provides all sorts of technical and specialist units which back up our forces in war, and, particularly, which back up at short notice our forces in Germany.
The Territorial Army is faced with the problem that it has grown very rapidly indeed. Whereas in January, 1952, it had a strength of 142,000 men, at present it has a strength of over 250,000. That has placed a great strain on the volunteers. Many of these volunteers have gone on since the war doing an immensely important job in their spare time, and the nation as a whole really owes them an immense debt of gratitude.

Mr. E. Shinwell: What are the numbers of volunteers now as compared with previous years?

Mr. Head: I thought I said a total of 60,000. To be quite frank, I have not got the figures, but I will tell the right hon. Gentleman, if it is the kind of thing he is after, that during last year 1,300 officers and 16,000 other ranks left the Territorial Army, and that during the same period we recruited 1,000 officers and 9,000 other ranks who had no obligation.
I am not saying that that is good, but I am saying that it is very gratifying to have recruited these numbers. If the Territorial Army is to work in the future, we must not only get these volunteers, but, because they will grow old, we must also encourage part-time National Service men to take on that job afterwards. If they do not, it will mean that we shall have to divert N.C. Os. and officers, whom we can ill spare at present, from the Regular Army.
It is a remarkable fact that we are the only nation in the world that has National Service and that runs its part-time Army on a voluntary basis. We ought to be very grateful for that, but we ought also to do everything possible to encourage the volunteer. We are going to bring in certain measures for the Territorial Army, about which I should like very briefly to tell the House.
They are these. We intend to try to limit the number of drills which they do in a year to 50 drill nights. We have found that up to now some of these volunteers have been doing far more than that because the part-time men attend at frequent intervals, staggered and in small parties, and therefore, the volunteer instructors are being overworked. We are to have a four-year training cycle in which the first and third year will be for individual and unit training, and the

second and fourth for brigade and divisional training.
I do not think it is a good thing for the Territorial Army to do too much divisional training. It will also mean that as far as possible in these two years of individual and unit training, the camps will be somewhere near the territorial location of the units concerned, which, I believe, is all important to the Territorial Army.
We intend to try to simplify—indeed, we have gone a long way to doing so— the paper work and the administration of the Territorial Army, because paper is the burden of the volunteer. We have relaxed travelling regulations such as those relating to officers staying a night away at home, and kindred things, including people getting from one place to another, so that they will not be out of pocket.
We are allowing extra officers into the Territorial Army so that every minor unit will have one officer full-time, either a Regular or ex-Regular re-employed, and every major unit will have three officers, with possibly one of them an ex-Regular re-employed. We are to give the Territorial Army extra clerical assistance, and that is because so many of the units are burdened with so much paper which, however much it is simplified, burdens the Territorial Army.

Mr. Michael Stewart: Civilian assistance?

Mr. Head: Yes, civilian.
We are also widening somewhat the field of commissions in the Territorial Army. Lastly, I have set up under the Under-Secretary of State a committee which is going into the whole question of the administration of the Territorial Army in conjunction with the Territorial Associations. Those, briefly, are the steps which we have taken to help the Territorial Army.

Mr. Shinwell: Are they not to be given any more money?

Mr. Head: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman. I had forgotten something. All volunteers and part-time volunteers for the Territorial Army will qualify for the new increased rates of pay which have recently been brought in.
Before I leave this question of manpower, I should like to pay a tribute— and I am sure a good many Members will join with me—to those public-spirited and unpaid volunteers who have made the Home Guard a going concern. They have got down to it. Their total numbers are now 34,000 enrolled men and 28,000 on the voluntary reserve roll. They have been allotted their tasks. They have done a lot of training, and they have provided an invaluable nucleus for the defence of this country if there should be a war. For myself, I am extremely grateful to them for the way in which they have done that. So much for manpower.
What I ought now to deal with is something about which the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) —he is not here at the moment—had a brush with his right hon. and learned Friend the former Secretary of State for Air—namely, this question of reduction of expenditure. I think he said that the expenditure for the Air Force should be slightly increased and that it must be got back from the Army. I think that I should deal with this question of reduction of expenditure.
I would say, first of all, that the best way of reducing expenditure in the Army —and it is something which we are really trying to do very hard—is to bring back those elements of the Army which are a very long way from home. What costs money is having units and formations a long way from home. Perhaps I may illustrate what sort of a problem that is.
Take, for instance, the cost of keeping a battalion in Korea. To keep that battalion going, including those who were training locally—the National Service men who have to get used to the conditions—the reinforcement locally, the men in the pipeline and the men training in the depôt, the backing alone is over 500 men for that battalion. If that same battalion were in Germany the number would be 70 men.

Mr. Shinwell: There is German civilian labour.

Mr. Head: It is nothing to do with civilian labour. These are men going into the battalion. They are nothing to do with the administrative tail. I am referring to the righting units, the pure

battalion. It has nothing to do with civilians. The right hon. Gentleman got the wrong end of the stick.
To ship a ton of stores to Germany costs £5 10s. To ship a ton of stores to Korea costs £22, and we have just discharged our millionth ton of stores to Korea. I think that illustrates the problem. To send a soldier to Germany costs £3 10s.; to send him to Korea costs £90. We now have annually 299,000 men moving overseas each way. That again illustrates the strain in money and in wastage of manpower. We send overseas every week three-quarters of a million letters. The size of this Army is immense.
My hon. Friend the Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir R. Boothby) is not here, but I thought I would mention for his benefit that annually we send overseas 9 million kippers. The enemy of economy today is the dispersal of the Army all over the globe—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—and Her Majesty's Government agree just as much as hon. Members opposite on the desirability of reducing our commitments.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: But the Government do not do anything about it.

Mr. Head: It is very easy to reduce a commitment when one is prepared to levitate oneself, like the hon. Gentleman, but it is not really so easy, and if he were Foreign Secretary he would discover that. Where else can we economise?

Mr. Wigg: Bermuda,

Mr. Head: Hon. Members opposite are very fond of quoting Bermuda, because it is the one subject on defence on which they are all united.
The favourite theme for economy in peace-time when the Army is short of money, and in war-time when the Army needs practically nothing but explosives and weapons, is always the Works Vote. As a result, the barrack accommodation situation in this country is frankly deplorable. Of the total barrack accommodation one-third is permanent and two-thirds are temporary. Of the one-third that is permanent, half was built more than 50 years ago. Hon. Members will see that only one-sixth of the barrack accommodation in this country has been built in the last 50 years. It is,


frankly, lamentable that the first introduction of a young National Service man to the Army should be, as happens in one-third of Catterick Camp, into 1914 temporary huts. Something has to be done about that.
We are now introducing a plan whereby over the next three years the money spent on barrack accommodation in this country will rise very steeply. To do that, we have to have extra staff to produce the plans in time to get that work done—and not only the plans which we intend to implement—but to have a reserve of plans so that whenever there are labour and materials to spare we can quickly put those plans into effect.

Mr. Julian Snow: Since we all hope that there will not always be a large standing Army, could not the right hon. Gentleman consult the industries which have produced very successful prefabricated and relatively short-time buildings, in order to provide hutted accommodation which could easily be dismantled when necessary?

Mr. Head: I can assure the hon. Gentleman that even if peace broke out all over the world and we could go back to a small Regular Army, we should have a lot to do for that small Regular Army. There is no question of erecting so many barracks that when we are able to reduce the size of the Army we shall have a surplus. That is a problem which I believe must be tackled, and I say sincerely that I hope that during the next three years, whoever may be doing my job, will not break that important plan. It is always a temptation, but unless the problem is dealt with on a long-term basis the conditions of our barracks in this country will become scandalous.
I am sure that this must be done. On the credit side is the fact that we are well on the way to breaking the back of the problem of the married quarters. The credit for that lies fairly and squarely with right hon. Gentlemen opposite. They started the scheme, and it has made a lot of progress, and we shall soon start modernising and repairing married quarters that are falling into disrepair.

Mr. Crossman: What are the plans about quarters in Germany? When the Germans rearm will they take over their own barracks? Are we to put up brand

new barracks? Or are these questions being left to be answered when German rearmament starts?

Mr. Head: No. We have thought carefully about that. However, I do not think the House wants me to go into the details. That eventuality will by no means take us by surprise, and we have already taken a good many preliminary steps towards meeting it.

Mr. Crossman: What?

Mr. Head: I could talk half an hour on that subject, but the House would not want me to. I think hon. and right hon. Gentlemen will agree with me that there are not any great savings possible on works. That leaves the question of production. We have tapered off the production programme for what is called the long haul. I would call the right hon. Gentleman—or was it his predecessor who was responsible originally?—Jack, not in familiarity, but because this undertaking was like the story of Jack and the beanstalk. We have had to estimate a lot about that programme. It had not been held in balance. There is a level of production below which nobody in my job can allow it to fall.
This is where one takes a risk, that if there is a war the active formations that have to fight will not be sufficiently equipped to enable them to have a fair chance. It is the job of everybody to see that they are proficiently equipped. I do not believe that we can go below our present production figure, but I should be the first to admit that we have to watch very carefully, as the production programme flows, that we do not produce too many weapons that are becoming obsolescent. It is a question of reconciling: continuity with new developments, which is always a difficult thing to do.
That is our object. The weapons now coming in, like the 35 inch rocket launcher and the recoilless gun and the Centurion tanks, for instance, are first-class weapons, the best of their kind, and there is no prospect of their becoming obsolescent in the next few years. Nobody has invented anything better.
I said at the beginning that there were four matters that I should mention, and I come now to the fourth, the question of keeping the Army up to date. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Brierley Hill


(Mr. Simmons) made a speech the other day from which I deduced that his view of the Army was that it was a large sort of animal that had failed to move with the times and keep up to date, a cross between a dinosaur and a brontosaurus. He seemed to visualise me as a demoralised jockey sitting wobbling on its back, waffling amid the mists of obsolescence, and cheered on by a lot of brainless blimps or what the hon. Gentleman called "top brass." That was, roughly, the hon. Gentleman's idea, and I reject that image of his entirely.
I would address a few remarks to the subject of up-to-dateness. There are many people, not only in this House, who say that this is the atomic age and that it is not an age of men, and that we should, therefore, cut down the size of armies because the future lies in the air and with the atom. That may be true some years ahead, but in these Estimates we are dealing with the situation now— today. There is no prospect in the immediate future of there being a kind of atomic curtain that can protect Western Europe—an atomic curtain with people with press-buttons behind it. There is not enough fissile material, and it would not be practical.
Even with full use of the air in defence, men of the other side will filter through, and where they come through they have to be met by men, not necessarily on foot, but in vehicles, tanks, and well armed. For the defence of Western Europe we still need men, and the defence of Western Europe is part of the defence of this country, an intimate part, just as important as the Channel. Therefore, we cannot, because of these new weapons, today radically alter the structure of our Army.
Some may say, "The Army has police duties to do overseas, in Kenya and Malaya, for example, and, therefore, you reject all change." That is not true. If new weapons or developments demanded change we should change, and modify the change, to suit the secondary function of policing throughout the Empire. That moment has not arrived.
The Leader of the Opposition was saying that weapons have more fire power, vehicles are more mobile, and that, therefore, we could reduce the numbers of

men. However, as a result of having better weapons and vehicles, formations have greater manoeuvrability, and so a division can cover a wider front. We have not so far such large forces in Europe as to feel at all satisfied that we can afford to reduce in that respect.
This question of keeping up to date is one about which the War Office thinks a great deal. I have stated in the Memorandum accompanying the Estimates that we plan to introduce a ground to ground guided weapon with an atomic warhead. An atomic weapon of fissile material will not, anyhow in the foreseeable future, become an intimate part of the lesser tactical battlefield. To put fissile material into things like 25-pounder guns or rifles or light automatics will for many years to come be a terribly extravagant and wasteful way of using fissile material. Therefore, the use of atomic missiles against armies in the field is still comparatively remote. When I say remote, I do not mean in time; I mean in direct contact, direct use in things like guns. Atomic missiles may be used against a bridgehead, but not against formations on the lesser, tactical battlefield.
There was a study made of this question of the impact of atomic weapons on the whole tactics and strategy of armies. It was held for four days at Camberley, and was attended by experts of many countries and also many scientists, and its lessons were disseminated through Commands to fighting units. There were two things, in particular, that came out of that study. The first, which, of course, is obvious, like so many things seem to be after a close study, was that the introduction of atomic weapons places a premium on dispersion. It will be very dangerous to collect close together, and yet sometimes we have to. Therefore, the need for dispersion and the need for rapid concentration puts a further premium on communications and control, and we are introducing into the Army a new V.H.F. wireless set with very good speech night and day. It is hoped that we shall overcome the necessity so many hon. Members have at different times complained about of the endless line laying that goes with permanent communications by means of introducing a radio relay system.
There were many things that emerged from this study, but the other thing I


specially want to mention was that the large fleet of wheeled vehicles, which has become the necessary accompaniment of modernised armies, will be vulnerable. A very close study has been made to see to what extent the lift in wheeled vehicles can be carried by air. It may sound, at the moment, unrealistic, but the helicopter and the slow flying freighter aircraft that can be landed in a confined space can make a big contribution to getting the lift off wheels. It is some way ahead, but it is our aim to introduce helicopters to the maximum extent. Anything we can do to reduce that very vulnerable mass of wheeled vehicles, which is the lifeline of the forces, will be invaluable to a modern army when atomic vehicles are used.
The soldier, the officer, especially the bright officer of the future, must think in an up-to-date way. The days when the cavalry soldier thought it very fashionable to know nothing about what was under a motor car's bonnet are over and past.

Mr. F. J. Bellenger: How many helicopters has the right hon. Gentleman got?

Mr. Head: The right hon. Gentleman is going back to my previous remarks. I cannot tell the right hon. Member without notice here and now, but I will tell him at the end of the debate today or probably tomorrow.

Mr. Paget: While the right hon. Gentleman is giving his lesson on atomic warfare, would he also agree that the kind of concentrations which the Russians found necessary in the last war would be quite impracticable in an atomic war, and the advantage of numbers, as they were used then, has to a very considerable extent been cancelled.

Mr. Head: I would agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman. I am sure that he is right.
I was saying that we must get officers thinking about the development of scientific and technical matters, and to that end we are trying now to get all officers who are about to go to the staff college or have just left the staff college to go through a short course at Shrivenham. When I first went to the War Office, there were only about 280 officers

at the Royal Military College at Shrivenham, and by next year it is hoped to have about 440. We must keep the officer in touch with science and modern thought, and thinking about their application to war and the probable effect which they will have.

Mr. James Simmons: Would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that the other ranks should also know about this?

Mr. Head: The other ranks do have a great many technical courses and, as the hon. Member knows, we have increased very much the amount of scientific knowledge which they are given in the form of courses.
I have talked mostly about Army problems and I have said very little about what the Army is doing today all over the world. I have published a fairly full account of that in the Memorandum, and I think that it is a story of which the Army and the House can be very proud. On this I should like to quote the noble Lord in another place, who belongs to the party opposite, Lord Pakenham, who, speaking in praise of the three Services, said this:
The Royal Air Force are doing a wonderful job, and they do not hesitate to tell us so: the Royal Navy are doing a wonderful job, and they wait for us to tell them so; the Army are doing a wonderful job and they would be astounded if anybody told them so." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 16th April, 1953; Vol. 181, c. 870.]
There is a certain amount of truth in that. I would say that the Army, in spite of economy and manpower, has done a great deal, and I think that it has earned its keep, when we think what would have happened to our economy if South-East Asia had gone Communist, if the trouble in Africa had spread, and if the defence of Western Europe had been organised without our troops of four divisions.
I do not want hon. Members to think that the generals have only one idea, and that is to get hold of more National Service men. From the Army's point of view, the organisation, training and staffing would be much easier and simpler without National Service. This is forced on us by events and forced on these young men by events. We have 214,000 National Service men in the Army today, mostly against their will. Some of them dislike it, and, unfortunately, they are the ones


who write to Members of Parliament and to the newspapers.
But there are very many of them who, although they do not want to do it, make a thundering good job of it and come out of the Army, many of them, better men than they went in. That is due to the Regular cadre which has to train and absorb them. The Regulars are under strength and they are often separated from their wives. I think they have done a very fine job indeed.
The hon. Member for Dudley said the other day that on the solution of these problems both the Army's future and the reputation of the Secretary of State for War depends. But he said, "I do not mind about the reputation of the Secretary of State for War; I mind about the Army." I should like, if I may for once, to agree with the (hon. Member for Dudley. Secretaries of State for War come and go, and the Army transcends their importance very much indeed.
I have tried to do what I can for the Army and explain to the House what I have done. For the rest of this debate I shall rightly be criticised for what I have left undone and for the mistakes I have made. But I appeal to the unity of the House in this: where the Army itself is concerned, spread all over the world, it has done a difficult and dangerous job magnificently well.

5.15 p.m.

Mr. John Strachey: The Secretary of State for War has given us a detailed, able and interesting survey of the work of the Army and its prospects, as he does year by year. It was full of facts and full of points, and he would not expect me to be able to comment on every one of the facts and points he made.
There are, for example, the announcements he made of concessions in respect of the Territorial Army and the concessions abroad—most welcome announcements—and I hope he will not think me ungrateful when we say that we would rather like to have had them in the Memorandum so that we could have studied them. It leaves the House in rather a difficulty if we have to hear of them without seeing them in print.
I think that I must follow the right hon. Gentleman, in this respect at any

rate, that I must concentrate on one or two main topics. I think that he will see that the topics which I wish to concentrate on, although I take them from rather a different angle, are the same ones as he took. They are three in number: the manpower problem of the Army; its commitments, and. finally, its strategic Reserve.
I will take the manpower situation first. Our whole problem of manpower is governed by the fact that the Army today works under a new system of engagements. It is a totally new system, introduced just over two years ago, and it amounts to a virtual revolution in the terms of engagement under which every Regular soldier serves. We are getting this year, for the first time, a sight of both the advantages and the disadvantages of that system. The Secretary of State for War approached the problem, but it could be put perhaps a little more vividly by calling the attention of the House to the recruiting figures which he gives us in the second appendix of his Memorandum. There we see in 1951, 26,000 recruits to the Regular Army, and then the figures appear to double in the next year to 53,000 and then to decline to 42,000, which is still enormously above the 1951 figure. Why is it, the House will rather naturally ask, that the Secretary of State in his speech, and more particularly in his Memorandum, takes a rather grave and concerned view of the manpower problem of the Army?
Certainly, if one did not know the explanation, this would be strange. After that apparently unexpected doubling of the rate of the Regular recruitment, we are told in the Memorandum, in paragraph 82, that the strength of the Army will inevitably fall during the coming years, and the Secretary of State hinted at that in his speech. Of course, the explanation is a quite simple one, that under the new terms of engagement nearly double the number of recruits were recruited only, in effect, each of them for three years. Some were recruited simply on three years' engagement, some on 22 years' engagement; but all of them had the option to leave the Army at the end of three years.
I am not criticising that new system. The Secretary of State, in his first Estimates speech two years ago, was, if I


may say so, rather anxious to claim that new system as entirely his own. Whoever introduced it, I think it would be fairer to say, as the right hon. Gentleman said today, that it was the brain-child neither of himself nor of myself. It was really copied from the Royal Air Force. But whoever thought of it, it is a revolutionary new system, and I still think that on the whole it was right to introduce it. For it is a liberal and up-to-date method of engagement in which the man will remain a volunteer in the sense that he stays in the Army of his own choice through his military career.
Of course, we must face the consequences of that. The consequences are that even a rapid increase in the rate of recruitment may not give any increase in the numbers in the Army. What we are really concerned with is not numbers of men, but numbers of men-years of service in the Army. It is a simple matter of arithmetic to see that the 1952 rate of recruitment, for example, of 50,000 men for three years' service in the long run gives no larger an Army than a 25,000 rate of recruitment for six years' service. In fact, it would give no larger an Army, and a considerably less efficient Army.
We have all been reading that remarkable article by Major General Cobb in Brassey's Annual, which puts out as clearly as anyone has done the problems of manpower which the Army faces as a result of the new terms of engagement. General Cobb calculates that a doubled rate of recruiting under the new engagements gives only a 15 per cent, increase in the total numbers in the Army. That all depends on what assumption he takes as to the numbers of men who extend on each three years' period. But if General Cobb is right—and it is a most able article—it certainly poses a formidable problem of manpower. Above all, it brings us face to face with the fact that everything depends from now onwards on the rate of the prolongation of the men's service.
That brings us to the problem of what is called technically, in the jargon of the subject, internal recruiting of the Army in all its forms. "Internal recruiting "' simply means the problem of inducing men who are already in the Army to stay in the Army. Now that they are free to go—and all of them are free at the end of every three years' period—that is perhaps the biggest question for the

Army. There is the question of inducing the National Service man to sign on for a term of Regular engagement. There is the problem of inducing the short-service man to take on the 22 years' term of engagement instead of the three years', and there is the problem of the man who is already on the 22 years' term of engagement to go on with his service every three years.
Those are all the aspects of the problem of internal recruiting. They mean that the size and, above all, the quality of the Army will depend in future, under our new arrangements, entirely on inducing a sufficient number of men to make the Army their life career. All future discussions of the Army's manpower problems will have to face that issue.
That is the reason for the increases in emoluments, of which we were given information during the recent debate on defence policy in general. Those increases in emoluments were very welcome indeed. They will help undoubtedly. The bounties to stay on will help, and the increases in pay to N.C. Os. and senior men will undoubtedly yield results. It is arguable whether the same amount of money spent on these increases in pay, rather than the bounties, would not in the long run have given an even greater inducement. I expect that the bounties will give a better shock effect, but I am not sure that in the long run the same money used in straight pay increases would not have done better.
It is of the utmost importance, as the Secretary of State will agree, that the whole question of the eligibility of the life of the men in the Army should be faced, because it will not be exclusively by emoluments that we get men to stay in the Army. It has got to be a worthwhile life in two respects. A man must feel, he has got to know, and it must seem to him as a reasonable, sensible man, that wherever he is stationed, all over the world, he is doing an indispensable job for the country. Secondly, that job has to be done in conditions which are not too intolerable. The man must not be separated virtually for the whole of his career from his wife and family. He must not be in a position in which he cannot bring up and maintain a family properly, and he must not, above all, be continually changing his station from one part of the world to another. All these things, now that we have in that real sense an Army which is permanently


voluntary and which can leave every three years, will be of absolutely crucial importance.
I share the concern which the Secretary of State evidently displayed as to the numbers of men who will extend or re-engage in present circumstances. This will be tested next November, which is the first time when the three years' period comes to an end. I believe it to be true that we must get something like 33⅓ per cent, to prolong their engagements to meet the Regular needs of the Army.
If all the Army were in the situation, for example, of the man at home or in Germany, one could say that the Army presents a life which, for the man who likes it, compares well and favourably with the alternative life in civilian circles. But when I look at the real position of the Army today, through no fault of its own, with 80 per cent, of it overseas and with so much of it so far overseas, in such difficult circumstances and conditions, we are bound to feel great concern at the manpower position and to wonder even whether the concessions of visits from families, leave at home and the rest, which was announced today, most welcome as they are, can be anything more than a palliative.
That brings me to my second theme of the commitments of the Army. They are most directly related under the new scheme of engagements to the question of the size and, above all, the quality of the Army and of retaining those comparatively long-service men, from whom alone we can get the senior N.C. Os., the most experienced technicians and the like—the men whose presence converts an Army from a disorganised rabble into a really organised force capable of carrying out its tasks.
I take it that during the debate both on the Motion and on the Amendment we are going to hear a great deal about commitments, and about the major commitment of the Army overseas today, which is the Suez commitment. I put it to the House that today we must look at that commitment mainly as an example, and no doubt the biggest and most crucial example, of the overseas commitment of the Army. I would urge hon. and right hon. Members opposite on the back benches, whose views on this subject we know well, to look partly, at

any rate, today upon this as an Army matter, a matter in which not only the welfare of the Army in the ordinary sense of its whole happiness and well-being, but also its efficiency is bound up. Because as I see it, if too much of the Army is kept too long in intolerable conditions, then it will not be there at all, because it has the right to go away today under the three-year engagement scheme.
But, of course, there is one thing on which we are all agreed in this House. If we take the view that keeping 80,000 men in the Canal Zone—60,000 of them in the Army—is indispensable to the security and welfare of the people of this country, then the Army will continue to carry that burden indefinitely. There will be no help for it, and we will all join in saying that that commitment must be carried. But those of us—and we have given the reasons for this on other occasions—who are completely convinced that, in principle at any rate, the maintenance of a substantial part of the British Army in Suez today is far from the national interests, and that the presence of troops there is not serving the true interests of the nation, must weigh very carefully in our minds the inevitable consequences to the Army of keeping troops there.
No doubt from the other side of the House we shall be told that the instabilities of the Egyptian Government at the moment make it impossible to consider this matter. I would only like, in passing, to say of that that it is undoubtedly true that, if we decided to remain, we could by force stay in the Canal Zone indefinitely, and because of that the Egyptian situation could be kept most unstable and no solid Egyptian Government would emerge. What I should ask hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite is, do they think that is to the advantage of this country? I think it would be a most profound disadvantage to this country, because the position of the present Egyptian Government would be made impossible and it might be succeeded by the Moslem Brotherhood, the Communist forces in Egypt, or some force of that sort, and that would be one of the worst things that could happen, and certainly would not be in the national interests of this country. Therefore, is not instability in Egypt one more sign of the advantages of a settlement there?
I want to look at this question essentially from the point of view of the Army, and from that point of view Suez is simply the largest, and worst and, as I have endeavoured to show, the most dispensable of the overseas commitments of the Army. What is Suez today? It is:
 … tents, sand, barbed wire and flies.
If those words seem more eloquent than those I generally use, I can only explain that they are the words used by the Secretary of State in his Memorandum, which by now we have all read. Suez is today little more than a concentration camp in which an enormous proportion of the overseas part of our Army has to spend at least some of its overseas service. It is bound to have a most deplorable effect upon the morale, well-being and contentment of the British Army.
How does Suez react on the manpower problem? It reacts in two inter-relating ways. It is the great obstacle—I am convinced of this from all the information that I received when I was at the War Office and since—to the growth, and the maintenance even, of the Regular component of the Army. By being a great obstacle to those things, Suez is the greatest "dis-recruiter," if I may put it that way, for the Regular Army, and that in turn makes it an enormous factor in the necessity for the promulgation of National Service, because it prevents the building up of the strength of the Regular Army. I should say it was the biggest single factor in that matter.
In turn that reacts in this way. It makes the Secretary of State for War come down to the House and tell us that there is no possibility of reducing the period of National Service. That will be so, in my opinion, so long as we maintain commitments on this scale. I make an opposite deduction from that than he does. I make the deduction that it is not only possible to reduce that commitment, but that it is indispensable for the Army and, therefore, in the national interest to begin the process of the curtailment of our commitments, and to begin with Suez.
It seems to me indefensible that we should continue to drag on the present position of crisis and uncertainty. After all, since we debated this matter a year ago the Front Bench opposite has fully conceded the principle of the complete evacuation of the Fighting Forces in Suez,

as I and my right hon. and hon. Friends suggested a year ago. We know that there have been negotiations for nine months and, having agreed to that, it seems to me quite indefensible, above all not in the interests of the Army, that the negotiations should drag on on two points which, though no doubt of some importance, are relatively of minor importance when compared with the principle of whether or not we should evacuate.
I have spoken these words on the commitment in Suez because it is obviously the key situation. But I should not like it to be thought that Suez is our only commitment. We have commitments in the Far East which, as the Secretary of State so graphically pointed out, are a greater strain in proportion because they are more distant. It is the old question of bearing the weight on an out-stretched arm. It is infinitely more burdensome, and if it is possible—and I should have thought it had become possible—to diminish those commitments in Korea and in the Far East, they would proportionately afford even greater relief.
The third topic which the Secretary of State dealt with, and which I want to deal with too, was the one of strategic reserves. There are really two problems here. Although the right hon. Gentleman did not ask us to face it today, those of us who are in favour of a reduction of the period of National Service are asked to face the question of the need of a strategic reserve, and I think it is a fair point.
In the sense of a strategic reserve to meet some sudden new commitment in the Commonwealth, that has been referred to by various Members of the Government in terms of a brigade. What I would call the cold war strategic reserve has to be a Regular brigade of men serving fully with the Colours, and instantly available. I should not have thought it impossible to produce such a force. No doubt a reduction in the period of service, even after we have cut our commitments, would make it more difficult, but I should not have thought it was unmanageable. If, however, we take the other aspect of a strategic reserve as we have argued it before in this House, a strategic reserve in terms of our N.A.T.O. obligations, in terms of potential general war, that is a far bigger question, in which a


brigade is hardly here or there. That is something which we cannot attempt to meet by means of Regular Forces, the active Army with the Colours. We know the nature of that problem.
It is the problem which faces General Gruenther today in Paris, the problem of the flow of divisions to that defensive screen which he has succeeded now, on behalf of N.A.T.O., in throwing across Europe. It is there, but it is thin, and, in the event of general war, it would need a steady and immediate flow of reserve divisions to maintain it. And, of course, in terms of deterrents, which are the terms that are really relevant, the fact that good reserve divisions were available to flow out rapidly after D-day to that screen would be, and I am sure is, of immense importance in terms of deterrence, and therefore in terms of the supreme object of all of us, the object of avoiding a general war.
General Gruenther put his problem extremely graphically and, if the House will permit me, I will read a few words. In a recent speech he said:
Our regular forces have the job of holding the enemy forces as much as possible. But they could not carry out the task alone, if the reserve units (the butcher, the baker, the candlestick maker from Lyons, from Courtrai or Canterbury) were unable to be mobilised, equipped and organised within a few days.
He puts it very sharply in terms of a few days.
What have we done to meet that commitment? We have, of course, the Territorial Army, and the Secretary of State spoke about it today. We have also the Reserve Army in general, which includes not only the Territorials but, as the right hon. Gentleman rightly reminded us, the Army Emergency Reserve, which is a large and important part of it. Together they form a force of something approaching half a million trained men today, which is in itself substantially a fine reserve force, and I think some of the information he gave us about it is decidedly encouraging; for example, the information in his Memorandum that 30 per cent, of the National Service men doing their Reserve liability have become volunteers in those forces. That is decidedly encouraging, and I am sure that it is far and away the strongest

reserve force which this country has ever possessed.
What gives me concern, and I imagine gives us all concern, is the question of time, because time here is the essence of the contract. It would surely be a difficult thing to come even near to meeting General Gruenther's time-table with our reserve forces; indeed, we must face the fact that it would be impossible to meet that time-table with the forces today.
We must look at the other side of the matter. I, for one, would be entirely against attempting to impose any greater obligations on the Territorials today. I think the Minister agrees with me; in fact, he was at pains to announce a series of alleviations of those obligations, and he was right to do so. We could not impose still more on the National Service element, still less could we impose further on the volunteer element, which is carrying a great deal.
What we might do there, and I urge this on the Government, would be something about the old question of the Territorial bounty. After all, £9 is very mean these days. It is a battle which we have all fought, and it is something which could be done additionally for this vital part of our Forces. Of course that in itself would not meet the problem I am putting to the House and to the Secretary of State—the question of how soon the flow of reserve divisions could start out. The only glimpse of a solution which anyone has seen so far is by a process of selection. As we all know, four Territorial divisions have been selected as the first Territorial divisions as it were. Those are the divisions which we filled up with the Z men under the old Z Scheme. Now, of course, they have been replaced by National Service men who are performing their Reserve obligations, and they are the divisions which will receive the cream of the new weapons.
Is there any way in which the first, second, third and fourth of those divisions can be made potentially ready at a considerably earlier date to go overseas and be the first reinforcement which would reach General Gruenther's screen? Because it seems to me, although I do not pretend to have a solution for a moment—I am only posing the problem —that it is the improvement of a part, at any rate, of our reserve forces—not


their improvement, as such, because 1 think they are already excellently trained men, but in the improvement of their state of readiness—which is really the heart of the strategic reserve problem in terms of general war. That is really the intractable problem which the House faces. The period of National Service has little to do with that because it would not affect the readiness of those early Territorial divisions one way or another.
Now I come to my conclusion, which is simply to attempt to relate the views we are expressing on the Army problems today with the views which we expressed on the question of defence and of the level of defence expenditure and its character as a whole during the defence debate. The House will remember that the view we took on this side of the House was that there had to be some curtailment of defence expenditure. We believe that the contribution of the Army to that can be made essentially by a reduction in the period of National Service. If it were to be a reduction of six months it would mean a reduction of some 50,000 men, not immediately, but after a couple of years. In the end this would mean a proportionate reduction in the annual budget of the Army because, in the long run, general expenditure follows, largely, the level of the manpower in the Forces.
Thirdly, we admit, and indeed we have pointed out ourselves, that that means some contraction of these enormous commitments which we face today, and we point to Suez as by far the most important and most urgent of them. These are modest proposals for keeping the Army side of defence expenditure within bounds Some of my hon. Friends thought during the defence debate that they were much too modest, but I do not believe that much more can be done than that today. But surely something must be done, because it is of the logic of defence expenditure that unless efforts are made to keep it down it does not stay where it is. It grows and grows, and we must surely regard the present position into which the Army has been forced as a profoundly unsatisfactory one.
As the Secretary of State was at pains to point out, this is a very large Army. And it is today inflicting, quite involuntarily, a very heavy burden on the economy of the country Yet. because of its spread throughout the world, it is

able to provide only a very small measure of security for the people of these islands. The Prime Minister put this point during the defence debate with a force of which perhaps only he is capable. The House will recollect his words when he said that this is
the only country in the world that ever had two years' national compulsory service and not a brigade to defend its own land."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd March. 1954; Vol. 524, c. 1141.]
It is true that he went on to say that that was a very honourable position. It may be honourable, but I do not think that it is very sensible.

Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: I have been itching to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, and now he has got to a point at which I simply must do so. In one breath he suggests that bringing the troops back from the Suez Canal Zone would bring home 70,000 men, yet in the other he says that if the period of National Service were reduced to 18 months there would be a reduction in the numbers of our total forces of 60,000. Therefore, if we bring back the troops from Suez but immediately cut the period of National Service, we shall still not have a brigade in this country.

Mr. Sfrachey: The hon. and gallant Member's figures are not right. By reducing the period of National Service we lose 50,000, not 60,000 men, and by the evacuation of Suez we add very considerably more than that number to the total forces in this country. If he were here, I am sure that the Under-Secretary of State for Air would agree that there are 20,000 Royal Air Force men in Suez, and there is no reason why the intake of future National Service men should not be adjusted between the Army and the Air Force. I maintain the view, which I have already expressed, that a strategic reserve in terms of something like a brigade is possible even with a reduction of six months or so in the period of National Service.
What is not possible, and I readily agree that it is a perfectly fair point if hon. Members opposite like to make it, is to have a strategic reserve for a general war on these terms. But neither is that possible with a two-year period of National Service. That has to be tackled in terms of the Reserve Army.
This is the position which the Army has to face and which we must face on its behalf, because this is very much a matter of political, foreign policy and defence decisions. We must find a way to provide conditions in which our Army can live and thrive or else under the new terms of engagement we shall not have an Army at all. We must create conditions in which the Army can avoid being too heavy a burden for the economy of the country to carry. And we must enable it to give the maximum possible measure of defence and security to the country.

5.55 p.m.

Mr. Richard Stanley: My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War and the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) have covered a very wide field. I shall only speak about the Territorial Army. I have heard and seen during the last week so many new experts on the Navy and the Air Force that I do not think that one more new expert will make much difference. I am very worried about the Territorial Army. Most of the facts which I shall give in this debate will come from the West Lancashire district. There people have very great fears about the future of the Territorial Army.
One problem concerns officers. At least one-third of the National Service officers live in the South of England and never turn up for battalion work at all except when the Territorial Army goes to camp. Anyone who knows anything about the Service knows how hopeless it is when a battalion has officers who do not see their fellow-officers or their fellow-men for the greater part of the year. That, in turn, imposes a much greater strain on the local officers, but I do not quite know what my right hon. Friend can do about it.
My right hon. Friend experiences difficulty about recruitment. I believe that it has been shown that the best conditions to encourage recruitment to the Territorial Army are either those in which there is the feeling that we might have to fight a war very soon, which, thank heaven, no one at the moment believes likely, or conditions in which service in the Territorial Army is made a rather amusing spare-time occupation with plenty of work but also plenty of fun.

If an undue strain is placed upon local officers by the absence of those who are not appointed from the area, there inevitably will be a drift away from the Territorial Army.
Another factor which might help in the running of Territorial battalions would be an arrangement whereby senior officers could stay in the Service a little longer. Unlike the case in the Regular Army, those who serve in the Territorial Army do not expect that when they go into action they will be going in company with those with whom they are serving at the present time. I believe that at the beginning of the last war comparatively few battalion officers took their men abroad, and few of those who did had their men serving under them for very long. If the older, more mature officers were retained in charge, they would be able to make the training and the general welfare arrangements more entertaining and more like the conditions associated with a Territorial Army battalion than a Regular battalion. That would be a great help to the Territorial Army movement.
I was delighted to hear the various proposals which the Secretary of State said would reduce the hard work required of the men in the Territorial Army. It would be very helpful if the man in the Territorial Army could be told, "You have done your camp duty and for two months you can have a complete Territorial Army holiday." Also, these men could be given a free month or so at Christmas or Easter. If we provided relaxation of that kind, it would definitely help. Obviously hard work would have to be done between March and camp.
Another problem is that of the amount of training that can be carried out. At the moment Regular commanders are looking after the Territorial Army areas and they are very hard worked. I cannot help feeling that, however much sympathy they may have for Territorials, they cannot make up their mind what is a fair period of work for a Territorial.
Let us face it. If someone is going into the Territorial Army there must be reasonable work to do. If only a committee of the War Office could look into the question I think we could knock out a lot of training which is not 100 per cent, essential. I was only a war-time


soldier, but I have heard of a lot of things which I think are a waste of time. There is the classification of weapons on long ranges which means that every year officers, N.C. Os. and everyone concerned gets physically cold and bored. I cannot believe that it really matters for this to be done every year.
Another thing which I am delighted to hear that the Secretary of State has done is the cutting out of administrative duties. We all know what a lot of paper work one has to get through. It is all very well in the Army, and it has to be done then, but, if one goes into the Territorial Army to try to help other people, it is not much fun to have to sit at a desk and wade through War Office papers, 90 per cent, of which one does not understand.
The right hon. Member for Dundee, West spoke about T.A. readiness. I agree with him that they are not really operationally ready, but their readiness should be to move on mobilisation. If that is the case, surely it is not necessary to have quite so many fitness tests and peace-time work of die Army for the Territorials to carry out. Obviously it would not be contended that any Territorial battalion would be physically fit enough to go into action. Therefore, they would have to be given a toughening up course when actual mobilisation came. We should be able to give a little relief in some of the drill periods.
Returning to the question of the officer situation, the commissioning system under National Service has not worked because it has not produced enough officers. Most of the officers come from the South. I should be astonished if anyone denied that we could get full complements without help from the South. Naturally something has to be done about N.C. Os., because in quite a few battalions it is very hard to get good recruits to take their places. I trust that something can be done about that.
The fulfilment of the Territorials time is in the camp. People sacrifice to go to camp for 14 days, and we cannot expect them to go on absolutely flat out soldiering for 24 hours a day. I was delighted to hear the Secretary of State say that they are only to have divisional exercises every four years. I am thankful to think that it will take four years to come round because I am afraid that last

year people took very little interest. There were divisional exercises and the officers and N.C. Os. did not know what was going on. It was a very gloomy period. I have not great military knowledge, but I cannot feel that when training Territorial armies we get much benefit by having anything larger than battalion exercises. I know that we have to teach officers how to work and have to teach inter-communications how to work in the bigger exercises, but would it not be better to do that by cadre courses than to seek to do it by battalion exercises?
If we could get these camps better run and made more interesting, we should do something towards getting National Service men to join the Territorial Army. At the moment they look upon it as a fatigue and they say, "I have to do 14 days more in the Army." They do not take an interest. If we could give them an interest and we could show them that they could enjoy themselves and were helping the country, I believe we should get a number of these men to sign on. There is a small point in connection with the Regular Army with which perhaps a number of hon. Members will disagree, but which I think has to be faced. That is the conditions of the National Service man when he comes out of the Army after two years' service.
I have spoken to a lot of people about this. They say that the National Service man who comes from Korea or Malaya is a first-class man to employ; he works very hard and is very good. I am afraid they do not say the same about others. I think that understandable when someone has been in the Canal Zone and had to go on guard for 48 hours and then 24 hours rest. Everyone knows that, while in some ways doing guard is not physically hard work, mentally it is soul destroying. One has to accept the view of these people. They come out and say, "How can I get off guard? Where can I get a cup of tea?" When there is something boring to do and a man has four or eight weeks to go before the end of his service, the tendency is to say, "Let us send those people. We do not want to instruct them; they will soon be going out of the Army. "I suggest that the Army could have a four or six weeks' course on which these men could go before leaving the Army. They would then get into a far better frame of mind before returning to civilian life.

6.8 p.m.

Mr. R. T. Paget: I wish first to say a word of thanks to the Under-Secretary of State whom we are all very happy to see restored to health. We feel extremely grateful for the way in which he has dealt with our personal queries throughout the year. I should also like to say something about the Select Committee on which he is the representative of the Government. That Select Committee has been behind him and working with him throughout the year. That has been in no small measure owing to the modesty and tact with which he has presented the point of view of the Government. As a member of that Committee I am grateful to him on that score also.
Another small point concerns an individual in another context. It is too early to go into it in any detail now, but in Kenya today a court-martial has concluded. At an appropriate time I shall want a lot of information as to why a gentleman who, according to the evidence, was responsible for a number of murders, has been charged with comparatively trivial charges.
I now want to go on to the wide issues with which we are concerned in regard to the Army. There is no point in making preparations for a war in which we cannot take part, and we cannot take part in a full-scale atomic war. There is no more object in making preparations for what we are going to do in a full-scale atomic war than in preparing for a planetary collision. It is something which does not concern us. We are a small, over-populated island.
It is within the power of the enemy to obliterate our ports. Our communications would be destroyed. It would not matter much how many people were killed because it would only mean that there would be fewer left to starve. Not only should we be unable to carry on a war, but we should be a geographical situation in which it would be impossible to reactivate. Doubtless the war would be continued from Canada to eventual victory, but it is not a war which would concern us as a political entity
We are seeking to guard ourselves against that sort of atomic war by providing ourselves with the power of retaliation. We are—quite rightly—

creating a strategic bomber force in the profound hope that we shall never have to use it. I do not believe that we shall. I do not believe any nation will be so insane as to invite retaliation upon the scale now available to both sides, and therefore I believe that if there is to be a war, of necessity it will be a limited war, confined by certain restraints imposed on both sides.
There have been many attempts in history to abolish war and they have always been unsuccessful; but the attempts to limit war have been vastly more successful. It has been a habit to gibe at The Hague Convention, but in point of fact the Articles have been honoured far more than they have been broken. At the beginning of the last war the Germans took the view that the Russians were not a party to The Hague Convention. Whether that decision was right or wrong I will not go into now, but it was one of the causes for the war there being conducted on a much more horrible scale than in the West. At any rate, today and in the course of the last war, the Russians claimed to be parties to The Hague Convention and, therefore, we should take the Articles seriously.
In the 1914–18 war the Germans, very stupidly I think, broke The Hague Convention by using gas. They found—and this is the essential sanction of any rule of war—that the use of gas gave no decisive advantage, but inflicted great suffering on both sides. Having learned that lesson, they did not use it again. In the last war we took what I believe to be a very bad decision. We broke The Hague Convention with regard to the bombardment of open cities.
I do not think that that decision will be repeated, because the last war and the destruction which we have had to face in peace-time has demonstrated the folly of it. It is a folly which would be vastly inflated by atomic weapons. I do not believe it will be done again. I have noted down the terms of Article 25 of The Hague Convention:
The attack or bombardment of any kind whatsoever of undefended towns, villages, dwellings or buildings is forbidden.
That is the obligation by which we, the Russians—all of us are bound. For heaven's sake, let us make it clear that it is an obligation which we take seriously, because our very survival and


existence depends upon it. And let us make this clear to the Americans, too.
I make no apology for raising the question of The Hague Convention on the Army Estimates. The Convention comprised military rules negotiated by soldiers who understood the realities of war, and were confined within the limits of what was practicable. They should be negotiated at a technical level by soldiers in order to clarify them and to bring them up to date. The Russians are not difficult to negotiate with on the technical level. We have not found them difficult to deal with at the top level, but here is a technical subject, the reinterpretation and classification of the existing Articles of The Hague Convention. I believe it would be well worth while to go into that matter and see what we can do about it; at least, show that it is something we take seriously.
Again, within the hypothesis that we are only interested in a limited war in which general atomic bombardment does not take place, I would say that it is quite futile to go in for an Anti-aircraft Command in this country. We have not the smallest chance of stopping anything and the only excuse for such a Command, I am told, is that the people will not feel that they are being defended if they do not hear guns going off.
I believe that the Chinese work on the same principle and let off fire crackers to ward off thunder. To waste a substantial part of our limited defence capacity upon this utterly futile gesture seems to me quite insane. I hope it will be cut out, and that we shall realise that the only defence is the capacity of atomic retaliation. While we have that no one short of a lunatic is likely to invite it.
While I do not for a moment believe that atom bombs will be used for the indiscriminate destruction of cities, they are a highly important armament which will be used tactically upon the battlefields, and in conceiving the army we require we have to do so in terms of an army to be used with atomic weapons, and faced with atomic weapons. The creators of armies have always been faced with the problem of balancing arms against men. As the arms are elaborated fewer men are available because from the fighting ranks must be subtracted those producing, servicing and supplying

the arms. It is always a question of maintaining that balance.
In the last war, our problem was to get at the enemy. We could only get a few men at the enemy; either in the desert or in Normandy, and, therefore, it paid us to put a tremendous lot behind every one of those men. I think there were about 70 or 80 men behind every man who fought. In the special circumstances of the last war that procedure was probably right. The Russians had the opposite problem. They had a vast front with the enemy at them everywhere. They required a tremendous number of men in the line, and they had to make do with much more primitive equipment and supply. That, again, within the terms of the last war, was what suited them. Now, in any foreseeable war, they are on a vastly shorter front, and yet they are still going in for masses which it will probably be quite impossible for them to deploy on any foreseeable battlefield.
Again, the mass attacks of the Russians, which involved achieving a six-to-one or eight-to-one superiority before they attacked, has become impracticable in an atomic war because those sort of concentrations cannot be developed in face of the atom bomb. Therefore, we have a vastly better prospect in Europe because the advantages of great numbers are to a very great extent nullified. On the other hand, I believe that we have made the same mistake of once again thinking in terms of the last war and going in for equipment which involves support, supply and production upon a scale which leaves us with an inadequate supply of men available for fighting.
Take the tank. The tank is by no means the first armoured vehicle which war has seen. There have been armoured chariots at various times throughout the history of war. There has always been one result. Armour has been developed until it has reached the point where it has become too cumbersome to be worth its protection, and then it is thrust right away. I believe that we have come very near that sort of position today.
Armour has become developed to the point where it imposes such a demand upon supply, bridging, communications and maintenance that the protection which it affords is no longer worth the cost because on the battlefield the means


of piercing the armour have been advancing much faster than its ability to protect.
We have now the bazooka which, as an infantry weapon, is highly effective at ranges up to 200 or 300 yards. We have the recoilless gun, weighing 2 or 3 cwt., mountable quite easily on a sort of jeep chassis, which, I believe, has now developed to the point of being quite deadly against tanks up to 2,000 yards and effective at greater ranges than that. We have now also the atom. Whatever else the tank will protect against, it will not protect against the atom, because there is nothing better calculated to become radioactive.
I feel that we have reached one of those turning points in history where, with the circulating development of arms, the protection supplied by the tank as an offensive weapon is no longer worth the burden which it imposes on an Army, and the armoured vehicle function will become an artillery function.
Turning again to the infantry, I believe that the future lies with the foot soldier, as it has so often done in the past, but he must learn to be able to work in much greater dispersion than he does today
There is another point in connection with armour. I do not think it has ever been any good, or will be any good, to try to mix armoured and unarmoured troops in attack. Where one has armour, the man who has not got armour feels that it is not up to him to advance. The existence of armour in such a situation has a destructive effect on the morale of the man who has not got armour, and that is one of the big problems.
The mixture of armoured and unarmoured forces is not a method which has proved successful except on rare occasions. I know that the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) has a great deal of experience in this matter, particularly of bringing up infantry in armoured vehicles. Where he could strip a Sherman and put the infantry inside he could get the infantry up to work with his tanks, but where there is a mixture of these forces, I believe that the presence of armour to a very great extent destroys the morale of the infantry. I believe that we have to develop sections, probably

with the recoilless gun as their basic weapons—certainly at platoon level— capable of manoeuvring in very small packets on a very wide distribution.
Thanks to the Minister, I attended the manoeuvres in Germany. The problem there was a rapid advance and a retreat under pressure to a bridgehead. I went out at night to watch the attacking forces coming up as the people from the bridgehead were retreating. I noticed the congestion on the roads at night caused by the movement of the divisions. If a few sections or platoons equipped with bazookas, recoilless guns and weapons like that, had been left behind hidden in the woods on that retreat and had come out of the woods at night, they would have done terrific execution on those roads.
But that is not in contemplation at present. We must accept the idea that sections and platoons may be overrun and surrounded and that they can maintain themselves and make their way back in the sort of fluid war in which troops are widely dispersed, which we shall have in the atomic age.
If we are to have this type of infantry, in which I believe the future lies, it has to be much more highly trained than any infantry that we have yet known. It must be able to work far more independently. It will to some extent have to be a picked corps. I very much doubt whether, so long as we have to man our Regular Army with National Service men, we can do it with people whom we have for less than two years for their training and development. We may be able to do with far fewer men, but I very much doubt whether, save at the cost of an efficient Army, we can do with men for less time than that.
That is one of the things which I believe an inquiry which we asked for ought to investigate. It ought to provide us with the real answers to that sort of problem, and problems concerning the curtailment of the size of our forces in relation to the cutting of commitments. I profoundly believe that an efficient Army will be vastly more valuable than a Canal Base when we know that the Canal Base can only be kept at the price of an inefficient Army.
When we do reach the point at which we can cut down on numbers we shall have to consider very seriously whether


to do it on the American method of selective drafts or drafts by ballot or whether, while maintaining an efficient Army, we can reduce the period.

6.31 p.m.

Brigadier Ralph Rayner: I shall not attempt to follow the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) in all his various detailed criticisms of armaments. I hope that he is right as regards the next war, and that it will be a limited war, but we cannot take a chance on it.

Mr. Paget: We shall have to.

Brigadier Rayner: We cannot. The world is still governed by force, whether we like it or not. It is governed by such instruments of force as the scientists have devised, and we have to accept the idea that we may have to run up against any sort of armament. We have to arm ourselves for the future as well as for the past. We hear that the chance of war has to some extent receded, but again we cannot take a chance on that. No doubt it has receded to some extent, as the forces of N.A.T.O. have become powerful enough to compete with any sudden move from the forces of the Soviets. But that recession can come to an end in two or three weeks, and we have to be ready for all eventualities.
I listened to the appreciation of my light hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War with the greatest interest, and also to the appreciation of the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) with a great deal of interest. On the question of heavy armaments which he raised, I rather wonder whether we might not cut down on some of our heavy military equipment. As the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence said the other day, we have to take a chance within the defence budget. We cannot produce a slap-up Army, a slap-up Navy and a slap-up Air Force, and some of us wonder whether we might not economise on some of the heavy tanks and other heavy equipment.
As Germany begins to pull her weight —and I hope there will be no doubt about that—can we not say to our Western Allies on the Continent: "We will produce a certain number of divisions, but you must produce most of the ground Army and most of the main, heavy, military equipment. We will look

after the seas as far as we can, and we will produce an absolutely unbeatable Air Force, but you have to remember, you allies, that towards the end of the last war the one thing that stopped the Russians more effectively than anything else was low-flying aircraft with rockets. We will produce those on the ground in a very short time." One rather wonders—

Mr. M. Stewart: We surely were not fighting against the Russians in the last war? The hon. and gallant Member spoke of stopping the Russians.

Brigadier Rayner: It is an absolute fact, proved by all the evidence that has been produced, that the way the Germans most effectively stopped the Russians in the last stages when they had not much behind them was with aircraft armed with rockets. That will be a very effective weapon in the next war, whether we have atomic bombs or not.

Mr. Crossman: Is it the hon. and gallant Gentleman's argument that because the Germans rearm we shall feel that we should reduce our land forces in Germany? Is it his view that we should now tell the French that our idea is that when the Germans rearm we shall leave the French to their fate with the Germans? Does the hon. and gallant Gentleman think that that will encourage the French?

Brigadier Rayner: That is equally what the hon. Gentleman suggested himself in the defence debate the other day. I am suggesting nothing of the sort. I am saying that we shall produce the number of divisions that we are supposed to produce, but that it might be possible to depend upon the Continent for the really heavy armament. That is perhaps an economy that we might consider.
I listened with great interest to the right hon. Member for Dundee, West, who said he regarded the Suez commitment as of relatively minor importance. Many of us do not so regard it. We hope that our Government will decide in the end that we cannot completely evacuate the Canal. We cannot regard it as of minor importance, for two main reasons. We feel that British prestige has suffered so heavily over the last few years that it cannot afford another complete evacuation in the face of threats and violence. We feel also that, in the foreseeable future, we cannot really trust in the ability


of an Egyptian Government to keep their word or to give proper protection to British nationals. Therefore we rather hope that although we may be able to remove a great many of the present forces from the Canal we shall be able to keep enough troops there to keep open a port and an aerodrome installation, and to be able to defend themselves.

Mr. Ian Harvey: My hon. and gallant Friend stated that we cannot trust an Egyptian Government to keep their word. Is it not very foolish in that case to reduce the garrison?

Brigadier Rayner: I do not agree with my hon. Friend. There is every argument for reducing the garrison. The base as it stands now is altogether impossible to maintain. I do not see why one country should keep the Canal open for the civilised world if the rest of the civilised world does not help. I am suggesting that we should keep in Egypt a force sufficiently strong to protect itself, and there are 40,000 Britishers from all over this country and from the Commonwealth who have served in Egypt and who would feel that that would not be a very formidable task.
On the question of National Service, my right hon. Friend gave very cogent reasons why we cannot reduce the call-up. There is another reason which I have not heard mentioned in this House. The way of life of every nation is reflected in its armed forces. The Welfare State has undoubtedly saved thousands of weak or unlucky people and their dependants from disaster, but it has put a premium on self-reliance. In the old days the average British recruit used to roll up, with self-reliance as his trade mark. Today jobs are so easy to find and so easy to hold, with the Welfare State in the background ready to perform 101 services, that very many recruits serve in the Army with very little idea of what self-reliance means. It is easy enough to teach self-reliance, if chaps are good, and most of them are, but I do not believe they can be taught self-reliance under a couple of years. That is one other very good reason for (keeping the period of service as it is now.
I should like as a Territorial to make one tentative suggestion on National

Service. Would it not be possible to bring forward the period by six months? After all, the difficult time as every parent— and many magistrates—knows it between leaving school and joining up. No doubt there would be rather strong medical arguments against it, and of course it would mean that a National Service man had to go abroad—and might indeed have to fight—at the age of 18 years.
But many of us on both sides of the House were in the trenches at the age of 18, or even before that if we gave a wrong date of birth. It has not done us any harm. Every young man wants to get busy on his life's work and get out of the forces as quickly as he can; and a six months' advance on dates might be worth consideration.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Your argument is that two years in the Army develops self-reliance, but surely you cannot develop self-reliance in an institution in which you always have to do what you are told?

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member should remember that he is addressing the Chair.

Brigadier Rayner: You and I have both been in the Army, Mr. Speaker, and so has the hon. Member. We know perfectly well that one is given many jobs in which one is left entirely on one's own. My eldest son has only been a National Service man for three months, but only last week he was given the job with three other boys of going 100 miles across country and reporting on certain things at the end of it. They are taught self-reliance all the time.
I want to speak very briefly on officer entry. There is no doubt that we are not getting enough potential officers, particularly from the Northern schools. We badly want them from the North, too, because that is where we get some of the best stuff.
I congratulate my right hon. Friend on a book which he produced only two or three weeks ago, called "The Queen's Commission." In the Territorial Army I have a good deal to do with National Service men, but I only found that book by chance yesterday. It is one of the best things on the Army that I have ever read, and I think it should be very widely circulated. Will my right hon. Friend do his best to get it more widely read.
I am sure that the average good chap from every class will want to join the Army if he feels that it is a worth-while and honourable occupation. As my right hon. Friend said in opening this debate, there is no doubt that the Army is taking the weight at the present time. I am sure hon. Friends in the other Services will forgive me if I point out that at the moment the Army is doing far more than any other Service.
Two-thirds of the Air Force is serving at home; while two-thirds of the Army is serving abroad. In the cold war the Army is performing far more arduous tasks than either the Navy or the Air Force. In Korea k is the Army which has borne the losses and the discomforts. In Kenya and Malaya it is the Army that is at grips with the bandits in the jungle. In British Honduras it is the Army that has now established order. It is a very honourable service indeed, and the more my right hon. Friend can publicise that in pamphlets such as I have referred to, the better it will be.

6.45 p.m.

Mr. Victor Yates: T thought that the hon. and gallant Member for Totnes (Brigadier Rayner) showed extreme confusion of thought. I do not understand his suggestion that our way of life is reflected in the Armed Forces. I believe that the Armed Forces reflect the policy of the country, but not the way of life. He said that self-reliance is the quality we would find in the Army. I am bound to say that, judging from the letters which I have received from members of the Forces, the Army is still not democratised. The soldier still cannot take his shop steward with him to see his commanding officer. He still has no right to challenge an order, whether or not he believes it to be right. In effect it is still the same old:
Their's not to reason why,
Their's but to do and die.
During the nine years that I have been in the House I have been waiting for the improvements that have been suggested from time to time from people who believe that the Armed Forces provide that kind of character training which even the Secretary of State for War likened unto the training of a university.
I agreed with the hon. and gallant Member when he disagreed with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for

Northampton (Mr. Paget), who I regret is not at present in his place. I do not understand why he assumes that in the event of a future war atomic bombs would not be used, when in fact they were used in the last war.

Mr. Crossman: In fairness to the hon. and learned Member, who is for the moment absent, he said that, if atomic bombs were used, this country would not be able to play any part in the war. It was therefore no good our preparing for war in which we would be exterminated.

Mr. Yates: He used the words that we should concentrate on a strategic bomber force but said that he did not believe we should need to use it. That is an awfully dangerous doctrine. From facts which I obtained in the United States of America, I got the impression that atomic warfare was a very real danger—and we must face it.
To some extent we are limited in this debate. The policy contained in the White Paper on Defence has been discussed. But I am alarmed and appalled at the bill we are asked to meet. The Whole defence expenditure amounts to £1,639 million, which is 11s. 6d. per week per head of the population—

Mr. Emrys Hughes: More.

Mr. Yates: Probably more, but I am taking into consideration the aid from America. Even so, it amounts to 11s. 6d. per head per week, which means that a man, wife and three children contribute 57s. 6d. a week towards Defence. That is an intolerable burden.
We are asked today to approve an expenditure of £561 million for the Army. I object to this. It amounts to £535 million after American aid has been deducted. What is the purpose of the expenditure we are providing for the Armed Forces?

Mr. Nigel Fisher: To save the hon. Member's neck.

Mr. Yates: I have sometimes paired with the hon. Member.

Mr. Fisher: That is why I am so interested.

Mr. Yates: The hon. Member ought not to engage in such enormous expenditure to save my neck. I am quite sure he cannot justify it in the country. In


the 1953 White Paper on Defence we were told that the supreme object was to prevent a third world war, and that the effort which we were making would fall broadly into two parts—our overseas obligations and commitments in resisting the Communist campaign in the cold war and, secondly, our preparations, together with our Commonwealth partners and allies, against the risk of a direct Communist attack.
That is not the aim today. The 1954 Defence White Paper defines our aim very clearly, and it is different from what it was last year. We are now told that the cold war will continue for a very long period. Paragraph 9 says:
First, we must maintain our resistance to World Communism and Communist adventures.…
When I read that paragraph I began to rub my eyes and wonder whether I was in the United States of America. The greatest fallacy in the thinking of the United States is that the great danger which the world is facing comes not from Communist manoeuvres but from world Communism, and that the way to destroy it is by the strength of armed might. I do not believe that war can destroy Communism. If there is any military aspect in Communism it is a symptom of the disease and not the disease itself.
World revolution is being brought about because of the poverty and hunger of the masses. Poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy have created that revolution and, as Mr. Stringfellow Barrs said in "Let us join the Human Race":
If all the Russians in the world died this evening and if all the Communists of whatever race were to commit suicide at noon sharp tomorrow the world revolution would not stop.
As long as two-thirds of the world is under-nourished we shall have uprisings and dissatisfaction.
The Minister has issued a very clear Memorandum relating to the Army Estimates and their aim. I entirely support his tribute to the Armed Forces. They have earned the gratitude of the nation. In the concluding paragraph, however, the Minister says:
I think that they "—
the Army—
have earned the full gratitude of the nation and indeed of the western world with whose

forces they have co-operated to make a vital contribution both to our security and the cause of peace.
The most extraordinary thing is that our potential enemies claim exactly the same thing. Mr. Lipinski, writing in the "Soviet News," which is published by the Press Department of the Soviet Embassy in London, had this to say about the Soviet Army:
The Soviet Union did not create its Army for the sake of seizing foreign territories and enslaving foreign nations. The task of the Soviet Army is a straightforward one, to safeguard efficiently the freedom and independence of the Soviet people.
He went on to say:
Bearing in mind the existence in the world of aggressive forces the Soviet Union is maintaining and strengthening its Army in the interests of peace and progress. The Soviet Army is the mainstay of peace and the security of the people.
I do not agree with the Soviet view, and we are very illogical when we say, as we do in the White Paper, that the £561 million which we are spending is for peace and security, while the money which is being spent by those with whom we differ is not for peace but is a sign of militarism.
Looking at the map which is contained in the Memorandum, we see that from London to Hong Kong over 32 garrisons are stretched all over the world. It struck me that this map is similar to one which I saw in the United States "News and World Report," which shows the Soviet Union, coloured in red, with the various American bases all the way round. The article contained in this publication states that bombers can reach Russia within two hours with atomic bombs, and it tells us about the American Strategic Air Command.
I should like to know what the Army is going to do in the circumstances which will be created in the event of an atomic war. I have been in Omaha, in the centre of America, where there is a highly-trained group of 150,000 Americans, which is called a "fire brigade." The article tells us exactly how they propose to work. They have:
… voluminous…files of more than two million pieces of information about vital Russian areas, they have learned the terrain and the best approaches.
They propose to go into action at the word "Go," if one bomb is dropped on


any ally. We are told that three or four of these bombs
will destroy almost any Russian city. H bombs, when available, will assure total destruction over a target area with a radius of 10 miles from the centre of the explosion. One of those will destroy Moscow or any other Communist target.
It is a terrible prospect. At the end of this American article, these words appear:
The big aim of course is to prevent war, to deter any Russian aggression.
I assume that its purpose is peace, but what an illogical situation. Everything we do is for peace, however much destruction it may cause.
Some years ago there was a celebrated comedian who gave us some amusement on the halls. I took a cutting from the Press of one of the amusing things he said, because I thought it illustrated the paradox in which we find ourselves. He said:
The most paradoxical thing of the lot Is the way that the nations behave,
It appears from the speeches of prominent men
That peace is the thing they all crave.
Yet the factories are working all day and all night
And the atmosphere's getting more tense,
They're turning out tons of munitions and guns
And they say it is just for defence.
To round off the joke they say we're all broke,
But for armaments millions they've raised.
If it's just to take part in a war that won't start,
Then I'm more than surprised, I'm amazed.
That was Sir George Robey. What he said was printed in the "Daily Herald" on 28th October, 1936. How apt it is today.

Mr. Fisher: That was a most unfortunate quotation, because it concluded with the date—1936. The hon. Member will be aware that there was a war, so that the quotation is not very apt.

Mr. Yates: There was no war in 1936. We did not enter the war until 1939. In any case, the remarks apply today. What we are being asked to do is to approve expenditure which, it is assumed, will bring peace, whereas in fact it is creating even greater fear. When I was in America I was greatly impressed by the attitude of the population towards the view that we could not achieve peace except by the strength which in fact has always brought us war.
I want to say a few words about National Service. From the time we opened the Parliament of 1945 I and many of my hon. Friends have expressed ourselves totally opposed in principle to National Service. I am convinced that we cannot build a Regular Army as long as the generals are free to bring into their ranks all these young men without having to use their brains and advertising capacity to recruit them. I have been writing to the Secretary of State for War trying to get a man into the Army. That may sound a strange thing for me to do, but nevertheless, under the previous Government, I pointed out more than once how bad is the Army organisation.

Mr. E. Femyhough: I wonder if my hon. Friend's constituent is like a friend of mine who, when asked why he did not join the Army, said, "They had no vacancies in what I wanted to be." Asked what he wanted to be, he said, "A field marshal."

Mr. Yates: So far, I have not come across such ambitious constituents. The Army is an organisation which has not been able to make itself attractive to the nation. It has not sufficiently advertised its goods. We have heard about the huge sums spent on advertisements, but the Army has to be allowed to take into its ranks every young man from the age of 18. The War Office can do this without using its brains at all.
The most reactionary proposal which has come from hon. Members opposite was the suggestion that boys should be called up before they are 18. I hope the House will resist that infamous proposal. The Secretary of State for War has told me that it costs £10 to £12 a week to maintain a National Service man, and I therefore assume that he is paying £3 million a week to maintain all the National Service men. We have had conscription for 15 years, and for 15 years we have had, at the same time, problems which arise very often as a result of this kind of training. If we train people to fight and to kill we must not be surprised if, in ordinary civilian life, on their return from the Army, they do things which We do not like.
Before I can support this expenditure I must know more about the Estimates. In an earlier debate my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) made a statement with which I fully


agree. It was similar to a statement which I had made previously, but my right hon. Friend has not always agreed with me. On this occasion he said:
Here I want to touch on what seems to me to be a fallacious argument. I am sorry to say it has been used on both sides of the House, quite unwittingly, I think. It is that if we could reduce our commitments we could reduce the period of National Service. The answer to that is that, if we are to rely on our military advisers there will always be commitments."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th November, 1953; Vol. 520, c. 1507.]
The Minister shakes his head. I was shocked by his statement this afternoon. He told us that the Government want to reduce conscription as soon as possible and as much as possible, but he gave no hope whatever to the mass of the people. There are many more opposed to compulsory National Service than the House realises. It is unfair to snatch young men away from civilian life at the most impressionable period of their lives, and in my judgment we have no right to ask, as a price of our security, that these men should forgo their liberties. I am aware that my views are very unpopular, but that will not prevent me from continuing to express them.
I believe the time will come when people will demand an end to conscription. Many hon. Members did not have their lives interrupted as OUT young men's lives are interrupted today. I cannot believe that this expenditure will bring the peace that we desire. It would be much better to be more constructive in our efforts and in our approach. We should not try to frighten our opponents into further efforts of defence, and thus poison the prospect of negotiations. I am not satisfied that we are right in giving this permission year after year for an expenditure which is absolutely abnormal and which in the end will lead the nation to destruction.

Orders of the Day — CANAL ZONE (CONDITIONS)

7.10 p.m.

Mrs. Barbara Castle: I beg to move, to leave out from "That," to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
this House, noting the deterioration since 1951 in the living conditions of our troops in the Canal Zone due to the uncertainty as to the future of the base, deplores the Government's handling of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations which has prolonged this uncertainty.

I wish to make it clear at the outset that I consider myself both fortunate and privileged in having been lucky in the Ballot for tonight's debate and so having this opportunity of raising a great human problem. I must say that I am encouraged by the amount of time which the Secretary of State gave in his speech today to conditions in the Middle East, and by the concessions which he announced to improve those conditions. This shows that I have chosen a subject of wide interest and of central importance to the efficiency of our Army, one with which the right hon. Gentleman is very much concerned.
I want to make it clear that my interest in this matter is, first and foremost, a constituency one. The question of the living conditions of our troops in the Canal Zone is one that affects not only the well-being and safety of some 70,000 of our troops, but also the happiness and peace of mind of their mothers and fathers and their wives and families in this country, as many of us know from the letters we receive.
There could be no more appropriate use of the debate on the Army Estimates than to concentrate the attention of this House on the conditions under which such a large proportion of our National Service men and of our Regular soldiers live and work. It is with a due sense of my Parliamentary responsibility that I move this Amendment. I know perfectly well that this is not a new problem and that it has been raised frequently in this House by hon. Members who are much better equipped to deal with it than I am. My excuse for speaking on it tonight is that with every month that passes the problem is getting worse. If we go on letting the matter drift we shall not only be betraying the faith and trust which our soldiers and their families have in this House to fight their battles for them, but we shall feel the evil consequences of this drift throughout the whole of our defence policy.
The question of the living conditions in the Canal Zone has been debated time and again in this House during the past two years. In January of last year, on the Supplementary Estimates, it was raised in great detail by my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), who will be seconding this Amendment, who gave us a very vivid


picture of the conditions under which our troops are living in this area.
Far from refuting his statements, the Under-Secretary of State for War gave the House some figures which dramatically confirm the claims which my hon. Friend made. By now everyone in this House should know these facts. They have been given not merely in speeches, but in Government White Papers and, not least, in the speeches of the Secretary of State himself. By now everybody in this House is aware of the central problem: namely, that in this stretch of territory in the Canal Zone, which, before the war, housed one brigade in excellent quarters, we have today crowded depots, stores and troops without any proper provision for garrisoning them.
We have three and a half divisions of men in accommodation originally intended for one brigade. Those men are sitting behind barbed wire watching the base deteriorate and watching the stores which we accumulated at such expense and trouble being pilfered almost under their eyes. Here I quote figures given in the debate in January, 1953, by the Under-Secretary in reply to my hon. Friend. Of these troops, only 1 per cent, are in permanent accommodation. Of the rest, we were told that 3 per cent, live in huts, 38 per cent, live in tents, and over half in camps which were partly hutted and partly tented.
What interests me is the way in which the Secretary of State himself returns to this problem in his Memoranda year by year. He has returned again this year in the Memorandum that accompanies the Army Estimates. He deals with these conditions at great length and far more vividly than I could hope to do. I should like to read to the House some of his words, because he is posing to us the problem with which he is faced. The Memorandum tells us:
Most units live in almost completely tented camps, surrounded by barbed wire, which are extremely cold in winter and desperately hot in summer. They are subjected to sandstorms, flies and mosquitoes.
He adds that the amenities for our soldiers there are "most austere" and:
It is far from easy for a soldier to get away from this atmosphere of tents, sand, barbed wire, and flies. If he leaves the camp, he must be armed and escorted. There are, indeed, few places for him to go to as it has

been impossible to provide amenities on the scale required for the large garrison which came at such short notice.
These are almost poetic words with which to describe the conditions in which so many of our soldiers are living; but agony is piled on agony. We know that since the abrogation of the Treaty all local leave has been stopped. The soldier cannot escape from this deadening atmosphere of monotony and decay by going to Cairo, Alexandria or Ismailia.

Mr. Head: I am sure that the hon. Lady does not wish to mislead the House. The Memorandum does state that the soldiers can go on the leave scheme we run to Cyprus.

Mrs. Castle: Yes. I was talking about local leave. I think that the right hon. Gentleman will agree that I am correct in what I have just said about Cairo, Alexandria and Ismailia. The impression one gets from reading the Memorandum is one of all these soldiers sitting in a concentration camp behind barbed wire meditating on the futility of existence and wondering what is happening to their families.
One of the most crucial problems to which the Minister has returned time and again is that married accommodation is grotesquely inadequate. The White Paper admits it. The latest figures which I have received—and I shall be glad to have them confirmed or corrected—are that only 1½ per cent, of other ranks have their families with them, and even for officers the figure is only 18 per cent. Yet the War Office says that it is hopeless to try to improve these conditions. Why is that? It is because, in the words of the White Paper:
It has never been possible to spend the millions of pounds really required on accommodation under the circumstances of uncertainty which now obtain.
Those words were echoed again by the Secretary of State this afternoon. I must say, after listening to the right hon. Gentleman and reading the White Paper, that it seemed to me that these words sounded like a cri de coeur from the Army to the politicians to end this uncertainty. I hope that we will answer that cri de coeur tonight, because unless we do it is futile for us to debate the future efficiency of our Army.
The War Office is obviously very unhappy about this situation. It knows


that it is disastrous for morale. It would be bad enough to work under those conditions if the soldiers felt that the job was worth doing. But what are our men doing out there? The theory is that they are supposed to be defending a lifeline of Empire. In practice, they are spending all their time watching the depots and trying to protect our installations and property from the depredations of the local inhabitants.
Here, again, the White Paper gives a most dramatic and vivid picture of local thugs specially trained for the work, lying in wait at night to attack our men, hoping to catch them off their guard, and jumping on vehicles and attacking drivers and escorts from behind. It must be the strangest kind of soldiering in all our history to have our soldiers spending their time defending themselves and British property from the local inhabitants on whose friendly co-operation we should be completely dependent in time of war.
To the sense of danger which the men must have is added the sense of futility. In addition to his normal duty, every man does two nights guard duty a week watching for an enemy who ought to be an ally if this base is to have any military sense at all. It is not surprising that a tour of duty in Suez is considered the worst assignment that the Army can offer. In fact, despite the additional dangers, the soldiers would rather be in Korea or Malaya.
It is not surprising that our men in the Canal Zone consider themselves to be the forgotten Army of 1954 sitting as they are in a concentration camp, doing a job which has no military sense. It is no wonder that commanders on the spot want the Government to reach a decision which will end this uncertainty. No wonder, too, that the War Office is worried and that the Secretary of State for War is worried, as I appreciate he is. He knows that the position is quite intolerable and that as long as it drags on our chances of stimulating recruitment to the Regular Army are seriously reduced. Above all, our chances of persuading men to stay on in the Army are reduced.
The Defence White Paper has stressed the urgency of this point as did the Secretary of State this afternoon. We know, as the White Paper says, that more men

will have to prolong their engagements if the increasing shortage of N.C. Os. and skilled tradesmen is to be made good. But we are told that in 1953 extensions of service were below the required strength and that re-engagements actually fell.
The Government have come forward with some new pay proposals to stop the rot, but that in itself is not enough to make Army life attractive. It is obvious that with 80 per cent, of our fighting units serving overseas, living conditions in the foreign stations are to play a really decisive part in deciding a soldier whether or not to stay on in the Army. Of all our overseas stations, the Canal Zone is the most important, because there we have the largest number of men living under the worst conditions.
The War Office realise that one of the main deterrents to recruitment to the Regular Army is the prospect of having to do a few years in the Canal Zone away from social life and civilised amenities. The leave concessions for these men, about which we have heard this afternoon, are, of course, welcome. But they are also a recognition of the fact that the present position is impossible, and is a deterrent to recruitment. They are as much a confession as a concession, and I suggest that they do not really meet the urgency of the situation.
We have been given an estimate of what will be the cost of these leave concessions for men in the Middle East and Kenya. It will amount to some £680,000. I tried to do an arithmetical calculation, and I arrived at the conclusion that, at £51 per man, some 13,000-odd men from these areas will benefit by the concession. I should like the Secretary of State to say exactly how many men in the Canal Zone will benefit, and, above all, how many of the other ranks as compared with the officers will be affected, because if the proportion of that benefit between officers and other ranks is the same as with married accommodation, it does not look as if many other ranks are going to benefit.

Mr. Head: There is no question of any distinction between officers and other ranks. The qualification, as I said, is nine months separation and having another four months to serve at the station. That applies alike to officers and other ranks.

Mrs. Castle: I am grateful for that assurance, but the total figures of those benefiting still remains small. I think that the Secretary of State knows perfectly well that this in itself will not take away the deterrent effect of conditions out there or solve the basic problem. This area and its living conditions will remain, despite this concession, one of the main obstacles to regular recruiting.
Despite this, no proposals have been put forward for improving the conditions. Nobody has brought forward any plans for making the situation better. Why? The answer, quite obviously, is that, when we have over 80,000 men living in accommodation originally planned for 4,000, it will cost millions of pounds to make that accommodation anything like habitable. As the White Paper points out, no one will suggest that we should spend that amount of money at present.
The War Office and the Foreign Office know quite well that there are only two ways of ending this uncertainty and of dealing with these conditions. One is by withdrawing all our troops and equipment before 1956, as we are committed to do under the Treaty. The other is by reaching an agreement with Egypt under which we would co-operate with them to maintain the base. In either case, of course, our fighting troops will have to go and anyone in this House who imagines that we can dig In our heels and stay in the Zone in the teeth of Egyptian objection, has just not read the White Paper. As the Memorandum points out:
The soldiers have two main tasks in the Canal Base, to operate it and to defend it
It goes on to say that our men are trying to do these jobs
amongst an unfriendly and often hostile population.
In other words, our soldiers are defending the base not against a future enemy of this country, but against the local population of the sovereign country in which it is situated.
If we have to defend this base in this way in peacetime, and if we are to insist on staying there despite our commitments under the 1936 Treaty and in the teeth of the bitter determination of the Egyptian Government to have us go, what chance have we of operating that base successfully in an emergency? I believe that

both the War Office and the Foreign Office know this as well as I do. I believe that the War Office want to end this uncertainty by withdrawing the fighting troops, as do the chiefs of staff. I believe that the Foreign Office wants agreement.
I think there is agreement among the experts that this situation does not help our defence but, instead, is a millstone round our necks. What in heaven's name, then, is preventing this solution? Here we have an amazing situation. These conditions which I have outlined and which the Secretary of State has outlined time and again, with their threat to the morale of our Army, are allowed to continue because of the activities of the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester. South-East (Captain Waterhouse).
It is a remarkable tribute to the power and authority of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, who is living in a military past which has long since become irrelevant. He is able to sit on these civilian benches and dictate the conditions under which 70,000 of our troops shall live. It is a most astonishing phenomenon. What is the secret of this remarkable power of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman? Obviously, he could not achieve it by his own strength alone. He could not achieve it even with the help of the little band of die-hard ostriches who are associated with him.
I suggest that the secret of his power is that he has a Trojan horse on the Government Front Bench in the person of the Prime Minister himself, and that the Prime Minister is going in the teeth of the advice of all his experts both at the War Office and the Foreign Office out of devotion to sentimental memories of the past.
This House would be failing in its duty if we let these Estimates pass tonight without registering our anger at a situation in which the well-being of our Service men and the intelligent use of our Armed Forces is being sacrificed so frivolously. Every soldier who is involved in this situation should realise that his misery in the Canal Zone, which is freely admitted by the Secretary of State, is not dictated by military necessity. It is dictated by the Government's cowardly and inept handling of foreign policy, and for this reason the House ought to censure the Government tonight.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I have listened to the hon. Lady's most interesting speech, and I thought it right to say, in case we were diverted too much from this topic before the House, that we must not let it develop into a foreign affairs debate. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, who will be replying to the debate, is not responsible for foreign affairs. I think the hon. Lady is quite entitled to say that this is a commitment which we should not have. That is all right, but if she goes on attacking the Foreign Office there is nobody here to reply for that Department, and I hope the hon. Lady will assist me in keeping this a debate on the Army Estimates.

Mrs. Castle: I am grateful for your Ruling, Mr. Speaker. I really am trying to help the Secretary of State for War in this matter. I am trying to reply to the implicit appeal in his own Memorandum—

Mr. Speaker: I accept from the hon. Lady that she is trying to help the Secretary of State for War. If she can contrive to do so without attacking the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, it will be to the advantage of all of us.

Mrs. Castle: I am also trying to help the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Speaker. The only persons I am not trying to help are the Prime Minister and the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East. In any case, I have now finished my speech.

7.35 p.m.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: In accepting your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, I should like first of all to say that I am more encouraged by this debate than I was by the last one when we raised this issue. We raised the matter on Supplementary Estimates just a year ago, and we heard a great deal of incredulity from hon. Members opposite when we referred to what is now admitted to be the almost desperate situation and the deterioration in the Zone. Well, we have advanced. It takes about 12 months before it gets through to hon. Members opposite that the facts which we state are the real facts of the situation.
I saw the situation again during the Christmas Recess. I would pay my tribute to the troops over there. Frankly,

I do not believe there is another Army in the world which would stick the conditions of the Canal Zone and which would maintain its discipline as high as their discipline is maintained. They are not as miserable as my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn, East (Mrs. Castle) seemed to think, because British soldiers have an incredible facility for making the best of life. They are making the best of life in miserable conditions, and if they are not happy, they are certainly miraculously avoiding looking miserable to the people who visit them. We need to pay them a tribute for what they are doing out there.
I want to make one or two references to conditions in the area. My hon. Friend said that only 1½ per cent, of other ranks and 18 per cent, of the officers had their families with them. I saw some of the married quarters, and even those who are fortunate to have married quarters do not find them exactly bright One I visited was no better than a displaced persons' camp. Year by year the are deteriorating. Year by year the Nissen huts look older, the paint flakes off and the place gets more decrepit.
I want to stress particularly the sense of frustration which struck me, for it is this frustration which all the officers there feel to be their greatest moral problem. I went to a depôt where there was £20 million worth of equipment, from hot water bottles to railway lines. There is a steady drain on those goods, because next door to the depôt is a village. The villagers have lived by pilfering all their lives. The only difference between former days and now is that it is regarded as a patriotic duty.
In the middle of the depot there is an observation tower. The commanding officer climbed with me to the top, pressed a button and out came the fire brigade. I asked, "Who are the firemen?" and he said,"They are gypos from the village." So one half of the population is outside thieving and the remainder are on the inside paid by us. The Egyptians are very gallant thieves, because it takes some courage to be one of a group of 20 and get through the barbed wire. Even if they are caught they are handed over to the civil authorities, who are Egyptians, and they acquit the thieves and give them liberation medals. It is a depressing thing to be one of 81,000 men stuck out


there at those depots, knowing that the goods are being pilfered and that nothing can be done about it. They do two nights' guard duty in a week in addition to their normal duties and they know they are not maintaining British prestige.
The demand has been made that we should take over the civil administration. But under the treaty we must collaborate with the civil population. There are 450,000 Egyptians—many more than there are British—living in villages and towns of the Zone administered by Egyptian authorities. We cannot take over the civil administration here without taking over Cairo and Alexandria. Perhaps some hon. Members opposite would like that. If so, they would have to withdraw the 250 men from Bermuda. They might even have to get the battalion which used to be at Balmoral and has now gone to Guiana. But even then we should have to have three more divisions to occupy all Egypt.
I know the Secretary of State does not dream that we should re-occupy Cairo and Alexandria and add yet another back-breaking commitment to the list that he has already said makes it impossible for the Army to be an effective Army. So the Army has to stay out there, and has to collaborate with the civil administration, which does not collaborate with the Army and which acquits all thieves. No soldiers in the world could find such a situation tolerable.
No wonder that the Secretary of State finds recruitment difficult. This is not only a major disincentive to recruiting for the Regular Army; it is corroding the cadres of the Regular Army, because when men whose time of service is up hear they are likely to be sent to Suez if they rejoin, they do not join up again. We all know of officers and N.C. Os., of essential men, who, when they hear that they would be due to go to Suez, promptly come out rather than re-engage. It is happening week by week and month by month, and the Secretary of State has to admit that the Regular Army is being corroded by this commitment.
This evening, we must consider this business of Suez from the strictly military point of view. Some people talk as though this base we are holding had always been there. Actually we have only had this base in the form in which

it now is since 1947. Before the war, what did we have in Egypt? We had 10,000 men in Egypt, 4,000 of them in the Suez area. [Interruption.] Unlike hon. Members opposite, I am not so anachronistic as to believe that we could go happily back to the days before the war.

Mr. W. R. Rees-Davies: Why not?

Mr. Crossman: The days when we kept 10,000 men out there have gone since we signed the Atlantic Charter and agreed we must not hold a sovereign nation down by force. We had those 10,000 men in Egypt. But we had no base. But only a garrison on the Canal. Then came the war and troops and equipment passed through the Red Sea and we began to marshal them for the Western desert offensive. That is how the base which we now know began to take shape along the Canal.
All this came about during the war, and I do not blame anybody for it. After the war, between 1945 and 1947, the Labour Government began dismantling this base. There were plans to move it elsewhere. At one time it was thought it might be moved to Mackinnon Road. The Foreign Secretary at that time described the base in Egypt as the biggest single obstacle to any form of collaboration in the Middle East. The presence of our troops there was a standing insult to Egyptian sovereignty, and so offended Middle Eastern opinion that we could not obtain Arab participation in the defence of their own countries. So we decided to move the base. Then in 1947 we had the evacuation of Palestine. All the junk out of Palestine was dumped into the Canal base. All the junk out of India was dumped into the Canal base. Now nobody knows how much junk there is in the base.

Brigadier Rayner: rose—

Mr. Crossman: I am not going to give way because I am concerned about the base, not party politics. An immense collection of junk was put into the base between 1947 and 1950, and then there arose the problem of Persia, and the first division went in. Let us be candid about why that division went in. The first division went in as a demonstration of force. Let us be fair, and acknowledge


that it was the Labour Government who sent the division in. Any Government, I think, would have had to make a demonstration at that time.
So more and more fighting troops went into the Canal Zone than it was ever intended should be there. There was a division and a half in 1951 and after the burning of Cairo a second division was sent until we had three and a half divisions of fighting troops scattered among this collection of depots. For that is what the base is. It is a collection of depots, and all those fighting troops were dumped down in them as a show of strength.
Those who call this a "hedgehog" are quite wrong. It is the longest, softest under-belly I have seen in my life. It may be wonderful from the point of view of dispersal under atom bombing, but this dispersal is ideal for sabotage, for pilfering, for guerrilla warfare. How anyone can think it is strategically vital to maintain this long, soft under-belly with thousands of guards strung out on the perimeters of the depots I do not know. [Interruption.] There are people who make the even more idiotic suggestion that we can hold the base with only one division out there, or even one brigade. That they say would take us back to the prewar days. Anyone who thinks in 1954 that we can hold down all Egypt with one brigade is living in a dream world.

Brigadier Rayner: No one has ever said so.

Mr. Crossman: If it is not to be held by force, our men must be out there by agreement with Egypt.

Brigadier Rayner: The hon. Gentleman is indulging, as he often does, in mere shadow boxing, and is ascribing to hon. Members on this side of the House ideas and opinions that none of us holds. As far as I know, none of us on this side of the House is arguing that we should keep that under-belly he is talking about by force. All that we suggest is that we should keep a Western defence force in Egypt.

Mr. Crossman: We do not glean very much out of that interruption, except the admission of the interesting fact that

some hon. Gentlemen want to give up the base and keep a garrison in Egypt. But after 1956 we must either evacuate all the troops and all the equipment or else we must reconquer Egypt, or else we must have an agreement with the Egyptians.
This brings me to the matter of the negotiations. I know that one should not embarrass the Government while negotiations are going on, and I would not do so. But the really significant thing about what has been happening is the negotiations have stopped. Up to last October they went on. By 8th October agreement was reached on things which appalled the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) and some of his hon. Friends who sit below the Gangway on that side of the House. One of them was that our negotiators agreed on the evacuation of all the fighting troops within 18 months. Another was that they agreed on a seven-year period during which we should maintain the base while training the Egyptians to take over. A third was to agreement on 4,000 technicians. Yes, all that was agreed by the Conservative Government.
There was a hitch on two points. There was a hitch on uniforms—a wonderful thing to hitch about. The other was on the complex clause about re-entry in case of war. The substance, however, had been surrendered. No applause from below the Gangway opposite? But that is what all the noise is about—because the Conservative Government have swallowed the substance, thank heavens, and gulped at the shadow—

Mr. Frederick Gough: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. When Mr. Speaker was in the Chair he called the hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn, East (Mrs. Castle) to order for dealing with matters which are the concern of the Foreign Secretary. I submit to you that that is precisely what the hon. Gentleman is doing now.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I understood that the hon. Gentleman was dealing with matters affecting the base, and as long as he deals with matters within the responsibility of the Secretary of State for War he is in order. Matters which are the responsibility of the Foreign Secretary would not be in order.

Mr. Crossman: I am grateful for your Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that the discussion is about the base and its maintenance and that references to the agreement are therefore relevant. For that is what we are discussing, and what we shall go on discussing, if the hon. Gentleman the Member for Horsham (Mr. Gough) does not mind. It is very unpleasant for him and some hon. Gentlemen opposite to hear about these things, but so that we may all be quite clear about it, let me repeat what I have just said. Those people on the Treasury Bench surrendered the substance, and they have been defending the figment for months for fear of their hon. Friends below the Gangway.

Major H. Legge-Bourke: I think that the hon. Gentleman will agree that it was Mr. Bevin who said the principle of evacuation was accepted.

Mr. Crossman: Certainly. I am saying that we have witnessed conversion of the Conservative Ministers to Socialist principles. When they got responsibility they discovered how sensible Mr. Bevin was in deciding to evacuate the base. Before, they made great speeches about scuttling; but put them at the War Office, and they say it is not scuttling at all. They say that this is an essential thing that we have to do. They see now that we have either to get out without any conditions or stay on conditions that Egypt will consent to.
Those below the Gangway refuse to face this choice because they do not have to, whereas everyone sitting on that Front Bench opposite has been convinced of it. Yet they have not had the guts to sign the treaty. That is what this little Amendment which we are moving today is about. We say: the British soldier never minds when he is given a tough job to do which is a real job for his country, but to be asked to submit to frustration and futility, month after month, in the Canal Zone because the Government, having agreed on the substance of the treaty, have not the courage to fight their own back benchers—that is insupportable.
We have the right to say on behalf of the soldier who has kept his morale up, who is showing guts and good temper: do not try his temper too long because, in trying his temper, the Government are

also undermining the chance of retaining any prestige in the Middle East. For the sake of illusions, which they do not share with their supporters below the Gangway, the Government are sacrificing the only possibility of keeping the Middle East on our side, so we say to the Government, on behalf of the Army and the peoples of the Middle East, who are also acknowledged by us as Allies: hurry up, show your courage and do what you know to be right.

7.53 p.m.

Captain Charles Waterhouse: I am sure that the House has enjoyed the latest endeavour of the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) to interpret what we think and what we are out for. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who are 'we'?"] I think that hon. Members opposite have been kind enough to address themselves largely to the people on these benches rather than to the Chair.
The hon. Member for Blackburn, East (Mrs. Castle) said that we were "ostriches." Let me assure her that we do not wear our feathers at that end. Both the hon. Members expressed one sentiment with which at least everyone of us on this side of the House completely agrees. We have the greatest admiration for the British soldiers who are in the Canal Zone. We share their sympathy for them, and we believe that their sympathy is real.
I much appreciate what the hon. Member for Coventry, East said about the morale of the troops. He was good enough to say that, in spite of all these difficulties, the morale and discipline of our troops in the Canal Zone had not suffered at all. He said, with truth, that people were not signing on again as we would like them to sign on. We know that. We deplore the conditions, but we utterly refuse to accept that we on this side of the House, and particularly those on the Government Front Bench, are in the smallest way responsible for them.
We have to accept the base as it was handed over to us by hon. Members opposite. I would remind hon. Members that the Treaty of 1936, signed by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, made very careful provision for our troops in the Canal Zone. The hon. Member for Coventry, East has taken the trouble to read parts of it, but has he


read the whole lot? Does he know that under that Treaty the Egyptians agreed to set up properly built barracks, to provide the necessary lines of emergency water supplies, to plant trees and to make pro vision for gardens and playing fields, etc. for the troops—

Mr. Crossman: How many?

Captain Waterhouse: For the troops there — [Interruption.] — perhaps hon. Members will give me a chance to reply. The troops which were agreed under the Treaty—10,000 soldiers, plus airmen and their auxiliaries, altogether 15,000 or 20,000 men. What was done? The war came along. There was no effort made to build barracks, apart from one barracks which was built at Moascar. The hon. Member for Blackburn, East said that only 1 per cent, of the troops were housed. I think that she is wrong. I think that about one brigade of the troops—

Mrs. Castle: I was quoting a figure given in 1953 by the Under-Secretary of State.

Captain Waterhouse: About one brigade in Egypt are properly housed. The rest, I agree, are very badly housed. But whose fault is that? We had troops in Cairo and in Alexandria who were not badly housed, and not badly looked after. The late Mr. Ernest Bevin agreed to move them out without any renewed agreement at all for making the necessary provisions in the Canal Zone.
What came after that? The hon. Member for Coventry, East has already described what happened. The bases there were reduced and munitions were moved to Palestine. That policy had to be reversed because he could not arrive at an agreement in Palestine, and the stuff came pouring back. It was then sent to India and it came back again to the Canal Zone. Very much the same thing happened in India. Material was moved to the Mackinnon Road, on which we spent millions of pounds. That policy, too, was reversed and it came back to the Canal Zone. When trouble arose at Abadan, right hon. Gentlemen opposite did not face up to it, as we thought they should have done. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh‡"] I think that this is a good, cogent reasoned argument.
What happened then? Within a few months of Abadan all these troops, so vividly described by the hon. Member for Coventry, East arrived in Egypt. We had great reinforcements and the position for the troops got worse and worse. There it is. Today, I quite agree that we have forces far larger than the base can possibly hold with decency or propriety. It is nonsense for the hon. Member to say that we are there in the old imperialistic sense and are going back to past ages. We have a right to be in Egypt under our Treaty. We have as much right to be in Egypt as any hon. Member living in a flat or house in London on lease has a right to be in that flat or house. The Treaty is extant and he is absolutely wrong in saying that in 1956 that Treaty expires.
What happens in 1956? The Treaty can be reviewed, and if, by then, the Egyptians are able to maintain the Canal and to maintain the security of the Zone, we are quite prepared to go out. But looking around at what has happened in Egypt in the last few days and weeks, does anybody pretend that Egypt is today in a position to accept those responsibilities? We are not encroaching on Egypt: we are standing on our Treaty rights.

Mr. Crossman: The right hon. and gallant Member has said three times that we are standing on our Treaty rights. Does he deny that we have now four times as many men there as were permitted under the Treaty? We have them in areas where we are not permitted to do so. What clause of the Treaty are we observing?

Captain Waterhouse: I am perfectly aware of that.

Mr. Crossman: The right hon. and gallant Member said "Treaty rights."

Captain Waterhouse: The hon. Member knows equally well how that arose. It is hon. Members on his side who are to blame. The hon. Member wants us to negotiate and to come to terms. The Members on his side are prepared to come to almost any terms with almost anybody. Can anybody say that the happenings of the last few days and weeks are any justification for blaming Her Majesty's Government for not having come to an agreement with these people in Egypt? Can anybody honestly say‑

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): I know this is a difficult Amendment, but I do not think that a discussion upon the Treaty or Agreement, except in so far as it has a bearing on the Base, would be in order, because there is no reply on this Vote by the Foreign Office.

Captain Waterhouse: The Amendment clearly blames the Government for their
handling of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I would point out that the Notice begins:
To call attention to the living conditions of the troops in the Canal Zone in Egypt…
That is the Notice. Therefore, that governs the rest of the Amendment.

Captain Waterhouse: I have no wish to infringe your Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, or to persue the matter very far, but I want to pursue this point, which is relevant to the debate on the Army Estimates.
What has been the one stabilising factor during the last three troublous weeks in the Middle East, when the President was put under arrest, was let out and half reinstated, has been now completely reinstated, and when his second lieutenant congratulated himself for not having cut his leader's throat when he had him in his power? What has been the one stabilising factor during our troubles in Khartoum, when a chief of police and many others were shot? Surely all hon. Members in the House, on the opposite side as well as on this side, will agree that the one element of stability was the fact that we had British forces there.
We agree it is sad that men have to live under such conditions. But there is nothing new in British soldiers being asked to accept poor conditions; that is the natural lot of men who become soldiers. On the North-West Frontier of India, conditions were similar. Soldiers lived there, and lived there cheerfully, but I admit there was the very cogent argument that they lived there feeling that they were there with a real object. It may well be that the soldiers in the Canal Zone today are in such doubt that they do not have a clear idea of what their objective is.
We have rearmed primarily in an endeavour to preserve peace, and we have

to deploy our troops primarily in an endeavour to preserve peace. If it is necessary to hold troops at the Canal, I am certain that any British unit or soldier is well prepared and glad to serve. But the hon. Member for Coventry, East dealt entirely with the base, but that is not by any means the only reason that we need a force in the Canal Zone. There are four factors, all of which justify the retention of a force there.
There is the base, which, the hon. Member truly says, has grown out of all recognition. How big it need be, I do not know. How big it would be designed if the military chiefs were asked now to construct a base, I do not know, but I feel fairly sure that a base of its present size is absolutely unnecessary, either for our present needs or for our future prospects.
The hon. Member said very little about the Canal. Our troops are there largely because of the Canal. Perhaps we cannot safeguard the Canal by having troops in any one place, but we can exert an influence, and thereby ensure peace, by having a body of British troops which is sufficient to ensure respect.
There is the Middle East. Are our commitments nothing in the Middle East? Do they not matter? Hon. Members may say that the troops should be moved to Cyrenaica, to Libya or to Cyprus, but what right have we in Cyrenaica, in Libya, or even in Cyprus, that we have not now got in Egypt?

Mr. Strachey: The Treaty.

Captain Waterhouse: The right hon. Gentleman, a former Secretary of State for War. says, "The Treaty." That is precisely why and how we are in Egypt.

Mr. Strachey: We do not have Treaty rights in Egypt to keep anything like this number of troops there in anything like these positions. That is the simple fact.

Captain Waterhouse: I have already dealt with that. I am fully aware that we have been forced by the ineptitude of the Government of which the right hon. Gentleman was a Member—

Mr. Aneurin Bevan: rose

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: If the right hon. and gallant Member gives way, it is in order for the right hon. Member to intervene.

Mr. Bevan: I thank the right hon. and gallant Member for giving way. He is much more courteous than his colleagues. He has said that we were responsible for violating our Treaty rights in Egypt. We admit that. So are the present Government responsible for violating them. The people who are right, obviously, are the Egyptians.

Captain Waterhouse: With the first part of that intervention I entirely agree, but the second part is nonsense. Right hon. Gentlemen opposite put us in a position which we have to accept. We cannot reverse everything they have done—we wish to goodness we could. We have to accept the position as we had it, and we are doing our best to rectify it.
I was saying that in Cyrenaica, in Libya, or in Cyprus even, we have no more legal position than we have now in Egypt. Hon. Members should not forget also our great responsibilities throughout the whole of Africa. Until a few months ago we were jointly responsible for the Sudan. We have made the Sudan; we have brought the Sudan up. They relied on us, they looked to us. Is it up to us now to let them feel that Britain is no longer near them if they are in need?
We are asked to negotiate—this is my last direct reference to negotiations—but everything that has happened in the last year tends to prove that our often expressed fears are unhappily correct; our prognostications have been proved to be right. Having done all that we could, having made the maximum gesture to Egypt over the Sudan, we still find them calling out loud and clear for unity of the Nile Valley when, 12 months ago, they were pretending that they were standing for the independence of the Sudan.
There is one further aspect—and I do not want to keep the House long on this —which has to be considered when we are thinking of the base. Turkey has recently become a member of N.A.T.O. and the strategic importance of that I do not pretend to be able to judge, but I do know that many soldiers have now changed their view on the essentiality of a great supply base on the Canal.
What, then, can be done? We are invited to have redeployment. My right

hon. Friend the Secretary of State spoke about it in his opening speech. Do not let this House think that very much is to come out of redeployment. There are about 60,000 white troops and airmen in the base, about 45,000 to 50,000 white soldiers and 15,000 airmen, and there are another 20,000 coloured troops.

Mr. Bevan: There are 71,000 British troops.

Captain Waterhouse: I will not quarrel with the right hon. Gentleman. Of the 71,000 which he mentioned, about 18,000 are from the Colonies.

Mr. Bevan: No.

Captain Waterhouse: Perhaps my right hon. Friend will tell me whether I am wrong. How many troops are to come back here through redeployment, and how long is it to be, when they do get back, before we will hear hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite asking why we want so many troops around Britain, and suggesting some modifications of National Service?
I agree with another remark of the hon. Member for Coventry, East. He said if we liked we could maintain the base with our present forces, but he said nobody wanted to do that. He also said that we could get out, lock, stock and barrel. I agree that that is a possibility. It is one that I should decry, but it is a possibility. I personally do not believe that it is a practical proposition to leave 4,000 dispersed technicians in that area.
The hon. Gentleman has graphically described what is taking place in the way of looting. I would hesitate to accept the responsibility for leaving 4,000 British troops and 25,000 British civilians in an Egypt and in a Canal Zone under political conditions such as exist today without British forces anywhere near to influence the situation or to protect them.
I suggest that that does not exhaust the possibility. There is an approach which has not been tried since the war, because since then every British Government—and I am sorry that my right hop. Friends are doing it—have talked in terms of evacuation. I met someone the other day who was freshly back from Egypt. He had lived many years there as a businessman; his father and he had been there for a period which spanned


80 years. He told me there is an Arab proverb which runs:
Give a man his land and he will expect to be given the seed to sow.
That, I believe, is a fair summing up of Eastern mentality. As long as they feel they can gain by bargaining they are not going to clinch the bargain.
As long as we are talking about evacuation it will be absolutely impossible to come to a real agreement with Egypt on any other terms than complete evacuation. I believe that we can go back to where we were in 1936. I believe it is still possible to say that, conditions being as they are, all those factors, which caused my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to make that Agreement, still operate, and should continue to do so until Egypt is able and willing to preserve the Canal, and to preserve security in her area. Until then we should say that we are going to maintain an armed force —a force of airmen as well as a military force—at a strategic point in that base.
As far as I am concerned the base can be contracted as much as the military authorities think possible. Indeed, the base can be done away with. I am not concerned with it, but I am vitally concerned with the essentiality of keeping in that part of the world a British force that will maintain security in the Canal and our rights in the Middle East, which will encourage and protect our friends throughout Africa.

8.16 p.m.

Mr. W. Griffiths: The reality of the philosophical differences between the two parties in the House has been exposed by the speeches that we have heard tonight. Generally speaking, my hon. Friends start from the assumption that it is undesirable for foreign troops to occupy any other country. We argue between ourselves over the issue of Imperialism and how we should withdraw our forces, but we are always united in the principle of believing that it is undesirable to have our troops in occupation of any country.
On the other hand, hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite contend that in the circumstances of 1954, and for strategic and economic reasons, it is impossible to relinquish any of our Imperial holdings. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) has—and I hope he will for-

give me for saying it—a rather old-fashioned view of our responsibilities. Therefore, I say that this debate points to the philosophical gulf between the two sides of the House.
Let me say this to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman. There are many things in his speech to which I should like to reply, but he talked about the danger of leaving a large number of technicians with a small force in Egypt after negotiations have concluded, because they would be exposed to considerable dangers. He has not appreciated that there would be an entirely different climate of public opinion in Egypt if British forces were withdrawn from that country. Does he not appreciate, for example, the entirely different attitude now adopted by the Indian people towards British nationals who have been living in India in recent years.
Does one hear of attacks upon Britons living in India? Is it not a fact that the withdrawal of British troops from that country during the days of the Labour Administration has caused a revolution in the attitude of the Indian people towards the British? So it was in Southern Ireland, and so it always is when Imperial rule is removed from a previous subject people.
I want to say a word or two about the base in Egypt. I know something about it, though my knowledge is probably not as up-to-date as that of my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman). However, I had the opportunity of spending three and a half years in Egypt during the war, though I am no more up-to-date than 1945. This I do know, that it is impossible to conduct the base there on anything like effective lines without the good will of the civilian population. That is true, however much we reduce the size of the base.
Just before I was sent home from Egypt I took charge of a big installation which I believe is still in the Canal Zone. It was a petrol dump. About 100,000 Egyptians were operating in the Canal area in 1945. I understand that the number is now down to about 20,000, but then 2,000 Egyptians were employed in that quite small depot simply in clearing sand off the railway line every day or in removing sand from the dump. Without their efforts in that physical task each day it would have been impossible for the


Army to use that section of the base. For example, we could not have brought locomotives in to shift the petroleum products because, after two or three days' neglect, the dumps would have been covered by drifting sand.
I know that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman does not argue that the base should be carried on at its present level, but the last time he addressed the House he spoke in terms of reducing it to a brigade force, to be located somewhere around Suez. It still remains true, however, that to do that we must have the goodwill of the population in order to operate the base effectively.
I do not think that any British occupation of Egypt in 1954 will be tolerated by any Egyptian Government, and the course that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman is advocating seems to me to be one designed to produce the maximum political irritation and the maximum agitation against the British with the minimum of technical and military protection. I find it extraordinarily difficult to believe that this is a practical contribution to the solution of this problem.

Captain Waterhouse: If the hon. Gentleman will allow me, I want to make my argument quite clear. It was this, that as long as we are dangling evacuation in front of the Egyptians, an agreement is virtually impossible. If we took a really firm stand and said to them, "We do not want to quarrel with you, we want to be friendly; we do not want to interfere with your internal government, but whatever you say or do we shall keep a force there until such time as you can protect the Canal Zone"; then I think we should have a better chance of coming to an agreement than we have today.

Mr. Griffiths: That is the view of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, to which he and his hon. Friends are entitled, but it is not mine. I think the scars of Imperialism have gone much too deep. I am one of those who agree that nothing short of the complete evacuation of Egypt will bring about the creation of such cordial relations between our two countries as, in the event of hostilities, might cause a future Egyptian Government to accord to us the facilities that a

military situation of the future might need.
I think that hostility to the British has gone much too far and, of course, it is understandable when the right hon. and gallant Gentleman and his hon. Friends tell the House of Commons of the attacks that are made on British soldiers in the Canal Zone. We all deplore them and we do not want our soldiers to be exposed to those attacks for a minute longer than is necessary. But the history of the British occupation of Egypt has also been marked by the most atrocious behaviour on the part of some British troops towards the North Egyptian native population.
I have seen this from the point of view of a private soldier. In the capital city of Egypt I have seen Egyptian civilians being interrogated in British barracks by British soldiers and beaten up in a way which is nearly on a par with the bestial reports that we have been reading about in the recent trial in Kenya. [An HON. MEMBER: "Tut, tut."] It is no use tut-tutting because those things are widely known, and every British officer or soldier who encouraged his comrades to refer to Egyptians as "wogs" during the war or afterwards was building up that widespread hatred of the British which today makes the negotiations so extremely difficult between our two countries.
Those are the facts of the matter. I do not want to go into further details, but if any hon. Gentleman seeks to disbelieve or to challenge me, I can go into revolting details of what I have seen and about which, as a private soldier, I was unable to take effective action.
I sum up my view in this way: the base on its present size is by general agreement impossible to operate without the good will of the Egyptian population. Even if it were desirable, we cannot operate it on the size advocated by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Leicester, South-East. I believe that the relationship between ourselves and Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries would be revolutionised by this Government if they would have the courage to initiate a new approach; if they would say to the Egyptian Government, in defiance of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman and his hon. Friends, after consideration of the need to get


out of the base as much material as possible and the withdrawal of our troops, 'On a certain date, maybe in 18 months' time, whatever you say about it, we will finally and irrevocably withdraw from Egypt."
If they said that, the Egyptians would begin to react to us from the date of that announcement and the climate between our two countries would improve. There is a chance that the relations between Britain and Egypt would flourish in that atmosphere, as the relations between Britain and India have flourished since the Labour Government took a similar initiative in respect of that thorny problem some years ago.

8.29 p.m.

Mr. Howard Johnson: I shall confine my remarks strictly to one aspect of the Amendment moved by the hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn, East (Mrs. Castle), the living conditions of our troops in the Suez Canal Zone. I found myself in almost entire agreement with the hon. Lady and I shall not attempt to go outside that narrow issue. I want also to pay my tribute to the high morale of the troops in the Suez Canal Zone, but I am concerned because I believe that there is deterioration in that respect and it is not fair to put this issue forward as though it is the responsibility of the present Government.
I am certain that hon. Members on both sides of the House have been very concerned for some years past with the living conditions of our troops in the Canal Zone. I well remember writing and making representations to the Secretary of State for War in the last Labour Government on this very point. Therefore, I do not think it is fair to make any party points on the present living conditions of our troops.
This was brought very much to my attention in November and December of this year when two constituents of mine, young National Service men, were killed in the Suez Canal Zone. It is a terrible thing when British soldiers are killed by Egyptians who are supposed to be our allies and with whom we are presumed to be on friendly terms, but these two men were killed by their own comrades. The whole House will agree that that is even far worse. The deaths of these two young men made me very concerned as

to whether the morale of our troops is not deteriorating.
The first death was that of Craftsman Huggett on 29th November, 1953. He was killed by a comrade with whom he was on Army sentry duty. The comrade was demonstrating, completely against regimental orders, how to fire a rifle from the hip and he proceeded to fire his rifle straight into the abdomen of Craftsman Huggett, who died shortly afterwards.
That incident was followed on 4th December by the death of Driver Fowler who, at Fayid, was shot in the head by a revolver bullet fired by a comrade. I have not yet heard from the Secretary of State for War the result of the court of inquiry into that incident, but I think that these two terrible events suggest that there is something wrong with the higher command in the Suez Canal Zone.

Mr. Douglas Glover: Surely my hon. Friend is not suggesting that because two soldiers are accidentally killed morale generally is deteriorating. I remember two very similar cases in my unit, in 1940, when the morale of the British Army was at a very high level.

Mr. Johnson: It might be a sign of the beginning of a deterioration in morale. I have had the opportunity of seeing a letter which was written by Driver Fowler within a few hours of his being killed. He had a very serious complaint to make about the fact that he had had no pay since he had left the United Kingdom some six weeks earlier and that for three nights since his arrival in the Canal Zone he had had to sleep on concrete.
I am concerned whether the small arms training of our National Service men is really 100 per cent, efficient. I do not believe that if the training is really efficient, terrible accidents of the kind that I have described should occur. I am also concerned as to whether men who are not physically fit are being put on this very onerous Army sentry duty in the Canal Zone. I have had examples brought to my notice of men who have been on sentry duty when they had a physical deformity which prevented their firing a rifle, or at any rate firing it accurately. One case was that of a man who had failed a rifle test because he was blind in one eye. Yet he was placed on sentry duty in what is now a very dangerous area. I question whether that is wise.
A type of mentality which has always horrified me is what I call the "military mind." We had an example of it today from these benches when it was said that the British soldier is always being asked to accept bad conditions. One knows that in wartime that is essential and that no one accepts them better than the British soldier. I well recall, when I commanded my battery in the swamp districts of Southern Nigeria, being obliged to have my men living in the most shocking and primitive conditions in malaria infested country. I managed to persuade them that there was no alternative; we were in the midst of war. They accepted the position until the American troops arrived in Nigeria. In less than no time they had prefabricated huts, the most magnificent anti-malarial precautions and refrigerators, they brought electricity with them and were living in the lap of luxury.
Is it just that what I call this cursed military mind should say that British troops must put up with something because they are British troops, whereas with a little imagination, a little drive and initiative, the conditions in the Suez Canal Zone could have been and should have been improved for the British troops many years ago and certainly should have been improved very much above their present low level? I am very concerned with that aspect of the matter.
I am always suspicious of the military mind which says that British troops must put up with bad conditions. I never subscribed to that and never will. I shall be glad to hear from the Secretary of State for War whether every possible amenity, quite regardless of cost, can be provided. I make no excuse for saying that because I am sure that in my constituency, and every constituency, if our constituents were told that they had to forgo a certain amount of capital expenditure in their towns in order that conditions should be made better for the troops in the Canal Zone, every constituent would gladly accept that position.
I come from a tourist town, where capital expenditure is of great importance, but I am certain that if the people of Brighton were told that there was some capital expenditure they could not have because it was essential to improve the amenities and living conditions of

the troops in the Canal Zone, they would willingly forgo capital expenditure of that kind.
I do not subscribe to the view that British troops must live in bad conditions because of financial stringency. I believe the money could be saved in this country and that we could afford to pay more in improving conditions for our troops.

Dr. H. Morgan: Come on, boys, cheer him.

Mr. Johnson: Things go terribly wrong, as, indeed, they did in those two units where there must have been a lack of discipline or an inferior morale to that of the remainder of the troops in the Canal Zone. We know what happened to one of the persons who disobeyed regimental orders and killed his comrade. He suffered 84 days' detention.
I do not question the justice of that sentence because I know full well that his real punishment will lie in the fact that for ever more he will know that through a negligent and wanton act he will have the death of his friend on his mind. But what happened to the regimental commander? Was he punished or not? If this had happened in my battery my brigadier would have been down on me in no time and I would have lost command of my battery.
I have heard from the Secretary of State for War what happened to the soldier, but I have not heard what happened to the regimental or unit commander. I believe there is a great deal more that could be done for the living standards of the troops in the Suez Canal Zone and I believe also that if things are allowed to go on as they have been going on for the past five or six years there will be a rapid deterioration in the morale of our troops. That I do not want to see.

8.39 p.m.

Mr. J. Grimond: In so far as the hon. Member for Kemp-town (Mr. H. Johnson) has been pointing to the conditions of great hardship of the troops in the Canal Zone, I entirely agree with him and would go a long way with him in asking the Secretary of State for War to improve them. I spent a few hours there and I was told that one can hardly get windows repaired. Even if


we are to withdraw some of our troops, I suggest that, in view of the danger under which these men serve and the magnificent job they are doing, we should ask the Secretary of State to impress on his colleagues—if he has to do that— the need for a little more money to spend on providing decent amenities.
We all know the old story that A.D.O.S. is the Greek word for unobtainable, and I suspect that if that be true of anywhere it is true of the base at the present moment. On the other hand, I think we should be holding out false hopes to our troops if we led them to suppose that in the present state of uncertainty they would get anything like American standards.
When the hon. Member suggested that there might be some lack of discipline and morale at the base, I am bound to say that during my short visit I was struck with exactly the opposite view. The morale seemed to be absolutely superb. I admit I was there for only two hours, but inspecting generals have formed their conclusions in a similar amount of time, though I do not pretend to be an inspecting general—in fact, I only succeeded in reaching the rank of substantive captain. But I have relations and friends who have served at the base, including a nephew who is a conscript soldier, and all the reports I have received show that the morale of the troops could not be higher. That may be as a result of the very fact of the inflammatory speeches of certain people in Egypt, and I do not think it would be fair to allow it to go from this House that we suggest that the standard of discipline or the morale of our troops is low.
There are a certain number of non-British employees at the base. Some of them are Egyptians and other Palestinians. They are serving there in danger to themselves, and if we should withdraw we must watch the interests of these people who would be in a serious position were they left there.

Mr. H. Johnson: Would the hon. Member agree that there would seem to be signs of deterioration of morale when 17 of our own soldiers were killed by their own comrades and 28 seriously wounded during 1953? Those figures are not indicative of a happy state of affairs.

Mr. Grimoad: I would describe those events as deplorable, but I am not clear why it should be necessary to ask what happened to the commanding officer, and I am not sure that we should give the impression that that is a reason to suppose that morale in the base is bad.
I wish to return to the theme of the mover and seconder of the Amendment and of the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse). Whatever view one may take of the history leading up to the present situation, or where the fault for it may lie, I think we have to deal with things as they are today. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman gave me the impression of someone who was angry because he had been tied to the stake. But having been tied there he was absolutely determined to be burned at all costs. He felt strongly that we had been put in a false position in Egypt and in the base, but when he came to his solution for that state of affairs I was not convinced.
I had a feeling also that we having perhaps gone too fast in the Sudan, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was now anxious to make good that mistake by making another in the opposite direction over the base. It may well be that we should not have considered those two problems together, but if we be proved to have gone too fast in the Sudan, I do not consider that to be a reason for making another mistake in connection with the Canal.
There is no satisfactory or easy and safe solution to this problem, and I think the House must realise that fact. We are in a difficult and dangerous situation. Whatever course we may take, we shall suffer great loss of material and money and probably experience great dangers. But I do not for one moment think that that absolves us from making up our minds to take some step, and I deplore the continual attitude of delay exhibited by the Government about the step now to be taken.
The situation in Egypt is not unlike what it once was in Ireland. The people of this country were bewildered and rather hurt by the attitude which Ireland adopted towards England. We failed to appreciate how strongly the Irish resented us at that time in the position


in which we were in their country. I believe that the Egyptians feel like that today, and it is not an altogether unreasonable feeling.
The lesson of Ireland and of all other situations of that sort is that one must grasp these changes in national feelings in their fairly early stages. One must make up one's mind what one's policy is to be and then stick to it. I am sure that our prestige depends not upon force or violence but upon the wisdom and consistency of our policy. If we had to use force on a big scale in Egypt, it would be a confession of failure. If we want an example of what such a failure could do, we have only to look at what happened at Damascus which was bombarded by the French with disastrous results to their prestige throughout the Middle East.
There were moments when the hon. and gallant Member for Totnes (Brigadier Rayner) seemed seriously to contemplate a war with the Egyptian Army. It is not practical politics to suggest that one should embody three or four divisions in this country and march on Cairo. I have the feeling occasionally that some people who want to take a strong line do so because they think it would be good for our souls if we had a victory over the Egyptians and established our power in that country. That is a completely mistaken view of the possibility of the situation. We have to look at the situation only in the light of what we want and what our real aims are. High among those must be a friendly local population.
Everybody is agreed that we do not want 80,000 men in the base. We have no strategic reserves at home, and we have very inadequate arrangements for the defence of the Middle East outside the base. I very much agreed with that part of the speech of the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East where he touched on the wider aspects of the matter. We are far too inclined to concentrate our thoughts on the difficulty of the base while the whole of the territory to the north and east of Egypt lies open and unprotected.
What we want is a supply base. We want the workshops and depots so that if we had to operate in the area to the

north and east of Egypt we could eventually lead back our supply lines and base them on the Canal and its ports. We do not want to use the base as a springboard for an expeditionary force, nor to have a garrison pinned down in it if we can avoid it. We have in any case not got the troops available for that purpose.
Next, we want to protect the Canal. That is a separate and distinct problem from that of the base, and it is a very important one. It is also one in which Australia and New Zealand and our Empire are vitally concerned. We might some time be told what consultations there have been with those Dominions on the subject. I do not know how far it would be in order to go into that; not very far, I suspect. But I would just say this.
It is true that at the moment there is not free passage through the Canal for ships going to Palestine. Even with 80,000 men there, we cannot guarantee that. But as far as other traffic is concerned, I understand that it is free. It is, of course, clearly in the interests of the Egyptians to keep the canal traffic flowing. In any case, in the fairly near future, the concession to the company runs out. The Canal is an international problem and we should bring into the discussion not only our own Empire but our allies as well. I repeat that it is a separate and distinct problem from that of the base. If these are our objects, we have to look at the present situation.
As was said in the previous debate by the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), we have gone a very long way in negotiations with the Egyptian Government. It has been argued that events in the last few days in Egypt have shown that the Egyptian Government is not a body with which anybody can do negotiations. I am willing to believe that Egyptian Governments are always extremely unstable, and may be so for some years to come. There is, however, something rather smug in our attitude to such Governments. They have an extremely difficult job. If we are going to be too nice about the sort of Government we are prepared to negotiate with we shall find it very difficult to do business of any kind in the modern world.
Regrettable as events in Egypt may have been, they should not deflect us


from our interests, which lie now in continuing on this line of policy along which we have gone such a very long way. Any back-pedalling at this moment may do very great harm to our prestige, not only with the Egyptians but with neighbouring countries.
We have reduced the points at issue to two. The first of them is whether the 4,000 technicians whom we want to keep in the Zone should or should not be dressed in uniform. There is a great risk in leaving these technicians in the place at all. I fully see the point of those who say that they will be unprotected, and of those who say that very likely the base and its installations will be looted. The hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) stressed the amount of pilfering which went on; not altogether political pilfering but a good deal of straight, old-fashioned thieving, which will go on in any case. To leave those technicians there requires an act of faith in the development of better relations with the Egyptians and in the ability of the Egyptian Army to learn its job and discharge its great duties on the base. I do not think that anyone can feel completely happy about it, but we have to make a decision and, having got to this stage in the negotiations, we must, I would say, take the risk.
The present Government have kept up a standard of order in Cairo which I am told is remarkable. If we leave the technicians there I am not clear whether they will be worse off in uniform than without it. I should have thought that in uniform they would be a greater provocation to the Egyptians than without, and that if we are to take the risk of leaving them there after all, we had better allow them to be dressed in mufti. I understand that if we can get civilians to take the job we are willing to consider doing that. The other point is whether the base should be reactivated in the event of an attack upon certain countries. Having got to this stage of negotiations, the Government should surely try to come to some agreement with the Egyptians on this point.
Suppose the Government say that they cannot give way on the two points, then what do we do? Suppose they take the line that if they gave way on those points others would be brought up: what is the alternative? The right hon. and gallant

Member for Leicester, South-East feels that we should no longer talk about evacuation and that we should cease our present negotiations and start again on the basis of keeping operational troops in the area. I understood him to say that we should be able to keep a division there. He also visualised dispersion of by far the greatest proportion of the base. I understand that what we want is not to have a division there, as this is not to be an operational base, but to retain supply and maintenance depots, which are now in the area. Thus we should be, under his plan, getting what we do not want and sacrificing what we do as well as losing the good will of the Egyptians.
It seems to me that this solution would give us precisely what we do not want, even if it were acceptable to the Egyptians, which I doubt. Personally, I think we should find that if we broke off negotiations we would have to retain the 80,000 people already in the base, so cutting off our nose at the expense of seriously spiting our own face. Our enemies could not wish anything better than that we should continue to have that number of men tied down there.
Some Members behave in this matter rather as though they feel they have been pushed around too much—in Abadan, in the Sudan— and now must make a firm stand somewhere. I do not think that we should be moved by that emotional view but should look calmly at our own interests. If we do that, then in our present state it is infinitely better to come to agreement.

Captain Waterhouse: At what point would the hon. Member stop? Would he be prepared to give up Cyprus, Malta and Gibraltar?

Mr. Grimond: No. If I thought that what we really wanted was to keep an army of 80,000 men in the Canal Zone as being vital to the defence of the free world and the Empire, I would be prepared to go along with the right hon. and gallant Gentleman. But I do not feel that that is what we want, and that is why I think we should not be led into breaking off these negotiations and throwing the whole thing into chaos again.
The Prime Minister, on the other hand, appears to think that we can delay with


advantage. I do not believe that time is on our side. If we get too near to 1956 the Egyptians will be only too happy to let the time run out. I dissent very strongly from those who feel that we shall be in a strong position when the time runs out. At that stage we shall be taken to the United Nations, world opinion will be against us and we shall have to leave Egypt in a most ignominious fashion.
When the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Leicester, South-East looked at the Middle East generally, he spoke of the vital consideration, to begin with, whether or not we stay in Egypt. It is at present very largely undefended from the air. I believe it is most important that we should have some plan in view, either by training the Egyptians, or by keeping our own people there if we can do so, to establish some system of warning, anti-aircraft defence and fighters not only for the defence of the Canal but of Alexandria and Cairo.
In the Middle East there seems to be a vacuum both of troops and policy. The only effective forces on one side is the Arab Legion, small and lightly armed, whose future is a little uncertain. On the other side there are the Jews, who are its deadly enemies. At the same time we have guaranteed the absurd Israeli frontier and have undertaken prime responsibility for the defence of that area against attack from the North.
I should like the Secretary of State to say a few words about our policy there. If we are to have Iraq as a first line of defence, we should get on with it. If not, what have we in mind? Our settlement with Egypt will have an important effect on this area, and its' effects will be carefully watched by both Iraq and Jordan and Israel. I think we can come to an arrangement with those countries, but we must press on. My objection is not to the Government's present policy in regard to this base, but to the rate at which they are pursuing it. If we cannot come to an agreement with Egypt, I feel that it would be better if we left the base and abandoned £300 million of stores rather than prevaricate about our policy all through this part of the world.

Mr. Ralph Assheton: What about the Canal?

Mr. Grimond: That is a separate problem, and we should try to make some international arrangement about it. I hope that we shall come to an agreement with Egypt, but to reach it we must show some real determination. We must maintain our policy, and continue these negotiations, even if we have to give way on one of the outstanding points.

9.0 p.m.

Mr. M. Philips Price: The Amendment calls attention to the conditions in the Suez Canal Zone and the dilatoriness of the Government in handling the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. I am not impressed by the argument that because of the uncertainty of the situation in Egypt and the instability of the Government the matter can be postponed. The Egyptians will probably continue to quarrel among themselves for quite a while yet, but about one thing they will be absolutely unified, and that is the desire to get rid of us.
I agree that we should try to come to some arrangement with General Neguib to preserve the Canal as one of the bases in the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean, but I am not very hopeful of its proving of much value if we get it. Even so, as an earnest that we mean business, we should reduce our forces there at a very early date. Certain contingents could come back at once, and other contingents could leave at intervals. We might consider making it a condition that the attacks upon our troops in the Canal Zone should cease before the next contingent left. I do not know whether that will have any effect, but it might be worth trying. As soon as we can we should get our force down to the level which we are allowed under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.
But all this raises a much bigger question—the value of the base in the whole plan for the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean. I am convinced that we must come to a definite decision on this matter before 1956. I have not very much faith in the value of an agreement with the Egyptian Government. I have little faith in the political situation in Egypt, or the value of the Egyptians as soldiers, although I may be less well informed than other hon. Members about this matter. I am better informed about other and nearer countries.
I am not very impressed by the argument which has been used by some of my hon. Friends, that once we leave Egypt she will be friendly and cooperative. I do not believe that. I remember too well what happened in Ireland. Many of us thought that if we relinquished our bases in Southern Ireland we should be allowed to go back there in war-time, but we were not allowed to do so. We shall find the same thing occurring in the Middle East as occurred with the Irishmen. They will let as down.
One condition which I am glad the Government have tried to obtain, although they seem to have failed so far, is that in the event of any of the Middle Eastern countries being threatened the N.A.T.O. Powers should be allowed to use the Canal Zone. I understand that the Egyptian Government said they would agree if the Arab League were threatened but not if Turkey or Persia were threatened.
When I was in Turkey last autumn, while this matter was under discussion, Turkish opinion was very nervous and jumpy about it. On the other hand, those who are in high positions in Turkey were not so worried because they seemed to think that the strategic value of the Canal is no longer what it was and that there are other bases elsewhere which ought to be the lynch pin of East Mediterranean defence. A future enemy is unlikely to come across the Libyan Desert. He is much more likely to come across the East Anatolian plateau or North-West Azerbaijan. That is where we have to look.
In the last few years we have seen the Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish defence arrangements which should do a lot to seal off that part of South-East Europe and Western Asia. We have Turkey as a bastion of the N.A.T.O. Powers. An even more important development is the agreement between Turkey and Pakistan.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I think the hon. Gentleman is making a speech on foreign affairs.

Mr. Price: I agree that I must not go very far in this direction, but I am dealing with the defence of the East Mediterranean and if you will permit me to

relate it to the Canal I will not go beyond that point.

Mr. Wigg: On a point of order. The issue before the House is not that of the defence of the Canal Zone, but that of the living conditions in the Canal Zone.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: What is before the House is the Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Mr. Strachey: On a point of order. The words of the Amendment, which, surely, are relevant, include condemnation of the Government's handling of the negotiations. Surely that is germane.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I have already said that what the House is discussing is the Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question"

Mr. Price: The Amendment reads:
…deplores the Government's handling of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations which has prolonged this uncertainty.
Surely I can say something about the negotiations?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I would remind the hon. Gentleman that I have already pointed out that we are limited by the words of the Amendment:
call attention to the living conditions …in the Canal Zone.
It is true that we can discuss what the hon. Gentleman is saying in relation to the latter part of the Amendment.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: I recognise that the earlier part of the Amendment reads, "to call attention" but that is a Parliamentary term used in the initiation of the debate in the early stages. The hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn, East (Mrs. Castle) has moved an Amendment, the terms of which are
that this House … deplores the Government's handling of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. …
Surely the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Philips Price) was in order in expatiating on the defence of the Suez Canal in relation to the Government's handling of Anglo-Egyptian affairs.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I ruled on this earlier. It is in order to discuss that in so far as it is the concern of the Secretary of State for War. In so far as it falls within the province of the Foreign Secretary it is not in order to discuss that.

Mr. Price: I shall be very careful, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. In any case, I do not wish to detain the House very long. The Government seem to me to have been very dilatory in handling the negotiations. It is very important to get a settlement soon because we are keeping many men in the Canal Zone who ought to be elsewhere, perhaps here. It is not so important to have a large base there because we can have a base elsewhere, and that is the point that I was making.
Although it is true that in the Canal Zone we have a large force of Egyptian labour, a labour force we cannot get so easily elsewhere, still, in present conditions, with a hostile Egypt, that advantage will not be of very much use. It is possible, farther north, in Turkey, on the Gulf of Alexandretta, to find, not perhaps a labour force, but conditions that will make it possible to have a base in Turkish territory, and to develop Cyprus, and to establish another base in conjunction with the developments going on for the defence of South-East Europe in Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. We can shift the whole axis of defence away from the Canal farther north to where a possible enemy is much more likely to be. That is the main argument I have been trying to make.
Developments are, I think, moving in that direction. Therefore, I beg the Government to hurry with these negotiations, because time has not been and will not be on our side. Things are likely to go from bad to worse, and we ought not to allow ourselves to be so placed that we may be called before the United Nations on a charge of breaking the conditions of a treaty.

9.12 p.m.

Mr. Douglas Marshall: I want to attend to the first and last parts of the Amendment, the first that calls attention to the living conditions of our troops in the Canal Zone, and the last, which deplores the Government's handling of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations.
My right hon. Friend, opening the debate today, used these words, "No one is more disappointed than I am about our not having reduced our troops in Egypt owing to the lack of an agreement." My right hon. Friend was pointing to one reason why it is necessary to have there the number of troops we have at present in the Canal Zone. It is obvious, and has been remarked upon again and again today, that we have there very many more troops than in times past, and that the accommodation there was provided for a very much smaller number, and that, therefore, the living conditions cannot, under these circumstances, be adequate.
Having been in Middle East for short periods in 1951 and 1952, and many times before, but not having been to Egypt for a few years, I felt about four or five months ago, that it appeared to be of no avail to go on negotiating with a Government that seemed continuously to be screaming against our country and also carrying out brutal attacks. That was my view at that time. Therefore, I personally was very glad to have the opportunity of going to the Middle East and to the Canal Zone, and listening to our people in the Canal Zone—to our Commander-in-Chief and to his officers and men, and discuss matters with members of the British civilian population and others as well.
Naturally, one must be influenced to a certain degree by the people who were actually being subjected at that time to different forms of attack and every other discomfort that was going on. It would be quite unnatural if one utterly ignored the views of those on the spot and had day-to-day contact with the men concerned.
One might have expected that under those conditions the people who were in fact being laid open to these forms of attacks would be the first people to say: "What is the good of going on with any form of negotiations at all?" But that was not, in fact, the case.
The case was that, in spite of what my right hon. Friend has just said, I found an absolutely united view about this matter wherever I went in the Middle East, in the Canal Zone or in Cairo by the higher responsible people and also by responsible junior people whom I met there.
I believe that the reason for this is not very difficult to find, although, at the moment it would be utterly absurd for anyone who has ever known Egypt to think that the problem of Egypt at any time can be simple. We must remember that we are discussing today the reason for the base and the fact that it is a base and not an operational theatre.
I think all hon. Members present will agree that the only way a base can operate is if the surrounding districts have more or less some form of friendship in a time of attack by an enemy. It would be absurd to think that a base would be very useful to operate from if, in fact, the surrounding countryside was just as much at war as the enemy it was fighting.

Mr. Patrick Maitland: Before my hon. Friend leaves that interesting point, would he agree that the friendship of a people is not purchased essentially by a treaty or agreement, particularly if the Government concerned has a bad record recently for breaking it?

Mr. Marshall: Most certainly; I do not disagree with that. The fact I am stating is that a base cannot operate as a base without having a friendly circle around it.

Sir William Darling: Salonika was a base operating in unfriendly territory. My hon. Friend will remember the Isle of Moudros. How does that fit in with his argument?

Mr. Marshall: I personally was not old enough to fight in the First World War, but the actual physical question of a base in time of war is a different matter from building up a base in a time of peace for possible operation in war.
The point which I want to make is a very simple one, and I am not in disagreement with our fighting forces today, who know very much more about this than I do. I do not profess to know these particular points of strategy as well as they do, but so far I have not met any active Service men in that theatre who would disagree with the point I have made.
If the maintaining of a base in that part of the world is necessary to the defence, not only of the Middle East, but of the peace of the world, it is equally reasonable that we should approach the problem at least with a view to getting the most satisfactory solution for main-

taining that base. Surely, even my hon. Friends, with whose approach at one time I agreed, would admit that for that purpose an agreement of some sort must be reached.

Major Legge-Bourke: My hon. Friend is confusing two issues. He is saying that this is a matter of discussing the base and whether the base is a base or something else. What my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) said is that the base is the least important thing, and many of us feel that it might well be dispensed with. The point at issue is the fighting troops in the Canal area.

Mr. Marshall: My right hon. and gallant Friend made his point, and I have dealt with it.
Anyone who has known Egypt for any time will agree that it is a country full of memories and that every Egyptian is a politician. That is not at all a good thing. Therefore, it is a difficult problem at any time. Those who have known the modern Egypt of today would agree that this difficulty is not lessened by the fact that it is at present governed by the younger generation, which by its very upbringing is both nationalistic and suspicious. All of this affects the problem of the base.
I want to face this problem by finding a measure of agreement between Egypt and Britain with regard to the base.

Mr. Speaker: This is getting a little remote from the Army Estimates. The hon. Member talks about an agreement between this country and Egypt. That, surely, is a matter for the Foreign Office and not for the Secretary of State for War.

Mr. Marshall: I quite agree, Mr. Speaker, and, naturally, I bow to your Ruling. I opened my speech, however, by referring to the fact that the Amendment
deplores the Government's handling of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations …

Mr. Speaker: I have already indicated that that part of the Amendment is not a matter we can discuss on the Army Estimates.

Mr. Marshall: I bow to your Ruling, Mr. Speaker.
I continue in this way. First, with regard to the conditions in the Canal Zone, I hope that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary has taken note of the remarks of the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) on the question of broken windows in a number of the huts. I say to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland that I have taken this matter up and already have a letter to say that the matter is being investigated. Possibly the hon. Member has seen more of this than I did. I hope we will get an answer from the Government.
Secondly, there is the question of the people who are employed by the Army in the Canal Zone and who, in some cases, have a national status but who, in other cases, have no national status whatever. I sincerely trust that if at any time we go away from the Zone, the Government will ensure that these people are looked after.
Mr. Speaker, you have already said that I cannot refer to the question of an agreement, but I trust that at least at this point I will be within the rules of order. The whole object of being in the base is that we shall help in the defence of the Middle East and of the free world. Therefore, I believe that it is necessary for us to be there through the wishes of the free world so that we can satisfactorily carry out that objective. I do not believe that time is by any means upon our side. It is necessary to get an agreement with Egypt so that we can feel that we are there because of that agreement and not wait for the present Treaty to come up for revision in 1956, and thus it will not be necessary for Egypt to refer the matter to the United Nations.
In sincerely trust that Her Majesty's Government will do all in their power to reopen negotiations, because I believe that that would be the best course they could take. It is for that reason that I fully support the negotiations which are going on at the present time.

9.27 p.m.

Mr. George Wigg: I am sure the House is grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn, East (Mrs. Castle) for putting this Amendment before the House, and it is well that the troops serving in the Canal Zone

should know that on the night that the House of Commons is debating the Army Estimates we are considering not only the things that concern the well-being of the men, but that which causes those duties which they are called upon to carry out. I am sure that in this I carry the whole House with me.
I am also grateful, as I am sure the House is, to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), because he has a very important role to play, for he has been able to get clear in our minds what are the issues which divide us. There are those on this side of the House and many hon. Gentlemen on the Government side who hold the view that a friendly Egypt, which will willingly co-operate with us is a vital British interest, whereas the right hon. and gallant Gentleman does not hold that view.
He said some very surprising things tonight. He attempted to explain the attitude of himself and his hon. Friends, who, it is said, have a great influence upon Government policy, by saying that the entire blame rested on this side of the House. He had a great deal of vocal support when he said that the responsibility for the fact that we were in breach of the 1936 Treaty rested with my right hon. Friends, that the breach had existed at the conclusion of the war and had persisted since that time, and that the present Government had to deal with that situation when they came to office.
On that point the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was quite hopelessly wrong. I have taken the trouble to look up the last published figures of Army strength in the Canal Zone before the war, and the information is included in the Army Estimates for 1938–39. According to those Estimates, published in February, 1938, the strength of the troops in Egypt was 11,739. So that in fact the pre-war Government stood in breach of the 1936 Treaty only two years after its signature.

Mr. Assheton: I do not think the hon. Gentleman is correct. If he will look at the Treaty he will see that its terms permitted more than 10,000 men—

Mr. Wigg: His right hon. and gallant Friend quoted that figure.

Mr. Assheton: indicated dissent.

Mr. Wigg: That was the figure given tonight.

Mr. Assheton: The hon. Gentleman has forgotten the terms of the Treaty. It said that British Forces could be maintained in the vicinity of the Canal Zone and the numbers were to be 10,000 men and auxiliaries and 400 pilots, together with the necessary ancillary personnel for administrative and technical duties.

Mr. Wigg: Auxiliaries are not borne on those Estimates. The actual establishment in 1938 was 11,739, and in any case that figure was far exceeded before the outbreak of war. All I want to establish is that we stood in breach of the 1936 Treaty almost as soon as the signature was on the paper.

Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke: rose—

Mr. Wigg: I am sorry, I have only a limited amount of time, so I cannot give way. This applies not only to men but to installations. Before the war we had only one brigade based on Moascar and another in Cairo, but long before the outbreak of war we were outside the Treaty area. It is beyond doubt, on the evidence of the 1938 Army Estimates themselves, that we stood in breach of the 1936 Treaty. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO."]
Now I want to turn to another astonishing statement of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Leicester, South-East. He laid the blame for the difficulties under which our troops live at the present time upon the Labour Government, because he said that Government had evacuated the splendid barracks in Cairo and forced our troops to live in congested, hovel-like conditions. I am sure that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman has never lived in those splendid barracks in Cairo but, for my sins, I lived for several years in Abbassia and in Kasr-El-Nil, and I was also in hospital at the Citadel.
In addition to the flies and the mosquitoes and the sand, there were the bugs. Never were there such bugs in the world as in Egypt, and never were there such intelligent bugs. One of the drills that all troops had to carry out, generally in our own time on Sunday morning after church parade, was to go round with a

blow-lamp and burn these horrible creatures. We would also get cigarette tins into which we would put paraffin and then stand the legs of our beds in them. But the bugs were up to that. Up the walls they would go, along the mosquito netting, and down the other side. And in the dead of night we would find that we were being dive-bombed by a special brand of Egyptian bug. So the idea of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman that we lived in wonderful comfort in Cairo and that now the troops are having a terrible time in the Canal Zone is another piece of nonsense which has its origin in his imagination and nowhere else. The facts are that ever since the First World War, conditions in Egypt for British troops have been terrible.
It is not a recent business that the troops can only go out under escort. In the years between the two wars one of the great penalties of serving in Egypt was that if anybody under the rank of sergeant wanted to go out he had to go with somebody else. He could not even go for a walk outside Abbassia or Kasr-el-Nil without being accompanied. I am sure that it is as true today as it was before the war, that one of the great things from which these young men suffer is the lack of privacy, of never being able to go for a walk alone and enjoy one's own company.
That was the condition before the war, and it certainly has a great effect on morale. The hon. Gentleman who said that morale is high and that the soldiers do not mind is quite wrong. It shows that the soldiers are polite and do not always tell the stranger who comes along to inquire what they say to each other. But if hon. Gentlemen visiting the Canal Zone for only a few days or hours would stay there for a while and would get on real chummy terms with the troops, and listen to what they have to say, they would learn that the one thing the troops want to do about Egypt is to get out of it as quickly as they can.
The right hon. and gallant Gentleman made an astonishing statement which he prefaced by saying that he was very frank and very honest with the country and with the lads in the Canal Zone and that everybody knows exactly where he and his hon. Friends stand in relation to this problem. He said, "never mind the base" and that he would go back to prewar


conditions and station a brigade group, which is what it would mean under modern conditions, in that area for prestige and for morale reasons—our morale. Certainly that has no military morality.
I do not know what the Secretary of State for War will say about this problem. I should have thought that Egyptian friendship is a vital British interest, but I also should have thought that this base in a working condition was a vital British interest. The right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East and his hon. Friends seem to forget completely that during the war no less than 41 divisions, 13 of them armoured, were supplied from Canal bases. Not only did these bases sustain this very formidable force in the field; but they maintained 65 R.A.F. squadrons as well.
It was from that Canal base that we liberated Palestine and Syria in the First World War, but as regards the Second World War, it is too recent history to remind the House of what was achieved by our Middle East Forces. Any soldier with a reputation to lose, be he humble or exalted, who makes a claim to know anything about the facts, would hold the view that our main interest in the Middle East is not in terms of an odd brigade sitting in Moascar but in terms that the Canal bases should be working.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: The hon. Member extols this base as a magnificent thing in the last war, but can he explain what the purpose of such a vast base would be now?

Mr. Wigg: There is somewhere about £250 million worth of stores there. [An HON. MEMBER: "Get them out."] Moving all that is a very formidable task. In addition to the £250 million worth of stores, there are £300 million worth of investments in terms of railways and roads and ports. It may well be that the base as such should be liquidated. It can be reduced, but given the present situation—and the Secretary of State for War and the Government have to deal -with the problem as they find it—it is a fact that the base is a going concern and it ought to be wound up as a going concern. The right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East and his hon. Friends want to abandon it.
In 1951 it was perfectly clear that there was sufficient labour available not only to work the base but to enable the troops in the area to live a tolerably decent existence. It is not right for men who come from climates such as ours to be called upon to do all the chores which have to be done in and around a base of that kind in the climate there. The availability of native labour is absolutely essential to any area in the Middle East where we station British troops. The availability of that labour was reduced from 30,000 in 1951 to a stage when the Under-Secretary of State for War had to announce a year ago that the labour available was 3,500 men.
It is absolutely certain that if the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East had his way, he would do no more than guarantee that no Egyptian would work for British forces. It would become quite impossible to maintain British forces there because the base would cease to be a going concern. As a result of two years slowing up negotiations we are in the situation whereby 70,000 troops in that area, including colonial troops, are living in sub-normal conditions, to put it mildly. They live in a vast concentration camp, surrounded by barbed wire, and for them life consists of patrols and guards and very little else. In addition, the labour force is not available to keep the base going, so that week by week and day by day it has deteriorated until it has reached the present point at which it is no longer a going concern.
The right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East has this to his credit, that not only is he a great Middle East strategist, but a great lover of economy. He wants a situation in which £500 million British assets, the value of the stores and installations, is to be thrown away and at the same time he would sacrifice what I and the majority of hon. Members regard as the vital interest of Egyptian friendship. I shall not trespass on your Ruling, Sir, by talking at any length about the agreement, but an agreement is absolutely essential if we are to stay there. Even if a lesser number than at present are to remain, the Secretary of State will have to tackle the question of housing and making life for the men and their families reasonably comfortable. He cannot do that without Egyptian agreement, and he cannot even


carry out building without Egyptian agreement.
The hon. Member for Kemptown (Mr. H. Johnson) talked about Nigeria and complained that we did not get refrigerators there, but the Secretary of State for War included in his Estimates £600,000 for new buildings and has not been able to spend it. In the same Estimates he promised to spend more the next year, but he could not do that, because the Egyptians would not put up the barracks and this shortage of labour produces the same result at every point.
I was interested to hear the hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. D. Marshall) who started from one point of view, went to Egypt and came away with another. Everyone, civilian and military alike, holds the view that we have to get cooperation and friendship. Even if we reduce the number to 4,000 technician men, drawn from R.E.M.E., R.A.O.C. and R.A.S.C, life for those 4,000 would be quite intolerable, assuming the Egyptians committed no violence against them, and in that completely unfriendly atmosphere it would not work. We have to get this friendship, and I believe that we could do so quickly.
A declaration by the Government that they intended to disregard the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East and to base their policy on the need to give a square deal to the men in the Canal Zone, if made tonight would constitute a remarkable step forward. When the right hon. Gentleman winds up the debate, although I know he is in the same difficulty as I am for the major part of it has gone beyond what is normally regarded as the Army Estimates and has roamed into the field of foreign affairs, I hope he will foe able to say that the Government are not going to listen too much to the views of the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East, but are going at full speed to pursue a policy of understanding and co-operation with the Egyptians.

9.45 p.m.

Mr. Head: I have listened with great interest to this brief debate which, I would remind hon. Members, was on an Amendment to call attention to the living conditions of the troops in the Canal Zone of Egypt.
I believe that an hon. Lady on this side of the House was concerned with a Bill for the protection of wild birds. She went to a Standing Committee upstairs which she thought was dealing with the Bill and sat for some time in a Committee discussing a housing Bill. After a while she felt that something was wrong. Having listened throughout this debate, I felt rather like that hon. Lady. It seemed to me that the vast majority of the speeches were more the concern of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary than myself. I am making no complaint against the Chair, because these matters are closely connected.
I wish to congratulate the hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn, East (Mrs. Castle), who stuck to the point much more than did a number of hon. Members, in the remarks which she made about the welfare of the troops in the Canal Zone. The hon. Lady was most sympathetic towards me. In fact, she was so sympathetic that at one time I wondered whether she was trying to divide me from the rest of my party. However, she told me that she was equally sympathetic with the Foreign Secretary, but how she squares up all this I do not know, because such triangles are very often difficult.
On the broader question, about which I think all hon. Members will agree I am not qualified to speak, it was evidenced that there were strong differences of opinion. There were some who said that we should get out now and some who said that we should stay, and if necessary, stay indefinitely. It would seem to me that upon this problem the House is agreed that it would be to the advantage of this country to maintain the base with a friendly Egypt.
Anyone who has studied the problem would agree that to achieve that state of affairs would be an extremely difficult task, nor is it particularly easy in the conditions obtaining at present. Nor is it a task which may be achieved in a hurry. I cannot go further in discussing the problem of negotiations with Egypt, and I do not think that hon. Members would expect me to, but I wish to make a few remarks about points concerning the living conditions of the troops in the Canal Zone.
There is no difference between myself and the rest of Her Majesty's Government regarding the fact that we have


retained a very inflated garrison in an area in which it is unwise to improve the amenities by spending a lot of money and in which we would not normally have this number of troops. It does not really matter whether it was hon. Members opposite who sent them there or not. The fact is that they are there, and we regret having to retain them in conditions in which we would not wish them to be.
Although those conditions are by no means ideal they are not really quite as bad as some hon. Members have made out. Of course, they are not good, but when the troops first went there the camps were tented camps out in the desert with no lights, very little piped water and no hard standings for the tents. I am not suggesting that it makes a palace, but since that time hard standings for the tents, electric light and piped water have been provided. That does not make for luxury, but it is an improvement.
We have taken a great deal of trouble to increase in the Canal Zone the number of mobile cinemas and to send out live entertainment for the troops. Facilities for sport, including football, sailing, bathing and fishing, are quite good. Within the financial and geographical limitations, we have done what we can to make conditions better. I would not for a moment argue that they are what we should wish to have but I would argue very strongly that, despite the conditions, despite the boredom, the flies, the sand and the tents, morale in the Canal Zone is astonishingly good.
Hon. Members from both sides of the House who have visited the zone have said, not to please me or to flatter the Army, that they have been genuinely impressed, and many of them surprised, by the morale which obtains there. The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) was impressed, and many other hon. Members who have been there recently have been impressed by the way morale has been kept up. It is nothing to do with me, but I maintain that that is a great credit to the Army as a whole.
Leave has been mentioned. One hon. Member said that there was no local leave whatever. There are, in fact, two leave camps within the Zone, one on Lake Timsah and the other at Port Fouad. They are not, of course, what one wants in the way of leave camps, but

they are there and they are used. They are an alternative to the other leave scheme under which men can go during the summer, which is the most trying period, to Cyprus for a period of leave.
There have also been remarks about the percentages of married quarters as between officers and other ranks. The figure in respect of other ranks which was quoted was misleading because it included all the National Service men. That makes the figure a very different one, because the percentage of National Service men who are married is very low indeed. If the figure is worked out on the basis of other ranks who are Regulars, it comes to about 4 per cent.
The number of officers' married quarters is under half the total number for other ranks in the zone. As I told hon. Members in a previous speech, the length of service among other ranks in the Army as a whole at present is very low. Only 10 per cent, of those in the British Army as a whole have more than six years service. Consequently, I consider that the allocation of married quarters in the zone is a fair one.
My hon. Friend the Member for Kemp-town (Mr. H. Johnson) raised the question—no one regrets it more than I do— of two of his constituents who were accidentally shot in the Canal Zone. I have been engaged in long correspondence with my hon. Friend about the matter, and, as I say, nobody regrets it more than I do. But he coupled it with what he claimed was an indication of loss of morale. I do not believe that accidents of that kind are in any way connected with morale. The point is that there are a very large number of sentries—we have a very large number of troops there—in the Canal Zone. There may be a dark night and perhaps the sentry is an inexperienced soldier—a sentry must have a round in the rifle—and a mistake occurs. These things happen, but they are nothing whatever to do with morale. We regret them, but, however much they ought to be avoided, I do not find them disturbing from the morale point of view.
The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) raised a point which I can assure him the Government have in mind, and that is the question of the various Egyptians who have been working for us throughout all these


troubles. I can assure the hon. Gentlemen that we are well aware of the position of those men, and that we shall bear it very much in mind in the future.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin (Mr. D. Marshall) raised a point concerning the base which is perhaps the crux of the future, the present and the past. It is that the retention of the base with a thoroughly hostile Egypt will always present a very difficult problem indeed. I am certain that he was absolutely right in stressing the importance of gaining the maximum possible amount of Egyptian co-operation.
The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg, who wound up this part of the debate for hon. Members opposite, started off with a few recollections of his own soldiering n Egypt before the ware. It so happens In Egypt before the war. It so happens that I also joined my regiment in Egypt in 1926, and when he spoke of the horrors and dangers of walking about I began to feel quite a hero. However, his claim that conditions there have always been bad was perhaps a relative remark. I feel that one can say that the conditions which obtain in the Canal Zone today, while far from ideal, are extra ordinarily healthy. I am not saying that they are very comfortable, but the general health of the troops there is very good.
Although I have not an intimate knowledge of this subject, I would say that the troops are very much less troubled by bugs than was the hon. Gentleman. [Laughter.] I hope I have not said anything which is in anyway against the hon. Gentleman. I am not sure that he was not a little unkind to the bugs, because, being something of an amateur entomologist myself, I think the Parliamentary name for "bug" is pulex irritans.

Mr.C.R. Attlee: No. That is a flea.

Mr. Head: Oh, it is a flea. I am much obliged to the Leader of the Opposition. It belongs to the family of the cycloptera.
I can assure the hon. Member for Dudley that there is nobody on either side of the House who can see any advantage, whatever their views, in our sitting it out indefinitely in Egypt. I do not believe that any hon. Member wants that, neither on this side of the House nor anywhere else. There are differences of opinion on how the matter should be negotiated, but to remain indefinitely in a hostile Egypt without any end in sight would bring, I think all hon. Members would agree, no great gain to this country or to the Egyptians.
This matter is entirely, and rightly so, in the hands of the Foreign Secretary and of Her Majesty's Government. It is one on which all that I can say—here again I think I am with the House—is that I hope, from the responsibilities I hold, that there will be a settlement and that we shall get that extent of co-operation which, from the point of view of the Egyptians, ourselves and the whole of the Middle East, would be an immense asset towards defence in future years. Further than that I cannot go, except to say to the hon. Lady, that she, having seen something of the living conditions of the troops in the Canal Zone, may now consent to withdraw the Amendment which she has put before the House.

Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

The House divided: Ayes, 271; Noes, 219.

Division No. 49.]
AYES
[9.59 p.m.


Aitken, W. T.
Bishop, F. P.
Carr, Robert


Allan, R. A. (Paddingtion, S.)
Black, C. W.
Cary, Sir Robert


Alport, C. J. M.
Bossom, Sir A. C.
Channon, H.


Anstruther-Gray, Major W. J.
Bowen, E. R.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston


Arbuthnot, John
Boyd Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.
Clarke, Col. Ralph (East Grinstead)


Assheton, Rt. Hon. R. (Blackburn, W.)
Boyle, Sir Edward
Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmouth, W.)


Astor, Hon. J. J.
Braine, B. R.
Cole, Norman


Baker, P. A. D.
Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)
Colegate, W. A.


Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.
Braithwaite, Sir Gurney
Conant, Maj. R. J. E.


Baldwin, A. E.
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H
Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert


Banks, Col. C.
Brooke, Henry (Hampstead)
Cooper-Key, E. M.


Barber, Anthony
Brooman-White, R. C.
Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)


Barlow, Sir John
Browne. Jack (Govan)
Crookshank, Capt. Rt. Hon. H. F. C


Baxter, A. B.
Bullard, D. G.
Crosthwaite-Eyre. Col. O. E.


Beach, Maj. Hicks
Bullus, Wing Commander, E. E
Crouch, R. F.


Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)
Burden, F. F. A.
Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)


Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)
Butcher, Sir Herbert
Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)


Bennett, F. M. (Reading, N.)
Butler, Rt. Hon. R. A. (Saffron Walden)
Darling, Sir William (Edinburgh, S.)


Birch, Nigel
Campbell, Sir David
Davidson, Viscountess




Deedes, W. F
Kerby, Capt. H. B.
Prior-Palmer, Brig, O. L.


Dodds-Parker, A. D
Kerr, H. W.
Profumo, J. D.


Donaldson, Cmdr. C E. McA.
Lambton, Viscount
Raikes Sir Victor


Donner, Sir P. W.
Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Rayner. Brig R


Doughty, C. J. A.
Langford-Holt, J. A.
Redmayne, M.


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord Malcolm
Leather, E. H C.
Rees-Davies, W R.


Drayson, G. B.
Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.
Remnant, Hon. P


Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.
Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)
Renton, D. L. M.


Duthie, W. S.
Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.
Ridsdale J. E.


Eccles Rt. Hon. Sir D. M.
Llewellyn, D. T.
Roberts, Peter (Heeley)


Eden, Rt. Hon. A.
Lloyd, Rt. Hon. G. (King's Norton)
Robinson Roland (Blackpool, S.)


Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)
Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)
Robson-Brown, W.


Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.
Lloyd, Rt Hon Selwyn (Wirral)
Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)


Erroll, F. J.
Lockwood, Lt. Col. J. C.
Roper, Sir Harold


Fell, A.
Longden, Gilbert
Ropner Col Sir Leonaro


Finlay, Graeme
Low, A. R. W.
Russell, R. S.


Fisher, Nigel
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)
Ryder, Capt. R. E. D.


Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F
Lucas, P. B. (Brentford)
Sandys Rt Hon D.


Fletcher-Cooke, C
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.


Ford, Mrs Patricia
McAdden, S. J.
Scott R. Donald


Fort, R.
McCorquodale, Rt. Hon. M. S
Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.


Fraser, Sir Ian (Morecambe &amp; Lonsdale)
Macdonald, Sir Peter
Shepherd, William


Fyfe, Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwell
Mackeson, Brig Sir Harry
Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)


Galbraith, Rt. Hon. T. D. (Pollok)
McKibbin, A. J
Smithers, Peter (Winchester)


Galbraith, T. G. D. (Hillhead)
Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)
Smithers, Sir Waldron (Orpington)


Garner-Evans, E. H.
Maclean, Fitzroy
Smythe, Brig. J. G. (Norwood)


George, Rt. Hon. Maj. G. Lloyd
Macleod, Rt. Hon. Iain (Enfield, W.)
Soames, Capt. C.


Glover, D.
MacLeod, John (Ross and Cromarty)
Spearman, A. C. [...]


Gomme-Duncan, Col. A.
Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold (Bromley)
Speir, R. M.


Gough, C. F. H.
Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)
Spence, H. R. (Aberdeenshire, W.)


Gower, H. R
Maitland, Comdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)
Spens. Rt. Hon. Sir P. (Kensington, S.)


Graham, Sir Fergus
Maitland, Patrick (Lanark)
Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard


Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)
Manningham-Buller, Sir R. E.
Stevens, G. P.


Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)
Markham, Major Sir rank
Stoddart-Scott, Col. [...]


Hall, John (Wycombe)
Marlowe, A. A. H
Storey, S.


Hare, Hon. J. H.
Marples, A. E.
Strauss, Henry (Norwich, S.)


Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.)
Marshall, Douglas (Bodmin)
Summers, G. S.


Harris, Reader (Heston)
Maude, Angus
Sutcliffe, Sir Harold


Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)
Maudlins, R.
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)


Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)
Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C
Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)


Harvey-Watt, Sir George
Medlicott, Brig. F.
Teeling, W.


Hay, John
Mellor, Sir John
Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. P. L. (Hereford)


Head, Rt. Hon. A. H.
Molson, A. H. E.
Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)


Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Monckton, Rt. Hon. Sir Walter
Thomas, P. J. M (Conway)


Heath, Edward
Moore, Sir Thomas
Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, W.)


Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Morrison, John (Salisbury)
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hn. Peter (Monmouth)


Higgs, J. M. C
Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.
Thornton-Kemsley, Col. C. N.


Hill, Dr. Charles (Luton)
Nabarro, G. D. N.
Tilney, John


Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)
Neave, Airey
Touche, Sir Gordon


Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Nicholls, Harmar
Turton, R. H


Hirst, Geoffrey
Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)
Tweedsmuir, Lady


Holland-Martin, C. J
Nicolson, Nigel (Bournemouth, E.)
Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.


Hollis, M. C
Noble, Cmdr. A. H. P.
Vosper, D [...]


Hope, Lord John
Nugent, G. R. H.
Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)


Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P
Nutting, Anthony
Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. Marylebone)


Horobin, I. M.
Oakshott, H. D.
Walker-Smith, D. C


Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Florence
Odey, G. W.
Wall, P. H. B.


Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)
O'Neill, Hon. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)
Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)


Hudson, Sir Austin (Lewisham, N.)
Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D
Ward, Miss I. (Tynemouth)


Hudson, W. R. A. (Hull, N.)
Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)
Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.


Hurd, A. R.
Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-super-Mare)
Webbe, Sir H. (London &amp; Westminster)


Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'rgh, W.)
Osborne, C.
Wellwood, W.


Hutchison, James (Scotstoun)
Peake, Rt. Hon. O.
Williams, Rt. Hon. Charles (Torquay)


Hyde, Lt.-Col H M.
Perkins, Sir Robert
Williams, Gerald (Tonbridge)


Iremonger, T. L
Peto, Brig, C. H. M
Williams, Sir Herbert (Croydon, E.)


Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Peyton, J. W. W.
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


Jennings, Sir Roland
Pickthorn, K. W. M.
Williams, R Dudley (Exeter)


Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Pilkington, Capt. R. A
Wills, G.


Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)
Pitman, I. J.
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Jones, A. (Hall Green)
Pitt, Miss E. M.
Wood, Hon. R.


Joynson-Hicks, Hon. L. W.
Powell, J. Enoch
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Kaberry, D.
Price, Henry (Lewisham, W)
Mr. Buchan-Hepburn and




Mr. Studholme




NOES


Acland, Sir Richard
Bence, C. R.
Bowden, H. W.


Albu, A. H.
Benn, Hon. Wedgwood
Bowles, F. G.


Anderson, Frank (Whitehaven)
Benson, G.
Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth


Attlee, Rt. Hon. C. R.
Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)
Brockway, A. F.


Baird, J.
Blackburn, F.
Brook, Dryden (Hartifax)


Barnes, Rt. Hon. A. J.
Blenkinsop, A.
Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)


Barttey, P.
Blyton, W. R.
Brown, Thomas (Ince)


Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.
Burton, Miss F. E.







Butler, Herbert (Hackney, S.)
Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Reeves, J.


Carmichael, J.
Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)
Reid, Thomas (Swindon)


Castle, Mrs. B. A
Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)
Reid, William (Camlachie)


Champion, A. J.
Irving, W. J. (Wood Green)
Roberts, Rt. Hon. A.


Chapman, W. D.
Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Chetwynd, G. R.
Janner, B.
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)


Clunie, J.
Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.
Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)


Coldrick, W.
Jeger, George (Goole)
Ross, William


Collick, P. H.
Jeger, Mrs. Lena
Royle, C.


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Jenkins, R. H. (Stechford)
Shackleton, E. A. A.


Cove, W. G.
Johnson, James (Rugby)
Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)
Short, E. W.


Crosland, C. A. R.
Jones, David (Hartlepool)
Shurmer, P. L. E.


Crossman, R. H. S.
Jones, Frederick Elwyn (West Ham, S.)
Silverman, Julius (Erdington)


Daines, P.
Jones, Jack (Rotherham)
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)


Darling, George (Hillsborough)
Keenan, W.
Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)


Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)
Kenyon, C.
Skeffington, A. M.


Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)
Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.
Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke-on Trent)


Davies, Harold (Leek)
King, Dr. H. M.
Slater, J. (Durham, Sedgefield)


Deer, G.
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)


Delargy, H. J.
Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)
Smith, Norman (Nottingham, S.)


Dodds, N. N.
Lindgren, G. S.
Snow, J. W.


Donnelly, D. L.
Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.
Sorensen, R. W.


Driberg, T. E. N.
MacColl, J. E.
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John (W. Bromwich)
McKay, John (Wallsend)
Sparks, J. A.


Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.
McLeavy, F.
Steele, T.


Edelman, M.
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Stewart, Michael (Fulham, E.)


Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.


Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)


Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)
Mann, Mrs. Jean
Stross, D[...] Barnell


Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)
Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.
Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.


Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)
Mason, Roy
Swingler, S. T.


Fernyhough, E.
Mayhew, C. P.
Sylvester, G O.


Fienburgh, W.
Mellish, R. J.
Taylor, John (West Lothian)


Finch, H. J.
Messer, Sir F.
Taylor, Rt. Hon. Robert (Morpelh)


Fletcher, Eric (Islington, E.)
Mikardo, Ian
Thomas, George (Cardiff)


Follick, M.
Mitchison, G. R.
Thomas, Ivor Owen (Wrekin)


Foot, M. M.
Monslow, W.
Tomney, F.


Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
Moody, A. S.
Turner-Samuels, M.


Freeman, John (Watford)
Morgan, Dr. H. B. W.
Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn


Freeman, Peter (Newport)
Morley, R.
Viant, S. P.


Gibson, C. W.
Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)
Wallace, H. W.


Greenwood, Anthony (Rossendale)
Moyle, A.
Warbey, W. N.


Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.
Mulley, F. W.
Webb, Rt. Hon. M. (Bradford, C.)


Grey, C. F.
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. J.
Weitzman, D.


Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
O'Brien, T.
Wells, Percy (Faversham)


Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Oldfield, W. H.
Wells, William (Walsall)


Griffiths, William (Exchange)
Oliver, G. H.
White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)


Grimond, J.
Orbach, M.
Whiteley, Rt. Hon. W.


Hall, Rt. Hon. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
Oswald, T.
Wigg, George


Hall, John T. (Gateshead, W.)
Padley, W. E.
Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.


Hamilton, W. W.
Paget, R. T.
Wilkins, W. A.


Hannan, W.
Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearne Valley)
Williams, Ronald (Wigan)


Hastings, S.
Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)
Williams, Rt. Hon. Thomas (Don V'll'y)


Hayman, F. H.
Palmer, A. M. F.
Williams, W. R. (Droylsdon)


Healey, Denis (Leeds, S.E.)
Pannell, Charles
Williams, W. T. (Hammersmith, S.)


Henderson, Rt. Hon. A. (Rowley Regis)
Pargiter, G. A.
Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)


Herbison, Miss M.
Parker, J.
Winterbottom, Ian (Nottingham, C.)


Hewitson, Capt. M.
Peart, T. F.
Winterbottom, Richard (Brightside)


Hobson, C. R.
Plummer, Sir Leslie
Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.


Holman, P.
Porter, G.
Wyatt, W. L.


Houghton, Douglas
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Yates, V. F.


Hoy, J. H.
Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)
Younger, Rt. Hon. K.


Hubbard, T. F.
Proctor, W. T.



Hudson, James (Ealing, N.)
Pryde, D. J.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Pursey, Cmdr. H.
Mr. Popplewell and Mr. Holmes.


Question put, and agreed to.

Main Question again proposed.

10.10 p.m.

Mr. Harry Wallace: I have three matters to raise concerning National Service. I do not propose to go into strategy and tactics, but to raise three down-to-earth issues. A number of my constituents are concerned about them, the trade unions are very much concerned about them and, in view of the expressions of opinion I have heard in the House about the desirability of

retaining the good will of those who can help in the recruitment of others and of creating contentment among the National Service men, I thought it my duty to bring these matters to the notice of the House. I have been in communication with the War Office on the subject and have had a helpful reply from the Under-Secretary of State, for which I thank him.
The three matters are: first, the difference in pay between the Regular soldier and the National Service man;


secondly, the fact, as I am informed, that the differential is maintained when the National Service man is serving, for example, in Korea; and, thirdly, the difference in the marriage allowance.
Most of us recognise that there is a case for a higher rate of pay for Regular soldiers. The man who joins for a fixed period is making a sacrifice. No one will pursue at great length the question of a pay differential in those circumstances. On the other hand, if that differential is maintained when a National Service man is in Korea, as I have been informed, the House is hardly giving effect to the rate for the job, and I put it no higher than that.
I cannot see why there is a discrimination in marriage allowance between the wife of a National Service man and the wife of a Regular private soldier. In my opinion, marriage allowance should be the same for both. I recognise that there are difficulties. The issue raises border-line cases. To try to create good will among those who are not serving in the Colours and to bring contentment to the National Service men, I ask the Secretary of State that further consideration should foe given to these issues, particularly to that of the marriage allowance.

10.14 p.m.

Colonel J. H. Harrison: I think everyone in the House would like to congratulate the Secretary of State for War on his extempore speech today. I hardly like to call him the father, but I felt he was the leader of the whole of his Department, even though, as he said, he is not the highest paid in the War Office. We can feel the human approach which he brings to the War Office in peace-time in looking after the welfare not only of the soldiers but of their wives and even their children, bearing in mind the reference he made to the visit of children to their parents abroad. In his Memorandum we can see his concern for the welfare of the Army as a fighting unit.
The right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) also made a very helpful and kind speech—more helpful and kind than those he has made in the previous two debates on Army Estimates in this Parliament.
I shall not do what I have usually done in Estimates debates—raise points

about the Territorial Army—because I feel that the Secretary of State has put right many of the points which I have raised in the past. I am one of those volunteers who were turned out of the Territorial Army two-and-a-half years ago, and I feel that I have not now so much right to speak about the Territorial Army as I had on the Army Estimates in the last two years.
We ought to be very grateful to my right hon. Friend for providing the map showing the disposition of the Army today. We see from that that we have garrisons in 14 places in Africa. Possibly we feel today the loss of the Indian Army that we could have called upon to help us, particularly in countries like Malaya, where the policing has amounted to a minor war in the last two years.
Thanks to my right hon. Friend I was invited to visit the British Army manoeuvres during the Summer Recess, and I saw the 42nd Territorial Division at its manoeuvres and four-day exercise on Salisbury Plain. I may be wrong, but it seems to me from the Statement on Defence and from the Air Estimates and these Army Estimates that our approach to the outbreak of a hot war has slightly changed. It appears that the opening gambits will be with the Royal Air Force, not so much with the Army.
That leads me to consider our reserve. At present, we have no strategic reserve, and I shall say something about that later. I am concerned about the training and the state of preparedness to take its place in the line of our Territorial Army Reserve. It ought to be prepared to take its place in the line in a few days, or a few weeks at the most. The division I saw at exercise could not carry out that exercise without bringing in some Regular officers to act as additional staff.
If that was the position of one of our Territorial divisions trying to carry out a divisional exercise I wonder what will be the position of our 10 or 11 Territorial divisions if they are mobilised and are supposed to be in a state of immediate readiness to go overseas. Are they or are they not under-staffed? It seems to me that they are at the present time. They have not sufficient staff officers to carry out their duties in the field.
For the successful functioning of a division, for the oiling of the wheels of divisional machinery, a good staff is


necessary. Are we training sufficient staff officers at present? From my experience as a Territorial soldier, and of all the good civilians who are brought into the Army in war, I should say that it is probably easier to train leaders, teach them how to use ground and the right way to attack an enemy post, than it is to train staff officers. Immediately the war broke out a large number of courses were started to train staff officers.
My right hon. Friend may say that we can rely on the reserve of the staff officers of the last war. However, it is nine years since the war ended, and those men are nine years older. The energetic staff officer of 33 or 34 is now 42 or 43, and if a G.2 or a G.I, has now got out of date. I do not think we can rely upon those officers. Would it not be wiser, in view of the large commitments we have, to train a rather larger number of our younger Regular officers in staff duties?
We have a first-class Staff College at Camberley. I do not think that anyone who has been there can criticise it, or deny that it turns out extremely good staff officers. It is quite difficult to get into. Of three Regular soldiers who were recently adjutants to the battalion I commanded two and a half years ago, one qualified and got to the Staff College and the other two failed on one subject, although they were both extremely capable fellows. Would it not be possible for some extra-mural course to be run in peacetime for some of these Regular soldiers so that we have an extra reserve of staff officers to staff the Regular Army or Territorial Army or any other commitments to which we may well have to supply staff officers in the future?
With regard to the visit which I paid to Germany in company with the right hon. Member for Dundee, West and the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), we were allowed, thanks to the kindness of the Cammander-in-Chief, to meet many of the soldiers and officers, including generals of other armies which will take part in Western European Defence, notably Dutch, Danish and Norwegian, and some of the retired German generals to whom we are looking to reform the German Army to which now general consent has been given.

Mr. Emrvs Hughes: Not here.

Colonel Harrison: It seems that in the main Germany is going to rearm within the framework of Western European defence. Those of us who visited Germany saw some of 45 million very active, hard-working people, and it seemed to me that if we did not incorporate them within Western European defence and a hot war should come, they would be, if they were overrun, used as citizens, possibly by our potential enemies, to help on their own soil. What seemed to me to be of paramount importance was the very grave fear among all these smaller nations that if the Germans were brought in they might, if we were not there, within a matter of five, six or seven years, be the dominant factor within the Western European Army.
Dutch generals and other responsible officers, said, "We want you in Britain to play your part." We have for eight and a half years maintained four or five divisions in Germany in a state of preparedness for war and prepared to play their part there. It is quite impossible for us, particularly when we look at the map of our far-flung commitments, ever to say that the whole of the British Army must be committed to Western European defence.
But if we build that up what is to be the position of the four or five divisions which we have there? What is the part which they are going to play? It seems to me, and it is purely my own suggestion —and perhaps it is more foreign policy than Army policy—that the best contribution we can make to Western European defence is to say that we would commit ourselves to a token force of two divisions, or corps or whatever it is within the Western European Army and, in addition, we should probably have to supply a high percentage of potential commanders and staff officers.
Therefore, there is all the greater reason for training a large number of staff officers. If we do not need them now in time of peace, I am sure that in some way or other in Western European defence they will be needed on an even greater scale within the Western European Army.
I came back, having seen our manoeuvres in Germany, with the conclusion that we could best play our part in making it really effective by commit-tine ourselves—not to a large extent, but


among our other commitments—to a token force in the Western European Army with a high percentage of staff officers. This would have the approval of all the smaller nations, who at present are worried as to whether they may be taken over by the Germans.
My right hon. Friend produced some interesting figures on manpower. The size of the Regular Army, running into about 190,000 men, does not seem to have varied very much over a long period of years. The National Service element is being reduced because of the smaller intakes. It is not because of the potential threat of war in the future that we need to have National Service, but is because of our cold war commitments over three Continents.
If a hot war breaks out in any place, only about one-third of the Regular Army will be engaged in that outbreak. If it is in Europe, it will be our forces in Germany; those in Korea, Hong Kong or anywhere else will not be engaged, and immediately we will call in our reserve divisions. Looking at it in this way, therefore, it is only if we can get down our commitments in the cold war that we could reduce either the form or the terms of National Service. If already on a two years' basis, because fewer boys were born in the 1930s or because the intake is less, we are losing about 10 per cent., the Secretary of State for War must do with 400,000 men instead of the present 440,000; and there is still the same call on the young men for two years' service.
I wondered, at one time, whether it might not be cheaper, in the long run, so to improve the conditions and pay of the Regular Army that we could get the extra men and, if we could reduce our commitments, would not have to call on National Service. That is what we should all like, but at present our commitments still seem to be too much.
I was interested in the suggestion of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton, particularly as it came from the opposite side of the House, that some form of selected or balloted conscription for a minimum number of men might suit the purpose better than calling up everyone. From the Army's point of view, a balloted or selected conscription

for three years, at good rates of pay to make it attractive, would be cheaper in the long run for the Regular Army. But these are rather things of the future than anything that could happen at present with our large commitments.
I should like to say a word about the three-year Regular soldier. Obviously, it is of the utmost importance to the country that these men, who have signed on with the idea that the Army might be the career for them, should fulfil a useful function and a high percentage of them stay on for six or for 12 years. Is there any distinction, after their initial training at the depot has been done in the first 10 or 11 weeks, between Regular three-year soldiers and the National Service men? It is important that those who join as Regulars should go to a unit. It may be a battalion, an R.A. regiment or an R.A.C. unit, but they should go to a proper unit where they get a sense of family and of belonging.
We know that there are a large number of jobs in the Army in this country which have to be done in the small transit camps, and so on, and which are dead end jobs. We want Regulars to re-sign and to continue in the Service, and it would be interesting to know whether a distinction is made whether or not they are sent to a unit. I should also like to know whether we have any units in the British Army at present composed entirely of Regular soldiers.
In a complete Regular unit the men get a sense of family and a sense of the job being worth while. The sergeants train the corporals and the corporals train the men who eventually are given their stripes. It is important to endeavour to ensure that those who join initially as Regulars continue in the Service.
We have heard a great deal about the strategic reserve. The House knows the commitments as well as I do. Apart from our reserve divisions, there are only three sources in the world from which it might be possible to build up a strategic reserve about which we hear so much, but it seems impossible to get many men together. We might recover some men from Korea, and we might get some back from the Middle East and Malaya. Is it possible to hold that strategic reserve in this country—possibly in Scotland as against England? Have we got the best


training facilities, or would it be better to hold the reserve in Germany?
Possibly the training conditions are much better in Germany. I should like to know whether it would be as easy to move a division, by air or by boat, if it was our strategic reserve, to another part of the world from Germany as it is from this country. In the event of a hot war breaking out in Western Europe we need to move four or five territorial divisions as quickly as possible. There are many doubts about how quickly those divisions could be put in the field. Some officers talk about two or three months rather than two or three days or weeks.
Might not it be better to have the extra divisions in Germany ready to play their part? I pass that question for the Secretary of State.

Mr. Ian Mikardo: In putting forward this proposition, is the hon. and gallant Gentleman bearing in mind that after the E.D.C. Treaty and the Bonn Contractual Agreement have been ratified, we shall have to pay all the local costs of our troops in Germany in hard currency and that his proposition would mean a very large increase in hard currency commitments?

Colonel Harrison: Yes, I was bearing that in mind. It was almost my final conclusion on that point to say that I see the advantage of having them in this country because it is very much cheaper for the taxpayer. I was posing the question whether we should bear the extra cost of having them in Germany as against having them at home.
I now wish to pass to what is possibly a much smaller point, and yet a point of great importance and one on which 1 believe that the War Office has been far too conservative. When the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey) and I were in Germany—we were allowed to go where we liked—the weather was fairly wet. For the last 30 years, the War Office has changed the style of hats for soldiers on innumerable occasions, while certain other items of clothing have been left very much as they were many years ago.
I have always felt that the present groundsheet with which the soldier is issued for the purpose of keeping himself dry is a very unsatisfactory garment from

all points of view. It tries to do two things. As a cape it is short where it should be long. A soldier wearing it on sentry duty never seems properly prepared to deal with an enemy. The answer which I have always been given concerning the groundsheet is that it is useful as a bivouac sheet. But if one wants to make a bivouac for two men, then two sheets are needed, and it is still necessary to have one to lie on. Therefore, it seems to me that this answer really falls to the ground.
Could not the Secretary of State for War, after 30 years of groundsheets, get his backroom boys or his officers to devise some better waterproof garment which was either a better cape or else a real bivouac sheet?

Mr. Head: We have now got a plastic sheet which is also a groundsheet, and I think it is a big improvement.

Colonel Harrison: I am glad to hear that, but I will continue my remarks. When in Germany we saw the Canadians deliver an attack at dawn, and they wore what seemed to me to be a very good garment. It was a cape which was slit up the sides. Their equipment was put over it and the hood was pulled over their heads. They looked extremely ghostly and frightening as they came through the mist.
In the many stores about the country which sell surplus Government stocks— I do not know where they all come from —it is quite easy to buy waterproof trousers and jackets which, presumably, are denied to the Army. We remember how often in the past we have won battles by keeping our powder dry—I think it was under Clive at Plassy that cur soldiers kept their powder dry and thereby won the day—and it is still important to keep our soldiers as dry as possible in all forms of warfare or manoeuvre if they are to remain competent soldiers. Perhaps the War Office could look into that small point on which, up to the Secretary of State's announcement just now, it has been rather conservative.
The last thing I wish to say is that I believe that we must give consideration to a Western European Army and that in some form or another we must provide a token force and that we should train sufficient staff to play their part.

10.34 p.m.

Mr. Michael Foot: I wish, first of all, to raise one or two small constituency points, small in one sense, but large in the estimation of the people of Plymouth.
However, before doing so I want to compliment the Secretary of State for War on the brilliantly delivered speech which he made at the opening of the debate. It is quite a novelty for a Minister in charge of the Estimates—and I have sat through all the Estimates this year and some of those of previous years —to speak extempore with hardly a note, and to cover all the subjects in considerable detail, and, at the same time, to be ready to give way to any interruption from whichever side it came. It was a remarkable performance, even if we do not agree with everything the right hon. Gentleman said. As I shall show later, the more remarkable the performance, the more he began to reveal some of the weaknesses in his case.
I wish to refer now to some matters concerning my own constituency. We in the City of Plymouth have had arguments with the War Office for something like 500 years, and there are still some which we want to finish. We have had some arguments about the land which is held by the War Office in our city. Six months ago I had an Adjournment debate in which the Under-Secretary of State for War took part. He promised to come to a conference with the people of Plymouth in order to discuss the land which is held in our city. There were several months delay before it took place, but it eventually did take place, and the decisions of the conference are now known.
Unfortunately, although the conversations were conducted with the War Office in a polite and genial fashion, I am afraid that we have not received very much dividend from them. There have been a few small concessions made by the War Office, and indeed perhaps we should be grateful for them because I believe this is the first acre of land which has ever been given back by the War Office to the City of Plymouth in the whole of its history. We ought to be grateful for the fact that we have started on the road towards regaining these lost territories, but even so, I am afraid, that it is not very much.
There is a whole area stretching along the front of Plymouth Sound which looks out on the most famous strip of water in the world, where, 20 or 30 years ago, people could walk along the front without having any obstacles placed in their way. This was one of the most famous parts of the City of Plymouth. This was a place where many of my ancestors carried out their courting and similar functions, but now the War Office have intervened. It is a shocking thing that the whole of this great tradition should have been destroyed by the bureaucracy of the War Office.
What are the reasons for them taking the area known as Eastern and Western Kings—although they have admittedly given us a bit of it back? They have told us that there are security reasons for having taken it. I have not yet heard from the Under-Secretary what are the real security grounds on which we have been deprived of this land. Therefore. I hope that the War Office will reconsider the matter and be prepared to hold further conferences with the City Council of Plymouth to see whether they can be more generous in releasing some of this area which they now possess.
A few weeks ago I raised with the Secretary of State for War the question of Plymouth Citadel. He gave me some figures of the numbers of people who are living in the Citadel, and he attempted to make some case showing that the War Office makes some use of it. I hope, however, that since then he has studied the history of the matter. The Citadel was built by Charles II deliberately to cow the people of Plymouth. It was built as a piece of Stuart revenge against the City of Plymouth, which fought on the side of Parliament in the Civil War. These are all facts.
Indeed, insult was added to injury because this Citadel was built with the guns pointing not against the Spaniards— because the people of Plymouth were capable of dealing with the Spaniards— but against the people of Plymouth. In addition, the Citadel was built on the very place where Drake had played bowls. It would be a most agreeable gesture if the Secretary of State for War were able to find some other accommodation for the people whom he has in the Citadel now and to restore this place to


the City of Plymouth. It would be a first-class amenity for the corporation and would be some recompense for the misbehaviour of the Stuarts in years gone by. Or the Secretary of State might look at the question of Drake's Island in Plymouth Sound, which he holds and which could be released to the City of Plymouth without any great difficulties.
Therefore, I hope that the same kind of ingenuity and magnanimity, in some senses, which the right hon. Gentleman applies to some other problems in his Department will be applied to this problem of dealing with the land, not merely in Plymouth, because I am speaking on behalf of other cities as well; but I hope that he can start with the City of Plymouth, since he holds probably a bigger proportion of that city than of most of the cities throughout the country.
Now I want to refer to something said by the right hon. Gentleman in his own speech on the subject of barracks and buildings and the provision of amenities for the troops in various parts of the country. The right hon. Gentleman spoke eloquently on this subject and said how eager he was that something should be done to make up the leeway of the failure to modernise barracks and the places where the soldiers have to live. He gave some remarkable figures showing how out-of-date many of these buildings were, and gave an indication that this is a matter very much on his mind and that he is eager to do something about it. It was the same kind of indication as we had from the Admiralty a few days ago on the Navy Estimates.
Despite this eagerness of the Minister to do something about it, however, it is shocking to discover what is the amount to be voted, because, if we look at Vote 8, there is a net decrease this year of £1,700,000, and almost every item in that Vote is reduced. So I do not think it can be argued that it is a particular reduction on one special kind of works, and it is clear that so far from the right hon. Gentleman carrying out what he declared to be his aim, of seeking to do his best to deal with this situation, he is reducing the amount that is to be spent.

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman is making a good point, but I said in my speech that we have a three-year plan for improving this barrack accommodation. The point I made was that

we cannot build barracks without plans, and the first step is to get the plans passed and approved before we can start building the barracks. This is not a matter of suddenly pressing a button and putting more into the Vote, but of gradually increasing it as we can.

Mr. Foot: That intervention is not as successful as the previous ones of the right hon. Gentleman. Whenever I hear either a representative of his Department or of the Admiralty saying that they have a plan for dealing with these things, I become nervous because the plan usually begins with a reduction in the Estimates. That was what the Admiralty said too. They have a wonderful plan, but it starts with a reduction in the Estimates. Even if the right hon. Gentleman has to spend some time in planning these reforms which he wishes to carry out, I would not have thought it desirable or necessary or likely to give any confidence if he starts by a big reduction in the Estimates. I say that chiefly in the hope that the War Office is not following the unwise example of the Admiralty in that matter.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison): If the hon. Gentleman will allow me to intervene, if he looks at Subhead A—"Works—Construction and Maintenance Services," he will find that the amount voted in 1954–55 for accommodation of personnel is greater than in 1953–54 because the Vote covers much more personnel accommodation.

Mr. Foot: Yes. I was talking about the whole Vote and there is a decrease in almost every item under Vote 8, which, I imagine, covers most of this work on the barracks to which the right hon. Gentlemen referred. If I have made a mistake about the figures, we shall be glad to hear about it later on the individual vote. But I am sure that the best way to start a great programme for remodelling these old barracks, which the right hon. Gentleman described in the most graphic terms, is not by starting off with a reduction in the Vote.

Mr. Hutchison: The hon. Member must get this right. It is not a reduction in the Vote on that particular item. He is taking the whole Subhead A, "Works —Construction and Maintenance Services," and not separating that part of it which refers to barracks.

Mr. Foot: This Vote does not deal only with barracks, of course. But under Subhead A for works, construction and maintenance services, there is a reduction of £1 million and I should have thought that that must have covered a considerable number of amenities of the kind that I have described. I am happy to discover that there are some increases, but I wish that these things had been set out more clearly in the Estimates.

Mr. Hutchison: This is perfectly clearly set out on the next page.

Mr. Foot: This is joist the kind of issue that we would wish to discuss on the individual Votes when they could be considered in detail. But the intervention of the Under-Secretary rather contradicts the Secretary of State for War, whose excuse for the figures was that he had to lay the plans.

Mr. Head: I know the hon. Member's fondness for dialectics. I said that there was no spectacular rise because we had to have plans, but the fact is that there has been a rise. The hon. Member should be more generous and admit when he is wrong.

Mr. Foot: If I have made a mistake I will apologise, but I hope that the Under-secretary will be equally generous in apologising to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State in apologising to the Under-Secretary.
The Secretary of State's speech was very interesting. It was a defensive speech. He was trying to cover up the fact that he is not able as Secretary of State to execute all the tasks which his Government by their foreign policy require him to perform. It is quite clear that if we go on as we are going at present, and if the general policy of the Government, which they ask the right hon. Gentleman to support, is continued, he will not be able to carry out any of the main objectives which he set out at the beginning of his speech. If the general policy continues as at present, he will not obtain his strategic reserves. The right hon. Gentleman has not given us any sign of any date by which he will secure those reserves in any appreciable quantity.
It is also apparent that the right hon. Gentleman will not secure a sufficient number of Regular troops. He has tried

to give us some reasons why we should not be quite so pessimistic as some of my hon. Friends think we ought to be, but he has not been able to assure us that he will be able to obtain the number of troops which he desires. Further, it is apparent that we shall not be able to carry out all the commitments imposed upon the right hon. Gentleman by the Colonial Secretary and by the Government's general policy.
I think that the right hon. Gentleman was perfectly aware of the increasing strains to which the Army has been subjected and was aware also that these strains show no sign of being reduced. That was why he made his defensive speech. He made it so that it would cover him when he discovered in the coming months that these strains had become worse and my hon. Friends were pointing out that fact.
But the most remarkable feature of all about his Speech is that, according to the prospects he held out to us, the task which he will be least able to perform will be the task which he put first on his list. That is to provide a strategic reserve. I have no doubt that he would like to do it, but he did not give us any indication as to how it was to be done, when, or where the strategic reserve was to come from and how necessary it was to have it by any particular date, even though he put it down as the first item he had to consider as Secretary of State for War.
The right hon. Gentleman talks about admitting these matters generously. I hope that he is extremely grateful for the part the Opposition have played in seeking to enable him to perform some of the tasks he outlined as the tasks necessary for the British Army to perform at present. He ought also to be deeply grateful for the debate on Egypt today because he knows, better than anyone, that this is the main place from which he can get some relief.
Therefore, it is all the more remarkable that these negotiations about Egypt, which the right hon. Gentleman, at the end of his earlier remarks, said he hoped would prosper and bring a situation as soon as possible in which British forces in Egypt could be reduced to a very small number—these negotiations, which might lead to this desirable result, were not initiated by the British Government, but by a change of Government in Egypt.
This was all admitted by the Prime Minister in his famous speech of 11th May, 1953. The Prime Minister said that these negotiations with Egypt were not initiated by the British Government; they were initiated because we had a request for negotiations from the Egyptians and he started the negotiations in response to their desires.
What an extraordinary situation‡ Here we have a situation which concerns the main burden imposed on the British Army today. However we may dispose of these troops later, that burden is the main reason why we cannot build up a reserve in this country. The British Government were boasting that negotiations to end the situation were not undertaken by the British Government, but by the Egyptians. The right hon. Gentleman should, therefore, be grateful to General Neguib. If his own Government would not open negotiations which would be beneficial to the British Army he should be grateful to General Neguib for starting what the British Government had not the initiative nor energy to start.
The right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Water-house) gave a most peculiar warning to the Secretary of State of which I am sure he will take not the slightest notice. The right hon. and gallant Member warned him not to be led astray by appeals by hon. Members on this side of the House to reduce the base in Egypt. K that policy were carried out, he invited the Government to consider what hon. Members on this side would say. He suggested that troops should be kept in the Canal Zone to preserve the two-year National Service period. He said that if the troops were brought home the right hon. Gentleman would not have a strategic reserve because hon. Members on this side would be wanting to reduce the two-year period. The right hon. and gallant Member was saying, "Maintain the commitments we have, and, maybe, undertake fresh commitments in order to retain conscription." I think (hat that is a fair description of his argument.

Mr. Ian Harvey: I am not a supporter of the views of the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) but, in deference to him, as he is not present, it is only right that he should not be misrepresented by the hon. Member. What my right

hon. and gallant Friend said was that if the men were brought home the strategic reserve would not be available because hon. Members opposite would then demand a reduction in National Service, which. I have no doubt, is true.

Mr. Foot: I am sorry I gave way because I thought the hon. Member was a supporter of the right hon. and gallant Member; he looked as if he was. I do not think the hon. Member really put the case of the right hon. and gallant Member half as eloquently and forcefully as the right hon. and gallant Member did.
The real problem today, and the Secretary of State agrees, is how we are to reduce our military commitments. The Government have got to change their policy in order to fit the military facts; and already events are occurring in many parts of the world which show that that is necessary. It will happen in Egypt. It is already happening in Kenya, and, in this connection, may I say that I congratulate the Government in the proposals which have been made relating to "General China"?
I do not know who is responsible for that decision; whether it was the Colonial Secretary or the Secretary of State for War, but I think that it was a wise action. Personally, I should not be surprised if it was the Secretary of State for War who is responsible. If so, as I have said, I congratulate him, for this is the decision of a person who says that we cannot go on pouring troops into Kenya in order to settle the problem there partly because we have not the troops to use there, and partly because we must try to discover a political solution. The French are facing an exactly similar problem in Indo-China. Many people seemed to believe that if troops were poured into Indo-China the problem could be settled; but now they find that the French have to seek a political solution.
All this is exactly what some of my hon. Friends on this side of the House have been saying ever since the end of the war. We have said that the British nation must seek solutions which accord with the power within our possession. There cannot be a policy where the nation burdens itself all the time with fresh commitments, for that means that one cannot perform any of them properly;


and it means that there are no strategic reserves left.
But now we come to a further complication of the situation, a complication posed on the authority of the Prime Minister in the defence debate a few weeks ago. There is now another cause of having to maintain military forces in this country because we have got to maintain a counterpoise of strength against the new German army. I should like to ask what proportion of the amount of money which we are devoting to these Estimates will be required to build up this counterpoise of strength against the army soon to be created in Western Germany. Hon. Members have the right to have an answer to this question because, after all, this will be the biggest military event that has happened in Europe since the end of the Second World War.
We are to find a powerful army raised in Western Germany. There have been reports in the "Manchester Guardian" this week that Eastern Germany is to raise 15 divisions; and, presumably, the West will not be content with 12 divisions if 15 divisions are raised in the other half of Germany. Therefore, I say, if there is to be an increase in response to what has been done in Eastern Germany, we here shall presumably have to raise our own strength as a counterpoise. This competition in arms will go on; and let hon. Members remember that this has to be done here in a country which has no strategic reserve at all at the moment and while the Government are not prepared to clear out of the Canal Zone.
It will have to be built up despite the fact that we have not been able to remove our troops from Kenya; despite the fact that our troops are still in British Guiana and may soon be required in British Honduras. One has only to look at the situation to see how hectic the competition in the arms race will be if the general foreign policy of the Government is implemented. It becomes military madness. There is no military solution for it and a political solution must be sought.
As some hon. Members on this side of the House have said, if we decide to rearm Germany as one of the important parts of our defence policy, and if we follow the logical deduction of the Prime

Minister, we must have a greater counterpoise of strength and we shall impose on the War Office a burden even vaster than it now has to carry, and which the Secretary of State has said it is not able to bear.

Mr. Nigel Fisher: I intervene with great diffidence, but may I put it to the hon. Member that his eloquent speech would be more suitable during the foreign affairs or a defence debate. [HON. MEMBERS: "it is in order."] I appreciate that it is in order and that I should not be right to claim a point of order. But many hon. Members have only one day in the year in which to discuss the Army Estimates and we should like the opportunity to do so.

Mr. Foot: I would remind the hon. Member that in previous Estimates debates I fought for the right of every hon. Member of this House to be able to raise points. The appeal should not be addressed to me but to the hon. Gentleman who is acting for the Patronage Secretary and who, in previous debates, has been the vehicle by which the debates were brought to an end.
If the hon. Member wishes to raise a point, I have the utmost sympathy for him and I will fight for his right to be able to do so. But if, as some people would like, we had the practice of raising only subsidiary matters during the Estimates debates, and not matters of general strategy, it would greatly reduce the value of such debates—particularly at a time when, as was indicated by the Secretary of State, the whole strategy of this country has to be re-examined and realigned.
I wish to give the Secretary of State the opportunity to make another speech which he said he was extremely keen to make. He showed today that he has the facts and figures at his finger tips when he spoke in such a spontaneous fashion. He was interrupted by one of my hon. Friends and asked to state what would be the position of British troops in Germany when the Bonn Treaty comes into force and rearmament starts there.
The Secretary of State had to restrain himself. He had to hold himself back. He was absolutely bursting with information on the point. He has all the information at his finger tips and it was only his deference to the House which


stopped him from telling the story which has not been revealed anywhere else before and which the House will no doubt be fascinated to hear.
I would ask the right hon. Gentleman to tell us what will be the total cost of the maintenance of British forces in Germany when the changed situation comes into effect and we are responsible entirely for their payment. What will be the total extra cost falling on the War Office Vote? When will the amount start to be paid? The right hon. Gentleman indicated that preparations were being made to deal with the subject.
He also said that preparations were being made in connection with barracks. May we be told what is to happen to the British troops in Germany? Are they to move out of the barracks they occupy at present so that German troops may move in? Are they to take over new premises? Or is a great amount included in the Vote for building fresh quarters in Germany? Is the work actually being done now to provide the quarters which will be required for the maintenance of the British Army if part of the facilities are taken over by the Germans?
Before we conclude the debate, we should like to have from the Secretary of State the half-hour speech that he promised. We should like to have a description of all the preparations which have been made by Her Majesty's Government for dealing with this problem when it arises. We should also like to have from the Secretary of State what he thinks will be the strategic result and the extra strategical burden—

Mr. Crossman: I should like my hon. Friend also to put another question to the Secretary of State. There are many thousands of Germans now working for B.A.O.R. as drivers and auxiliaries in other ways. When they are taken over by the Germans, will the War Office bear the full cost of supplying its own drivers and auxiliaries to replace the Germans? I am sure that my hon. Friend has forgotten to put that point to the Secretary of State.

Mr. Foot: I had not forgotten it at all. I did not put it because I was sure that the point would occur to the Secretary of State, for he assured us at the beginning that he would be quite willing to give us

a full description of the plans which his Department has prepared on this subject. I am sure that he will not disappoint us on that.
Taking it all in all, the Secretary of State in his speech at any rate made a greater effort than was made in the case of either the Air Estimates or the Navy Estimates to nibble at the problem of describing what are the strategic problems facing this country. Therefore, we hope not only that the right hon. Gentleman will be able to fill in the gaps which he left in his earlier speech but that his example will be recognised in future with good effects in the case of the other Service Departments. We hope that next year we may have an indication from the Government side of the House that what the Opposition have been saying for the last six years is really beginning to penetrate and that the Government will begin to understand that we cannot impose on the definitely restricted Armed Forces which this country can maintain burdens far beyond their capacity to bear.

11.13 p.m.

Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: There are one or two points on which I should like to follow the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), but I do not wish to follow him in all that he said in his foreign affairs type of speech.
We have repeatedly had from the Opposition the demand to withdraw some of our commitments in order to reduce National Service. The hon. Gentleman rightly said that there was a political solution to some of the problems. Presumably, he was referring to Kenya and to Malaya. I do not know whether he was also referring to Korea, but is he seriously suggesting that troops should not have been sent to Malaya and Korea and that one should wait until a country is overrun and then seek a political solution?
What political solution would get the Russians out of Czechoslovakia or Poland now that those countries have been overrun and are behind the Iron Curtain? Does he seriously suggest that the situation in Malaya would not have been desperate if we had not sent troops there and kept them there until the situation was cleared up? [Interruption. ] When one hits hon. Gentlemen opposite hard, they do not like it. They cannot take it.


We have sat here and listened to rubbish being talked for the last 40 minutes. When one tries to destroy those arguments and, I may say, succeeds in doing so, all one gets are catcalls and jeers.

Mr. Swingler: I asked what was the hon. and gallant Gentleman's solution for getting the Russians out of Czechoslovakia.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: My answer is that nothing was done.

Mr. Swingler: What is the solution?

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: The point of the remark I was making was that it was no good talking about a political solution. Until one has prevented the country from being occupied then is the time to seek a political solution. I asked what was the political solution for getting the Russians out of Poland and Czechoslovakia. I question the giving up of commitments, and if my right hon. Friend does concede to the hon. Gentleman opposite his request for a reduction of the commitment in Plymouth I hope that will not be used as an argument for the reduction of National Service.
I should now like to address myself to one serious aspect of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), that of the strategic reserve. He quoted General Gruenther as saying that in four days—those are his words, and I think he is an optimist—he would need heavy reinforcements to reinforce the thin line over the 300 mile front in Germany. He was suggesting—and this point I did not get clear—that the Territorial Army and the Reserve forces we have in this country should be miraculously got ready to go across the Channel in four days to reinforce General Gruenther. I am glad to see the right hon. Gentleman shake his head.
That brings me to the next point. To keep five Territorial divisions at a state of six weeks' readiness would mean that their staffs would have to work Saturdays and Sundays after doing their ordinary work during the week to keep the organisation of those divisions up to scratch so that they could mobilise at once. The trend is the other way, because those people cannot stand the pace. The strategic reserve would have to be formed from the troops who were

brought back from the Suez Canal, otherwise where would they be obtained?
Admittedly, we have a brigade in Korea, which we are hoping to see home soon. We have troops in Hongkong. But that is not the size of the strategic reserve. General Gruenther wants three or four divisions over there and not a brigade. When the troops come back from the Suez they will be the strategic reserve about which General Gruenther is talking and there can be no suggestion of reducing National Service at the same time.

Mr. Wigg: What the hon. and gallant Gentleman is saying was being said to Lord Haldane before the First World War. But Lord Haldane said we had to mobilise and get in on the French left, no matter what was being said by the General Staff, who did not think it could be done, nor did the German General Staff. In fact, we had men in action within 22 days.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: The strength of that army, and I remember mobilisation with my own regiment, was two-thirds of the total required, and it was completed by reservists, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman says. It was remarkable the way they came in. They went in at one door as civilians, out at another as soldiers and on to a horse ready to go over the following day.
The situation today is totally different. The regiments in Germany are under strength, and will be made up to full strength from the Reserve. That will not produce a Reserve of four or five divisions, ready to cross the Channel at a moment's notice. I hope that hon. Members opposite will realise the practical aspect of the situation before they become emotional about it or before—and we know this is a vote-catcher—they try to stir up in the country the feeling that it is members of the Tory Party who are keeping people in the Army when there is no necessity for it.
My right hon. Friend has done an immense amount, in the last few months, to keep the middle-piece N.C.O. and officer in the Army. This is one of our most serious problems, and he has done a great deal towards solving it. Will he consider doing something else which, in my view, will help even more than some of the things he has already done?


I refer to the education of the children of officers. N.C. Os. and men stationed abroad.
This is one of the greatest deterrents to re-engagement and a deterrent to recruiting. Lack of continuity, changing from one station to another—particularly in the early stages—involves a change of curriculum, a change of teachers, a change of methods—all disturbing, particularly for children up to the age of 11, who, let us remember, cannot be accepted by a local authority in this country for secondary school education unless they have passed a grammar school examination. The present system does not give them much chance of passing it.
I understand that in the Army on the Rhine, for instance, the Army schools are reasonably adequately supplied with places for children up to the age of 11. Possibly the problem in that field is not as great as it was. But we have to remember that no parent in this country, whatever his wage-earning capacity or station of life, has not the desire to send his son, if he has the ability to a university with a State-aided grant. For example, I was talking recently to a man who keeps a greengrocer's shop; both his sons are at a university. The Army, too, should be able to take advantage of this magnificent education system of ours—but the soldiers are not able to take advantage of it in the same way as those who are living, or stationed at home.
Something must be done about this. Let us face it: a lot of the blame falls on the local education authorities. We know of the pool of money which exists to give grants to the children of serving men who have returned from abroad, but local authorities do not look very sympathetically on applications. They are much more apt to see how many spanners they can throw into the works and how many objections they can raise.
I know of a child who was sent home to an aunt in a certain local authority area for the purpose of education. The local authority looked at the case and turned it down because, the authority said, the child's parents were not resident in the local authority area. Of course they were not; they were in Singapore.

Mr. Enrrys Hughes: On a point of order. Are we discussing the Education Estimates?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: This is in order on these Estimates.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: These parents were living in Singapore. Their home was in Scarborough. The local authority concerned said that the child should be educated at Scarborough, not where the aunt was living. That is the sort of objection raised; local authorities demand a residential qualification.
There is an even more important point which I hope my right hon. Friend will consider with the Minister of Education. The scales are assessed and designed by each local authority, entirely separately. They vary as from one local authority to another, and I believe the whole matter should be taken out of the hands of the local authorities and put fairly and squarely in the hands of the Minister of Education so that we can get a uniform assessment for these grants throughout the country.

Mr. Ede: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman answer this question? Was this case of the child living with the aunt ever sent to the Minister of Education, because I would suggest—having had something to do with the Act upon which this depends—that it is where the child resides, and not the parents, which settles the issue. I cannot help thinking that if it had been brought to the attention of the Minister she would have taken action. I am not prepared to say what the law would be in Scotland, because that always seems against the people one would help in England.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman's intervention, because almost no one else in this House knows more about these things than he does. In fact, that is exactly what happened. The case was taken to the Minister, but we do not get to know of all these cases. People do not always write to their Member, who can often put things right. They accept the local authority's ruling and suffer when they need not do so. I hope that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Minister of Education, will try to see if we can thrash out something which is a little more reasonable and practical.
These scales and assessment for grants are worked out on the basis of the cost of living in England. My wife is on the education committee of a county council


and knows this problem. When it is necessary to assess a family's means for a grant they are told the family is living in Singapore or Hongkong, and they do not have the foggiest idea of the cost of living in Singapore in relation to what it is in England. It may be costing that family twice as much to live abroad as it would at home, and their income in relation to the assessment is nothing like what it would be in the local authority area.
I hope that these points will be considered. They constitute one of the greatest deterrents to recruiting and re-engagement. The Secretary of State has done a great deal, and we ought to congratulate him on what he has done. I have heard every single speech of his since 1945, and today's was the finest he has ever made.

11.29 p.m.

Mr. James Johnson: As one who has spent a little time in education, I could not agree more with what the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) has said. The whole House is with him, and I hope the Secretary of State will take heed and do something for these youngsters of serving men.
I also echo the nice words of the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) about the speech of the Secretary of State. I thank him for the beautiful map at the back of the Memorandum which will delight all who love cartography. However, I want to take up a question which has not been discussed tonight and one which we discussed last year in detail.
The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) and myself were chasing the Ministers last year on the subject of colonial forces. Last year the Secretary of State was almost lyrical about 19 battalions which he said he intended to raise, I think in a three-year cycle, between 1952 and 1955. I believe that he spoke of having five battalions in 1952–53, eight more Regular battalions to come, and six volunteer battalions, making 19 altogether.
I listened carefully last year, and this year I looked up Vote A. I am a little hurt about this. I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman mentioned this in his opening speech. In view of our wide

commitments, I feel, and I am sure that he does, that there is need in some places for more African and colonial forces. On examining Vote A, I find that the colonial Governments are spending more money than they did last year. They are spending well over £13 million, but instead of their being an addition to the number of colonial forces I find that the figures are down. They have gone down in the last two years from 78,000 to 75,000 and next year they will be 72,450.
This does not make sense to me. I should like an explanation. I do not mind the extra money being spent. Obviously, the cost goes up annually, but I should like an explanation of the figures. They are slightly inconsistent, in view of the fair words we got last year about the future increase in the number of colonial forces.

Mr. Head: Does the hon. Gentleman realise that in many cases the colonial forces are not paid for out of our Vote, tout by the Colonial Office or by the territories themselves?

Mr. Johnson: Of course, and I make the point that they are paying more than before and seem to be getting slightly less value.
Last year the Minister also talked about established battalions. I think he spoke of equivalent battalions. He talked of having one company in one place and one somewhere else which might be made up into a so-called battalion. Perhaps we could be told whether those battalions have full complements of companies on the lines which the right hon. Gentleman suggested last year. I find this position a little hard to square with the past speeches of hon. and right hon. Members opposite. In fact, nearly all the Ministers on the Government Front Bench have talked in the past about using colonial forces—as I think most of us have talked —if we are to fulfil our overseas commitments without having too big a drain upon manpower at home.
At one effervescent moment in his past, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury even talked about having a foreign legion. What has happened to this enthusiasm? Is it a matter of finance? In view of the money we are spending in Kenya—I think it is £250,000 every month—in an emergency situation, it would pay us to use more foresight and


to spend money on what we might call Regular colonial forces. They would then be available in emergency. I hate to be gloomy and to talk about British Honduras, but we might even need forces there in the near future.
I was in Kenya some weeks ago, and, indeed, I was on the West Coast of Africa at an earlier date, and I have found that our colonial leaders do not shirk their responsibilities in this matter. Mr. Kwame Nkrumah and other well-known African leaders say that they are not afraid to pay their money into the Imperial kitty or to raise soldiers in their Colonies. There is no backwardness on that side, and, therefore, I am at a loss to understand the backwardness here in the Metropolitan Parliament.
The old Indian Army has gone, and we shall need something to take its place. I believe that Africa can provide the answer. I believe that we could easily get between 60,000 and 80,000 African colonial troops. I know that I shall probably be told by the Minister that the real difficulty is finding the necessary white officers and white N.C. Os. to train these cadres of colonial forces.
I do not suggest at this moment that we should take them from the Canal Zone and elsewhere, and send them to Kenya in order to build up a Catterick or an Aldershot there, but I do think that we can cautiously build up many more colonial forces than we have done so far. If white officers and white N.C. Os. are the difficulty, why not have white colonial officers and white colonial N.C. Os. to look after black colonial other ranks?
There are many Kenyans and Rhodesians and many other white Africans who would be perfectly happy to go into these colonial battalions and to work alongside black Africans. It would mean spending money, but we should take time by the forelock and spend the money now. Unless we give special inducements, we shall have to take United Kingdom men. Better housing and better barrack accommodation for their wives and families would be needed, and perhaps financial inducements. We have special expatriate allowances for colonial civil servants, so why not special allowances for English, Scottish or Welsh

officers and N.C. Os. who are seconded, so to speak, to these colonial battalions?

Mr. Mikardo: I am trying to discover why my hon. Friend is ruling out the possibility of black troops having black officers and N.C. Os. May I remind him that the American Army seems to adopt that system quite successfully, so why not us?

Mr. Johnson: I was just about to come to that. My hon. Friend must have powers of telepathy. In the same way as the Americans, we must have African officers and N.C. Os.
Last year I raised the matter of black officers in the West African forces and I received a most satisfactory answer. By now there must be eight, 10 or more Gold Coasters and Nigerians at Sandhurst and Camberley who, in due course, will receive full Queen's commissions. They will mess with their white cousins in the officers' messes when they get back to the Gold Coast. If it can be done in West Africa, why not in East Africa?
We talk about the warlike peoples of India, like the Punjabis, but there are also warlike tribes of Africans; and even the Kikuyus, who are, I suppose the least warlike of all the peoples of Africa, have not been doing so badly over the last 12 or 18 months. But there are far better tribes than the Kikuyu, such, for instance, as the Nandi, the Kipsigi and the Kamba. These tribes did wonderful work in the last great war in Asia and we allowed far too many of these first-class N.C. Os. to drift back to their villages and thereby lost them for the future.
Now a word about what we might have done and ought to be doing now. At the end of the war, the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Alport) and Michael Blundell, a man of some stature among the white settlers in East Africa, spoke on these lines, and they were discussing a scheme whereby the best N.C. Os. in the King's African Rifles should be sent on a five-year course to Makerere College. It is important to educate them if we are to eliminate the colour bar in the officers' mess and have coloured officers alongside white officers. If the black officers are to hold their own in the officers' mess— I am not thinking of the correct way to pass the port and similar techniques—not


only must they be good officers in the bush and the jungle, but they must also be able to do the paper work. They must have the education.
We should put these N.C. Os. on a four or five-year course at Makerere College or the inter-racial university college which is to be begun at Salisbury or the university college which is to be built at Nairobi. Not only would these men have the status and be able to mix with their white colleagues in the mess but, even more important, they would be able to do the administrative work which must be done in addition to the usual fighting and manoeuvres.

Mr. T. L. Iremonger: I think there is a great deal of force in what the hon. Gentleman is saying, and before he leaves that point perhaps I may be allowed to reinforce it by referring to the Fiji Regiment which was formed during the war and which is, at the moment, serving with its own Fijian officers and European officers in Malaya with the greatest effect. We hope it will continue to serve for some considerable time.

Mr. Johnson: I welcome that interjection. What matters is not the colour of a man's skin but what is inside his head and the other qualities which are so vital to any officer.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Are there not certain disadvantages? For example, the head hunters of Borneo, who were brought to Malaya, had to be withdrawn because they were decapitating people?

Mr. Johnson: I accept that point, also.
Now may I pass on to this question of manpower? It is not only a matter of adding to the sum total of troops to fight in a future war. It is not just a matter of adding to the military and strategic value of our forces. Even more important when we are dealing with these young emergent colonial societies is to bear in mind the prestige and sense of satisfaction that we are giving to them in placing them on an equal status with white people in the forces. It is important to have not merely African district officers and teachers but African officers in the forces, too. Only when they attain the highest ranks in all walks of life will they attain that dignity and status which they deserve.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) for mentioning this point, and I wish to emphasise the necessity for eliminating the colour bar in the Services in that way. The colour bar is an evil thing, wherever it may be. If we can eliminate it in this field, we shall have gone a long way towards lifting up these colonial people.
But it is not just a matter of giving them status. In any young society— Turkey, the Soviet Union, China and elsewhere—the Army is being used as a means of education in the widest possible sense. The African peasant people are in much the same state of society. Where there are large masses of illiterate peasant farming people, the Army is used to educate them and then they are sent back again to their own villages and local societies to be leaders.
I only wish we had done this in Kenya at the end of the last war. We might have had less bother with the Mau Mau if we had done so. If we had taken some of the N.C. Os. who left the King's African Rifles in 1945 and sent them back, along with whites, in mixed teams to work in the reserves, we should have had a much better reservoir of coloured people to help us in these last difficult 18 months. We have missed our opportunity there of getting better officers and leaders of the district councils and in all the normal avenues of society in these native areas.
I end where I began. If in this House we talk about our commitments overseas and say we have not the manpower to go here, there and everywhere, here is a possible supplement, and the more African colonial troops we have to garrison or to take station in the West Indies or Africa, the less need there is for the white troops to be there. They can come back to their wives and families at home or be used in other theatres of war where they can be put to more and better use at any given moment. While I do not want an Aldershot in Kenya, I do say that the present need of the Commonwealth for military manpower is an opportunity for the African Colonies.

11.47 p.m.

Mr. W. R. Rees-Davies: I am happy to have the opportunity of following the hon. Member for


Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson), because he was out in Kenya recently when I was there as a mere political nomad, not a member of the delegation from this House. Nevertheless, I was much interested in what the hon. Gentleman said and I support practically all he said with only one small caveat, and I am not sure that he would not agree with me on that also.
Obviously, the purpose is to try to build up the general status of the African, but that is dependent upon his educational status. I do not believe that could necessarily be done by taking a grown man and sending him for two or three years to a university. I think it will have to be developed over a period, so that the education of these young men is built up from an early age until they achieve the status necessary for the purpose which the hon. Gentleman put before the House. Otherwise, I am in substantial agreement with what he had to say.
With regard to his other point, it is true that if we are in the future to be able to continue to meet our world-wide commitments, we must seek to develop far more N.C. Os. and officers from our Colonial Territories and throughout the Commonwealth.
Now 1 want to turn to two or three purely practical points in the sphere of Egypt. In this matter also I have quite a close interest because my former battalion, the 1st Battalion the Welsh Guards, is now serving in the Suez Canal, and I am in close personal touch with officers, N.C. Os. and men now serving in that district.
I start by saying that I agree very largely with the facts that we have heard, although my ultimate conclusions are entirely different from those of many other hon. Members. I have it on the best authority possible that the N.A.A.F.I. conditions in the Canal Zone at the present time are extremely unsatisfactory. First, the men are complaining that they have not enough food. Their complaint is greater there than it is in any other station, whether it be Germany or throughout Europe and the Far East. It is complained that the variety of food is bad and the supplies of the N.A.A.F.I. in the Zone are extremely irregular. The officers complain that they cannot get enough spirits, whether gin or whisky, and not enough tonic water.
The men complain that there is insufficient variety of beer and an insecure supply of sweets, though we hear that in this country we are eating more sweets than ever before. The cooking is not as good as it is in other parts, so what that must be like I shudder to think. I am seriously urged by officers and men out there that consideration should be given to sending out better Army cooks to go to the assistance of their less competent brothers.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: How recent is this information?

Mr. Rees-Davies: I received it from a senior officer at 10 o'clock tonight. That, of course, was not the first information, but I thought that I should get it right up to date from a senior officer who arrived in this country 10 days ago.
Apparently, some units are complaining with some justification that training is very difficult, and that guard duties are a very serious matter indeed and are longer in duration and more in number than in almost any other sphere. But the real difficulty that the Secretary of State for War must face is the impossible position with regard to the maintenance both of transport and installations which must inevitably deteriorate and will go on doing so very fast.
It is unfortunate that men who have been trained according to the best traditions of the Army should find this laxity when they take over installations and hutted encampments and they do not find the thorough inventory that one finds where the best practices and traditions of the Army are followed. Recruitment also goes down, because the men out there are not prepared to sign on, since if a young soldier does so he has to serve another year or two in the area. I hope that the House will agree that this is as fair a statement of the difficulties in the Canal Zone as one could make, and the information comes from senior officers.
As one who has been associated with the views of my right hon and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), I should like to say quite sincerely why I fundamentally disagree with the views expressed by the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) and the hon. Lady


the Member for Blackburn, East (Mrs. Castle) this evening. First of all, they put up an entirely erroneous "Aunt Sally," which they then knocked down. They offered two alternatives. They said, first of all, that there must be either an agreement with Egypt or, secondly, that we must get out. To my way of thinking both these points are quite wrong.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: We have now moved from the Amendment back to the main Question.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I venture to suggest that it is clearly in order for me to deal with the question of the retention of the troops in the Suez Canal Zone. I was about to say that there are two alternatives to the premises which were put before the House earlier this evening. I think that if I am allowed to go on, I shall prove that I am in order.
The first alternative, clearly, would be to sweep away the base. It is nearly 100 miles long and all the sandy installations which exist lie in the areas around the main towns. Port Suez, Ismalia and Moascar, where there are the flies, the dust and the sand.
What I am advocating is that we should reduce to something of the proportion of the garrison of Gibraltar and bring down our commitments to a very small area, bringing ourselves within the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which at present we are breaching. I agree that it is no answer at all to that argument to say that the Egyptians first broke it. We cannot turn round and say, "Yahoo, we are going to break it."
We should reduce our commitments in this area down to those which the Treaty permits us, which is an effective force of 10,000 men and the necessary ancillaries, port facilities and the like. That is the argument which we who associate ourselves with the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East believe is the necessary and effective course to take.
There is a further alternative which is also of paramount importance and has never been really debated in this House. It is what steps can we take to ensure effective international control of the users of the Suez Canal, because the basis of this matter is not the military

strategic base. That is not the first consideration, but it is equally important that this army should realise that it is their bounden duty to see that our shipping can proceed through this international waterway.
I therefore feel that the arguments addressed with that vivid emotion which I am afraid were so vitriolic that I shall hereafter call the hon. Member "the Borgia from Blackburn" proceeded on arguments which had no relation to the military strategy with which we should look at the case.

Mr. C. J. M. Alport: I gather that the proposal now is to reduce to a garrison of 10,000 troops. Would my hon. Friend elaborate how 10,000 troops are to ensure the navigation of the Canal, which is 100 miles long?

Mr. Rees-Davies: I was proposing to deal with that point, but if I may I will deal with it when I come to it in the course of my speech. I wish to deal with that and a number of other arguments.
Those are two quite separate alternatives to what has been addressed to the House tonight. This matter has been presented to the country as "either enter into an agreement with Neguib or get out altogether." I will address myself to the argument that we should decrease our forces to a garrison in this area and, furthermore, that we should do it without any agreement or negotiations with Egypt whatsoever.
As I must address myself to the arguments in their proper order, I must first prove the case that there should be no further negotiations and no further agreement with Egypt. Why do I say that? I say it for this reason. I will refer to what has happened in the last five years. We can never enter into any agreement in the next three or four years with Egypt until they have a stable Government. First, on 28th December, 1948, Nokrashy Pasha was murdered by the Moslem Brotherhood. On 27th January, 1952, Farouk dismissed Nahas Pasha and installed Ali Maher Pasha. On 2nd March, 1952, Ali Maher Pasha was himself deposed and Hilali Pasha succeeded him. On 29th June, 1952, Hilali Pasha fell. On 29th July, 1952, Hussein Sirry Pasha formed a new Government. On 2nd July, 1952, Hussein Sirry Pasha fell and Hilali


Pasha was installed again. In July, 1952, Neguib—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member is now dealing with a matter which is more properly within the field of foreign affairs.

Mr. Rees-Davies: My point, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, is that we have heard it said tonight that the only method by which we can evacuate the forces is by entering into an agreement with Egypt; and, therefore, I respectfully submit that I must establish two points. First, that it is certainly quite ineffective to have any agreement with Egypt, because we cannot trust what those in power will do; and secondly, that we can achieve the removal of those forces, which is what I gather hon. Members wish to achieve, without entering into an agreement. I think that I am only following up what has been put forward in the argument of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), who is himself a former Secretary of State for War.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It would seem that the first part of that argument is a matter for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and we are not now discussing foreign affiairs. The second part seems to be relevant to this debate.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I merely want to point out that Neguib then had his military putsch. Neguib forced Farouk—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member is now returning to what is properly a matter of foreign affairs; it is a matter for the Foreign Office.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I am sorry; I thought that I was on the other part. However, there were no fewer than twelve abdications and changes.

Mr. Strachey: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but on the basis of his argument it would appear to be undesirable to have any treaties with France who alters her Government very rapidly; and I would remind him that his right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary quite recently said in the House that we should be very limited if able to deal only with countries which had stable Governments.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I hope the right hon. Gentleman will not tempt the hon. Member too far along that line.

Mr. Rees-Davies: It may be that France frequently changes her Government; but she does so constitutionally. Egypt does not.

Mr. Wigg: May I try to help the hon. Member to keep within the rules of order by asking whether there may not be a cause for this instability? The Egyptians cannot have an agreement with us; if they could, the instability might not be there.

Mr. Rees-Davies: All I say is that there were no fewer than 12 different changes, mostly undemocratic, and which all occurred before there was any question of going into any agreement with Egypt. In the last two months, some hon. Friends and myself have put a Motion on the Order Paper, and it has turned out that we were quite right; and there have been two important changes even in that relatively short period.
I should like now to refer to paragraph 39 of the Memorandum to the Army Estimates, where it is stated:
The Egyptian attitude during these months has resulted in a very hard time for the Army. A large number of attacks, robberies, and incidents of all kinds have made the soldier's life always tense and frequently dangerous. During the period from 15th May to 15th November, 1953, there were no fewer than 885 incidents in the Canal Zone, directed against our men or their families. During 1953 there were 127 attacks with firearms, 34 attacks with knives, and 93 attacks with other weapons. Sixteen British subjects were murdered between 1st January, 1953, and 30th January, 1954.
I know that I have the disadvantage of being a lawyer, but it is absolutely inconceivable to me that we can enter into an agreement with men who are openly and undoubtedly permitting murder and robbery throughout their whole territory. Is this, country to condone these violent acts by entering into an agreement? I could not support any such agreement.
Further, we have to look at this vital question of military strategy and what the Army can do in the light of the fact that no agreement is worth the paper on which it is written. Agreement or no agreement, if we had one it would not be of the slightest effect because the whole background of the military junta—not Neguib so much but Nasser and his colleagues—is of close association with the Communists. It is nothing more nor less than their starting up the conditions of the usual violence which the


Russians will find for their benefit in this area.
It is interesting to note that recently at Berlin Mr. Molotov took great trouble to ask my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to remove British troops from Egypt, and that those who controlled the ministerial posts in Egypt had been in close contact with Mr. A. Chikov, a member of the Soviet staff, and have been closely associated with the Communistic organisation, the "Democratic Movement for National. Liberation," and this group is actively associated with the "Partisans of Peace," another organisation inspired by the Communists.
What I am saying so far as military action is concerned is this: imagine the position of the Secretary of State for War if we entered into an agreement and thereafter he found that around the corner in Cairo there were these Communist-infiltrated partisans who immediately proceeded to pillage and murder the 4,000 technicians left behind. I would be very chary of being one of those technicians, if any such agreement were effected, without having around me the regiment of which I was a member or a brigade of troops—even though one may have little regard for the military efficacy of Egyptian troops.
We on this side of the House recognise that there is no longer any need for a jumping-off ground as a fundamental base against Russia in time of war. That is an important point. Some people may regard it as a concession. Therefore, for what purpose do we need our troops there? The first is to keep open an international waterway until we can achieve an effective international agreement. The second is to ensure that we have adequate and proper airfield and port facilities for two purposes; first, because it is the main strategic air base of real value in the Middle East, and, secondly, because we require port facilities for re-entry in the event of an emergency.
We do not need another agreement. We can start to scale down our forces and choose the strategic area the Army needs. I am sure the Secretary of State for War and the Government Front Bench are well aware that there are well-known generals and air marshals in this country who support this view. I do not propose to mention names, but there are

men of great eminence who have stated more than once that it is vital to have a strategic air base in Suez, the more so since the removal of Khartoum, our most effective air base in the area, means that we have to look for another. There is no other effective base except that which can be found in the area.

Mr. Wigg: I am sure that the hon. Member is aware that there are 10 fully equipped Royal Air Force airfields within 10 miles of the Suez Canal. I take it that he would give up nine of them and retain one.

Mr. Rees-Davies: My information is that the airfield close to the port is one of great strategic necessity in that area.

Mr. Wigg: Which port?

Mr. Rees-Davies: The airfield is that at Moascar. We have a dual need of the air base and the port facilities.
We can reduce to the small area and continue with these bases. We are entitled to do so under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. More nonsense has been talked about our position under the Treaty than almost anything else that I have heard. I read an article the other day by the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) which indicated that he had either never read the Treaty or, if he had read it, had conveniently put it out of his mind.
He said that if we did not move out after 1956, we would be guilty of flagrant aggression against the Egyptians. That is quite untrue. Article 8, combined with Article 16, make it quite plain where we stand. Article 8 has been read to the House before, but it might be as well to read it again.

Mr. Fisher: I would point out that my hon. Friend has already been speaking for nearly half an hour.

Mr. Rees-Davies: Article 8 says:
In view of the fact that the Suez Canal, whilst being an integral part of Egypt, is a universal means of communication as, also, an essential means of communication between the different part of the British Empire … until such time as the High Contracting Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal, authorises His Majesty The King and Emperor to station forces in Egyptian territory in the vicinity of the Canal …


That is a plain enough statement. It goes on—

Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman has not read it correctly. He should not mislead the House.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I am not misleading the House. I am reading the relevant parts and not the whole of it because my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher) wants me to sit down. I am sorry if I have taken too long. I will read straight on:
… and in the zone specified in the Annex to this Article …
That is the point that 1 am making, that we must reduce the area to bring it within the terms of the Treaty.
… with a view to ensuring in co-operation with the Egyptian forces the defence of the Canal.
It goes on later:
The presence of these forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt. It is understood that at the end of the period of twenty years …
that is, 1956.
… the question whether the presence of British forces is no longer necessary owing to the fact that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal may, if the High Contracting Parties do not agree thereon, be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for decision … in accordance with such other procedure as the High Contracting Parties may agree.
It is perfectly plain that in 1956 Egypt could not possibly show that the Egyptian Army was in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of the navigation of the Canal. If it could do so, it must do it in agreement with us.
When we turn to Article 16, which is quite simple, we see that we have complete safeguards for our position there for as long as we like. It says:
At any time after the expiration of a period of twenty years … the High Contracting Parties will … enter into negotiations with a view to such revision of its terms by agreement between them as may be appropriate in the circumstances …
It goes on to make it quite plain that it is agreed that any revision of the Treaty will provide for the continuance of the alliance between these parties in accordance with the principles contained in the earlier Articles.
There is no reason at all why we should fear the future. We do not need to have an agreement. We are entitled to do what we ought to do and go back to the Treaty rights and adhere to them. There is no question of being turned out in 1956, and there is no reason why we should be, when one bears in mind the avalanche of claims which may arise if we go on losing prestige. If any hon. Member doubts that, let him ask Anglo-Iraq Petroleum and other big interests their views on the matter, or ask trade unions what would happen if large contracts were lost, which will occur if we scuttle out of Egypt.
The whole argument of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Coventry, East is irrelevant. It is that we must get out, which I regard as a scuttle, or enter into an agreement. Neither is necessary, because the true course is to adhere to our agreement and to adhere to our principles, and to see that we are within the Treaty. Having done so, and the Secretary of State for War, having got himself into that comfortable position and saved himself from the difficulties of maintenance of the existing installations, can then go to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and invite him to seek an agreement for international control with the United States and other users of the canal to ensure that the canal is safe, and safe for our shipping when the Convention falls in in 1968.

Mr. Alport: I did address a question to my hon. Friend which he promised to answer.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I am much obliged to my hon. Friend. He asked me how, if we reduced our commitment to this small area, we could ensure the effective navigation of the waterway. The same question was put to me by the hon. Member for Coventry, East when I raised this matter in December, and I could not deal with it then. The answer is, of course, that at the present time, with the whole of the 90 or 100 miles we have, we are not able to secure that navigation on this international waterway because we are behaving in such a flabby fashion, and I borrow the word from the hon. Member for Coventry, East, who was talking about the flabby Empire.
If there is an effective air base there, and an effective garrison at the port, the


threat of the use of air power if there is any interference by the Egyptians will be sufficient to ensure and maintain that the canal is safe. What we need is a clear sense of purpose, and a clear statement that we intend to keep the canal open, and that if the Egyptian troops seek to stop us we will use force to prevent them.

12.19 a.m.

Mr. A. Blenkinsop: I do not wish to follow the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) in his general argument, but it seems to me that, whatever may be the rights or wrongs of the legal interpretation, it is a false point to raise this issue in the face of a major national demand in Egypt. That has been expressed by right hon. Gentlemen on the other side, as well as on this. When the hon. Gentleman was going through his catalogue of responsible or irresponsible Governments in Egypt, it was perfectly clear that one of the factors for ensuring instability in Egypt has been the inability of the Government to come to any agreement with Egypt about the Suez Canal.
I should like to take up a point raised by the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer), who referred to one particular aspect of the problem of education in the forces, especially that of children of serving men. I had an opportunity, during the autumn, of visiting B.A.O.R., for which I am grateful to the War Office, and of seeing what the Royal Army Educational Corps was doing, not only in teaching children, but also in the training of serving men themselves. I am sorry that the Memorandum contains such a cursory mention of this modest but important aspect of the Army's activities. It is brushed off in three lines, in association with entertainment. It is worthy of a little more reference than that.
The hon. and gallant Member for Worthing raised an important point. He spoke of the difficulty of securing proper educational facilities for children in B.A.O.R. or other overseas stations and described that as an important unsettling factor in recruitment. I saw something of this at first hand. I saw a number of the admirable schools being run by the Army in B.A.O.R., and it is true that the majority of the children in those

schools have been moving from station to station over the years. It is very difficult to obtain any sort of continuity of education, a problem which must worry parents.
The problem is whether those children are to continue being educated overseas or whether provision should be made for them in this country. If provision is to be made overseas, it will enable better contact to be maintained with their parents. On the other hand, if provision is to be made in this country, there will be better continuity of education.
When I raised this matter last year, the Under-Secretary of State replied to me in writing, particularly about secondary education, and said that at that time the War Office were considering three possibilities for secondary education. One was to continue the present policy towards the full provision of secondary education overseas in day and boarding schools, according to need and the facilities available. The second was to make partial provision overseas and to set up Service schools in the United Kingdom for selected children. The third possibility was to set up Service schools in the United Kingdom for all children of secondary school age.
Has the War Office reached any conclusion in this matter? When I was in B.A.O.R., considerable provision had been and was being made for secondary school education, particularly of coeducational boarding schools—comprehensive schools, we might call them. Those of my hon. Friends who are particularly interested in the provision of comprehensive schools might well go out to Germany and see something of what is being done under Army auspices. It is a very interesting experiment, and considerable development is taking place.
In particular, we have three secondary boarding schools at Cologne, Wilhelmshaven and the new school at Hamm. I should be glad to know whether all three are in operation and whether it means that we are to concentrate our educational efforts in providing overseas secondary school education. If we are, I hope it will be possible to do what the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing was anxious to see done— make it possible for those who are attending these schools to secure the highest education and to have an opportunity of preparation for university.
I hope it is something that can be done even in overseas conditions. Very few people in this country realise what a very large proportion of the War Office expenditure on education goes in the field of children's education. I do not know what the figure is today, but I imagine it is almost half of the £3 million provided for in the Estimates both for other ranks and officers at home and overseas. It cannot be too much emphasised what a very important part this particular aspect does play in Army education today.
Quite recently, this field of children's education has passed under the control and administration of the Royal Army Educational Corps, and no doubt that is highly desirable for administrative and other reasons, but it is important that the lay aspect of that service should be maintained. We have a very admirable director of the service in Germany, and I hope that there will be no interference with his liberty of action. The sort of point that may well arise is that there might be those who would wish to secure a good deal of formality and stereotyped production of text books, based rather on the experience of training manuals.
If you want to train soldiers to fire a rifle or perform other military operations, it is important that the sequence should be the same throughout the world, but in this very important field this attitude should not be adopted. It is important that those teachers who are doing an excellent job under difficult conditions abroad should be given the fullest freedom to follow their own line of education, and I hope that their present Liberty of action will be safeguarded for the future.
It is fair to say, and I am glad to be able to say it, that there does seem to be a much fuller recognition in Army circles generally of the value of general education. I found, in discussing this in B.O.A.R., that commanding officers fully recognised the importance of this, and how it linked with their own training. This education for the serving man ranges from the preliminary work, done to try and deal with the tragic field of illiteracy, right through the various courses for the three educational certificates to a limited amount of higher education.
With regard to the preliminary education, it is a matter of great concern to all

of us that there is still such a high proportion of illiterates or semi-literates coming into the Forces. No one can say that this is a larger problem than it used to be, because we have no statistics or knowledge of how big a problem it was, and it is quite wrong to suggest that the problem has grown worse. Certainly, it is true that there is a serious problem.
One unit applied some preliminary tests to a group of soldiers who had come out from home to join them. The men were without any special educational qualifications and it was found that out of their number almost 10 per cent, were regarded not as illiterate but as only semi-literate. Nearly 10 per cent, of that group of young soldiers were men whom the commanding officer said were of no use to him at all. He was most anxious that they should go off for special preliminary training to special centres.
The War Office are to be congratulated on the excellent work they are doing. It is original work, as many people appreciate, but if that effort to deal with illiteracy is to have any success everyone who has seen anything of the courses which are run would agree that it needs to be followed up by steady work after the men return to their parent units. That is by no means easy to achieve. Nevertheless, a real effort must be made. I appeal to the Under-Secretary to look into the problem.
Then we have the general bread and butter work of the Royal Army Educational Corps. There again, I found a receptive attitude among most commanding officers who certainly seem to realise that this fits in very well with their own Army training. They find that it helps them enormously. Indeed, many look to the Corps to help them select future N.C. Os. I was glad to find that most commanding officers make time available for this most important part of Army training, and that out of a relatively short period of the year in which it can be done. Because of the amount of time which has to be taken up by exercises, there is not a very long period available for this kind of training.
In B.A.O.R. there are a number of educational centres. It is important that much of the training for the higher certificates should be done in these centres rather than in the barracks. There is no doubt that the atmosphere is much conducive


to the success of the courses. In these centres an attempt is being made to provide for the voluntary educational service. Inevitably, this is a very difficult job. It always was during the war and it is even more difficult now.
Naturally, many of those concerned with the work in the centres are dispirited because of the small response which they get. I do not think that that should lead us to advocate the withdrawal of the provision. I hope that no proposal of that sort will be made. Even though the total may be small it is of the utmost importance that the young men should have at least some of the facilities which can be made available to the troops at home much more easily.
These facilities are available in every town in the country through the evening classes organised by local authorities, technical colleges, the W.E.A. and other bodies. Obviously, nothing like the same range can be provided in Germany, but it is astonishing what a little effort can secure. I was most struck, in one of the educational centres in Minden, by the tremendous effort which had been made to deal with a great variety of subjects. A great attempt was being made to establish contact with the men from new units coming into the area to discover what would be the most useful courses to run. I feel that one wants to pay a very real tribute to the work done in that field.
Finally, there are some higher education centres. I saw one of them, and I found it hard to imagine how it justified its name. A short time ago a good deal of its1 accommodation was, inevitably, being used for these very valuable and important preliminary education courses for illiterates and semi-illiterates in the forces. Another section of its accommodation is being made available for resettlement courses. I suggest that "higher education centre" is a bit of a misnomer in these circumstances.
I do not know whether any change has come about since then, but I certainly think that it is a problem which we need to face. I am not sure that it would not be better to run resettlement courses in this country rather than in Germany. However, that is a matter which I am sure is now under consideration.
The Royal Army Education Corps is doing a very important job in this wide

field of activities, but it certainly needs a good deal of invigoration in the form of new blood. I do not know what the intentions are with regard to it. There have been some discussions about a change in its form, but I do not know whether any decision has been taken in the matter.
It is of the greatest importance that young people should be encouraged to go into that field because work of very real importance is being done there, particularly in linking up with general Army training. The danger is that at the moment the Royal Army Education Corps is not getting that flow of able instructors which it certainly needs.
I can imagine that there will be difficulties when the new scheme finally comes into operation in this field as in many others. I assume that the financial provisions are going to be made more difficult. I do not know whether the Under-Secretary of State can say anything about that. For example, with regard to the secondary education provided in these boarding schools, how much of the cost of these institutions will in future fall directly upon the Treasury, I do not know. No doubt that will be a matter of very serious concern.
However that may be, I hope that there will be no question about maintaining the very valuable work being done in that direction at the present time. Perhaps at a later stage in this debate the Undersecretary of State will be able to say something about the future intentions of the War Office with regard to the development of the work of the Royal Army Education Corps.

12.34 a.m.

Mr. C. J. M. Alport: I am sure that the House is very grateful to the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop) for the very thoughtful speech which he has just made. Normally at this time, the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) makes his annual attack upon the Brigade of Guards. But we have had enough excitement for the moment in this debate without having that added to our other pleasures and matters of interest, and we will wait until first light, no doubt, before the next engagement takes place.

Mr. Wigg: I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Gentleman, but may I draw your


attention, Mr. Speaker, to the fact that there are not 40 Members present?

Notice taken that 40 Members were not present;

House counted, and 40 Members being present—

Mr. Alport: Perhaps I may now continue to deal with one or two of the points to which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State referred when he dealt with the present position of the Army.
As I see it, the problem is this. In deciding the future organisation, equipment and pattern of deployment of the Army, those who have the responsibility for planning it are faced with a very difficult problem indeed. Roughly half the Army as it at present exists is required for what I call a European type of war, complete with all the intricate and costly paraphernalia of armour and atomic arm. The other half is required for the traditional rôle of maintaining law and order in overseas territories.
Although it is impossible to say how far those two requirements will vary in the future, I would think that on the whole an Army of the present size, at instant readiness will continue to be needed for deployment in Europe. In addition, a varying number of units will be required for operations in support of the civil power to maintain law and order in theatres overseas. These are likely to be the two roles required of the Army in the future.
The problem, let me repeat, is this. How far are those two roles completely incompatible at the present time? How far can we have a universal all-purpose Army, with all-purpose units—for instance, an all-purpose infantry battalion—which, on the one hand, is capable of deployment in Germany in a corps formation as part of a highly modernised and highly equipped N.A.T.O. force, and, on the other hand, is available by its training and equipment for action in Kenya, or if necessary in British Guiana, in totally different circumstances, where the rôle is very different, where the organisation required appears to me to be very different indeed and where the type of arms and equipment required are different?
I should have thought, therefore, that this would be a strong argument now for

the development of two types of infantry battalion with different training and, at the same time, for an expansion of our colonial troops, because I cannot think that it is economical in manpower or in equipment to use United Kingdom battalions, for instance, in Kenya. I do not think that a United Kingdom battalion in Kenya is a very satisfactory formation. I do not think that the troops are trained for that type of warfare.
I do not think it would be right to train them for that type of warfare because the majority of those men are National Service men, and when they return to the Reserve they will be of value, not in the fulfilment of what I would call internal security operations overseas, but as reserves for the highly complicated, armoured and atomic army for deployment in Europe.
Again, I should have thought that the twin propositions are these: that we want more colonial troops, that it is an economic proposition now to have more colonial troops, and at the same time we want those colonial troops, or the British units that are to operate in the Colonial Territories, should have their own Service, their own organisations and their own special equipment. The time has long since passed when we should have started a Colonial Service Army which is separate from the United Kingdom Army.
I am greatly impressed by the fact that the type of officer—and there are many exceptions to what I am saying, which is necessarily a generalisation—now being made available from the United Kingdom for colonial units has not the experience or the maturity of judgment or, sometimes, the high level of attainment or character essential to the command of colonial troops. I do not believe that it is satisfactory in any circumstances to use National Service officers for such troops.
After all, the essential qualification required by an officer in the colonial Army is that he should know his troops and should know their language, and he cannot command them effectively and, what is far more important, he cannot administer them effectively unless he knows their country, their home, their environment, their customs, their language and the men themselves. Therefore, we cannot have short-service officers with colonial troops.
I want to ask my right hon. Friend whether he will not now consider the suggestion which has been put to him and to his predecessors for many years past, for the formation of a colonial military service. I agree very much with nearly all the points made by the hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson), because his views and those I am trying to put to the House now dovetail quite clearly.

Mr. Julian Snow: What the hon. Gentleman has just been saying about the vernacular need of officers serving with colonial troops is quite contrary to what was the pre-war experience. Officers serving with the King's African Rifles before the war, to my personal knowledge, were seconded from home units, and only in rare cases did they know the native vernacular; but they were very good officers.

Mr. Alport: I do not want to argue with the hon. Gentleman, but I can assure him that he is not correct in that statement. They certainly came from home units, but they spent at least three years out there and, in many cases, six eight, ten, or twelve years serving with the colonial forces. They knew the language extremely well. It was one of the essential things that they should know either Swahili or Chinianja. We cannot, however, expect an officer going there for six months or a year to take the trouble to learn the language which is essential to the understanding and proper command of colonial forces.

Mr. J. Johnson: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would agree with me that it would be a good thing to attempt to get more African officers as quickly as we can in the near future?

Mr. Alport: I fully agree. The hon. Gentleman referred to a suggestion which was made at the end of the war that the best of the African N.C. Os.—who were potential officers—should have been given that higher education which is essential if they are to have a fair chance of turning into good, efficient, modern officers. But five, six, eight years have passed—it is the fault not only of this Government but of their predecessors equally—and many of those with experience of war, who would have started the tradition of the post-war African officer

at its highest standard, have been lost to the Army in East Africa.
I am thinking not only of East Africa. It applies to all our Colonial Territories. I am certain that the War Office policy of giving second and third place always to the colonial forces over the last eight years has been wrong. I agree that for what I call an atomic Army for operations in Europe, the colonial forces are not up to that required standard and are not suitable for that form of employment. But an extra £1 million spent on the colonial forces now would save us a great deal in European manpower and in equipment and in training. At present we are having to use troops which are not suitable for employment in colonial operations, and who are much more expensive simply because they are being used for purposes for which I do not regard them as suitable. Therefore, I ask my right hon. Friend to reconsider the attitude of the War Office, which on the whole has been thoroughly inimical to colonial forces during the last eight years.
I will not enter into the controversy about strategic reserves, but the House should consider one aspect. I believe that if we are to have an effective strategic reserve, at any rate for the purposes of the cold war—that is for the movement of relatively small bodies of troops over substantial distances—we have to consider the necessity of providing them with suitable air transport very much more thoroughly than has been the case in the past.
I regard this is primarily an Army matter. We require air transport first, for the movement of our strategic reserve. I do not think that it is sufficient for my right hon. Friend and his advisers to be satisfied with improvisation by bringing in aircraft from charter companies or B.O.A.C. for a particular requirement or operation. I would remind my right hon. Friend that, as he is far better aware than I am, civilian planes will not always be available for military purposes at the beginning of a full-scale war, because probably they will be required for moving refugees and emergency operations of that kind. It will be a mistake, therefore, to place the reliance which is obviously placed at the moment on civilian aircraft for military purposes.
The second requirement of air transport is for airborne operations. I may be quite wrong, but I have always conceived it probable that the first units that would be employed in an emergency would be our airborne troops. I should have thought that our formations in Europe would be used primarily for holding operations and that any quick counter-thrust would be made by the Airborne Division or a parachute brigade. But when Territorial Army exercises were held last year, American planes had to be used for airborne operations. Would they be available if required in wartime? I am sure that they would not be. It is most unsatisfactory from the point of view of the British Army that we should be relying on American planes for this work.
I know that there are plans in existence at present for providing Transport Command with a new type of 'plane for Army purposes. There are now two types of plane available, the Hastings and the Valetta, but both are unsatisfactory for Army purposes. The reason is, primarily, that they are side loading and carry a relatively small freight payload. The new Beverley, which we hope will be available, is a very expensive plane and we shall not get many of them.
I do not know whether my right hon. Friend can say how many will be available for the Army, but they are not likely to be available in sufficient numbers for the movement of strategic reserves, or airborne operations, or for the other purpose for which air transport is required, the administration of the Army in the theatre of war after air superiority has been achieved.
I stress to my right hon. Friend that there are many hon. Members on this side of the House, and probably opposite, who are greatly concerned at what appears to be the neglect there is at present of what I believe to be an extremely important arm of a modern army. We know that the United States have their C119 and the French have their Nord 2501, both of which are tail loaders and both of which, in some ways, have advantages over the Beverley.
Surely it is not beyond the ingenuity of British manufacturers to provide an aircraft which is suitable to Army purposes. In the case of a relatively minor emergency, what I would call a cold

war as opposed to a hot war. I should think transport of the strategic reserve would be vital, and it should be air transport.
It seemed to me ludicrous when the Abadan crisis came about that the parachute brigade, which was moved to make a show of force, had to be moved in an aircraft carrier from Malta, or the United Kingdom I believe it was, to Suez. When the question arose of moving it from Suez to Abadan, the aeroplanes available were found not to have the range at full payload for that purpose. What is the point of having a highly trained parachute brigade when it has to be moved thousands of miles by aircraft carrier because the aeroplanes are not of the right design?
I think there are ways in which this difficulty can be overcome. There are strong arguments for moving the responsibility for the provision of air transport for Army purposes from the Vote of the Air Ministry to the Vote of the Ministry of Defence, or possibly to the Vote we are discussing tonight. No one blames the Air Ministry for not giving the Army the same priority as it gives to its own requirements. Perhaps this should be refereed by the Minister of Defence. There is a lot to be said for placing financial responsibility on the arm which is to use the service and which knows its requirements.
Another suggestion I make is that if we are to get aircraft of the type we require and at a price we can afford, because we need them in numbers, somehow or other we have either to get standardisation with other N.A.T.O. countries so that by a larger scale of production we get them more cheaply, or we have to be prepared perhaps to subsidise charter companies. If we can get them used in civilian air transport we who are concerned with the needs of the Army will get bigger production and, therefore, decrease the cost.
I ask my right hon. Friend to consider whether it is possible to get standardisation with N.A.T.O. nations, which may be very difficult. Alternatively, he could consider a system whereby, just as civilian lorries capable of being used for military purposes were subsidised before the war, we might subsidise aircraft used by civilian firms which could be used by the Army in the event of an emergency.


It would be necessary that these planes should have the characteristics which the Army requires.
I believe that, in such ways, we shall be able to provide ourselves with a really effective strategic reserve. We should be able to do so by providing ourselves with smaller numbers with a greater mobility; because a reserve requires not only strength and cohesion, but also the ability to get on to the spot where it is required in the quickest possible time.

1.0 a.m.

Mr. James Simmons: In the fluent and eloquent speech with which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War opened this debate, he said something about my conception of the Army being that of a prehistoric animal running away with "blimps" and "brass hats" upon its back. Perhaps that is a little exaggerated, but I admit that I have criticised the "brass hats" of the Army in the past and, I have no doubt, shall do so again.
However, the time which we spend in discussing the Army Estimates is not time wasted. The Army is a Service which engenders a pride among those who serve in it, and when we discuss the Army Estimates we hope for the opportunity of dealing with various aspects of them as they affect the human and personal content of the Service.
The right hon. Gentleman is asking for a lot of money and I think that it is only right that, having been asked for this money, hon. Members on the back benches should examine minutely and critically all the proposals which are covered by the Votes. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will not complain if we "have a go" before we turn round and say, "Give him the money, Rab."
The welfare of our soldiers, including the National Service men, should be the first concern of hon. Members. We all realise that efficiency is most important, but efficiency depends to a great extent on the state of mind of the men in the Service. We claim that we ought to have the time to discuss these matters fairly extensively, but the time available for discussion of Army matters is becoming less and less.
Two years ago we had a very good innings on the Army Annual Bill, and

the Government were convinced by the long and exhaustive, and exhausting, arguments spread over, I think, three sittings, that the Bill was an obsolete weapon. As a result, that weapon has now gone in for rehabilitation, and while it is there, we are denied an opportunity for discussing an aspect of Army affairs.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: I really must rise to that fly. It has only been found necessary to delay detailed discussion until the findings of the Select Committee are available to the House. The facilities are still with us.

Mr. Simmons: I am not complaining that the discussion is held up until the report is published, but I am saying that that fact lessens the time available in the interim period for discussing Army matters. Two years ago we were allowed to discuss more than Vote A. I remember that I made three speeches on the various Votes. Now it has become the Government's practice to move to report Progress as soon as they have secured Vote A. These developments have denied us the opportunity to probe into problems which must be solved if we are to have better recruiting and a contented Army. We must remember that a contented Army means better recruiting because a contented soldier is a living advertisement for Army life.
The debate on the Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair" provides opportunities for foreign policy experts, but rather cramps the style of ordinary chaps such as myself and some hon. Members opposite who have been anxiously waiting to speak. We wish to discuss Army matters. We wish to talk about the chaps in the Army, whether they be those with "pips" on their shoulders or "chips" on them. If we could have a full discussion on the Votes we could leave the main debate to the theorists.
We are precluded from discussing Vote 3, relating to the War Office, and what mysteries we might find were we allowed to do so. I have had a glance at it and notice that opportunity is provided there to get right down into the subterranean passages to see what is really going on. Then there is Vote 4, Civilians, which deals with the Army "tail" which the Secretary of State used as a bludgeon to belabour the Labour Government when


he was in Opposition. There is Vote 6, Supplies; Vote 7, Stores; Vote 8. Works. Buildings and Land; Vote 9, Miscellaneous effective Services.
Such matters as recruiting, hospitals and welfare are included, but we are precluded from discussing them. We might get a chance on Vote 8 and perhaps we might discuss Vote 1, Pay. We could discuss Vote 10, Non-effective Services. and Vote 11, Additional Married Quarters if the Patronage Secretary did not move to report Progress. But we dare not risk it and we have to raise the points to which we wish to refer during the general debate and in an inadequate manner.
I hope that in those circumstances we shall not be charged with staging a filibuster. We do not wish to waste the time of the House. We wish to discuss the most vital service for the defence of our country, the welfare of the troops and the efficiency of our forces. We need a great many reassurances from the Secretary of State.
The right hon. Gentleman should be the last man to complain, although I do not say that he does. When he was on this side of the House he was most assiduous in his quest for knowledge. He probed here and there and made statements, some of which we remember. For instance, on 10th March, 1949, he asked:
… how it comes about that, with £305 million to spend and 550,000 men in the Army, we have so few formations and units that can fight.
He must not be surprised if we are even more concerned to get value for our money now that he has not £305 million but £526 million to spend. He has also more men than we had in 1949.
That same day in 1949 he was declaiming:
I suggest that the present numbers are getting rather too big for the country's manpower and for our equipment programme.
In paragraph 7 of the Defence White Paper we have been told:
Our armed forces cannot … be provided with all those things which ideally they should have.
Has he more men than his equipment programme will carry? What is the good of having the men if one cannot equip them?
If the hot war broke out, should we have a counterpart of Antwerp in the First World War? I am not saying that

we would, tout we must probe these things. We have heard disturbing statements. We have been told that troops are going to be sent into battle, if battle comes quickly like a thief in the night should a hot war break out, without equipment which they ought to have to make them first-rate efficient soldiers.
The right hon. Gentleman was also concerned about voluntary recruiting. He said on 10th March, 1949, that in respect of recruiting the first factor was pay. He stated:
To get a good Army we must have and pay for good officers."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 10th March, 1949; Vol. 462, c. 1421–5.]
I note that the emphasis was on the officers. I did not see anything in his speech about good pay for the other ranks. Perhaps it is all right to get the top right first and hope that the bottom will follow. I would rather start at the bottom and leave the top to look after itself, for it is better able to do so.
Pay has been increased several times. Has that solved the problem? What is the Secretary of State going to do next? It is his baby now. When he was in Opposition he had no responsibility, and he told us what we ought to do. Now he has a chance of doing it as his policy. Has the continuation of our policy of gradually improving the pay of the Forces had the desired effect upon recruiting?
On the subject of economy, the right hon. Gentleman said that we could do much by employing more civilians in the barracks. Is that policy being carried out? I am also concerned about the number of civilians employed in the War Office and the departments of the C.I.G.S., the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General. In the subterranean passages of the War Office and those other departments, 149 retired officers are employed in a civilian capacity. How many of them were retired to do the jobs they are now doing? How many of them are of military age and could still usefully be employed in uniform in the Service? Besides those officers, 232,374 civilian clerks and typists are employed.
In 1951, the Secretary of State switched to officers on the staff. What I have been saying up to now relates to 1949. In 1951, he asserted:


Far too many officers in the Army are now on the staff."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 815.]
One of his hon. Friends was saying today that there ought to be more officers on the staff: in 1951 the Secretary of State was saying that far too many officers were on the staff.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: I think that the speech to which the hon. Gentleman is referring, if I understand it correctly, was advocating that more officers should be kept up to date in staff matters.

Mr. Simmons: That speech was made before the right hon. Gentleman became Secretary of State. It was on the last occasion on which he could have a free fling from this side of the House. But what has he done about it? In the department of the Under-Secretary there are 69 staff officers and 76 military clerks: the Military Secretary has 18 staff officers and one military clerk: the C.I.G.S. has 341 staff officers and 191 military clerks. This is all in the warrens of the War Office. The Adjutant-Genera] has 217 staff officers and 191 military clerks. There are three staff chaplains. I wonder whether they are staff officers?
I notice, too, that there is provision for a Roman Catholic chaplain, but there is none for a Nonconformist chaplain. Could we be told why? I am a Nonconformist, and there are many Nonconformists among National Service men and Regular soldiers in the Army today. In the old days one used to be asked what one's religion was, and, if there was any hesitation in answering, one was classified as Church of England. It was taken for granted. I remember once hearing someone say that he was a Quaker, but he was classified as Church of England because they had never heard of a Quaker. In the Chaplain's Department there is a Chaplain General. I take it he is Church of England. There is a principal Roman Catholic chaplain.

Mr. Hutchison: One of the deputy chaplains is Church of Scotland.

Mr. Ede: It is still the Established Church.

Mr. Simmons: I am talking of Nonconformists, a very important factor in the British way of life. It was John

Wesley who started what we might call the new social revolution in this country.

Mr. Hugh Delargy: Roman Catholics are Nonconformist.

Mr. Simmons: They conform to an authority outside this country. I am concerned with Nonconformists generally, and want to know whether they are adequately represented in the Chaplains Department. There are only two staff chaplains and one chief staff chaplain in addition to the three head boys I have just mentioned. In the "Quarter-bloke's" department there are 331 staff officers and 196 clerks. [An HON. MEMBER: "Quarter-bloke? "] He is the man who looks after the rum.
What are the duties of all these staff officers? At the dizzy heights of the Secretary of State-ship which he has attained, the right hon. Gentleman's vision has become so blurred that he cannot see what he could see when he was on this side of the House. He cannot see that there are far too many staff officers cluttering up the War Office building in Whitehall. Could they not be sent out on recruiting tours? They would make a very fine circus, with their red tabs and gold braid. We might send a brass band with them to attract attention, instead of leaving the staff officers to sit in their offices.
There are 341 in the office of the C.I.G.S. and 331 in the office of the "quarter-bloke." Heaven knows what may be going on there. In the office of the "quarter-bloke" all kinds of things go on. There are 331 there—with how many bottles of rum we cannot say. What are they doing in the office of the "quarter-bloke "? We should have an inquiry about what is being done with all these staff officers.
The Under-Secretary of State says that these staff officers should be trained and brought up to date, but what is the good of training them and then dumping them in Whitehall? If they have been brought up to date, they should be in the field, among the troops, disseminating their knowledge, not cluttering up the offices in Whitehall.
Switching back to 1949, which was a vintage year in respect of the Secretary of State's quotable gems of wisdom, we find that on 10th March, 1949. the right


hon. Gentleman was waxing eloquent on National Service. He said:
What I do not accept and am entirely opposed to is that this method of forming an Army should continue indefinitely. It is my belief that if it does continue we shall have a thoroughly bad and ineffective Army at a very high price.
He said that when he was on this side of the House.

Mr. Wigg: He has made it come true.

Mr. Simmons: Since the defence debate, I have come across the following gem, in the same column:
That gap is an unsettling and harmful period in their lives.
He was referring to the gap between leaving school and the call-up. I have said that myself, but I did not realise that I was following such a noble and illustrious precedent. But what is the right hon. Gentleman doing about it, now that he is the civilian head of an Army in which over 50 per cent, of the other ranks are National Service men?
As reported in column 1428, he declared, with a fine indignation,
I think that the annual intake of the Army is at present dictated far more by a desire to retain the universal principle of National Service than by the requirements of the Army. We could, I think, immediately cut it very considerably.
That was in 1949. In the defence debate this year, did he oppose or did he support the suggestion—

Mr. Wigg: On a point of order. In view of this devastating attack upon the Secretary of State, may I call attention to the fact that there is no member of the Government of comparable rank present? Is not the Secretary of State grossly disrespectful to the House in failing to be present during the debate?

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: I cannot think that there is any discourtesy. The Secretary of State has been attending the debate practically throughout. This is an amusing and interesting speech, not a devastating attack. It is certainly not a personal attack. If it had been, my right hon. Friend should have been warned.

Mr. Wigg: Would you accept, Mr. Deputy Speaker, a Motion for the adjournment of the debate to call attention to the fact that the right hon. Gentleman is absent when his veracity and competence are in question, in that he has

been misleading the House on this and previous occasions? My hon. Friend has done a useful service in bringing to our notice these remarks of the right hon. Gentleman which I confess I had forgotten, and which I am sure the House, the country, and the right hon. Gentleman has forgotten.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I will not accept such a Motion in the middle of a speech.

Mr. Ian Harvey: On a point of order. Since the question of discourtesy has been raised, did the hon. Gentleman inform my right hon. Friend that he was going to make this attack?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That is not a point of order.

Mr. Simmons: As I was quoting statements to which I gave the references, I did not think there was any need to give any prior notice to the right hon. Gentleman. I assumed that as he is in charge of the debate he would be present, or he would have someone taking a note of what was said during the debate by every Member

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: The hon. Gentleman must have seen me taking voluminous notes the whole of the time. If he is really saying this is an attack on the veracity of my right hon. Friend, and in consequence on his character, surely it is the custom to give warning beforehand. My right hon. Friend could not be expected to stay and anticipate this sort of thing during every speech.

Mr. Simmons: I leave it to the House to decide whether what I was saying was an attack on the right hon. Gentleman's veracity. I was stating facts which can be verified from HANSARD. The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) said that he had forgotten these remarks. So, apparently, has the Secretary of State.

Mr. Tom Driberg: Further to the point of order. Although I agree that the Secretary of State has been here most of the time, it is not necessary or usual to notify a Minister if one intends to refer to him in the course of debate on his own Estimates.

Mr. Hutchison: What I took exception to were the words that my right hon. Friend's veracity had been questioned.

Mr. Driberg: The hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey) suggested that my hon. Friend should have notified the Secretary of State, and I do not think that is necessary when his own Estimates are being debated.

Mr. Simmons: I made no comments at all on the veracity of the Secretary of State. I quoted statements, and I am quoting statements he made when he was in Opposition. I am doing now what he did then—discussing the Estimates presented by someone else. We are discussing his Estimates and we have the right to quote what he said when out of office. Surely that is ordinary debating procedure.
I make no personal charges. I put these statements forward for the House to come to its own conclusions. Did the right hon. Gentleman fight inside the Cabinet before the Defence White Paper was published for a reduction in the period of National Service? Is he prepared to go to the stake for those principles which he so vehemently and eloquently put forward from this side of the House?

Major Legge-Bourke: The hon. Gentleman has been quoting what my right hon. Friend said in 1949. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will at least recall at the same time that that was before the Korean War started and also before the great concentration of troops in the Canal Zone.

Mr. Simmons: I am aware of that. I was quoting what the right hon. Gentleman said in 1949. He said:
I think that the annual intake of the Army is at present dictated far more by a desire to retain the universal principle of National Service than by the requirements of the Army. We could, I think, immediately cut it very considerably." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th March, 1949: Vol. 462, c. 1422–8.]

Mr. Head: That is a favourite quotation, but I would point out that it is from 1949. It is very easy to say that without remembering what was going on then. The point is that in 1949 we had none of these vast overseas commitments, and the primary reason for National Service was to train reservists. My point, in the background of that remark, was that we were then piling up a very large number of reservists.

Mr. Wigg: So we are now.

Mr. Head: I do not deny it. The incidence of National Service was a great burden on a Regular Army which was trying to do a job as well. The whole principle was different. The reason we have so many National Service men now is not to train reservists but to bring up the manpower of the active Army so that we can fulfil our overseas commitments.

Mr. Simmons: I was coming to the anticipated answer of the right hon. Gentleman. I knew that he would speak of overseas commitments. Why these commitments? I do not want to delve into foreign and colonial policy, but it occurs to me that the bull-in-a-china-shop policy of a rogue elephant at the Colonial Office is a policy which has made these commitments. That is Government policy.
It is a bit thick when we have to send troops to repair the damage done by the uncivilised attitude of the white settlers. We have to send our own lads to die or to suffer because of these uncivilised people who could not treat people properly but had to exploit them. They could not treat the people on whose backs they lived as decent human beings, and that has caused half the trouble in these parts of the world today. We have commitments, but that does not let the Government out: the commitments are the result of Government policy.
Why is voluntary recruiting flagging? Is the Army doing enough to try to hold the men who pass through its ranks—to hold them by attraction rather than compulsion? The Army gets a bad Press. Anything that will make a sensational headline is seized on by the purveyors of gutter journalism. I lay certain blame at the door of the Press for prostituting the profession of journalism by exploiting some matters in a shameless and shameful way. On the other hand, I remind the right hon. Gentleman that if these things did not happen the Press could not exploit them.
My hon. Friend the Member for Lady-wood (Mr. Yates) has raised one or two questions in the House about the treatment of men who were sent to the Army when they were unfit. I believe that one died in the Service because of lack of proper treatment. These things happen, and the Press report them. I remember that I once had a case of a lad


whom the authorities tried to keep in the Army when he was no good at all to them. It came to a court action, and we got headlines in the papers.
Has the Army got a public relations officer, and, if so, is he given the material to write good human stories? Could members of the Press be invited to visit a "glasshouse" to see the new methods that are now being used for the kindly, gentle, moral and mental rehabilitation of Army misfits? That would make a wonderful story if it were true. Of course, they would have to absorb the atmosphere. That goes without saying. I have never been in a "glasshouse" myself. I dare say I deserved to be there more than once, but I never got landed there.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: What do you want to know about it?

Mr. Simmons: My hon. Friend is an expert on detention under military escort. Perhaps he will make some further remarks upon the matter when I sit down.
In the last debate, I asked the Minister about the treatment of men in the military detention camps. The Under-Secretary of State, in answer to my question, said:
At one of the military establishments at least … great attention is paid to rehabilitation, to bringing the men back to a better attitude of mind with the idea of reforming rather than of punishing."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th March, 1953; Vol. 512, c. 1080.]
He only said one. I wonder whether he can report progress, and if he can say that all these places of military detention have psychiatrists and people with a kindly attitude towards fellow human beings, or whether the old "glasshouse" attitude still persists in the majority of them.
I suggest that there would be a good story for the Press if some of its members were taken to one of these places of correction and were shown the new methods employed for dealing with the misfits. Misfits are no good to the Army, and the silliest thing the Army can do is to hang on to men who will never make good soldiers, whether they be Regulars or National Service men. In addition, they are a bad advertisement for the Army, and, therefore, should be discharged.
Another way of popularising the Army would be to take members of the Press to the home of a National Service man

and show them how his wife is living on the National Service grant.

Mr. Wigg: When she gets it.

Mr. Simmons: Yes. Could the Minister say whether there has been any corresponding increase in the National Service grant in relation to the cost of living? I think that the National Service grant system wants to be thoroughly overhauled. The wives of young National Service men should definitely not be worse off as a result of their husbands being in the Forces. Where they have dependent parents, they, too, should be looked after, because the National Service man, as his title implies, is doing a national service, and to anyone doing a national service the nation ought to have an increased obligation.
Another good story would result from inviting the Press to an officers' selection board in order to prove that the North Country accents are music in the ears of the people who select the candidates. That would make a very good story. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) would agree that Lord Beaverbrook would jump at it. Those are suggestions for popularising the Army. We have to make the Army something that people will look up to. We have to remove the scandals resulting from the headlines in the gutter Press which tend to destroy faith in the Army. The War Office had better get a Press relations officer on to the job.
These things are necessary to encourage recruiting. Is it to encourage recruiting that there has been a cut of £550,000 in marriage allowances to officers and £1,450,000 in marriage allowances to warrant officers, N.C. Os. and men? Is the fact that welfare costs are down by £13,500, education costs by £6,000 and technical training costs by £3,000 likely to convince people that the best is being done for the welfare of the men in the Forces?
The War Office claim that life in the Army is a man's life. It ought to be, and it could be. While the War Office are claiming that life in the Army is a man's life, they have still got grown men doing menial duties as officers' servants and batmen. Here I am back on my King Charles' head again. I heard the other day that some officers have only a quarter of a batman. But this situation


remains; these menial duties are being done by men who are told to join the Army and enjoy a man's life. Is it a man's life to scrub the boots, clean the buttons and polish the Sam Brown of an officer? These things, and saluting, are all the other tommy-rot, are the very negation of manhood.
Will the War Office take positive action to democratise the Army? When my hon. Friend the Member for Lady-wood said that a soldier could not take his shop steward to see his commanding officer, there was a titter. What is so funny about it? Is it not possible in the Army, when there is discontent and trouble, that there should be a spokesman from the other ranks to go and see the commanding officer? If negotiation and conciliation are acceptable in the industrial field, are they not just as important between officers and men in Her Majesty's Forces?
We have a Minister of Labour, one of the most able Ministers of this Government, who comes to the House from time to time and tells us how he is striving to bring about peace in industry by conciliation and arbitration. Why not apply that to the Army?

Mr. Head: Since this question has been raised twice, perhaps I may intervene. I do not know whether it would be fair to regard the N.C.O. and the platoon sergeant as shop stewards, but they can go to the officer.

Mr. Simmons: Of course, there are N.C. Os. and N.C. Os. There are warrant officers and warrant officers. Some say "Good old sergeant," and others say something else. It would not be a safe proposition to say that the N.C.O. should always be the shop steward.

Mr. Yates: Shop stewards are elected.

Mr. Simmons: The best method to adopt when there is a grievance in a hut or a camp is for the men to get together and elect their own spokesman who should have the right of access not to a sergeant who might "bawl him out," but to an officer who, being a gentleman, would listen to him. Surely that is something along the lines of democratising the Army?

Mr. Wigg: The Minister has just made an important statement. Is he asserting

that throughout the Army no private soldier can speak to an officer except in the presence of an N.C.O.?

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: No, but when it is a question of conciliation and he comes up before the officer, he is accompanied by an N.C.O.

Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman has not answered the question. This is a procedure which has always existed in the Brigade of Guards but never in regiments of the line. Has this now been introduced?

Mr. Hutchison: I am saying that my experience in those days was that if a man wanted to see an officer in office hours in an orderly room, he was accompanied by his platoon sergeant.

Mr. Simmons: Yes, that would be a restraining influence. I was speaking of man-to-man talks. I would go further with that idea and say that they ought tc encourage the soldiers to think—and to think for themselves.

Mr. George Thomas: They would not be in the Army if they did.

Mr. Simmons: They ought to be instructed in world politics, in ideologies, with their officers, as intellectual equals. I think the Secretary of State this afternoon spoke of getting officers together to give them information on new developments, and I interposed, "Why not the other ranks?" The right hon. Gentleman replied that they also would be given certain information. I am concerned with intellectual equality. Let the soldier feel that he can discuss with his officer these problems of strategy, of ideologies, and world politics. Let him feel that he can make the Army a career and yet not lose his individuality, that with the physical development which the Army provides can go intellectual development as well.
That is not an impossible ideal as some of the incredulous faces of the brigadiers, generals, colonels, majors and what nots on the other side of the House seem to suggest. I believe it is a possibility. It is no good the Secretary of State looking so bored about it. We say, "Join the Army and enjoy a man's life." What is a man's life? It is an intellectual life as well as a physical life. We have


the duty to give the men in the Forces a belief in their own individuality, in their own human value, and in their intellectual equality with the officers under whom they are serving. If we can show the men that they can be citizens in uniform, with full citizen rights, having a useful life in the Service and living a useful life afterwards, I think we shall get the recruits.

1.49 a.m.

Major H. Legge-Bourke: This debate has roved very widely since it was started by the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) talking about bed bugs. We slipped to Egypt and back again and now the hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons), whom I congratulate on his marathon, has finished by suggesting various headlines for the Press in order to popularise the Army. One hardly knows where to start after sitting through it all and trying to understand the point which the hon. Gentleman was making.

Mr. Simmons: I am sorry if I was not clear. As an intellectual equal I am willing to clarify any point.

Major Legge-Bourke: The hon. Gentleman had a gallant record in the First World War and has a considerable corner in the heart of the House which he established when Parliamentary Secretary to the old Ministry of Pensions. We always enjoy what he has to say. I hope he will forgive me, however, if I do not follow him in detail. I have some points of my own to make. The hon. Member took nearly an hour to make his speech, but I do not intend to delay the House for that long.
I think it only right to congratulate my right hon. Friend on the way in which he presented his Estimates. I do not know whether he had in mind when he was making his speech the notable manner in which Lord Norwich then Mr. Duff Cooper, once presented his Estimates. My right hon. Friend lived up to, if he did not excel, that performance. I sincerely congratulate him and thank him for what he has done. What has pleased me more than anything else is the fact that he has arranged for free air travel for Service men returning home on leave from the Canal Zone. That is about the biggest contribution that he could make

to offset the disadvantages that our troops must suffer as long as they are in that area.
I promise not to get involved in Foreign Office matters, which have been fairly thrashed out, but as we are now speaking of the Canal Zone area I should like to say a few words about redeployment. Whether we go or whether we leave something behind in that area, inevitably there will be some redeployment. That is a subject to which we ought to pay attention tonight. As I understand it, there are three possible places where redeployment could take place. One is Jordan, with which we have a Treaty and in which we have a considerable interest through the Arab Legion which is mentioned in these Estimates. The others are Cyprus and Libya. I have visited all three at various times, including Tripoli, which has been occupied by British troops since the war.
These areas have problems of their own which require considerable attention before we take it for granted that if we deploy men there we shall find automatically conditions suitable for them there and a better plan at the end of it all. I remember being told over and over again towards the end of the Second World War that unless one absolutely had to do so one should never put vital things on an island.

Mr. Strachey: Is not that rather depressing, since we live on an island?

Major Legge-Bourke: It is inevitable that we should have certain vital things on this island, and that makes for difficulties enough, in all conscience.
I do not want to turn into an armchair strategist, but I question the wisdom of putting anything vitally important in Cyprus until we are quite certain that all coasts within fighter aircraft distance of the island are either sure to be neutral at the outbreak of a war or will be on our side. It is true that Turkey is now in N.A.T.O. and the disadvantage of not having Syria and Lebanon and Israel in with us is offset.
We ought very seriously to consider whether it is wise to move anything we have in a place which at least we could be sure of defending into a place which seems somewhat hazardous, unless we have done certain things first. Among


those other things I have particularly in mind tying up the Syria, Israel, Lebanon littoral before we move anything of vital importance into Cyprus. I ask whether there has been an Army, a Service, or a combined operations approach to the equivalent armies in the other countries which, at the moment, are not in with us
This is not essentially a matter for the Foreign Office, although they may have to arrange the ring and get the other Governments to agree. I want to know whether there have been any talks at all to see whether we could map out a plan and get those Governments to agree on the policy. It has been agreed that armies which are not enemies of each other do attempt to liaise with each other and get to know each others problems. If we have a hold-up in the development of the Middle East Pact we might perhaps break down any barriers that exist by getting the armies talking to each other.
On an earlier occasion, I said that I always disagreed with the Prime Minister when he said that Palestine was of no strategic importance. Although I know the difficulties which exist in the area and which are likely to arise there in a country which is new and wants to establish its autonomy without any doubt in the world, it is important—especially if what we were discussing earlier is to take place in regard to Suez—that we should keep the closest possible liaison with the Israeli Army. Our Army should be helpful to them, just as it should be helpful to Jordan and the other countries of the Arab world.
I still believe that there is a possibility of remaining on the mainland for deployment rather than hopping off to Cyprus. If we could discuss this from a purely military aspect with purely military personnel, we might find a plan which would lead to a political solution to implement the military solution.

Mr. Driberg: A point which may help the hon. and gallant Member, although he may think it a Foreign Office point, is that one of the chief disadvantages of the situation in Egypt, the hostile local population, might very well, in course of time, be repeated in Cyprus if the propaganda of Enosis for union with Greece gets stronger.

Major Legge-Bourke: During the war I very nearly got landed in an extremely

stupid thing because of not knowing the country well enough. It was to take part in the celebration of the anniversary of the Battle of Navarino, which would have caused a minor revolution in the village in which we were stationed at the time. Cyprus is certainly an island with many political problems and I agree that Enosis is one of them, and a major one. Certainly, that aspect ought to be considered.
Lots of very important things have been happening recently, and perhaps the most important is the pact between Turkey and Pakistan. I am hoping that, as a result of that, there will be missions or, at least, liaison officers from the British Army with the armies of those countries. I know that the Americans have had the most to do with Turkey; or, at any rate, more than we have.
There was a pact which expired about two years ago, known as the Sa'adabad Pact, which also brought Afghanistan into an agreement, and it seems to me that if we are going to have our strategic concept ranging from Turkey right on to Pakistan, it is very important that we have as much military liaison as possible with the indigenous armies, and I hope that the Secretary of State will be able to say something about this.
Of course, I know that he may be under the difficulty of not being able, in the public interest, to disclose much, but at least I should like an assurance that he will do what he can to keep in touch with what is going on in the armies of those other countries while, at the same time, trying to keep them in touch with our own military point of view with whatever information he would like them to have.
I should also like to ask about the possibility of using Libya; and if we are to use Libya I imagine that we shall use her rather more from a mechanised, armoured point of view than from an infantry point of view. Even if we do that, it does seem that we shall want transport which will be rather more rapid than any wheeled transport can be; and I was interested when my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Mr. C. J. M. Alport) was speaking about aircraft for use with infantry and for transport.
But I would mention one of the difficulties. It is not considered a very wise


thing to have more aircraft on the outbreak of war which are capable of transporting goods and people than one is likely to want for the whole war, and if there are civil aeroplanes available, there are probably, in terms of numbers of aircraft and numbers of pilots, when the reserves are added, together with those available at the outbreak of war, enough to meet foreseeable needs.
But there is one question, and it is whether the pilots who fly civil aircraft for civil airlines will really be sufficiently in tune with the latest military training in so far as the technique of landing in hostile areas and that sort of thing is concerned. I suggest that we are rather too readily assuming that Transport Command will be able to help out should war come, but we are doing very little indeed to train any of the pilots to co-operate with troops.
When my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester was speaking—and he knows more than I about the types of aircraft —this point impressed itself on my mind. May I say, in passing, that I hope we shall not transport troops in Bristol freighters because I do not know a worse machine from the passenger's point of view. So far as goods and chattels are concerned, it may be good enough, but I flew to Ireland several times in one of these planes when the Dakotas had broken down, and I do not want to do it again and I do not want anybody else to have to do it.
My hon. Friend's remarks reminded me of something I had said and I remember being sharply cross-questioned about it by hon. Members who had served in the Air Force. I suggested that the Army should have its own air arm. I still think the Army has as much right to an air arm as the Fleet. I do not think anyone in the R.A.F. need be frightened that it would be an attempt by the military to break up the Air Force, which was what I was accused of attempting to do.
If we are to deploy our troops in the Middle Eastern area we have to improve the rapidity with which they can be concentrated with their supplies in the places where they are needed, and one of the obvious ways of doing this is to provide an adequate transport air arm for the Army, properly managed by men accustomed to co-operate with the Army. There are magnificent men and aircraft in the civil airlines, but we know what

happened in the early stages of the Silician campaign when gallant pilots were flying in people under conditions which they had never experienced before and very sad disasters occurred. We do not want to see that kind of thing happen again. If we trust that Transport Command will be all right to do the job when the time arrives we may get a nasty shock.
Now I wish to raise one constituency point concerning the Territorial Army which the assurance of my right hon. Friend about the increases in pay applying to the Territorial Army, where the conditions are observed, will do something to offset. It still causes disgruntlement that officers who renew their uniforms have to pay Purchase Tax on them. I realise that my right hon. Friend is not able to deal with this matter himself but would have to get the agreement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. However, it seems rather ridiculous that men who give up their spare time to the service of their country should be required to pay Purchase Tax on their uniforms.
I wish to say a word about the speech of the hon. Member for Ladywood (Mr. Yates). He reminded us of what he said in 1946 and I remember saying exactly what he said about National Service. It is abhorrent to me as a compulsory matter. One of my hon. Friends commented that the reason for National Service was to save the neck of the hon. Member for Ladywood. I think it is not only to save the neck of the hon. Member, but also to preserve for him the right to make the sort of speech he made tonight.
All who know him realise that he has feelings of deep sincerity on this matter, and it would not be right for anyone to say that the hon. Member was wrong in what he said. That we disagree with him is obvious already, but I would invite him to look again at the Memorandum, where he will see a tribute to the British Commonwealth Division in Korea. The hon. Member would do well to read it again. What the Commonwealth Division had to do in Korea is one of the reasons why we have got to have compulsory National Service. There is nothing which would please me and all who have ever served in the Regular Army more than to have sufficient volunteers coming forward to make it unnecessary.
The hon. Gentleman dislikes National Service. There is very great danger in his putting over too often the views that he has done tonight and putting them over to people who do not understand what is in his mind when he is doing it. He is prolonging the period until we can dispense with compulsory National Service. The hon. Gentleman sometimes overlooks the consequences of too frequently putting over the pacific argument. I believe that the more the pacifist argument is put over, the more it prolongs the need for National Service, although that may seem a paradox.
I ask the hon. Gentleman to believe that those of us who have been Regular officers or Regular other ranks in the Army do not like the idea of compulsion in providing manpower for the Service. We realise that that has to take place sometimes, but we want the need to last as short a time as possible. If the hon. Member will co-operate with us to that end, we shall be very grateful to him.

Mr. Yates: Before the hon. and gallant Gentleman sits down, may I say that I pay tribute to the men of the forces, particularly for what they did in Korea. The hon. and gallant Gentleman has recalled 1946. It was a most extraordinary thing that he should agree at the end of a war that it was necessary, for the first time in the history of the country, to compel men to join the Army in time of peace. I do not think that that action in itself promoted peace at all. In fact, we went from 12 months—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. The preface, "Before the hon. and gallant Gentleman sits down" does not give an hon. Member the right to make a second speech.

2.14 a.m.

Mr. George Thomas: I am very glad to be able to follow the hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke), who always speaks with authority upon these military matters. I am diffident about taking part at all in a Service Estimates debate, but having listened to some of the authorities—not the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just spoken—my nervousness disappears. I realise how it is possible to be in the Services a long time and yet

acquire very little general knowledge of the Services as a whole.
I want at once, in case I should err, to join those who have paid tribute to the quality of our National Service men and our Regular Service men, officers and other ranks. It has not been my privilege to share the life of military personnel, but a few years ago I spent a little time with various officers' messes and with other ranks in Greece. I got into a lot of trouble there. I was very grateful to the British Army at the time. I appreciated seeing the Union Jack at the various posts.
I know that we have in the British Army the average civilian dressed up in uniform and possessing the qualities of which we are proud in civilian life. The Army has some dirty jobs to do, and some unpleasant tasks to fulfil. Korea was not a picnic, and to be there now is a hardship on lads separated from their families. There is a tendency, I fear, for us to take for granted the sacrifice of long separation from one's family, but boys who are serving a long way from home, especially those in the Far East, must never be allowed to feel that they are, as others once felt they were, a forgotten Army so far as this House is concerned.
There has been a lot of talk about Egypt, but to be honest I am too confused in my thoughts about Egypt to make much contribution on that subject. I am not so confused, however, when I look at the British Commonwealth and find that British troops, and among them, Welsh lads, have been picked out to be sent to British Guiana.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: And Scots, too.

Mr. Thomas: I agree, but my concern is with Welsh boys. The Celts as a whole come under this heading. They are a tolerant, kindly and patient people.

Mr. P. Thomas: And intelligent.

Mr. Thomas: The hon. Gentleman reminds me that they are intelligent. I speak for the South, and he may lay any claim he likes for the North.
This House does from time to time call on young men, who are raw in the ways of life, and who are just approaching their manhood, to undertake duties


in an atmosphere of suspicion and bitterness that would test the qualities and character of older people. It is a matter of pride for all of us, whether we take the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Ladywood (Mr. Yates) or that of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for the Isle of Ely, whom I nearly called the hon. Member for Aldershot, that over She scattered centres of the world where the British "Tommy" is to be found nine dimes out of ten he is a credit to the homeland. [An HON. MEMBER: "Only nine? "] Ninety-nine times out of 100 then; I am prepared to make the proportion higher.
There has been a tendency in recent weeks, due to the manner in which one or two officers have lowered the standard, for people to tend to gibe at the rest of the forces serving in difficult conditions in that part of the world. I am referring to Kenya, and on both sides of the House I know there is a feeling of sympathy with those who have an unpleasant task to do in that country, and of admiration for the general bearing of our men under those conditions. It ought to be a matter of satisfaction for us here, as it is for the troops there, that the sort of incident which has been dealt with by court-martial is quite out of the ordinary so far as our standards are concerned. At least that is the proud thought which I have, not having served but knowing the average lad in these islands.
Having said that, there are some questions to which I want to direct the attention of the Secretary of State. "The Methodist Record"—and I am a Methodist—has contained a lot of correspondence about young National Service men abroad. In my opinion, the Army stands in relation to young conscripts in exactly the same position as the schoolmaster stands to his pupils—in loco parentis. The Army has snatched these men often, but by no means always, against their will, from the influence of their homes and their friends, dressed them in a uniform so that, at the start, they feel anonymous, and pushed them into strange surroundings. Inevitably, a great test of character is involved in pushing young lads from the villages in the rural areas or from the back streets of our great cities into foreign lands, when all that a boy of 18, who left school only three years earlier, has to do is to

ask for a contraceptive and it is given to him.
We are faced by certain serious moral problems within these islands at the present time, and I ask the Minister whether he is sure that Army officers are taking as seriously as they should the concern which Nonconformity, at least, is expressing in its religious journals at the manner in which this subject is being treated. I will not dwell on the point, for the Minister will undoubtedly have had his attention drawn to the fact that for a long time there has been disquiet and uneasiness among ministers of religion, by no means all of them pacifists—because that has nothing to do with the subject.
The period of National Service is two years, and I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Ladywood that it is too long. We have heard in other Estimates debates that no one in the British Commonwealth bears quite as great a burden as we bear in this connection. With the exception of Australia, no country in the Commonwealth accepts conscription for its young people. It is fair to ask whether we can continue to give to the Service Ministers the right to snatch these young men away from the industrial front and from the educational front, with all the consequent social difficulties. There are people who ask "Can Britain be defended without conscription?" It is a fair question to which we must address ourselves. Can we defend these islands without giving to the Government and the Service Ministers the right to have these National Service men year by year? The military strategists behind me and in front of me—

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Hear, hear.

Mr. Thomas: I thought my hon. Friend was taking his rest while he may, and I am sorry that I disturbed him.

Mr. Hughes: That was enough to rouse me.

Mr. Thomas: No doubt my hon. Friend will give the House the benefit of his strategy later. He has had plenty of military experience.
First of all, it is fair—at least in my experience—to say that the great part of our conscripts have one idea above all others. These boys, from the minute they enter the Army, have one idea, and that


is to get out. They look for their liberation and freedom from the Service to get on with the job of life.
We did not have conscription before the war, when our commitments were far greater, in my opinion, than they are now. When Hitler was menacing the world, when Mussolini was shouting from the house tops, and when Japan was paralysing the Far East, we held on to the right of every man to say he would volunteer or not in time of peace for the Services. But today, when we have not to defend India or Pakistan; when Ceylon and Burma do not require the services of the British Army; when our commitments are already reduced, we are saying that conscription in time of peace is essential to maintain the defence of this island.

Brigadier Terence Clarke: We only got it after six years of Socialism.

Mr. Thomas: I see that the hon. and gallant Gentleman is back.
It is true that we were able to meet our commitments in those other years because we had the use of large colonial forces. Perhaps I am wrong; I see I am hurting the hon. and gallant Gentleman. We could, of course, defend this island, but we need conscription to hold on to certain parts of our Colonial Territories. That is the sole and overpowering reason why the Secretary of State, in his Estimates, has to include the requirement for these conscripts to be snatched from their homes and sent away.
Who knows whether contingents of the British Army may not be already on their way to British Honduras in order to see that an election is not held because the result may not be acceptable to us? Other parts of the Commonwealth can tell the same story, and I feel we are slipping into the dangerous habit of thinking that the generals must be right, and that without these conscripts we shall not be able to sleep safely at night.
The Prime Minister said the other day that the Russians had been disarming to an extent. It is true he reminded us that they were still stronger than we are, and, of course, we do not expect to be strong enough to beat them alone. There are the Chinese too, but I will not go into that broad picture. I will leave something for the hon. Member for South

Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) to talk about. These Estimates are m line with the other Service Estimates the House has already granted. They were created in a panic atmosphere. The Secretary of State reminded us, when replying to the hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons), that when he was speaking in 1949 it was in the days before Korea.
We are now speaking in days after Korea, when the proud boast is that world tension has decreased and that there is a better relationship between the nations. We do not hold Mau Mau to be anything like the threat which Korea was to the peace of the world when it looked as if Russia was beginning to show that she was willing to strike and to have a third world war. Everybody knows how anxious we were in this House in case that war was beginning, but now we know that it was not. There are plenty of indications that there is no intention to strike from Eastern Europe. The Prime Minister himself makes it perfectly clear. That is another reason why I believe that we could end conscription now.
It is the duty of hon. Members from time to time to approach the War Office on the question of compassionate postings. I must say that I find that Department rather tough.

Mr. Mikardo: Not so bad as the Navy.

Mr. Thomas: I find the Navy very fair, but we are dealing with the Army tonight. The way in which we have to plead, beg and argue, in the most tragic cases, to get a lad nearer home is something to which I am sure the Secretary of State could, with full advantage, give attention.

Mr. Head: In case we are getting off the track, I would point out that there are no compassionate postings. It is a case of complete release from National Service or posting as usual.

Mr. Thomas: I am sorry if I misled the right hon. Gentleman. I was about to say that I realise that it was in the lifetime of the previous Administration that compassionate postings were brought to an end and the present policy was adopted. Clearly, the present system involves severe hardship. Many of us with constituency cases will have been embarrassed at having to go back to


say," We are very sorry, but we cannot succeed in helping you in this matter of a posting." The Minister ought to look at the matter again.
I find an echo in my own heart for much of what was said by the hon. Member for Ladywood. This piling up of armaments as a way of obtaining defence is a policy of despair, a policy based upon the fact that unless we are stronger than the others we cannot feel safe. The other people—the Communists, let us be frank about it—also have their own atomic bombs or hydrogen bombs. Member after Member has indicated that after the atomic bombs have been used we shall have what is called "broken-backed" warfare.
These islands would be almost destroyed. What use would our Army be then except to keep alive the poor devils who would be fighting for their sanity? This is no way to feel safe. The only way for safety is the way referred to by the hon. Member for South Ayrshire last week. I intend to do something which we do not like doing very often in this House. People tend to feel it humbug, but it is not humbug from me tonight when I refer to the New Testament. Most of us who go to church today pay lip-service to the teachings of the Nazarene, but until we are prepared to practise them there can be no safety for any of us in this world.

2.35 a.m.

Mr. John Hall: One of the great advantages of debates on the Estimates is that if one has sufficient patience, one can be sure, sooner or later, of getting up to speak. But I am not at all sure that that advantage is not very much outweighed by the disadvantage that everything one wanted to say has been said three or four times before.

Mr. Mikardo: That does not stop the hon. Member from saying it.

Mr. Hall: How right the hon. Member is.
However, I will try to cover new ground as far as I can and make a brief reference to an article in "The Times" of yesterday which, I think, has been very fully borne out by the debate. Quoting the biographer of Lord Lansdowne, the article says that there has never been a more thankless task in

British administration than that of the Secretary of State for War.
Many other Ministers might, perhaps, claim the title of "Minister of Thankless Tasks," but judging by the various and conflicting opinions bandied across the Floor of the House both today and yesterday, I think we can award the palm, at any rate for the moment, to the Secretary of State for War. I am going to ask one or two questions which might make him feel that there is some point in that.
I want to deal with the question of pay as it affects recruiting to the Regular Army. We all know that probably the major difficulties which discourage men from volunteering for the Forces are pay and the problems of family separation. I do not say that pay is the most important thing, but it plays a considerable part.
I must say that when reading the White Paper on Service emoluments my mind was carried back to the early days of my own career in the Army when it was very quickly borne in upon me that, after a lance-corporal, the lowest form of animal life in the Army was probably the second-lieutenant. Although the recent increases in pay have given a great deal of pleasure to lance-corporals, and, indeed, to all N.C. Os. up to the rank of warrant officer, they do not appear to have given very much pleasure to the one and two "pip" subalterns who, in fact, as the Secretary of State mentioned earlier, are now to draw less per day than a sergeant.
That awesome and magnificent being the regimental sergeant-major will, in future, especially if he is a guardsman, be able to give a variation to the expression "Sir" when addressing anyone below the rank of captain. I do not necessarily object to this, but I hope that no N.C.O. of the rank of sergeant or above will be discouraged from volunteering for a commission by the knowledge that he will be worse off for some years if successful in getting a commission.
Even if I point out that it is a possible disincentive to some future officers, I think we must all welcome the effort that has been made by the Secretary of State to improve the pay prospects of what he calls the middle group of officers and


N.C. Os. It is a step in the right direction. All I am asking is whether it has gone far enough.
Take, for example, the brigadier. I believe that his pay with allowances goes up from £2,053 to £2,180, an increase of £127. It sounds quite a big increase, but owing to the present rate of taxation most of it goes back to the Treasury. That is not very encouraging, especially when we remember that if we compare the present day purchasing value with its pre-war purchasing value, it is only worth about £750 before the war. This is perhaps a reflection on the Surtax levels of today.
As we have had mentioned most things in this debate, including the Foreign Office and Education Estimates, I thought that reference to the Treasury might not be out of the way. I think there is good reason for examining rather more sympathetically the pay of the senior officers in all the Services including the Civil Service. It may be a good thing to reconsider the reintroduction of those allowances which until 1946 were free of tax. I know there is a tendency to shy away from the idea of giving tax-free allowances, but many people already believe that Army pay is free of tax. They certainly think that the pay of Members of Parliament is free of tax. I do not think it would be a shock to public opinion if we were able to give the Army personnel the advantage of some tax-free benefits.
The major problem which causes a difficulty in recruitment is the question of separation of families. That has been dealt with by many Members in the debate, and I do not want to go over the subject again, except to make mention of the education of children. That is a subject on which I thought that I could let myself go, but the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop) covered it so fully that I almost looked for the Minister of Education to reply.
I would mention one point, however. I wish to ask my hon. Friend the Undersecretary whether he can consider the possibility of setting up an Army boarding school. There are many officers and other ranks who have to leave their children behind when they go to their

stations. They like their wives to be with them, and if married quarters are available they take their wives, but very often they have to leave their children behind to be educated. I do not think that this is a suggestion which is unworthy of examination if, in conjunction with the Minister of Education, it were possible to set up an Army school.
Now I want to come to my own King Charles' head, which is the question of the training of the reserve Army. The right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) mentioned this question of having a reserve Army available in Western Europe soon after the outbreak of a war. The Prime Minister, in his winding-up speech in the defence debate, which was one of the finest speeches that I ever heard, referred to the possibility of what he called the warning period or alert. He said the period would not be very long. He mentioned something like one or two weeks.
It is unrealistic to suppose that we shall be able to mobilise a reserve Army, the Territorial Army, the Army Emergency Reserve and the other reserve forces, in time to get them trained, ready and fit to go into operation within a few weeks of the outbreak of war. If we got such a warning and it turned out to be a false alarm we should find that we had mobilised our forces for nothing, and how often can we continue that process? We have, therefore, to work on the assumption that the reserve Army is reasonably well trained so that it can be used on the outbreak of war.
I have already expressed an opinion on the subject in previous debates. My own opinion is that the Territorial Army, and more especially the Army Emergency Reserve, would not be ready on the outbreak of war to be put into battle in a few weeks in support of formations in Western Europe. The Territorial Army and the Emergency Reserve would need to do at least three months' intensive training before it was fit to take such action.
We have heard two or three times that the original reason for National Service was the production of trained reserves. The reserve Army, through no fault of its own, has not been able to continue the training of those National Service men in the way that is calculated to produce the most effective fighting force on mobilisation.


What would happen if we suddenly had to mobilise and if we suffered the kind of atomic air attack which is envisaged in the Defence White Paper? Would the reserve forces, with insufficient training in deployment, movement, camouflage and dispersal, be able to deploy and operate efficiently in the first few weeks of intensive attack? If the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) is right and we did not have atomic warfare, but the ordinary conventional form of warfare, there would be all the more need to deploy those land forces quickly where they are most required. I do not think we could do so quickly.
It is no use making criticisms unless one is, at the same time, prepared to suggest the way in which the training could be improved. At present any National Service man who, after his service, is allocated to the Territorial Army, has, in addition to his 15 days' camp each year, to do a minimum of 30 drills of one-hour periods. The Army Emergency Reserve man, on the other hand, does no drills at all and escapes that liability.
One suggestion we might adopt would be that the Army Emergency Reserve officers and other ranks should be instructed to attend their nearest Territorial H.Q. for cadre courses. There are many courses they could take such as officers' courses in movements and communications. There are various regimental courses and N.C.O. instruction courses which could be given quite well at Territorial H.Q. within reasonable reach of the average Army reservist's own home town or village. They would give him the same drill liability as is undertaken by the man posted to a Territorial Unit.
The real problem of Reserve training is the length of the training camp. Two weeks each year for three years is insufficient to produce the trained unit. At least three weeks are needed, and four would be preferable. Of course, there are many disadvantages of increasing the annual camp, such as the effect on the man's employment, the opposition of his employers, the difficulty of holidays, but there are various ways of doing this. We might consider a four weeks' camp every third year or the possibility of reducing a man's Reserve liability to, say, 2½years instead of 3½ years, and have camps in

those periods of three or four weeks each time.
When it is possible to reduce or to consider reducing the period of the National Service liability—and we all want to see that time arrive—it may, at the same time, be possible to rearrange the time spent in full-time National Service and the time spent on the Reserve. For example, three months less might be spent in full-time National Service and a longer period on the Reserve, and the time spent each year might be amended so that a man did a month's camp in each of the three years in the Reserve. Any of these, or other suggestions might help to improve the Reserve training.
There is no doubt that if we were able to stimulate a much larger number of volunteers, many of the problems would be solved, but I am not sure that we have not got as many as we are likely to get, and as many as we had before the war, when we did not have so many Reserve units. It would be interesting to know the number of volunteers now as compared to the number of volunteers before the war.
However, there are some things we can do to improve volunteers. The Secretary of State mentioned a number of proposed changes for the Territorial Army, all of which are helpful and must be beneficial, but my right hon. Friend did not mention anything for the Army Emergency Reserve which is half the strength of the Territorial Army and one-third of the total Reserve strength.
I suggest that the bounty now given to the Army Emergency reservist who volunteers and which now does not start until the first camp after he has finished his normal liability for Reserve training, should be available to him at his first camp after volunteering. There might also be a bounty for officers. At present no such grant is paid to them, certainly not in the Army Emergency Reserve.
These are small suggestions which might help to obtain volunteers for the reserve Army. But whatever the answer, the problem must be solved. It is unrealistic and useless to believe that we have a defence system in Western Europe, depending almost entirely upon our ability to deploy well-trained reserve forces and we have nothing of the kind.

Mr. Swingler: This argument is extremely important. I should like the hon. Member to distinguish between the various categories about which he is speaking. The main part of the reservists of the Army are the more than 250,000 National Service reservists who are men who have done two years' military training. Surely those men should be easily mobilised in case of emergency, so long as there is a competent administration to fit them into the units. Therefore, these prolonged periods of Reserve training about which the hon. Member speaks are unnecessary for the main body of reservists.

Mr. Hall: It is true that the larger proportion of Reserves, both Territorial Army and Emergency Reserves, are National Service men who previously have had two years' Regular Army training. When they first come out of the Army, especially if they go to a Reserve unit for training shortly afterwards, they are still trained soldiers, though that depends largely upon their experience. But as time goes on, and when they have had only two weeks' training a year, plus a minimum number of drills in Territorial units, their efficiency falls.
That must be especially the case in the Emergency Reserve, when they meet each other only once a year for two weeks. Therefore, at the end of the period we have a body of men who, to a large extent, have forgotten a good deal of what they acquired during their period of Regular service.
It is also the fact that a large number of National Service men, except those in Malaya and Korea and perhaps Western Germany, have been in largely static formations and have not been fully and thoroughly trained for field force use. One has to start training them in field force work which many of them encounter for the first time.
It is essential that we try to solve this problem of Reserve Army training. I know that it is exercising the mind of the Secretary of State very much indeed. It is a very difficult problem. No one underestimates the serious difficulties that lie in the way of a really effective training of a Reserve Army. It is a problem that has to be solved because upon it depends the strength of our forces and our effectiveness in resisting aggression should it come.

2.54 a.m.

Mr. Julian Snow: I feel that occasions like this debate are those when ageing military gentlemen become extremely anecdotal and produce from the wealth of their rather ancient experience a fund of knowledge about military affairs which the authorities under the Gallery may find somewhat amusing.
Before I go on to follow this fashion, I should like to draw the attention of the Secretary of State to one or two rather mundane matters that do not necessitate a very profound military knowledge, which, in any event, I never had. He may remember that during his speech yesterday afternoon, in the course of this debate, I took the opportunity of interjecting a question about the production of prefabricated married quarters. I thought at the time that either I had expressed myself very badly or that the right hon. Gentleman had not thought very hard about the point that I had made.
All over the world where there are British garrisons and in this country where there are barracks, it will be generally agreed that apart from the great age of most of these quarters their general standard is deplorably low. Even in my constituency, where Whittington Barracks are relatively modern, one can only describe most of the married quarters as rather squalid places. One feels sorry for the wives of the soldiers who have to make a home for their menfolk and children in places which are so deplorable.
Bearing that in mind, I cannot understand—and in any case there are not enough married quarters to go round— why the Government have not drawn on the productive capacity of our industry to set up prefabricated married quarters. There is plenty of room and plenty of production and it seems that would be a simple way of dealing with this very serious problem.

Mr. Head: My memory, which may be at fault, was that the interjection of the hon. Member was concerned with barracks and not with married quarters.

Mr. Snow: In that case, I accept responsibility for having expressed myself badly, but I thought that in the context in which the right hon. Gentleman was


speaking at the time it was understood that I was referring to married quarters in barracks. Perhaps we can compromise on that explanation, but I repeat that the War Office ought to look into the question of putting up prefabricated married quarters in barracks in an endeavour to relieve the unhappiness which I know exists in the Army today.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: I want to be clear whether the hon. Member is speaking of home or overseas stations.

Mr. Snow: I am referring to both and I know at least one firm, the Bristol Aircraft Company, which does manufacture a prefabricated house specially designed for the tropics and has exported some to the Congo. I cannot see why the Department should not look into this matter to see whether this problem could not be tackled at relatively low cost.
Another point I wish to make is in connection with the standard of instruction in the Army. The normal method of unit or regimental instruction, and the courses organised by higher authorities, seem to me all very well for a standing Army dependent on normal intakes of National Service men and so on, but it seems that insufficient attention is paid to instructing in weapons, administration or organisation, men who might come in on mobilisation, civilians who have a civilian mentality. Most of us who were on the Reserve or who were called up early in the last war will remember the appallingly low-standard instruction we received.
Much of that low standard can be blamed on the inability to understand the intellectual standards and levels of the ordinary civilian population. We have officer instructors and N.C.O. instructors whose ideas are so different from the ideas of civilians and even whose accents are so very different. I well remember, in the early days of the last war, being told to attend a lecture on modern infantry weapons. It seemed a good lecture, but a reasonably intelligent man asked me after the lecture, "What is this about ' Far-par'? "He meant "fire power." That may seem a small point, but more attention should be paid to giving the ordinary civilian the sort of instruction that is intelligible to him. This is a matter to be looked at. It is not what is talked, but how it is talked.
I want now to turn to another matter. I will, if I might, call on my limited military experience; but I was for many years in the Territorial Army, including rather surprisingly, perhaps, a trooper in the Calcutta Light Horse, and what I would like to refer to is anti-aircraft gunnery.

Mr. Mikardo: What a connection!

Mr. Snow: My hon. Friend says, "What a connection," but I was talking of a horsed regiment. Yet when I joined Anti-Aircraft, there were officers still wearing spurs. The position both so far as Anti-Aircraft Command and the units in the field are concerned seems to me to be very serious if for no other reason than that I am informed that there is a state of serious demoralisation among instructors and permanent staff. For example, I am told that there is not a single predictor in operation which is capable of following, and training guns to engage, a modern aircraft; and by modern aircraft I mean those types now coming into super-priority production.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) said earlier in the debate that Anti-Aircraft ought to be abolished. I thought that that was rather overstating the case, but he meant, perhaps, heavy Ack-Ack, and I agree with him if that is what he did mean. There must be at home, and for the mobile forces, a continued use of light Anti-Aircraft, and I ask the Under-Secretary if the Army is really getting as good equipment as the Royal Navy appears to be getting in this direction.
He may have read the speech made only two days ago by the First Lord of the Admiralty on this subject. At the beginning of the last war there was reason to believe that naval anti-aircraft, allowing for the peculiarities which it must have, was far in advance of that on issue to the Army. Perhaps one of the troubles now is that there is a "hangover" in the Royal Artillery whereby there is a snobbishness on the part of Field Artillery officers towards the Anti-Aircraft gunner. Indeed, I say to the Secretary of State that if he went to Larkhill now he would find a rather strained state of affairs between Anti-Aircraft and Field Artillery instructors; and this is based on the erroneous idea that Anti-Aircraft is the poor relation of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. I say further that if he subjected


senior officers' of the Anti-Aircraft branch to an examination about their equipment they would probably not come out of it very well; and the reason is that they are often drawn from Field Artillery. I may be wrong, but I leave my criticism there.
In respect of Anti-Aircraft Command in this country, I hope that some of the manning mistakes made during the last war will by now have been rectified. I have said before, and I think it a reasonable remark, that Popski's Private Army had nothing on "Pile's Private Army." There was gross over-manning and waste at Group and Brigade level, and it is questionable as to whether the conventional structure, with brigades and regiments, was economical or tactically desirable.
When consideration is given to the fact that a large percentage of anti-aircraft strength of each unit in the Home Command will be made up of women, it would seem that there is a case for having a more localised system of interchanging batteries from relatively quiet to relatively active positions. We know what happened in the last war when brigades were tucked away miles from any sort of activity and became very demoralised. Yet during the extreme activity of dealing with the Vis on the East Coast, regiments and brigades were grossly overworked, bearing in mind that even at that stage there was a high percentage of A.T.S. operating the equipment.
The hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke) and the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Alport) expressed disquiet about the availability of transport aircraft. They were saying, in effect that so far as they knew, and it is also my information, the production at home of what I should call freighter aircraft for the Services does not meet the requirements of the immediate future, and certainly not the unforeseeable future.
If we are to depend on the purchase of American aircraft I would ask the Secretary of State to examine the possibility of having French aircraft. There is, for instance, the "Breguet Deux-Ponts" the two-decker, which started its service flying proper at the time of the Berlin airlift and is in production in France. It is an aircraft designed for

military use. I believe it carries 125 fully equipped men with a stores load, or eight light vehicles and a petrol load.
I should like the Secretary of State to have another look at the terms of employment of civilians at barracks. He is aware that I have a constituency case which I intended to raise were I successful in catching Mr. Speaker's eye. I hesitated to raise it because at one time it appeared to be purely a constituency point. But I have now come to the conclusion that the whole question of employing civilian labour, to reduce the uniformed personnel employed on civilian activities, must be examined.
This constituent of mine is named Mr. Hope. He was a miner until just after the outbreak of the last war and then served in the Yorkshire and Lancashire Regiment. Subsequently, he served in the East Yorkshire Regiment. He was demobilised in 1946 and in July of that year became a civilian store-keeper at Whittington Barracks. Among his duties was the sorting out of soiled linen for the laundry.
In 1952, he suddenly became unwell and eventually it was discovered that he was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. He went to hospital for six months during which time his wife, who was left with the two children, received National Assistance. Mr. Hope came out of hospital in May, 1953. He made an application through the barracks for some assistance or compensation, claiming that he had contracted tuberculosis in the course of his duties. The command secretariat, G.H.Q. Western Command, advised him to make a claim to the Ministry of National Insurance under the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) (Prescribed Diseases) provisions.
I want to know from the Minister why that advice was given. The Command had legal advice at its disposal, and its legal advisers must have known that tuberculosis was not a prescribed disease for a man working in a hospital and doing that sort of work. Anyhow, his claim was turned down, and was turned down again on appeal, for the simple reason that it was not a "prescribed disease."
I came into this matter at the stage where the claim had been rejected by the tribunal. I recently put two Questions


to the Minister. I first asked him how many cases of tuberculosis had been recorded at the barracks during the period while the man was employed there, and the answer was that there were nine, of which eight were pulmonary tuberculosis. I then asked the Minister what arrangements were made to protect storemen handling bedding and clothing from infectious diseases. In his reply the Minister said that trained Royal Army Medical Corps orderlies collected the affected articles and disinfected them at the medical reception centre.
The right hon. Gentleman may know that I telephoned his Department to find out when that organisation was put into effect. The answer was that his Department could only be sure that it had been in operation for two years but as far as it knew, it had always been in operation. That was not a very definite reply, but I quite understand that it might have been difficult to find out what had been going on as far back as 1946.
Therefore, I sent a telegram to my constituent's solicitors today, and I had a telegram this evening to the effect that during the whole of the period that the man was doing the work there was no general knowledge, and certainly no knowledge on his part, that any such disinfection of contaminated clothing had been carried out by medical orderlies. So far as I can judge, for the whole of or part of his employment before he went into hospital, the man was probably handling tubercular infected clothing.
We now have the position that the man is not protected under the Industrial Injuries (Prescribed Diseases) provisions. What I do not understand is why this man, who went through the war as a soldier, became a civilian employee at the War Office, and went into hospital as a seriously ill man and is still awaiting another operation, and whose wife had to apply for National Assistance, was not offered some financial compensation by the War Office. It is wrong that a man who has done his job by the Army should not receive what I consider to be the ordinary decent human treatment to which he is. entitled.
I wish to put two points to the Minister. First, will he look into the possibility of making the man, at the very least, an ex gratia payment? Secondly.

in the interests of others at the barracks —and elsewhere for all I know—will he ensure that the necessary arrangements, have been made to protect such men from infection since they are not protected by legislation?
It is an important point, for those of us who come from mining areas know how difficult it is to get a certain disease prescribed. My right hon. Friend the Member for Fulham, West (Dr. Summerskill) was telling me recently of the battle she had had when she was a Minister to convince the officials of her Department about prescribing pneumo-coniosis and silicosis. Here is a much less definite situation, yet there is no other protection of a financial nature for such a man as this constituent of mine who has done his job. I apologise for taking up so much time on an individual case, but it is a matter of principle, and I appeal to the Minister to give it his urgent and sympathetic consideration.

3.16 a.m.

Mr. Nigel Fisher: I am sorry that I cannot follow the hon. Gentleman the Member for Lichfield and Tamworth. (Mr. Snow)—

Notice taken that 40 Members were not present;

House counted, and 40 Members being present—

Mr. Fisher: As I was saying, I am sorry that I cannot follow the remarks of the hon. Gentleman on the subject of anti-aircraft defence, of which I know absolutely nothing, but I agree with much of what he said about married quarters, many of which are not at all good.
May I join with hon. Members on both sides who have paid tribute to the remarkable speech of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State? I think that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke) was correct when he said that the last occasion on which a Minister presented Service Estimates without any notes was when the late Lord Norwich presented the Navy Estimates before the war. I recall hearing that speech from the gallery, but I think that the speech we heard today was even better than that.
The problem I want to consider is one that is mentioned in the Memorandum to


the Estimates and arises also from the brilliant speech of my right hon. Friend. It is that of recruitment. I will deal with it from the Regular and Territorial Army points of view, and propose to add a few words about the Home Guard, about which we have heard no mention at all today. Figures for the Regular Army show a drop of 10,000 since 1952, and a further fall is expected this year. A really serious feature is the marked decline in the number of Regulars with more than six years' service, men who are the nucleus and essence of any army.
In most good regiments I do not think that there is an officer problem: there are enough officers and warrant officers, but the real difficulty is the shortage in the ranks between lance-corporal and full sergeant, and also among the skilled tradesmen. There are three main reasons for that. The first is that the British are not a military-minded race. I do not think that men care much about discipline, and I think they like it even less today than they did before the war. That dislike has extended to civilian life. It is a pity, because it may have repercussions on the character of our people and the social life of our country. But whether soldiers dislike discipline or not, I am sure that what the soldier dislikes most is badly administered discipline. I think there are still too many units showing too little imagination in the administration of their discipline, and that may be one factor which makes men reluctant to spend the best part of their lives in the Army.
Another factor may be that very few men get the opportunity to spend the whole of their lives in the Army because they have to leave when they are still quite active, at about 45 years of age. What are their prospects then? Rather poor—a rather small pension, with the possibility for a senior N.C.O. of a job as doorman perhaps outside a luxury cinema or a West End hotel, taking tips for summoning taxis. It is not very pleasing or lucrative prospect for a self-respecting man with a family to keep. The same situation applies, although with less force, to many officers, who retire about the same age.
The greatest disincentive of all to signing on is the amount of overseas service which the men now have to endure. We

no longer see the pre-war recruiting posters, "Join the Army and see the World." Everybody knows perfectly well that they have to see far, far too much of it if they join the Army.
I read in the White Paper that no fewer than two-thirds of the married men serving overseas are separated from their families. It is not unnatural that when a man leaves for a three-years tour abroad his wife should complain about it. In many cases a man has to choose between messing up his marriage or letting down his regiment, and, not unnaturally, he chooses not to sign on. In that event, the Army loses a perfectly good soldier.
I was talking to a man only this morning who is a very keen and efficient non-commissioned officer—a sergeant in the Regular Army—interested in Army life and keen on his career. He has just completed a five-year engagement and is being asked to sign on. For four of those five years he has been serving abroad, separated from his wife and family. He has not had a Christmas at home for five years. He is being asked to sign for a further period with no guarantee at all that he will spend a higher proportion of the next five years at home than he has spent here in the last five years. He told me, "I am not going to sign on." I do not blame him. I do not blame the War Office, either, for there is little the War Office can do about it. Nevertheless, it is one of the overriding factors in discouraging Regular recruiting.
I should like to pay tribute to four important things which the War Office has done to encourage recruiting. It has introduced the three-year engagement, which worked very well in the Brigade of Guards before the war and which has been equally successful when given a wider application to the Army as a whole. It is easier to get men to enlist for three years than it is to get them to enlist for five years or seven years, and, once they are in, some will always stay on.
Next, my right hon. Friend announced today these very encouraging annual free leaves at home, as well as other measures to help separated families. I am sure they will be a great success. Next, there are the new rates of pay, which have been well received by


Regulars. They will make a great difference.
May I make a small sugestion to the Under-Secretary of State? The present five-star pay system is very complicated. It is very difficult to explain to the potential recruit and I think it must make things difficult in the pay office. I cannot help thinking that from everybody's point of view it would be a good deal easier, and it might even be fairer to the soldier, if we could adopt a simpler system based on rank and service only.
There is one other step the War Office are now taking for which I am personally grateful. I referred last year to the deplorable state of some of the larger barracks. I believe I had the temerity to refer to Wellington Barracks, which, at that time, was being painted white for the Coronation, as a "whited sepulcher" because conditions were so deplorable inside. Having been so frank then I must at least thank the Secretary of State now for something appears to be going to be done by way of a long-term programme for the modernisation and replacement of many barracks in this country. I only hope it will not be too long-term.
My right hon. Friend has provided a shorter-term engagement. He has provided better pay and bounties and help for separated families. And lie has promised to provide better barracks. There is only one other thing the Secretary of State might do and that is provide more and better food. Soldiering is a healthy outdoor occupation which makes a man hungry and no one who has served in the Army would attempt to deny the importance men attach to their food. During the food scarcity, which happened to coincide with the late Labour Administration, there was some reason for the Army rations being reduced to conform to the somewhat meagre civilian rations, but now that we have this new era of Tory abundance there is no longer any excuse, and soldiers ought to have plenty of food, and I hope that no petty financial considerations will be allowed to affect the contents and coverage of the soldier's plate.
I appreciate that much has been done for the Regular Army in these Estimates —perhaps all the War Office can do for the time being—but I believe that regiments can do a certain amount to in-

crease their own strength. Although the Army recruiting figures are down as a whole, I know of individual regiments where they are up, simply as a result of their own efforts. They have tried hard and they have got more recruits. What one regiment can do others should seek to emulate. Local recruiting sergeants can and do bring in most of the recruits. The regimental band can help and there are grants to cover the expenses of bands used for this purpose. Publicity can help but it must be good publicity and it should be honest publicity. I came across a case recently of a mobile recruiting van displaying a miniature lay-out of a modern barracks, but there are so few such barracks in existence at present. This form of publicity was almost dishonest.
I do not think that these vans are very much good anyway. They only show recruiting posters and photographs. What would be better would be something like a double-decker bus with the recruiting personnel living in the upstairs part, and having the show window on the lower deck with a loudspeaker for records and for addressing crowds. The bus would be in the right place at the right time, going to big football matches, fairs and carnivals and other events where people assemble. In such places it is not difficult to attract an audience if you go about it in the right way; but you must have the right man in charge.
You would not employ, as I have seen employed, a National Service lance-corporal to enlist Regular recruits. You would employ a good long-service sergeant who had himself signed on; a man of some eloquence and personality; the sort of man who could run a good side show at a fair; a salesman.
I was not thinking of the hon. and gallant Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). I was thinking more of a sort of military version of the successful Harringay evangelist, Mr. Billy Graham. In talking to people he should compare rates of pay in the Army with those in civil life. People do not realise what Army clothing, food and accommodation are really worth in terms of cash.
I estimate that they are worth about £3 a week. Hon. Members opposite are always talking about the cost of everything, but when the argument is used


against them they say, "It is not worth as much as that." I should say that food, clothing and accommodation are worth £3. A single man in the Army with three years' service will get £3 18s. 4d. over and above that. That means that he will get the equivalent of £7 a week, which is not bad for a lad of 21 with no responsibilities.
A lance-corporal aged 22 will get £5, which means £8; and a full sergeant aged 27, with eight years' service, unmarried and living in barracks, will get the equivalent of £10 5s. Od. a week in civil life. Those facts should be put over. I am sure that if regiments would make a real effort on those lines they would get the recruits that the Army needs.
I should like now to turn to recruiting in the Territorial Army. There should not be any serious officer problem for good regiments in the Territorial Army. I know that sometimes hon. Gentlemen opposite rather decry it, but there is a tradition of service, or whatever one likes to call it—I do not want to be pompous —which does ensure a certain amount of officer material. I think that a good unit today may even have a waiting list for officers. Again, it is the long-service non-commissioned officer who is in short supply.
How many National Service N.C. Os. intend to sign on? I do not know what the War Office estimate is. Of course, it will vary according to the regiment. It might be 20 per cent, or 30 per cent. How can we get more to sign on? I think that the Secretary of State has gone a long way to answering that question by some of the announcements in his speech
There are a number of other minor points which might be helpful. A man might be given some new Territorial Army medal if he signs on after his National Service training period. He might perhaps be provided with a peacetime uniform; certainly the N.C. Os. might. Battle dress is not quite the same thing. I realise that, sooner or later in every debate on the Army Estimates, I get on to this point, but I think that No. 1 dress would give more pride of regiment and more pride of personal appearance. His girl friend would like it, too, and that would be a help because

it is the wives and sweethearts who discourage the men from signing on for extra Territorial Army service in these days.
Then there is the question of a bounty. It might be possible to give a man £5 or £10 when he signs on for four years and perhaps another £15 or £20 if he signs on for 12 years. That would help. I realise that money is not all-important in the Territorial Army, but it is a factor. I know that the men do not expect to make money, but they do not expect to be out of pocket. They have at least the right to feel that they should not be out of pocket on account of their service.
I was glad to hear that the paper work is to be cut down and that more permanent staff are to be provided. I am sure that training will be more effective as a result. I am glad that in future divisional training is to be carried out on a four-year cycle and that drills are to be limited to 50 a year. Both those improvements will be welcomed in the Territorial Army.
I hope that we shall get better amenities at the week-end training centres. As it is, many of these represent two days of complete purgatory. There are not enough civilian staffs. The Territorial Army battalion has to provide its own cooks. The men often live in very depressing wooden huts with external latrines, wash-houses, and so on. The nearest town is perhaps five miles away, and the only social amenity for the two days is literally "tea and a wad" at the N.A.A.F.I. That is all there is.
Yet, apart from the annual camp, that is the only side of Territorial Army life which the National Service men see. I was glad to hear that in future these annual camps are going to take place in the territorial area of the regiment concerned. I think it would be rather nice to have some of them at the sea. I am sure that would be appreciated.
Some hon. Members have suffered much, as I have, on the traditional training areas like Salisbury Plain, and one must have imagination about these things when dealing with the Territorial Army. I think that the men will "take" the four-day divisional exercise in the open, and might even see in it some sign of efficiency providing that the remainder of the fortnight's training is comparatively civilised.
What we cannot expect is a terrific rush of volunteers at the end of a fortnight which has been absolutely awful from the first to the last day. There must be a little imagination about these camps, and the rough has got to be mixed with a certain amount of smooth. I appreciate that we need the rough to inculcate training and efficiency, but I think that the smooth is also needed to preserve morale and the voluntary spirit.
Those are two perhaps apparently irreconcilables which have to be reconciled to provide for the nation a Territorial Army which is both voluntary, at least in part, and at the same time proficient in the arts of war. It is difficult to combine, but not perhaps impossible. It is certainly not an easy job, and equally certainly it is not a party or a political issue. It is something to which we must all contribute if we are to see the results which we all want to achieve.
Lastly, a few words about the Home Guard. There are 152 paragraphs in the Memorandum which my right hon. Friend prepared for the Army Estimates, but only one of them—a very short one indeed—dealt with the Home Guard. It struck me—I hope that I shall not be considered offensive—as a rather complacent little paragraph.
I know that recruiting to the Home Guard has varied a good deal. I believe that some battalions in the Eastern Counties are very nearly up to the reduced strength of 300 which the War Office announced 15 months ago. But it is very uneven. Many battalions are not, and never will be, anything more than cadres.
I can only speak of the position as I find it in my own area of north Hertfordshire. Our experience there has been most discouraging—not for the want of trying. Originally, only 4 per cent, of the chaps required came forward. They usually consisted of some old soldiers, some more than usually patriotic men, and a few—just a sprinkling—of the sort of men who rather enjoy "playing at soldiers."
I suggested to my right hon. Friend at that time that it was perhaps somewhat extravagant to keep the same overheads for 40 all ranks as had been authorised for 900, and in November, 1952, my right hon. Friend announced a cut to

300 per battalion, which, I think, was a very sensible step to take. But, so far as north Hertfordshire is concerned, I am afraid that it is still far too optimistic.
Last autumn there was a Home Guard recruiting drive in Eastern Command. Each battalion was authorised to spend £90 on publicity. The net result in the battalion of which I am speaking was two recruits. After two years the strength of this battalion is about 45. But 20 of them never appear; to defend 150 square miles of Eastern England this battalion commander has precisely 40 rifles, three Bren guns and 25 men. Indeed, the number of men may be even fewer. They signed on originally for two years, and that time is coming to an end in a few weeks, so they will be asked to sign on again, and I am afraid that some of them will not.
The plain fact is that the military history of this country has always shown again and again that the mass of out people do not volunteer for any form of military service in any circumstances whatever unless and until war seems very likely indeed. Then they flock to the Services. That is a fact, and there is nothing to be gained by ignoring it.
But I am equally certain that there are strong grounds for retaining the Home Guard as a cadre on which to expand in time of emergency. In a period of tension before the outbreak of war I am sure that the sparse ranks of the Home Guard will rapidly be filled. But that will not be a period when we can go in for orderly recruiting or progressive training. There will not be time. We shall not get the amount of warning that we had at the beginning of the last war.
It will be a case of the levée en masse. In each village the men will be coming in to enrol, and in each village the arms and equipment ought to be ready and available for them to use at short notice. Leaders and detailed plans have to be ready, too. The leaders have to be trained beforehand, and the plans must be prepared and the equipment obtained in advance. The leaders—the officers and the N.C. Os. are all there already; they are being trained now.
A battalion and company headquarters organisation exists at the moment. That is precisely what my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington


(Mr. Anthony Eden) advocated in this House in March, 1951. It was a first-class suggestion. If the men training in the cadre Home Guard today could feel themselves to be the leaders of the real Home Guard of tomorrow, then we should retain their interest; they would want to stay on in the organisation and feel that they were doing some good and were the foundation upon which we could build in an emergency.
But that foundation cannot possibly be effective unless we have mobilisation and expansion plans all prepared beforehand. So far as I know—I speak subject to correction—there is none. If a man enrols today an indent has to go to the command ordnance depôt. He may receive his arms and equipment within a week or two, or it may be longer. If in a crisis recruits were pouring in daily, and at the same time the Regular and Territorial Armies were also being mobilised, confusion and chaos would be complete.
I beg the War Office to prepare its plans now for a rapid expansion from the cadre to the operational basis if the need arises. I think that we should publicly admit that the bulk of the Home Guard today is on a cadre basis. But we should ensure that it can be quickly transformed into a vital weapon for the defence of this country.
If the Government will do that, I think the conception of the Home Guard will not have been a failure, and, in time of need, I believe that the country as a whole will be grateful for the forethought and statesmanship of my right hon. Friend as far as the Home Guard is concerned, just as we on this side of the House at any rate, are all deeply grateful to him for what he has already done for the Territorial and Regular Armies.

3.45 a.m.

Mr. John Baird: We have just listened to a speech which put forward many technical points and which made a contribution to a more efficient and pleasant Army. Indeed, many of the speeches of hon. Gentlemen opposite have been dealing with technical points and I want to raise one or two small ones myself.
We cannot discuss in a vacuum the question of reducing the Army Estimates.

We can only discuss it properly if we relate the Army to the political problems facing us at present, and the only major contribution to reducing the Estimates is to cut our commitments overseas.
Paragraphs 97 and 98 of the Memorandum deal with a problem which I know is troubling the Secretary of State at the moment, that is, the failure to get medical and dental officers to staff his medical services. I see that the right hon. Gentleman has set up a committee under Lord Waverley to inquire into this matter. Why Lord Waverley, I do not know; Government officers always seem to appoint him to these various committees. Anyway, the committee will inquire into the provision of an adequate number of medical and dental officers, and particularly of specialists and surgeons. It is a problem which has arisen since the war.
The fact is that since 1945 there has been an almost revolutionary change in the medical and dental service in this country through the introduction of the National Health Service, and today the financial attraction of private practice is such that doctors and dentists feel they cannot afford to go into a salaried service. There is the same trouble in the Army as in the School Dental Service, because we cannot afford to pay the medical and dental officers more than equivalent ranks in the same type of service and, therefore, we cannot attract the right people into these services. In other words, we cannot offer sufficient incentive.
The hon. Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher) referred to Wellington Barracks. I remember that when I came into this House first I was still in the Army and was posted there. I went there two or three mornings a week to give dental treatment and I have never been in a more atrocious surgery in my life. Speaking as a dental officer, I say that if we gave dentists and doctors better accommodation, we might attract more decent medical men into the Services. I am not in any way disparaging the Army medical and dental services, because I know during the war they did wonderful work. So far as the dental service is concerned, I believe that there was more education in dental health matters in the war than there has been for a long time, and that at the end of the war the dental


health of the Army was better than it was at the beginning.
For the life of me I cannot understand why we should have three military medical and dental services. Why cannot we have a unified medical service for all the Armed Forces? There is no need for separate commands and a separate structure for the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Americans are more progressive than we are in this respect. I remember being stationed in York during the war, where there was a large accumulation of Air Force and Army personnel and there were two separate structures to treat the military men, with the same commands and the same amount of paper work being done by the two Services. I cannot understand why we cannot break away from the old, narrow concept and get a unified medical service for the Armed Forces.
Apart from that, I believe that today, as a result of the National Health Service there is no reason for having an elaborate medical service in the Army. The ordinary National Hospital Service and Health Service could do a large amount of the work now being done by medical personnel in the Army. It is true that we would still need a medical service for overseas, but a large amount of the medical work of the Army's hospital and dental services could be done under general medical and dental services and in that way we should save on personnel. These are one or two minor practical suggestions which I hope the Minister will consider.
There is another, rather technical point, with which I should like to deal. We all remember that a few weeks ago there was a rather controversial television broadcast by Major-General "Mike" West on sentences for cowardice in the face of the enemy. I remember raising that matter in the House in 1945 and appealing for an amnesty for some of the many young men who had been sentenced to five or six years for either cowardice or desertion in the face of the enemy. I raised the matter then because, although I had never been a combatant officer but merely a dental officer in the Army, I was ordered to sit on various courts-martial. I was one of a court of three who were responsible for sending a considerable number of young men to the "glasshouse" for a large number

of years. I was determined to do what I could to prevent that kind of thing when I left the Army, and we did secure an amnesty for large numbers of men.
When I listened to Major-General West's broadcast I realised that what he described was obviously the policy of the Army and I felt that we had learned very little from our experience in the Second World War. The first thing that struck me when I sat on these cases was that perhaps 75 to 80 per cent, of people sent down for cowardice or desertion in the front line were young boys in their 'teens or early twenties who had not had nearly enough training before they were sent to the front line. I believe that the same thing happened to a great extent in Korea.
I believe it is true to say that a considerable number of the men who funked it in the long run had been for a long time good soldiers but, suddenly, their nerve had gone. The conditions of modern war are such that perhaps the more sensitive one is the more likely one to crack up in front-line warfare. But we were told that because we must have discipline and morale in the Army we must send these young people to the "glasshouse" for a number of years.
A short time after that I was transferred to Brussels, where there was a notorious "glasshouse" which I had to visit once a week to treat prisoners. The only dental treatment they received was the extraction of teeth. I have never had a more demoralising experience than watching these men run at the double and do all sorts of wasteful things which break a man's spirit. If it is necessary for the sake of morale to sentence men to long years of this demoralising experience, I accept it. But very often lack of morale is due to bad leadership more than to a breakdown of nerves among a few young men. Will the Under-Secretary of State for War not inquire into this matter and find out whether there is not some means whereby these men whose nerve breaks in Korea or in other spheres of action can go for medical examination before being sent to the "glasshouse "?
I remember that when we discussed this subject in 1945 one or two hon. Members opposite said that if these young men knew that they could go for medical examination they would all want


to funk their duty. That is not true. This is a medical problem, and 75 per cent, of the men sentenced for desertion and cowardice during the Second World War should have been sent to hospital and not to the "glasshouse."
I turn now to a major problem that faces us. Earlier, the hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) and the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Alport) dealt with one or two of the major political problems that are linked up with the Army. The hon. Member for the Isle of Thanet said that we were legally entitled to carry on in Egypt even after the Treaty comes to an end in 1956 and that there was a military argument for staying in Egypt with a much smaller military commitment—I believe he said of 10,000. The hon. Member for Colchester talked about using more colonial troops.
It seems to me that these arguments are begging the question. Is it suggested that we should take loyal Kikuyu from Kenya to police British Guiana, or take loyal Guianese to police Kenya? How, otherwise, are we to do this kind of thing? On Suez, I seriously believe that hon. Members are living in the past and talking about a British Empire which no longer exists. Our moral position in the world today is much more important than our military position.
In my time we have been through two major world wars. What is the attitude of the so-called colonial peoples to us after the experiences they have had in that time? I wish to paraphrase a story which I believe the late Earl Grey told after the First World War. It was of a Japanese who came to a reception here. One of our statesmen asked him, "What do you think of our great Western civilisation?" The Japanese shook his head and said, "We were content to live in Japan, isolated from the world, to cultivate our chrysanthemums and live at peace; but then you taught us how to build battleships and to make bombs."
That is the attitude now of India, British Guiana, Kenya and all the other so-called colonial countries and we have to try to understand these people. We cannot possibly either keep the Egyptians down and control the Suez Canal or keep the Africans down by military force. We can only keep the Suez Canal with the

friendship of the people of Egypt and the sooner the party opposite realise that the better.
Let us always remember that we shall never solve the military problem by getting a more efficient and streamlined army, but by tackling the political problems that make it possible to have a much bigger Army than we can possibly sustain.

4.0 a.m.

Mr. Frederic Harris: I am sure that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mr. Baird) will forgive me if I do not follow him in his arguments, because he spoke of a specialised side of military service of which he has, of course, particular knowledge.
Like many hon. Members I have had possibly six hours' sleep in three nights and have been waiting for 12 hours to make a speech which, to say the least, is frustrating. I know that there are other hon. Members who will have to wait even longer. I sympathise with them very much indeed. I was very doubtful whether I should take part in this debate because I have only a layman's knowledge of matters connected with military service; but there are hon. Members who have taken part in all three Service Estimate debates, and it is, therefore, not, I think, out of order for me to participate, especially when I want to deal with a matter which has not been touched upon in any detail as yet—and that is the service of our troops in Kenya.
I should like to congratulate my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State on the brilliant way he introduced these Estimates. He covered a considerable amount of ground, and what impressed itself on my mind was his extreme grasp of the whole of the matters about which he talked. It must be an encouragement to all hon. Members to know what a grip he has of his Department. Nearly two months ago I returned from Kenya in the same plane as my right hon. Friend. We left Nairobi but were held up at Khartoum and had to wait until the early hours of the following morning because of engine trouble.
During that time I had some discussion with the Secretary of State with regard to his all too-short-visit to Kenya. Here again, I was very encouraged by his


considerable grasp of the situation, following that short visit, and of the problems of the Services in Kenya. I know that every hon. Member regrets the cause which creates the necessity for troops being in Kenya at all. But for all races it is absolutely vital, not only for the future of Kenya, the East African territories, but also, I suggest, eventually for the whole African continent, that order be restored quickly there.
There is no doubt that our troops out there are fighting a most terrible and filthy cult in Mau Mau; it is something which simply must be put down and destroyed. The tragedy is that it was ever permitted to develop to the extent to which it has and that we should have gone through 18 months of emergency, with the need for so many of our troops in Kenya, when so much of the trouble could have been avoided. Our Army in Kenya is operating under the most difficult conditions.
There is no doubt that what is happening in Kenya is real war; and when, sometimes, we hear speeches which are not appreciative of the true situation, it is most disturbing. Fortunately, the Mau Mau, in the main, is only found with a certain number—although a fairly large number—of lawless Kikuyu. But, we have also a very large body of loyal Kikuyu and approximately four-fifths of the African population is anti-Mau Mau. That fact, perhaps, is not fully appreciated.
It is indeed unfortunate when sections of the national Press feature in their headlines accusations of cruelty on the part of our troops and other even disturbing facts which, unhappily, sometimes occur in Kenya. I am not complaining of the fact that everyone should be made aware of what is happening, though it should certainly be appreciated that the unpleasant happenings occur in other parts of the world too, besides Kenya. My complaint is that the national Press do not feature many of the deeds of outstanding valour performed by our forces in Kenya. The other day we heard of a young lieutenant who killed eight Mau Mau in one action. Very little was said about that in the national Press, yet the trial of Griffiths was given headlines. This has the effect of creating a wrong impression in the minds of people in this country or the

world about what our men are doing in Kenya.
I would make the strongest plea that if the Press is to draw the attention of the public to such things, which, I agree, are a disgrace to our Army overseas, let them counterbalance these occurences with accounts of deeds of valour and gallantry performed by our men who are fighting under very trying conditions. I am sure that not one of our troops would wish to be fighting in Kenya under these present difficult conditions and I frankly feel that they are not getting a square deal from our national Press.

Mr. Swingler: Would the hon. Member amplify his well-deserved tribute to the vast majority of the men of the British Army in Kenya by a reference to the recent action of the Colonial Secretary in negotiating with "General China" to try to bring to an end the war with the Mau Mau?

Mr. Harris: Every hon. Member is entitled to his own view on that matter. I have not made up my mind and will not do so until I have heard all the facts. I should also not like to make any criticism until all the details are known. We should appreciate that a man like "China" has done the most terrible things in the past and it is certainly difficult to know whether one should use such a man who has carried murder and other crimes to great extremes and then arrest, say, a native woman in Nairobi for carrying a gun and perhaps hang her later; while a man like "China" escapes his well-deserved penalty. However, I applaud the aim behind the move—

Mr. Speaker: Order. This discussion would appear to be more appropriate on the Colonial Office Vote than on the Army Estimates. The hon. Member must confine himself to the Army Estimates.

Mr. Harris: I bow to your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, but I wish to say as much as I can about what the Army is doing in Kenya today.
The concessions announced by the Secretary of State yesterday afternoon will be appreciated by all hon. Members. I have always felt that in a so-called modern word it was a most unfortunate thing that men in the forces should be kept apart from their wives for such long periods at a time. The plan to


enable them to spend more time together will be warmly welcomed. As a result of the proposals for bringing Service families together to a greater extent in the future, there will, naturally, be much more air transport. That is presumably why the cost of air transport in the Estimates is increased by about 60 per cent.
I understand that the Army in Kenya is stationed there at no cost to the Kenya Government for their pay. Yet, for some extraordinary reason, the cost of transportation is borne by that Government. At the moment it has tremendous burdens to carry, and yet it has no control over such military expenditure. Is it a fact that the Kenya Government pays for this transportation, but does not meet the actual pay cost of the troops themselves? If so, what is the point of such an arrangement?

Mr. Swingler: The Kenya Government meet the cost of accommodation of the troops.

Mr. Harris: I should like to have some definite information about that from the Secretary of State.

Mr. Swingler: All colonial Governments meet the cost of the accommodation of the troops in their territories, and also the cost of transportation, but they do not have to raise the money for the pay of the troops.

Mr. Harris: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I believe that that is so. It was stated yesterday that the air transport concessions would cost about £680,000. How much of that extra burden will now fall on the Kenya Government, or will it all be met from our Estimates?

Mr. Swingler: In all cases the cost of transportation of troops falls on the colonial Government concerned. I assume that the alteration in the type of transport in this case will not affect the principle that the cost of the transportation of troops falls upon the territory concerned and is met out of the taxation levied upon the inhabitants of the territory.

Mr. Harris: I should like to get that clear.

Mr. Head: I cannot give the precise information which is required, and I

should not wish to give the House wrong information, but my impression when engaged in the negotiations was that the total cost involved in the concessions would fall on our own Estimates. It does not seem to be entirely fair to place the extra burden on colonial Governments. However, I should like to check my information before making a definite statement.

Mr. Harris: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. While we are still on the point about these concessions, I am sure we all agree that our troops in Kenya are ambassadors for our country and that it is very important that we should be able to feel that they are reasonably content with the conditions which are provided for them. I am certain that these concessions will give them real satisfaction.
I do not know what type of transport aircraft will be used for the purposes of these air-lifts. This is a rather different matter from that of air transport as a whole, which was discussed by my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Mr. Alport). It is a long and not an easy journey to Nairobi, and I hope it will be possible to use a satisfactory type of aircraft for the purpose, especially from the point of view of the men's wives. It was a tragedy that the Hermes aircraft were taken out of service.
They were a most successful and comfortable aircraft, and although the reason for the action was, I believe, because of expense, perhaps now we may be able to see some of them back in use again for the particular transportation that may be involved in this operation.
I should also like to know whether with all the troop movements in Kenya anything could be done to get any benefit from MacKinnon Road. Those of us who have seen MacKinnon Road lately realise that it is in a really deplorable state. It has cost £12 million of the taxpayers' money, and it seems extraordinary that it has not been more used in the past. Perhaps now it could be put to use again.
We all wish to bring this trouble in Kenya to an end, and get our troops back as quickly as we can, but I feel that to do this the military may have to open the country up much more than has hitherto been done. Here I am talking about road communications. I was one


of those who criticised very much the expenditure on the groundnuts scheme. I felt that some of that money could have well gone into the development of Kenya. If it had it is possible we would not have been faced with the same degree of difficulty that faces us now.
The question of opening up Kenya through the forests might be tackled. I believe that it has been considered, and is possible. We will be using much military transport there, and anybody who knows anything about transport knows it deteriorates quickly, especially in the hands of the military. Therefore, the better the roads are kept the better everything will be in the long run. I make that particular appeal because I think considerable expenditure could be saved in that way.
I would urge the earliest possible defeat of the Mau Mau, which is desired by every hon. Member, and winning the maximum support from the loyal Kikuyu, who, I think, have not had all the support they could have had from us. That will mean we shall have to speed up military operations as quickly as we can. It may mean for a time more help will have to be given. I strongly support the views expressed about the development of colonial troops, because I do not think that that aspect has been explored nearly enough in the past. I do not mean that men should be brought from Malaya and elsewhere, but there are plenty of loyal Africans of all races in Kenya who would respond to such an appeal. The loyal Kikuyu there have been an example of that, and such loyalty could be developed very much more. Anyone who knows the situation and the meagre weapons which the loyal Kikuyu have had to put up with realises there is plenty more that could be done for them.
The Army can also help to better conditions in Kenya by buying as much of their local supplies as they can from the secondary industries in the Colony. It is clearly stated in the Members' special report that we need to develop the secondary industries in Kenya to help to meet present difficulties there. Many Army supplies which are still taken to Kenya from overseas could be bought locally. I put a Question down on this subject recently, which the Under-Secretary of State answered, telling me that the War Office were doing all they could

to make such local purchases and that they would exploit the possibilities to the full.
We should also try to ensure that people in this country, as well as residents in Kenya, do all they can to help to entertain and give comfort to the troops in Kenya. I am not sure that the troops are not a little neglected. We hear of concert parties being sent to other parts of the world to entertain the troops, and I wonder whether similar entertainment is used to the full in Kenya to help the troops in their difficult conditions.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I have recently returned from Kenya, where I spoke to the commanding officer of the Buffs and the commanding officer of another battalion at Nyeri. I asked for a specific assurance on that point, and I was given an assurance that the hospitality and entertainment were excellent, as far as the men were able to get away to enjoy them. On the rare occasions on which they could get away, the troops were taken into the settlers' homes, for example, at weekends.

Mr. Harris: I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention, because I am certain that we want to be sure that our troops are getting all the diversions they can under these conditions.
May I refer briefly, in conclusion, to Suez? We must, among other things, remember the very bad psychological effect on the peoples of the whole of the African Continent if we made a complete withdrawal from Suez. Moreover, we must always ensure that all shipping will pass through Suez with very little interference.

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton: No interference.

Mr. Harris: We want to be sure that there is no interference with shipping in future, but I can assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that he is wrong when he says there is no interference at present, because a boat carrying some of my company's goods was held up for 15 days by the Egyptians in Suez.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I think the hon. Gentleman misunderstood me. He said there must be very little interference with


shipping in the future and I said that there must be no interference at all.

Mr. Harris: I am sorry; the misunderstanding must be due to tiredness at this hour of the morning.
My remarks were intended to have been principally confined to Kenya. I am sure the Secretary of State will continue to do his utmost to complete the difficult task there as speedily as possible so that peace may again be restored to that troubled country and our troops brought back at the earliest possible opportunity.

4.25 a.m.

Mr. Hugh Delargy (: I hope no one will object if we now return to the Army Estimates. Most of the speeches since the Division could very well have been made more appositely during a colonial or foreign affairs debate, and I would have thought that after what my hon. Friends had said about Suez between the hours of 7 and 10 p.m. last night little else was needed. The last speech had nothing whatever to do with the Army Estimates, and I would be somewhat out of order in replying to it, except for one point.
The hon. Member for Croydon, East (Mr. F. Harris) criticised the Press for high-lighting the atrocities committed by British soldiers in Kenya, and said they were constantly being reported in too exaggerated a fashion. As a matter of fact, there were few persons who had heard of any atrocities at all—and they must have been going on for the last 18 months—until the first trial of Griffiths. That was the first time these atrocity stories were printed in the Press and shocked the consciences of most decent men and women in England.

Mr. F. Harris: What I did try to say was that such headlines were not balanced by statements of the valour displayed by our troops, and their other activities.

Mr. Delargy: I do not agree. A great number of tributes have been paid to our troops. Since the hon. Gentleman and his friends want to suppress these stories they will not do the good name of this country any good, because they will be printed in other parts of the world. Since the valour of our troops is well known we

have nothing to fear from the truth, even though, now and again, it is unpalatable.
I am not going to speak of foreign affairs, the Colonies, Kenya, Suez or Egypt. All I want to do is to ask one or two simple question, briefly and concisely, so that I may all the more easily get an answer. On Vote 5—Movement —the sum asked for is £34,450,000. That is, of course, a considerable amount, but in one respect it is not enough. Part of this money is devoted to paying the travelling allowances of troops coming home on leave, or, finally, returning on completion of service. It is admitted that this money ought to come from public funds. There are certain sections of the community whose travelling expenses ought to be paid out of public money. Even M. Ps. have their fares paid between London and their constituencies or homes, although, in passing, I may say that the Government are not very extravagant in my case, since the return fare to my constituency is only 5s. 2d.
Unlike all other hon. Members I am unable to travel first-class. There are only third-class carriages on my line, the worst railway in the country. The carriages are filthy, the trains stop at every station, and when they do not stop they go very slowly indeed. We have been promised by another Government Department that the line to Thurrock is to be electrified. We have been waiting a very long time, to the great inconvenience not only to the hon. Member for Thurrock, but to the hundreds of his constituents who have to travel to London and back every day.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: Would it help if the War Department took over this line?

Mr. Delargy: I do not think I would be in order even to make that suggestion. I am sorry that the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation is not here, but I hope the Secretary of State for War, when he has got through with his other work, will remember to remind his right hon. Friend of his pledge to electrify the line between London and Tilbury.
I am merely establishing that certain persons have some right to have their railway fares paid and, most important of all, that the railway fares of soldiers going home on leave should be provided


out of general taxation. The House may be shocked to hear that this right is not accorded to every soldier in the Army. I sincerely hope that the Secretary of State or his hon. Friend will be able to assure me that my information is false, but I am informed that there are certain soldiers who, when they travel home on leave, have to pay part of their transport costs themselves. Those soldiers are Irishmen who come from the Republic.
I understand that they have free passage merely in the United Kingdom and that, thereafter, when they get to the nearest point to the frontier—that very unnatural and unjust frontier that the House has heard me criticise from time to time—they have to find their own way home. They can hitch-hike, walk or crawl on all-fours as far as the War Office cares.
This is most unjust, on several counts. It is wrong firstly as an offence against simple justice. These soldiers are exactly like other members of the Army. They live the same life, share the same hardships, risk the same perils, and they ought to have the same rights. Why should these men have to pay their fares when all the others do not?
Also, this is wrong from a legal point of view. In the Parliament before the last we passed the British Nationality Act. I remember it well because I tabled several Amendments to the Bill but, of course, like all the Amendments to which I put my name, they were defeated. That Act lays it down that the moment any person who was born in the Republic of Ireland sets foot on British soil he at once assumes all the rights, privileges and responsibilities of British citizenship. He can vote, or stand for Parliament In fact, he can do all the things that we are entitled to do.
Similarly, therefore, upon joining the British Army these men, who, under the Act passed by us a few years ago, are entitled to be full British citizens as soon as they come here, are surely entitled to retain those rights. One of the rights of a British soldier is that of having his fare paid when he goes home on leave. It is illegal not to pay the fare of these men.
Perhaps worse still, it is unjust psychologically. Many of those men live in the South of Ireland and they will be obliged

to pass, on their way home, through Northern Ireland. None of them wants to do that in the present state of affairs. These men know very well that they will not be welcomed by the authorities in Northern Ireland. They know that even a certain section of Northerners born and bred, even with excellent military records, are not particularly well treated by their Government in the north. They are discriminated against in housing, in employment, and sometimes even in voting. Obviously, these British soldiers resident in Southern Ireland, knowing how unwelcome are these other chaps, realise how unwelcome they are likely to be and that they are not likely to get any advice or assistance.
It is also unjust, not merely because in my view it is against our own law, and not only because it is a waste of money, but also because it is an enormous waste of time. Anyone who has had any experience of the Army knows full well that when a man sets off on leave his only thought is to get to his destination with the least possible delay. He does not want to wander all over the north of a country in order to get to the south of it, nor does he want to go to Bannockburn by way of Beachy Head. But he cannot go the quickest way unless his fare is paid.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Bannockburn?

Mr. Delargy: Yes. I am quoting a poem by G. K. Chesterton. [HON. MEMBERS: Birmingham, not Beachy Head.] Yes, of course.

Mr. Douglas Glover: Surely the hon. Gentleman knows that no Englishman ever wants to go to Bannockburn.

Mr. Delargy: The hon. Gentleman has really done me a grave injustice. He has evidently not been listening to me at all, because all this time I have been talking not about Englishmen, but about Irishmen. But, quite seriously, I sincerely hope that the right hon. Gentleman will look into this very definite grievance, and will put it right at the earliest possible opportunity.
I also wish to ask a question on Vote 4 under the heading "Civilians Employed In Connection With Recruiting, Welfare and Legal Aid." I am particularly interested in and curious about the subheading, "Civilians employed in connection


with the Forces' Broadcasting Services, etc."
I note that at home "Specialists (temporary) various" are paid £330–£865, but we are not told how many there are. What I am particularly anxious to know—because I have listened to many of these broadcasts—is who chooses the people to broadcast on these programmes. Some of the broadcasts are good, some not so good, and some are very bad indeed.
Since the War Office evidently pays some of the cost, has it any say in who are chosen to do the broadcasts? I hope that in this connection party Whips on both sides have no say in the matter, as they have, unfortunately, in other broadcast services. I want to know why they are chosen when people like myself have never been asked to speak to the forces. After all, I am a man of vast experience.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: The hon. Gentleman has been unlucky. Quite a number of M.Ps. have broadcast to the Forces.

Mr. Delargy: That does not surprise me. I know that quite a number are broadcasting every day, and are also appearing on television, but I do not happen to be among their number. But I am interested in the education of the troops with whom I served for some years, and no doubt other hon. Members' claims are quite as strong as mine.
I am very glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) is here because I want to refer to something which he raised in his long and extremely entertaining speech earlier this morning. This is on Vote 3, at page 48—"Department of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State." My hon. Friend asked why there was not a principal Nonconformist chaplain — though I feel that I should comment that he got his theological distinctions a little blurred at that moment. I use the expression "Nonconformist" in its generally accepted sense and not in its literal sense. Roman Catholics in England are nonconformists just as members of the Church of England in Scotland are nonconformists.

Mr. Simmons: Do the Roman Catholics regard all the others as nonconformists?

Mr. Delargy: Certainly. But I am talking of the Army Estimates and British law. Unfortunately, British law and the Roman Catholic Church do not see eye to eye on many matters.
I want to reinforce my hon. Friend's plea that such a reverend gentleman should be appointed to such a post. I also note that the principal Roman Catholic chaplain is paid £300 a year less than the Deputy Chaplain-General. I should like to know why. Incidentally, I am very glad to see that this year a principal Roman Catholic chaplain has been appointed. There does not appear to have been one before.
I also want to know why the Chief Staff Chaplain (C. of E.) and his two staff chaplains have had their salaries so very much reduced when already they were receiving much less than the Chaplain-General and the Deputy Chaplain-General whose salaries remain untouched. I hope we are not going to see the old Tory policy of cutting the smaller wages first extended to the realms of the Established Church. That would be most improper, and I hope we shall have some help from the right hon. Gentleman on that point.
On Vote 10, page 177, there is a rather mysterious item—"Pensions, gratuities, &c., to widows, &c.; the Relief Fund." It seems odd to me that pensions are paid by the War Office. I would have thought that pensions would be more appropriately paid by the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance. However, there may be some very good reason for these special pensions being paid by the War Office, and I should be very glad to hear it.
Under the heading of "the Relief Fund," we find this statement:
A sum of £1,250 is allowed annually to provide for small charitable grants to the immediate relatives of deceased regular officers who are not eligible for pension, but who have good claims on the public on account of the officers' services and their own pecuniary circumstances.
The operative words there are "small charitable grants." The charitable grants would be very small indeed, judging from that stated sum. I do not know among how many officers' wives or dependants that money is shared, but it seems a very paltry sum indeed. If pensions or special grants or gratuities are to be paid by the


War Office, I hope they will be worth while and not these paltry sums.
On Vote 9—" Appropriations in Aid" on page 173 there is a mysterious item called "Payments for the Loan of Troops for Film work." It is a great pity that any hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North-West (Mr. O'Brien) is not here. He is the expert on these matters. I do not know what this item means but, even if I did, I would not be much wiser because the amount of payments is not stated. I hope, therefore, that I shall get a little information on that point.
My last point is of a much more serious nature. It arises under Vote 8—" Works, Reconstruction and Maintenance Services." It concerns the conduct of the War Office with regard to people living in married quarters and I have in mind a particularly sad case. I have sent the details to the right hon. Gentleman and I know he must be making exhaustive inquiries because it is a difficult case and its more tragic aspects I do not intend to mention this morning.
It was the case of a lady married to a professional soldier who had honourably served for a number of years in the Army. She lived happily with her husband and three children on Army property in Essex until he was posted to the Far East. Arrangements were made for the wife and children to join the soldier in Singapore, which pleased her and pleased him and pleased the Army authorities because the family were vacating their married quarters and leaving them free for someone else.
Unfortunately, the soldier met his death in particularly sad circumstances and suddenly. The widow is in a most unhappy state; she has all sorts of grievous problems, but what seems to me to be a particularly callous thing was that she received word that within a short time she would have to leave her house. It looks at first sight as though the War Office was behaving like the worst type of agricultural landlord.
In a case of this nature surely the War Office could guarantee that this lady and her children should at least be allowed to remain in the Army property until such time as the local authority or some other had offered her suitably adequate accommodation? I hope that something will be done about this case. I am sure that other cases arise from time to time, and

the Army should not behave with such precipitous haste as to throw out on to the street persons whose husbands have rendered such great service to their country.

4.49 a.m.

Mr. Douglas Glover: After 13 hours in the House the first thing I want to say is "Thank you" not only to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War but to his predecessors and also to the permanent officials and generals and lesser officers and all ranks in the Army for the wonderful transformation which has been effected. When I left the Army, in 1946, we had a strength of 4 million. It had to be run down and then it had to change its role completely and now, nine years later, we have had the report which my right hon. Friend gave this afternoon. It shows that although there may be causes for complaint, we have a really efficient Army at the present time in spite of the difficulties under which people have had to work to produce that result. Irrespective of party we, as a nation, owe them a vote of thanks.
The hon. Member for Thurrock (Mr. Delargy) said that in his speech he would stick to the Army Estimates, but it is a very big subject which it is difficult to tie down. We have had speeches on foreign affairs, colonial affairs, religious affairs and on all the subjects one could think of. I shall try to keep strictly to Army matters and to speak mainly about the creation of a strategic reserve which has been mentioned so often in this debate.
That brings me to the subject of Suez, but I shall not say very much about it. I had hoped to be called to speak on the Amendment, but if I say too much about the Suez Canal Zone now I shall be out of order. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] We seem to have reached a stage after this debate where there is not more than a difference of 10,000 men between us. It has been said that we need a garrison of at least 10,000 so there is a surplus in the area at the moment of between 50,000 and 60,000 men. If my right hon. Friend is able to extract these troops from that area and he comes to considering the formation of a strategic reserve, might it not be worth dividing the two divisions that are in Suez between the Territorials?
The House will remember that in 1939 some Territorial divisions were thickened with Regular brigades. I understand that the strategic plan is to be able to mobilise Reserve or Territorial divisions in a matter of three or four weeks. It appears to me, knowing, as I do, the present position of the Territorial Army, that it would be quite impossible to do that unless that Army is stiffened with a strong Regular element. If we have two Regular divisions in the Canal Zone and if they could be divided among Territorial divisions it would mean that we should be able to produce four field force formations in a short time.
Another point on this question of a Reserve Army was mentioned by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Eye (Colonel Harrison), when he dealt with staffing. He referred to Regular staff officers. One type of training that one can do on a part-time basis is learning the rudiments of staff training and staff manipulation. I should like to see the opening for the Territorial Army of at least two non-residential staff colleges, one in London because it is the largest area of population and the other in Scotland, possibly in Glasgow, because Scotland has always had a reputation for producing good soldiers.
I believe that such a scheme, recruited on a Territorial engagement, if linked to the four years' cycle which the Secretary of State has mentioned, could provide the staffs that the Territorial divisions need. Those divisions only secure staffs when they concentrate because the War Office gathers from all over the country staff which would not be available in time of war. I suggest that these non-residential staff colleges should work on the basis that a man should join and do his training for three years on a three-year staff course, his training and syllabus being divided over nights, week-ends and fortnights as an ordinary Territorial officer and in his fourth year he should form the junior staff element for a T.A. division. If that system were worked for a number of years we would get over a difficulty in the number of junior and medium staff officers we have in the Army.
Having a very good knowledge of the problem, it appears to me that on the A and Q side any good junior business

executive has at his finger-tips the whole "know-how" of the problem, but not the Army "know-how." If, therefore, he can be trained in staff duties, his business knowledge will fill the other gaps. I hope that my right hon. Friend will give this matter some consideration. I do not think we can again allow to happen what happened in 1939 when every Territorial regiment and battalion lost a certain percentage of officers straight away to make up the divisional staffs. Those officers had no staff training and they took three to six months to become proficient in their duties.
If we could provide our staff element from the Territorial Army we would more quickly make available a complete division on mobilisation in case of war. I am sure that hon. Members on both sides of the House will realise that if there is another crisis, unless those divisions are able to mobilise as soon as the first warning is given, it will probably not be much use to mobilise at all.

Mr. Swingler: Is the hon. Member aware that ever since the war Parliament has been voting millions of pounds on this in the light of experience in that war and if the War Office has not a sufficient system for the call-up in case of emergency a really shocking scandal exists?

Mr. Glover: We have the Army Emergency Reserve and people in specialised and technical jobs doing their fortnight's training each year. I am open to correction, but I believe we still have not got a staff training scheme for non-Regular soldiers.

4.59 a.m.

Mr. Tom Driberg: I suppose this debate will come to an end
Before we go to Paradise by way of Kensal Green,
if I may quote correctly the poem which my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Mr. Delargy) quoted incorrectly in his entertaining speech. My hon. Friend usually heeds a little assistance with Roman Catholic quotations and we humble schismatics are glad to come to his aid.

Mr. M. Stewart: My hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) may remember one Roman Catholic, Hilaire Belloc, who said:


Any fool can get his quotations right who has a book of reference, but it takes a scholar to know so many quotations that he never gets any of them quite right.

Mr. Driberg: I am very much obliged to my hon. Friend for his reminding me of that; it is also the essence of scholarship to be able to empty one's mind of facts and figures and simply to know which reference-books to look at and where they are.
But to return to the Army Estimates. The hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer), in making a valuable point about education, said that when something or other he was describing went wrong, people did not always write to their M. Ps.; and he added that if they did, the matter could be put right. I quote this because towards the end of his extremely able speech yesterday afternoon, the Secretary of State for War said one thing which I rather regretted hearing him say. Perhaps he was speaking "off the cuff," but in talking about National Service men, and how some, naturally, do not like the Army very much, he said that, unfortunately, those who did not like it were the ones who wrote to M. Ps. I am sorry that he spoke in that vaguely disparaging way. Goodness knows, none of us wants any more letters than we already get, but hon. Members who have been in this House for a few years, and especially those who have been officers in the forces, become intuitively expert in sorting out the minority of "scroungers" and "line-shooters" among our correspondents.
I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman did not mean it in this way, but his remark did seem to lend some countenance to the constant pressure and false propaganda which is put across by some senior N.C. Os. and warrant officers in each of the three Services, that men have no right to write to their M. Ps., at any rate without permission. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, that is absolutely untrue. Every Service man or woman retains the citizen's absolute right to communicate with his or her M.P., and this right has been explicitly reiterated again and again by the Prime Minister, both during the war, and since, and by spokesmen of successive Governments. But there is this fallacy which dies hard in the Services and which is deliberately

perpetuated, quite wrongly, by some N.C. Os. and warrant officers.
If I am asked to justify my generalisation by quoting time and place, I say Catterick, 15th October, 1953. There was a new intake of National Service men: potential signalmen, I think these were. They were told that they had signed a form undertaking not to write to the Press or to their M. Ps. These young men had, indeed, to sign several forms, and in the general confusion of their first night at Catterick, of all awful places, while they were naturally rather dazed, they were told—I am not quite sure by whom—that they had signed a form of this sort. I have said I do not know by whom, but perhaps a "buzz"—to borrow an expression used by the Secretary of State in another context—went round. After the months which have elapsed, I do not know whether it is possible to investigate the incident, but I have given the date and the place.
Actually, the Secretary of State ought to be, and no doubt is, glad when perfectly serious and substantial letters of criticism, complaint or grievance come to him through Members of Parliament, because he does not want underground grievances festering in the Army. I have here two examples of the kind of useful information and reasonable criticism which comes to one in constituents' letters. When I have quoted them I think that the right hon. Gentleman will agree that they are not frivolous complaints, not altogether unimportant and, also, not curable by representations through the usual channels, which, of course, we all agree should be used first on Service matters when it is reasonably possible to do so.
The first of the examples I wish to quote is on the subject of further education. Quite an important contribution to our future efficiency and the productivity of our industry can be made by the preparatory training and education provided in the Services to qualify long-service men, who are about to leave the Army, to play their part in civilian life. Of course, it is a great pity if the money we vote to the right hon. Gentleman for this purpose is wasted by muddle and inefficiency.
The constituent who writes to me is a Regular soldier of long service. He is


qualifying for civilian life and studying for his B. Sc.(Econ.). He writes:
Repeated requests to the education sergeant in my unit as to the difference between the London and Cambridge syllibi for the General Certificate of Education eventually brought the answer that he could give me no information, as the district education staff had only the London syllabus: yet the Army G.C.E. exam, is run on the Cambridge syllabus.
That is a minor example of rather foolish muddle, but there is more in this letter. This constituent took part of his examination when he was overseas. Five months after he had taken the examination he still did not know the result. No word had reached him. He made inquiries at G.H.Q. and eventually managed to find out that he had passed in two of his three subjects. It was not until over a year after the examination that he was informed that in one of them he had passed only at the ordinary level instead of at the advanced level for which he had entered. This information came after he had made arrangements for the current year's study and when it was impossible to attend the further necessary lectures. He adds another rather interesting point in his letter:
A short course in one of my subjects was announced recently and I applied for a vacancy. I was informed that only officers might attend from my Command, although I am assured by the civilian organisation running the course that other ranks from another Army Command and from the R.A.F. are attending the same course.
Is that not rather foolish? I am not quoting this letter in full, although it is a well-stated and interesting letter, but I will quote one other point:
The education sergeant in this barracks is one of the most misemployed men I have ever come across in my Army career "—
that is probably saying quite a lot—
and appears to be given no opportunity of carrying out his proper task. For a considerable time he was employed as sergeant's mess caterer. The only lectures I have known him give were on military security and similar subjects, except for a few hole-on-the-corner lectures for sergeants, for which he had no class-room and had difficulty in getting his students made available. …
I think I have read enough from the letter to show—by the way, I accept the bona fides of the writer—that it casts quite an interesting and rather depressing light on one aspect of Army life and

Army education, at any rate in one command.
The other example that I wish to quote is a much smaller matter. It is an example of the kind of maddening stupidity—at any rate, at first sight; there may conceivably be a rational explanation for it, but I cannot imagine what it could be—that crops up in some units, at a low level; stupidity amounting perhaps almost to petty cruelty.
This constituent is not a Regular soldier, but a National Service man. He has been taking a driving course with No. 3 Driving Training Company, R.A.S.C, Farnborough. He tells me that one of the routine training exercises on this course included draining the sump of the vehicle en route—without pit or ramp, of course—while dressed in battle-dress, and, on occasion, greatcoat, and without overalls. Crawling under the vehicle to do that job obviously makes one's uniform or greatcoat filthy with oil as well as mud. That happens constantly.
After this exercise there is a parade, and those whose greatcoats or uniforms are found to be oil-stained are told that the clothing must be cleaned and that each soldier will be required to pay for the cleaning. On one occasion, at any rate, some of those concerned protested that they could not afford to have their uniforms cleaned, for they had to be sent to a commercial dry-cleaner's; they were told that a sum for cleaning would be deducted from their next pay.
A parade of so-called "offenders" was then held, and the men were marched to a civilian cleaning establishment not far from the camp, where each had to leave his oil-stained clothing; each then had to pay for the work done by the civilian firm. The charge for cleaning an overcoat was 6s. 6d. and there was a similar charge for a battledress.
Is this usual in similar circumstances? I do not know whether the Undersecretary can give me an answer now or not. I will let him have all the particulars, although I have already identified the unit. It ought surely to be possible to issue the men with non-inflammable cleaning spirit, or allow them to buy their own, so that they could do their own cleaning, which would be much more economical. I do


not see why they should have to subsidise civilian firms in this way.
One of my constituents could not write to me this week because, poor chap, he was killed in Germany last Sunday. He was a trooper in the Royal Hussars. I ascertained from the War Office last night that he is being buried today in Germany. Yet, up till Wednesday night, apart from the original sad telegram notifying them of their bereavement, his parents had not received one word about the funeral arrangements or what was happening to his body. This seems to be quite wrong.
He is, as I say, being buried today. I rather hesitate over the suggestion that I am about to make, but it was, after all, the Army's responsibility to communicate with the parents about the funeral arrangements in good time to enable them, if they wished to do so— and could afford to do so, I suppose— to go to the funeral. I am, indeed, informed by the War Office by telephone that it was the commanding officer's responsibility to communicate with the parents. It is very strange that he did not do it. I hesitate to suggest this, but the really imaginative thing for the right hon. Gentleman to do, to make up in some small degree to the bereaved parents for the anxiety and ordeal they have had, would be to send a car this morning to Coggeshall, in Essex, take them to an airport, and fly them to Germany, sending a signal in advance to make sure that the funeral is delayed until they get there. I hope he will do this, but I shall understand if he cannot, although it would be the imaginative thing to do.
Individual human responsibilities and what may be called domestic public relations of this kind ought never to be ignored in the great military machine. Cumulatively, neglect of them is a tremendous disincentive to recruitment, and to men signing on again. Conversely, humane treatment earns enormous, perhaps disproportionately enormous, good will for the Army.

Mr. Swingler: The example which my hon. Friend is quoting is something which impresses the House, because in recent years we did pride ourselves in making progress at the War Office in the human approach to these cases. On what date were the details communicated to the

War Office to give them an opportunity of telling others? What was the lapse of time?

Mr. Driberg: I personally have never found the War Office lacking in humanity when such compassionate cases are brought to their notice. On the contrary, they act quickly. Where there has been apparent callousness it has usually been because of some slip-up or foolishness or misunderstanding at a lower level.
In this particular case it has all been rather hurried. The death occurred on Sunday last. The telegram reached the parents on Sunday evening or Monday morning. By Wednesday night they had had no news about the funeral, so they wrote to me. I received their letter on Thursday and telephoned to the War Office. The War Office told me that it was the responsibility of the commanding officer to have let them know. He should have done so. Of course, the War Office have not had much time to investigate the matter at all, and that is why it is necessary to put it directly across the Floor of the House to the right hon. Gentleman or the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Under Secretary in the hope that one of them may take some action such as I have suggested.
I entirely agree about the distinct improvement in modern times in the handling of these difficult personal problems by the War Office. I am not suggesting that there was callousness here, but I am emphasising the need for constant, scrupulous attention and vigilance by all responsible people at all levels. When I recall how at the very front, during the Second World War and in Korea, one used to see officers sitting night after night until a late hour engaged on the painful and tragic task of writing letters of condolence, I cannot understand how in this case—unless there was some slip-up in communications—this elementary duty was overlooked when one man had been killed, by accident, in peacetime.
As I have referred to one accident, may I here refer also to a matter which I raised during the debates on the Air and Navy Estimates? I hope I shall be able to get assurances from the right hon. Gentleman or the hon. Gentleman as satisfactory as those which I received from the Under Secretary of State for Air


and the Admiralty spokesman. Recently, a Essex sea cadet was accidentally killed by an obsolete rifle. I should like an assurance, similar to that which I received from the other Service Departments, that these obsolete American rifles, which came here under Lend-Lease and have not been properly checked or proofed for years, are not being used any more since that accident, and that special care is being taken to make sure that all firearms used in the Army Cadet Force are not only efficient, but safe.
I turn to another major matter. The Secretary of State has himself spoken more strongly than anyone else of the terrible, obsolete conditions in so many Army barracks. One thinks of Catterick where, as he has said, a number of men are living in huts which were built as temporary huts before 1914. One thinks, too, of the ironic contrast between the glittering panoply of the Household Cavalry and the damp squalor in which they are housed at Combermere Barracks, Windsor, which the right hon. Gentleman knows well. This aspect of War Office administration is no credit to any of us, through no fault of the right hon. Gentleman.
I do not expect answers about these matters tonight, for I have Questions about them on the Order Paper for answer in a few weeks' time. I merely seize this opportunity of emphasising once again the extraordinarily bad condition of many of these barracks, including, in particular, those which I have mentioned. I especially stress the appalling conditions in what I may call the overflow at Windsor—the Imperial Service College.

Mr. Head: We have started on that.

Mr. Driberg: I am very glad to hear it. I hope, incidentally, that the right hon. Gentleman will try to save the very fine old trees there, but if it is necessary that the fine old trees should be cut down, then it is better so if it means that we shall get decent modern accommodation for the men of the Household Cavalry when they are at Windsor.
There is also the extraordinary and, presumably, wasteful business of hundreds of expensive vehicles standing out in a morass of mud all through the winter in

the misty, damp climate of the Thames Valley. Some protection should be provided for them and for all such valuable equipment.
I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman or the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke) can confirm what I was told by one officer in Comber-mere barracks—that even in the officers' mess, or perhaps I should say most of all in the officers' mess, they can get an occasional lick of paint, every year or two, only by inviting the Queen to a dance. Even then they have the flowers banked high and the lights turned dim so that Her Majesty will not notice the damp stains on the walls. If it is like that in the officers' mess, it is even worse and more sordid in many other parts of the barracks.
It may be that some of my hon. Friends disapprove of diverting money, materials and labour from housing as it is usually defined to the building of barracks and military married quarters; but, of course, in its way this is also housing, and soldiers' wives and families have just as much right to decent accommodation and decent conditions as have civilians. Until the date—I am afraid the distant date— when all armed forces can be disbanded, I fear that we must continue to rebuild barracks and married quarters. Nobody would wish them to be squalid and inefficient.
The next point I wish to make concerns ex-prisoners-of-war home from Korea. On 23rd February I questioned the right hon. Gentleman about one aspect of their welfare, with particular reference to the possibility of paying them retrospectively the ration allowance to which, it might be argued, they are entitled. I am emboldened in my view by reading the definition of ration allowance in the Army Estimates, on page 131:
Ration allowance based on retail prices is issued to personnel who are entitled to rations, and to whom no ration in kind is issued.
I maintained that these prisoners of war in North Korea were certainly entitled to rations, for they remained on the strength throughout the period of their imprisonment; yet, for obvious reasons, no rations could be issued to them by the Army. When I asked the Secretary of State if he would authorise the retrospective


issue of the allowance in lieu of rations he simply replied: "No, sir." I thought that when he came to answer my supplementary question he did seem a little uncomfortable and, for him, surprisingly evasive; he usually deals with us very directly at Question time.
I asked him to bear in mind two particular points: first, that these men did not receive Red Cross parcels, which are to some extent a substitute for ordinary rations in most modern wars; and, secondly—a minor, technical point—that this House did presumably vote the right hon. Gentleman and his predecessors the money to pay for their meals throughout the last three or four years. I do not remember seeing in any previous edition of the Estimates any news that the catering services were costing less because so many thousands of prisoners were no longer drawing rations. The right hon. Gentleman replied to this:
No, these Regulations have always been the same for prisoners, and when these men returned they were given 35 days' leave with double ration-cards.
That is not really quite the point. He added, and, of course, this is really the point:
I do not think I could take this exceptional step.
Then my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) helpfully put in another supplementary question, saying:
But surely the Minister has misunderstood the point. The Regulations lay down that a man's rations follow his pay; that he is entitled either to rations or ration allowance. If these men were not fed and went through months of starvation, surely it is only common decency to give them the ration allowance."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd February, 1954, Vol. 524, c. 180.]
By saying "months of starvation" my hon. Friend offered a slight loophole, of which the Secretary of State naturally took full advantage, because, in fact, although food and conditions were extremely bad in the early months of their captivity, in the later months and years, especially when they came under the control of the Chinese, they were treated on the whole, reasonably well and were given such food as was available.
I do not think it could compare with our British Army standard of rations. It was rice and odd pickings—the sort of thing that North Koreans and Chinese, people accustomed to a very low Asian standard of living, do eat. Although I

do not quite accept my hon. and gallant Friend's statement that they were practically starved, these men certainly were not fed during their years of captivity up the standard they should and would have been having under the Army Estimates.
The right hon. Gentleman went on to say—I think inaccurately—that
the North Koreans subscribed to the Geneva Convention.
They announced at the beginning of the war that they would abide by the principle of the Convention, so far as they could; but they did not actually subscribe to it. Of course, in the circumstances of that war, it may not have been altogether easy. There may have been all sorts of difficulties. At any rate, as the right hon. Gentleman went on to say, quite frankly:
… there have been cases in which the diet of prisoners has been adequate.
Then he said:
To institute what has been suggested would constitute a difficult precedent."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd February, 1954; Vol. 524, c. 180–1.]
But, of course, difficult precedents are meant to be tried by bold Ministers. If the Treasury is digging in its heels and saying, "Oh, no, this would really open all sorts of doors," to use one of the favourite Treasury clichés or metaphors, or "This would be administratively inconvenient," I hope that if the right hon. Gentleman thinks there is some intrinsic merit in the suggestion, he would not be put off merely by administrative inconvenience or by fear of creating a precedent or by opening doors which the Treasury might not like opened.

Mr. Swingler: It is important to get this matter clear. Is my hon. Friend suggesting that every soldier taken into captivity should be entitled to ration allowance in lieu of rations, or simply that, owing to the peculiar circumstances of the Korean War, a precedent should be set in that case? Clearly, there is some difference, especially when we look at the circumstances of the Second World War. If he is asking that every soldier taken prisoner should be entitled to ration allowances in lieu of rations, that will involve a great deal.

Mr. Driberg: At the moment I am dealing only with the Korean War. I am trying to deal with it as a special case,


partly because it was not a war in which the Red Cross operated in the usual way in which the Red Cross does in modern wars, when they are between nations who are really subscribing to the Geneva Convention. I certainly think that it can be argued that this was a special case and that in lieu of the rations which they should have had from the Army, it is not altogether unreasonable to ask now that there should be some retrospective grant of this modest sum.
As I am on the question of Korea I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he can yet make any statement about a subject on which, I think, nothing publicly has yet been said by the Government, and that is the very difficult question of indoctrination in the prison camps. Can he say whether any action is being taken against prisoners who did to some extent, to a greater or a lesser degree, collaborate with their captors?
I know from ex-prisoners whom I know personally—there have also been statements in the papers—that the War Office has recently been making investigations and taking statements from ex-prisoners about the conduct of some of their fellow-prisoners. There might, I suppose, be something to be said for action against prisoners who have actually betrayed their own comrades to their captors or something like that; but I am inclined to think that the right hon. Gentleman will find insuperable difficulties in his way if he tries, in general, to institute any kind of prosecutions or courts-martial for collaboration in this very peculiar war, which is, I suppose, the first war—it only just started in the Second World War—in which elaborate indoctrination has been tried out by a captor power.
It would be hopelessly unfair, and the Minister would find it very difficult, to draw the line between partial collaboration and complete collaboration. I do not know whether he wants to say anything about it yet. If he does, I hope very much that he will tell us that he is not proposing to institute proceedings or courts-martial in respect of this business.
One very small point, as I am referring to the Far East: Can the hon. Gentleman tell me whether it is still true, as it was the last time that I was in Malaya, that in the Gurkhas

they have to pay United Kingdom Income Tax? It seems very odd. It may be, of course, that it is only the British officers who have to pay it, but even if they do I am not quite sure why they should. If they have no families living in England, and if they are out there for years and years on end, it seems a little unfair that they should have to pay Income Tax at United Kingdom level.
However, there may be something to be said for the officers paying it; but if it were to apply to other ranks—supposing their pay were high enough to qualify for Income Tax at all—then it would be completely unfair, because their homes are in Nepal.

Mr. Wigg: It is a fact that in the postwar years officers serving with colonial forces now pay British Income Tax, whereas before the war they did not.

Mr. Head: Quite recently we made special arrangements whereby the Malay Regiment and the Gurkha Regiment pay the local rate of tax.

Mr. Driberg: I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention.
The last point that 1 want to make is on the question of Cyprus. The hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely had a very interesting passage in his speech, in which he urged some caution before we decide to jump into Cyprus if and when the time comes to jump out of Suez. He advanced various reasons for that, and I interrupted him to point out that we might there also be faced with the difficulty of a hostile local population if the already substantial campaign for Enosis does proceed further.
I can quite envisage that a few years hence, if there are really large British forces in the Island of Cyprus, there might be considerable resentment locally if nothing had been done to meet this popular clamour for union with Greece. I do not want to go into the foreign affairs side of it at all, but, as the hon. and gallant Member showed in his speech, it does have a bearing on the future prospects of the Army.
The point I want to make about Cyprus may seem to most hon. Members a somewhat trivial one, but it does not seem unimportant to me. Cyprus is one of the


most beautiful islands in the Mediterranean and, indeed, in the whole British Commonwealth and Empire. It is beautiful both naturally and by reason of many priceless archaeological and architectural treasures, Byzantine, Gothic—buildings of all sorts of periods. I am just a little alarmed at what the Army may do to Cyprus if it is going in there in a really big way.
After all, when one looks around our own beautiful country—East Anglia or Essex—one still sees the devastation caused not by Hitler's bombs, but by our own Army and Air Force; one is appalled by the wreckage left behind by the Service Departments when they leave a site that they have occupied for some years. This can happen in our own land, under the very eyes and on the very doorsteps of all sorts of admirable busybody associations, the Council for the Preservation of Rural England and all the rest of them. So it is a little alarming to think what may happen in a comparatively remote island, where there are probably fewer people able to make any effective protest against the spoliation of the island and its matchless architectural treasures.
I see, for instance, that model towns are being built for the soldiers and air men, with shops, cinemas and every kind of modern convenience and civilised amenity. I am very glad to hear that, for the sake of the soldiers, with whose welfare we are chiefly concerned this morning; but I do hope that in doing all this the War Office will not ruin the appearance of the island. It would be ghastly if we had dumped down next to that exquisite row of, I think, sixth-century churches at Famagusta a kind of replica of Peacehaven, or Slough—

Mr. Wigg: Or Aldershot.

Mr. Driberg: —or Aldershot, as my hon. Friend says; or of one of the other hells on earth which western civilisation and capitalist prosperity and the speculative builders created in this green and pleasant land in the last century, and particularly in the last half-century.
Let me end by saying this: If we have to have a businessman's Government, if we have to have a Tory Government, if we have to go on having enormous defence expenditure, I think that the right hon. Gentleman is the best Secretary of State for War that we could have. It is

not, perhaps, saying very much, put in that way; but I do, nonetheless, mean it as a sincere compliment to him personally.

5.42 a.m.

Mr. E. Fernyhough: It is rather unfortunate that hon. Members on the Government benches are exhausted and that 1 have, therefore, to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg). It makes the debate much less interesting.
This week there has been a great campaign in the House for equal pay. It is a campaign which I support wholeheartedly, the principle being that men and women doing the same job of work should get the same rate of pay. I want that campaign extended. I want the principle extended to men who are doing the same job in the Amy, Navy and Air Force. I do not believe that there is any justification for two different rates of pay for two men doing identical jobs in any of the Services.
Although I might want to reduce every other Estimate, I would be prepared to have one increase relating to pay. The pay that the National Service man is getting is insufficient. I am sure that just as before the war we recruited our Army. Navy and Air Force largely from among the unemployed, who were driven to the Services through economic circumstances, likewise today, the Army is getting a substantial proportion of its Regulars as a result of economic pressure.

Mr. John Hall: Is it not true that throughout the years before the war, irrespective of the amount of unemployment in any one year, the number of recruits was more or less static each year?

Mr. Fernyhough: I can only give the experiences of boys who were my friends, boys of 18, 19 and 20 in North Staffordshire who lost their jobs and could not get others. After five weeks, and particularly after the means test was applied, the lad concerned would be living on his parents or on some other member of his family. So he joined up. Several of my friends were forced into the Forces by that experience. And I say that the Army today is getting a substantial proportion of its Regulars by the same economic pressure.
I am quite sure that when a boy is called up for the Army it decides, if he


lives in Glasgow, that the best place to send him is Penzance, and if he comes from London it sends him anywhere north of Edinburgh. What happens? [An HON. MEMBER: "He wants to see his ' mum.'"] The boy is anxious to get home at week-ends and he cannot afford the fare. So what does he do? He signs on for a further year in order to get the extra guinea a week so that he can get home. There are hundreds of lads who, every week, are demanding sacrifices from their parents because what they have at the end of the week after the customary stoppages from pay is not enough to allow them to get home, but they are so anxious to do so that their parents, who can ill afford it, are giving them 25s. or 30s. a week to get home.
I remember one case of a boy who was at Catterick and who wanted to go to his home in North Staffordshire. Every time he came home his parents had to pay part of his fare. I do not think it is a good thing that these young men— who are doing what any decent young man wants to do, go home when there is an opportunity—should be forced to sign on for a longer period to get the money which will enable him to do that.
I believe that to get the Regulars that are required all kinds of pressure is being brought to bear upon the National Service men. I have mentioned previously some of the methods adopted, though I believe they have now largely been dropped. However, I was talking to a number of National Service men last Sunday night and they told me that in Western Command an order has now been issued that no National Service man can be stationed nearer than 30 miles from his home. I do not think that this is the way we shall induce them to sign on for three years. It is a shocking thing that there should be discrimination in that respect, and it ought to be looked into.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison: Well, let us look into it now. Can the hon. Member say where he obtained this information? Was it a National Service man who said that no young man finds himself doing his service closer to his home than 30 miles? Is that what the hon. Member is saying?

Mr. Fernyhough: This must have applied to either Saighton, Blayton or Dale because those are the only camps in the area.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Did the hon. Member see a copy of the order?

Mr. Fernyhough: Of course I did not, but I am entitled to believe that man until he is proved to be untruthful, just as much as to believe the hon. and gallant Gentleman. Let the hon. and gallant Gentleman look up the OFFICIAL REPORT and see how we have proved in the past how various things are done. If these things are being done they should be brought to light so that the Minister may deal with them.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Did the hon. Member write to the Secretary of State?

Mr. Fernyhough: No.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: The hon. Member preferred to use the publicity of the House and get the headlines.

Mr. Driberg: A debate on the Army Estimates is a proper occasion to raise such a subject.

Mr. Fernyhough: All this happened a week last Sunday. If the hon. and gallant Member thinks that I ought not to raise this subject, why did he raise the subject of education? That, of course, was not for publicity. No Tory would ever think of doing anything that involved publicity. Tories are such modest and retiring men.
I want the Under-Secretary or the Minister to look into this matter and inquire whether this order has been issued in Western Command and whether it is now to be said that no National Service man henceforth will be stationed nearer than 30 miles to his home. I hope that the Minister will also see that Service lorries are available at the main line stations to meet Service men who are returning after 24 hours or 36 hours leave.
I should like the Minister to travel on the 2.5 a.m. train from Crewe to Chester on any Monday. It is absolutely packed with Service men and there is a mad rush for the two or three taxis that are available. How, in the name of fortune, somebody has not been injured by swinging doors when the men jump out of the train to rush for taxis I do not know.
There is nothing unreasonable in expecting that Army lorries should be at the station to take these boys back to their respective camps. The Air Force is able to provide these facilities. The soldiers have to pay taxi fares to get to the camps, otherwise they would have to walk six or eight miles. If it is raining or snowing, as it has been on the two or three occasions when I have travelled in that area, I can understand their wanting to take advantage of a taxi service.

Brigadier Clarke: We have heard a lot about "mum" paying her son's fare back, but how many free vouchers does a National Service man have in a year?

Mr. Fernyhough: Not enough. I think that he gets two. [HON. MEMBERS: "Four."] I still say that four are not enough. If a man is granted 36 hours' leave he should be given the fare to get home. If hon. Members opposite are to treat this matter flippantly, I would remind them that these are the boys from whom they hope to make the Regular Army. I do not believe they will get them in the numbers they would like because two world wars in one generation do not make people anxious to become part of the machine to be used in the third world war.
I also hope that the Minister will have a look at the reports which appeared in the Press last week about certain incidents at Catterick Camp. I am sure they must have been brought to the attention of the right hon. Gentleman. They told how non-commissioned officers were trying National Service men and how National Service men were issued with cracked cups and told after a few days there would be an inspection and the cups with which they were issued would not pass, so they had better buy new ones.
The reports said that the old cups were taken back and the same trick served on the next batch of National Service men. The report said that a collection was made by a group of National Service men for a sergeant who was supposed to be posted, but two or three more collections all went to the same man. No one knows whether the story is true, but it is in the interests of the Army that the Minister should make a denial of these things if they are not true.

Mr. Swingler: These things are illegal.

Mr. Fernyhough: Exactly, and they have received wide publicity. If public fears are to be allayed, it is necessary for an inquiry to be held. Another matter I wish to raise is the "Fiddle of the Phantom Army." For the benefit of the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer), who will want to know if I have raised this matter with the Minister, I will say that some time ago I tried to put a Question down, but could not get it past the Table. I advised the Table that I would save it as it would come in useful in the debate on the Army Estimates. This is what the report says:
Taxpayers swindled out of thousands to pay the phantom Army.
The giant fraud, the fiddle of the phantom Army has become uncovered after 10 months of investigation. War Office accountants believe that thousands have been paid from Army funds to 'dud' soldiers who exist only on the receipt forms of phantom units throughout the country.

Mr. John Hall: Where was that published?

Mr. Fernyhough: In a Conservative newspaper, the "Daily Sketch."

Mr. Hall: On what date?

Mr. Fernyhough: On 19th August, 1953.

Mr. Hall: Stale news.

Mr. Fernyhough: Yes, but we only have the Army Estimates once a year and the last debate we had on them was in March, 1953.

Mr. Head: As the hon. Member has produced that paper he would be interested to know that about the same date the same newspaper came out with a headline which said:
Army swindles in Germany cost the taxpayer £40 million.
I rang up the editor and, after inquiry, he admitted that there was not a word of truth in it, but that did not alter the headline, nor the harm it did to the Army.

Mr. Swingler: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether that was reported to the Press Council?

Mr. Head: I do not know what happened afterwards, but I had a letter of apology.

Mr. Fernyhough: I will not delay the Minister any longer on the point, but I do hope that he will look into the


matter because, if it is not true, it has not been denied, and people become concerned when they read such a story as that.
I now want to have a word on the question of conscription. The hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely said that speeches such as that made tonight by my hon. Friend the Member for Lady-wood (Mr. Yates), should not be made too often because they were undesirable and gave a false impression. But I would ask whether it would not be a good thing if speeches such as that could be made in every country in the world? If they were, would not our position be very different? And if it would be a good thing to make them in every country, it cannot be wrong.
I have never understood the attitude of most hon. Members on the other side of the House on this problem of conscription. If ever men attempt to force a non-trade unionist into a union, the Conservative party as a whole is outraged. Its members think that there is something wicked, something tyrannical, that men should compel one or two to join their ranks and become trade unionists. Let us also remember that when the Durham County Council decided that a few nonunion school teachers should join their trade union, the defenders of individual liberty on the other side of the House rose in a body to criticise that local authority.
But, surely, how much more infamous is it to compel young lads, who have not a vote, and who have had no say in the running of the country, and who in many cases do not want to go, to go into the Army. How much more infamous is that if we condemn, as some hon. Members opposite condemn, the closed shop and the attitude of the Durham County Council, and then force young men into the Army against their wishes and very often against the wishes of their parents.

Mr. Rees-Davies: Would the hon. Member not agree that there is only one thing which rises above the rights of the individual, and that is the right to serve the Queen and the nation?

Mr, Fernyhough: That is Conservative doctrine. That thought is on a par with the totalitarianism of Hitler or of

Stalin. That is the sort of thing they said. In Korea, the armistice was delayed for months because we insisted that it was against our morals, and against our principles, to send back to North Korea those Korean prisoners who did not want to go back. If it is wrong to send a Chinese prisoner where he does not want to go because he faces death— [HON. MEMBERS: "There is no comparison."] We said we would not send them back because they might face physical violence or even death. Are not our soldiers facing death in Malaya? Of course they are. They were compelled to go. They had no choice.

Mr. Dudley Williams: What faced the Chinese prisoners was a different form of death than might face the soldiers of this country. The form of death the Chinese faced was murder.

Mr. Fernyhough: A man is just as dead all the same.
I support up to the hilt the stand which the Foreign Secretary took on that issue. It would have been indefensible to do otherwise. But it does not strengthen our case for military conscription. It does not make it any easier for our lads to know that there is some difference between them and a Chinese or a North Korean prisoner.
Many of the young men in the forces know that conscription was brought about because of the danger of a war with Russia. But where do they find themselves? In Egypt, in Kenya, in Bermuda, in British Guiana, and maybe in British Honduras shortly. They do not understand how they are waging a struggle against Communism in those countries. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about Malaya? "] I did not mention Malaya. They do not understand how they are stopping Russians by killing Kikuyus. Their parents do not understand it either. These boys were conscripted to defend as they thought their own country and now they find themselves scattered all over the world.
These Estimates distress me. They are something we shall have with us for a long time. I hope that hon. Members will remember them when they are discussing other matters. Does anyone believe we shall be able to put into effect the road schemes for which hon. Members are agitating while we have Army


Estimates of this size? How is it possible to get on with schemes like the Severn and the Tyne tunnels and other desirable projects so long as defence Estimates are taking up so much of our resources?

Mr. Yates: Do not forget the hospitals and schools.

Mr. Fernyhough: It is an almost intolerable strain upon our economy and is making the nation poorer every year.

Mr. G. Thomas: Where will it end?

Mr. Fernyhough: I believe that the greatest danger to world peace is world poverty. Hungry men are angry men— [Interruption.] If the hon. Member opposite doubts that, let him stand on his feet and say so. Apparently he has not the courage to rise and repeal what he was muttering under his breath. He would not be in order, of course.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member should address his remarks to the Chair.

Mr. Fernyhough: I am anxious to keep in order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I am always anxious to keep on the right side of the Chair.
If hon. Members opposite do not believe that poverty makes any difference to men's outlook, it is obvious that they do not understand world history and the history of this country. Hungry men are angry men, and angry men are irresponsible men. While three-fifths of the world's population is living in poverty as it is doing today, all the Army, Navy and Air Estimates in the world will not give us the peace that we want.
I remember that during the 1926 General Strike Arthur Cook, the great miners' leader, when the coalowners and Mr. Baldwin's Government were appealing for industrial peace—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. The hon. Member is straying from the Estimates now.

Mr. Fernyhough: I am just giving an illustration, Mr. Deputy-Speaker.
Arthur Cook said that one could not grow the flower of peace in the garden of poverty. One certainly cannot grow the flower of international peace in a world in which three-fifths of the popu-

lation is hungry, because hunger will always drive men to revolt.
If we had spent in Kenya 10 or 20 years ago on desirable economic reforms the money that we are spending upon the Army now to suppress the Kikuyu, we should not have had the present trouble there. It is no use pretending that poverty has nothing to do with the struggle which is being waged there. It is no use pretending that hunger is not a substantial cause of the revolt. If we had spent on social reforms the money that we are spending—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. The hon. Member must really come nearer to the Estimate.

Mr. Fernyhough: If we had spent the money involved in the military method of subduing the Kikuyu upon the social and economic reforms which are required in Kenya, it would have been more wisely spent and would have given better results. That is true of many other parts of the world.
I now wish to say a word about the problem of the Suez Canal Zone, a matter which has been mentioned by practically every hon. Member who has spoken. I am not an expert, and cannot claim to be. I look at this matter as most ordinary people would. Let us take the case of the man who goes into lodgings. The agreement made when he goes in is alright, but there comes a time when the real owner of the house wants him to get out. It is true that he has a contract which is quite legal, but his position is made so unbearable and untenable that he may have to get out. Ultimately, we shall have to get out of the Suez Canal Zone.

Mr. Speaker: From the hon. Gentleman's last metaphor it appears that he is dealing with the Treaty between Egypt and this country. That is a matter for the Foreign Office, and not the Army Estimates.

Mr. Fernyhough: I am sorry that you have made that Ruling, Mr. Speaker. A harsher ruling has been applied to me than has been applied to many hon. Gentlemen to whom I have sat and listened throughout the night. I made notes of what was said. The Government should take a leaf out of the former


Government's book. We got out of India, and because we did that we lost 400 million enemies and gained 400 million friends. [Interruption.] That could apply in the case of Egypt. If one million people lost their lives how many would have been lost if we had tried to hold India?

Mr. Speaker: Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but that has nothing to do with the Army Estimates.

Mr. Fernyhough: I agree, Sir, but I have sat here so long and heard so many transgressions that I thought I would have my say. To come back to the Army Estimates, I questioned the Minister some time ago about the dumping of some thousands of tins of meat into the sea by the Army. I never heard anything more. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman has neither written to me, nor given me any information about the question I raised.

Mr. Head: As the hon. Gentleman is making these accusations to me, although I have not got the facts before me, I can say that he put down a Question on the Order Paper and I answered it. I said that these tins of meat had been dumped because they had been examined and had been found to be bad. He said that it was a waste of money, and I told him we were hoping to collect payment from the firm because the meat was bad. The 'hon. Gentleman never wrote to me. I think it unfair of him to come here and say what he has.

Mr. Fernyhough: The Secretary of State informed me that the War Office would take the matter up with the contractors, because the Department wanted reimbursing. I presumed that the Secretary of State would write to me. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why? "] Because I had raised the question. The meat had to be dumped because it was bad. The meat was ordered by the last Government, I know, but it was marked, "To be consumed before 1951." What were the brigadiers and generals responsible for those stocks doing to allow it to go bad? [An HON. MEMBER: "Making sandwiches."] It should have been consumed before it went bad.

Mr. Fisher: I am trying to follow the argument closely. The meat was marked,

"To be consumed before 1951." The hon. Gentleman's party was in power during that period, so that the fault lies on his side of the House.

Mr. Fernyhough: In 1951, I could not know that the meat would be dumped in 1953. It was dumped by this Ministry, and this Ministry was responsible at the time. If the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke) wishes to ask a question, I will gladly give way.

Brigadier Clarke: Would the hon. Gentleman not ascribe all this nonsense to six years of Socialism?

Mr. Fernyhough: I readily ascribe the nonsense which the hon. and gallant Gentleman talks in the House to the training he received while he was an hon. and gallant Member in the Army.

Mr. Baird: Was the War Office reimbursed? We have not yet discovered the answer to that.

Mr. Fernyhough: That is what I expected the right hon. Gentleman would tell me. It was the loss of public money which caused me concern. I was glad that he was taking the matter up with the contractors and I should be delighted to hear that he obtained reimbursement of the money from the contractors who supplied the meat. I understand that it was supplied by private enterprise.
I will conclude with this comment. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] If hon. Members are anxious to get their breakfasts, and if I thought that by speaking longer I could keep them from their breakfasts, I would continue, because everybody is now quite happy. My hon. Friends intend to continue the debate, so there is no need to think that the show is over when I sit down.
Is the size of the Estimates such as to guarantee peace, as is suggested? I do not believe that the present ideological struggle can be won by military methods. Today it is a battle for men's minds and men's souls.

Mr. Spencer Summers: The hon. Gentleman says the ideological struggle cannot be won by forces. Will he not agree that it might well be lost without them?

Mr. Femyhough: If I believed that we could beat Communism with bombs, or defeat bad ideas and wicked philosophies by force, I would go with the hon. Member all the way, but this is a battle for men's minds and souls and a way of life. I believe that if we place our values and principles before the world and allow the depressed parts of the world to share in them that I believe we can win this struggle. I am sorry we are doing so little along these lines, and I hope that next year more money and resources will be devoted to uplifting humanity and less to destroying it.

6.26 a.m.

Mr. George Wigg: When the Secretary of State addressed the House 14 hours ago, his speech contained a curious omission which many hon. Gentlemen were not aware of, although I am sure he is. When in opposition one of his theme songs was the building up of the colonial army. Time and again when we had debates the right hon. Gentleman was the spokesman for his party in demanding the build-up of these forces. He was forthright in his denunciation of the slackness of Labour Ministers.
When the right hon. Gentleman assumed office in 1952, he came to the House, on 10th March, and said:
I remember that when I sat on the other side of the House and the right hon. Member for Easington was the Minister I, and many of my colleagues exerted considerable pressure on him on the question of colonial manpower. I think it would be rather dodging on my part were I not to say a word on that subject, now that our roles have been reversed."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th March, 1952; Vol. 497, c. 1034.]
He went on to explain how three months of office had converted him from the nonsense which he talked in opposition.

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman is indulging in his old game of taking out the bits that suit him best. He is ignoring what I said last year about the striking increase in the colonial Forces.

Mr. Wigg: I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that I shall leave out nothing.
I have drawn attention to the fact that this year the right hon. Gentleman said nothing about the colonial forces at all, and I have put the House in possession of the fact that in opposition he advocated two things—more pay for the

Regular Army and building up the colonial forces. I then came to the speech which he made in 1952. Even then he wished to "dodge the column," although he had not the audacity to say nothing. A year later, he talked once again about the colonial forces, and the raising of 14 battalions. I interrupted him, and he replied:
I told the hon. Gentleman quite clearly that 14 of them have not yet been formed."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th March, 1953; Vol. 512, c. 862.]
An hon. Gentleman below the gangway has spoken about "catching the headlines." There is no one better at that than the right hon. Gentleman. But how many of the 14 battalions have been raised since he spoke a year ago? Will he answer now? He will not answer. So we have a pretty shrewd idea of what has happened.
We find the right hon. Gentleman, when in opposition, demanding a great colonial army. I do not know whether there are any of the right hon. Gentleman's supporters here who demanded this build-up to relieve and solve our manpower problems.

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman is enjoying himself. I do not blame him for that, but it is only fair to point out that when we were talking about these colonial forces absolutely nothing was being done to increase them. I say that that plan of the 14 battalions and the steps which we took were the first steps to increase colonial forces. If we had had as much success in getting right hon. Gentlemen opposite to do it earlier, we should have been very pleased with ourselves.

Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman speaks of what he has done to increase them.
I have a good memory, and 1 can turn up references fairly quickly. I look at the Estimates for 1952–53 and I see what were the figures for colonial forces in 1951–52. There were 65,500 men. I look at the Defence White Paper, paragraph 42, and I see that there are about 65,000 men in the Navy, Army and Air Force units of the colonial forces today. After three years of office the right hon. Gentleman has achieved nothing, yet he came to the House a year ago and, when I


pressed him, he said that 14 battalions were to be formed in this year. Now he has not got the honesty to answer the simple question, "How many of these 14 battalions have been formed since last year?"

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman will get the answer.

Mr. Wigg: Why did not the right hon. Gentleman make some reference in his speech to the fact that he had reached the manpower ceiling so far as colonial forces were concerned? This policy has gone bad on him, the reason being that the major shortage in the Army today is one of N.C. Os. and warrant officers. He has not got the junior officers, N.C. Os. or warrant officers to form the cadres round which he ought to build his colonial manpower.
The consequences of this shortage go far beyond the military consequences. My hon. Friend the Member for Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson) talked about the poverty in colonial areas. That is not the real trouble. It is only part of the trouble. The facts are that the Army, in the years between the wars, did far more for our Colonial Dependencies than the Colonial Office has done in all the years of its existence.
The Army took men who had never made any contact with civilisation. It taught them a great deal and put into minds and hearts aspirations which had always seemed far beyond them. It took hundreds of thousands of them from the bush and sent them to fight against the Italians and the Japs. When they came back, what they demanded was not to set up a revolutionary movement but to be given the opportunity to be like us. The Army taught them techniques and gave them ambition.
It is clear that we could have solved a great deal of our problem if at the end of the war we had had available a reserve of N.C. Os. and warrant officers to enable us to build up considerable colonial forces.

Mr. Head: I told the hon. Gentleman that he would get the answer. This is the position: I mentioned these 14 battalions, which I said were to be formed between 1953 and 1955. Of these, six have been formed in Malaya. Of the re-

maining eight, we are forming, between January and May, 1954, two and two-thirds; and a further four and one-third in the Federation of Malay States will be completed by September, 1955. There is one which has been deferred. That is the one in the West Indies. The total comes to one less than 14, which is 13.

Mr. Wigg: Can the right hon, Gentleman say how many have been formed now?

Mr. Head: I have told the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Wigg: I am sorry, but the right hon. Gentleman has not.

Mr. J. Johnson: May I inform my hon. Friend that I asked these very same questions five hours ago? I have been waiting all night to get the answer, and I am still waiting patiently now.

Mr. Wigg: I am glad if I have helped the hon. Gentleman to get a reply. We have not received an assurance that the 14 battalions about which the right hon. Gentleman spoke a year ago are anything more than still on the stocks. In any case, even if all the 14 were formed in the period to which he refers, it is still the fact that the ceiling of 65,000 has been reached, and that the right hon. Gentleman's dream of the expansion of the colonial forces has been abandoned.
So that has gone, but, even before that, we saw the abandonment of an even grander policy, although, apparently, a number of hon. Members opposite below the Gangway still do not realise it. In our discussion earlier tonight on Suez, some hon. Members spoke of Suez as a great Imperial lifeline, and a lot of other similar nonsense. Canada is looking to the United States, and Australia and New Zealand are looking in the same direction. The fact is that the Dominion Governments are not looking to this country any more, and the idea of a great concept of Commonwealth defence is just a dream. The Secretary of State for War has also put paid to the idea of a colonial army, and now we are left to our own resources, or rather, the Army of the right hon. Gentleman—an army of adolescents on the one hand, and of greybeards on the other.
Of course, some hon. Members are not very critical, or else they could not have been listening very carefully when the


right hon. Gentleman made his speech yesterday afternoon. What did he say when he tried to explain away why he introduced the three-year period of engagement in 1951? He said that he did it because the Royal Air Force had been very successful. The Royal Air Force, faced with a shortage of technicians and realising that two years was not long enough in which to learn the job, and wanting men for three years, varied its terms of engagement and took people in for three years and four years with the Reserve, and then exempted them from any part-time service.
On his own submission, the right hon. Gentleman shows that he is incompetent, because he fails to see what a world of difference there is between the Royal Air Force and the Army. The Royal Air Force is almost completely mobilised. It does not want vast numbers of reservists. It wants people for three years to meet its current commitments, and if war should come it would expand in a much smaller way, whereas the Army has a different job to do.
Every Secretary of State for War for the last 100 years has been faced with the problem of how to meet current commitments, and of how to expand the Army overnight. We could have done it in a variety of ways, but the right hon. Gentleman is very much like a pike on a cold day: if he sees anything shining, he has to go for it, even if it is only a hook. He has taken hook, line and sinker, and, as a result, we are now faced with a bill for £16½ million for pay and bounties. That figure is in addition to the right hon. Gentleman's salary, and in addition to past years, because a year ago, on 26th and 27th January, my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), who now lies asleep on the bench below the Gangway—

Mr. Crossman: Withdraw.

Mr. Wigg: Very well, not asleep, but only appearing to be.

Mr. Crossman: I should like to explain that I concentrate better with my feet up.

Mr. Wigg: Then my hon. Friend had better resume the horizontal if he sleeps better that way, and perhaps persuade the Secretary of State to do the same.
When we debated the Supplementary Estimates on 26th and 27th January last we

warned the Secretary of State of what was happening to his manpower; we warned him about the failure of his recruiting campaign. He let a year go by. When this party was in power every opportunity was taken by hon. Members opposite to abuse Ministers; "Too late," they said, "too little and too late." I am prepared to bet the right hon. Gentleman a shilling that in a year's time the manpower problem will be worse than it is now.
The answer to the problem is very easy to see, because the problem of recruiting is affecting all the three Services. The fact is that the disillusionment which is going to hit this country as a result of rearmament is going to put paid to the right hon. Gentleman's recruiting campaign.

Mr. Swingler: It has already started.

Mr. Wigg: Yes. The people of two generations cannot be asked to sacrifice themselves in order to overthrow German imperialism and then be asked to agree to restore it; the right hon. Gentleman cannot ask the sons of the women who lost their husbands in the first and second world wars and the sons of the men who were maimed and killed—[An HON. MEMBER: "Sloppy."] The hon. Gentleman may think it is sloppy, but we shall see. The decision on this point is not settled by the comments of hon. Members opposite. The solution to the manpower problem depends on the willingness of the young men to undertake Regular engagements, and they are not going to undertake them. The hon. Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher) told us of the lack of success of the Home Guard policy in his area. People are not going to join the Home Guard. After all, they can read. They know what has happened.
We are told in the Defence White Paper that the next war is going to open in a great blaze of atomic attack, and after that we are going to have the "broken-backed" period. The right hon. Gentleman talks as if that White Paper did not exist. But sooner or later the truth of the White Paper is going to penetrate. People are going to ask, if the next war is going to start off with this vast atomic attack, if there is to be widespread destruction and damage, why are vast sums not being spent on Civil Defence? Why is the right hon. Gentleman


not doing something about training National Service men in Civil Defence so that they can be of use to the Forces and of use in civil life when they come back?
There is a world of difference between what the Government say in their White Paper and what they do in practice. The right hon. Gentleman is a master at making the best of his case, leaving out what he does not want put in and then dressing up very attractively what remains. He talks about travel facilities costing £680,000 for 13,600 men. That is excellent for the 13,600, but what about the rest? What about the young National Service men who want to come home and who have no interest in sitting in the Suez Canal Zone? The 13,600 will find life a little easier, but that will not help the right hon. Gentleman with his manpower problem.
He is considering spending £16½ million on pay and bounties. There have been discussions behind closed doors, and the suggestion has been made that something was to be done. A number of men who were thinking of signing on have postponed doing so until they find out what is going to happen. If there is an announcement about the bounty they will sign on, and a few more perhaps will sign on, too. But ultimately the problem will be settled by the men themselves. As I have already said, my forecast is that a year hence we shall be as far away from a solution of this problem as we are now.
Now I want to talk to the House about another aspect of the Memorandum. It is all very well to form seven new battalions. It is all very well to talk about divisions. But would the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to tell us how many units in the Canal Zone are up to establishment? Would he also be good enough to tell us what per centage of our units in Germany are up to establishment? I ask that because if the figures we have been given today are correct, if there are three divisions in the Canal Zone, or if it is two divisions of the 16th Paratroop Brigade—

Mr. Crossman: Three divisions.

Mr. Wigg: —then some of those units must be at very low strength because, as I

understand it, the total number of troops in the Canal Zone is 80,000, from which the Royal Air Force personnel, amounting to 20,000, have to be deducted, which leaves 60,000, and from that 60,000 has to be deducted the figure of 10,000 Colonial troops, which brings the total to 50,000. If that figure of 50,000 is correct, and represents nearly three divisions, some of those regiments must be at a very low level.
Certainly that is true of the units in Germany. When some of my hon. Friends and myself went over to Germany last year the Northamptons were on exercises. We found that they were at such a low level that a draft of 60 men had to be brought in the night before the exercises to enable them to be undertaken. My guess is that the Army is so strained from one end of the world to the other that there is scarcely a unit that is anything like approaching its establishment.
During the course of the year we had some evidence of this when the troubles blew up in British Guiana, and Her Majesty's ceremonial guard had to be withdrawn from Balmoral to send it to that country. The Government said we must have peace through strength. The only thing they did not send there was the fire brigade—

Mr. Mikardo: That will be kept for Honduras.

Mr. Wigg: I presume what will happen will be that Bermuda will once again be evacuated and that our strategic reserve is now in Honduras. That piece of imbecility, we now know, was the result of the romantic thinking of the Prime Minister.
The fact is that this country is paying an enormous bill. Next year, with the Supplementary Estimate, it will be nearly £1,700 million. We have these young men in uniform and we are still a long way from security. What the country is doing—and I pray that it will wake up before it is too late—is what the French did after the First World War.
The French tried to buy security through building the Maginot Line, which crashed at the first blow. The British people, under the guidance of this Government, are trying to build up their Maginot Line, the Maginot Line of two years' compulsory National Service, and


we think that merely by having an enormous bill and keeping a tremendous number of men in uniform, and having two years' compulsory military service— far more than any of the original members of N.A.T.O.—we are buying security. Yet we are as far from security today as ever, because security can only be obtained by living militarily and economically inside our strength.

Mr. Crossman: That is the answer to hon. Gentlemen opposite.

Mr. Wigg: We have to live inside our manpower strength. This country is unable to afford the military adventures of Kenya and British Guiana. If it has the one, it cannot have the other, whether we like it or not. These illusions of grandeur belong to the paranoiac. They do not belong to the balanced, sensible view of the second half of the 20th century. Sooner or later, consciously, or taught by the hard logic of facts, we must face the truth that we cannot live beyond our strength.
Some hon. Members opposite, and even some of my hon. Friends, may ask why I agreed to a £4,700 million armaments programme during the Korean war at the beginning of 1951. I supported that expenditure and the increase in the period of National Service from 18 months to two years. I believed that we were right at that time. We were attempting to scale an unscaleable cliff but in doing that we were trying to convince those with whom the power of peace or war appeared to rest that if the worst came, cost what it might, this country would respond to the challenge in the same way that it had responded to challenges from the time of Napoleon to that of Hitler. But there is a great difference between making that sharp push over a limited period and trying to keep up appearances with the neighbours next door.
Historians may say that our effort from 1951 onward prevented a third world war, but now that that danger is past there is no possible excuse for the kind of programme that is involved in these Army Estimates. They have no contact with reality. We need at the War Office a second Haldane, an organiser who gets down to essentials, not a soldier, and least of all a Regular soldier. We need a man who will so

organise the Army and its system of call-up and mobilisation that it is in accordance with the needs of the times.
As a result of National Service we have built up a vast reserve force which will reach its maximum in about July of this year. If that reserve force is to play its part we must be able to put in five divisions to strengthen the 4⅓ divisions in Germany, not in a matter of weeks but in a matter of days. Let hon. Members consider where the Secretary of State for War has landed us in his anxiety to pursue policies that will produce quick results. He went in for a three years' service and no part-time training for his Regulars. His Regulars, on mobilisation, will be called up, but their military knowledge will be out of date. They have done three years' service but nothing since.
The hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) was absolutely right when, during the defence debate, he drew attention to the vital importance of training our Army Reserves. They must be men who can take their place in the Army and handle the most modem weapons in a matter of days.

Mr. Head: How would the hon. Member do it?

Mr. Wigg: I should have something like the base that we now have in Suez across the Channel. I should have the mobilisation carried out on the other side of the Channel.

Mr. Head: Of the Reserves?

Mr. Wigg: No. I should use exactly the same system as was used for the Regular Forces in 1914. The kit and equipment would already be in Germany. The men's reporting points would be in Germany. I should have it so arranged that it would be necessary only to fly the men into Germany from their place of assembly to the places where they would put on their kit.
Two years ago I spent six weeks in Israel, which has an even greater problem than we have here because in some parts of that country the distance from the Arab hills to the sea is only five miles. Mobilisation of the Israeli forces is a matter of minutes. A situation might arise in which a man, working on the farm or in the factory, might, within half an hour, have been called up and be


fighting. The Israeli mobilisation plan was based on a highly flexible system which produced the result that the men knew where to go, where to get their equipment and arms and where their place of assembly was.
Of course, that plan was not born of any great military theory, but it was born of the exigencies of the Israeli situation. There should be a study of that plan, of the mobilisation plans which were put into operation and of the Expeditionary Force. I believe that mobilisation depots based on Antwerp and places like that is the only way to plan. To assemble the men in this country and convey all the heavy equipment across is something which obviously cannot be done.

Mr. John Hall: Do I understand the hon. Member to say that he would have all the mobilisation equipment, stores, vehicles, guns and tanks, on the other side of the Channel?

Mr. Wigg: Yes.

Mr. Hall: And the hon. Member appreciates the amount of space which would be needed?

Mr. Wigg: I see no alternative. The right hon. Gentleman can put his movement people on to this. It is a question of train space and shipping space. If, in fact, we had to move all the equipment across, it would take a very considerable time. It is equally obvious that if all that was involved was flying of men over to the Continent, that would be a possibility. I suggest that the present method of giving priority of equipment to a selected number of divisions and giving no priority for training is wrong.
I said it a year ago and repeat it now; I would face political unpopularity by increasing the period of part-time service. I do not believe that a fortnight is enough and if it is enough, no time is given to the Regulars. We should decide on the time which is militarily necessary and not what is politically expedient. I want realism.

Mr. Fisher: As the hon. Member is keen on realism, could he explain how the training is to be done when the tanks and guns are in Germany and the men who have to use them are in England?

Mr. Wigg: AH the training of the four divisions would be done in Germany.
Last year I went with the hon. Member for Wycombe and saw the Territorials in training. Never in my life have I had a more depressing experience. Militarily it was not worth anything. They were "browned off" and were only there because they had to be. It was clear that it was not a mobilisation exercise. They assembled somewhere in Lancashire and were taken to Salisbury Plain. But, as soon as they got there, they were rationed and looked after by Regular troops. That is not an exercise at all. It may have been an excellent operation for the G3's in Southern Command. It got a few lines in "The Times" and the "Daily Telegraph" and found General Martin a job for a couple of days.

Mr. Hall: The hon. Member has not answered my question.

Mr. Wigg: The best training area in Europe is in Germany, and if we are going to call the men up for 15 days I would train them over there: I should carry out the whole of the exercise in Germany. After all, they have not all to be called up in the summer time, and there is no earthly reason why that vast area around Sennelager should not be used; why cannot the four divisions, by which the right hon. Gentleman lays so much store, be trained there? After all, the Germans started the war and they lost the war, and I see no reason why they should not pay for the exercise of our troops.

Mr. Hall: I understood that very shortly we should have to pay for our own troops in Germany.

Mr. Wigg: I have heard that, but I should very much like to know what the bill will be, and I say that it is utter nonsense that we should pay for our troops in Germany. The Germans ought to pay—or at least some of the cost: they should pay for our occupation troops, or for the training of these divisions. The Germans started the first world war, and the second; they started the "fun and games." and I do not see why they should not pay.
But in my animosity towards the Germans, let me not forget the right hon. Gentleman. He appears to have convinced a number of his own friends opposite that he has done a good job during the


past year, but to me the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Where do we find the proof about the right hon. Gentleman's tenure at the War Office? I suggest that one should have taken last year's Estimates and the right hon. Gentleman's speech and filed them away, and then brought them out a year hence to see what further damage he had done to the Regular Army.
One could do that with this year's Estimates, but then another year would be lost. We have lost a year on the 1953 Estimates, and it has cost £16 million. Some hon. Members opposite are full of praise for the right hon. Gentleman, but he is very expensive at £16 million a time, and there is no guarantee that we are going to get better results. So long as he, with his purely military background, is there, we shall never face up to this problem. The War Office, being what it is, and not counting moral courage among its attributes, gives him the sort of advice that he wants. There are brilliant paper schemes, but no more divisions to go into Europe.
I would ask the right hon. Gentleman how long he thinks that the four divisions to which he is giving priority would take from the time that the "balloon goes up" to the time when they would arrive on the Continent. Let him tell the House whether he thinks that when these divisions go they will be in a complete state to meet in combat what would probably be the best armour which the Russians could muster. If he can answer that question satisfactorily, then I shall be the first person to throw my hat in the air.

7.5 a.m.

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton: If tributes are to be paid to preceding speakers, I will pay mine to my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), who indicated in unanswerable fashion the disastrous situation facing the country and the state of our military unpreparedness to deal with any situation which might arise.
One of the things the Secretary of State said in his opening speech stuck in my mind. He told us that in the Army there are 180.000 Regulars compared with 214,000 National Service men. As a result of the activities of the right hon. Gentleman, we now have an Army in which the National Service men outnumber the Regular element. The gradual

decline in the number of long-service Regulars has had the disastrous result of excessively diluting the Army and has forced us to resort to the wasteful expedient of sending National Service men to the Middle East and the Far East.
That was not the intention when National Service was continued after the war. The whole idea was to provide a reserve for this country. It was never the intention that National Service men should be sent to do the work of the Regulars. In the period between 1945 and 1951, the right hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members opposite made all kinds of foolish statements about what they would do when they got to power. When the Secretary of State was twitted with some of the things he said, he was able to wriggle out of them by saying that the Korean war had introduced a new factor into the situation.
The views of the Conservative Party about the gradual decline in the numbers of Regular Service men and the sending of National Service men to the Middle East and the Far East will be found in the Conservative publication, "Britain Strong and Free." We must examine to what extent the pledge the party opposite made to the country just before they came to power has been fulfilled. We shall find that from 1951 until today the decline in the number of long-service Regulars has grown and the expedient of sending National Service men to the Middle East and the Far East is still being employed without achieving very satisfactory results.
In the Memorandum accompanying the Army Estimates there are figures giving the comparative strength of the Army in 1951, 1952 and 1953. The figure as at 31st December, 1953, represents a total strength of the active Army, men, women and boys, of 440,997. That includes 4,479 National Service male officers and 214,088 National Service men.
The Government will have to make up their minds whether we are getting real value for the expenditure that we are incurring by calling up young men for National Service for a period of two years. I saw some figures the other day which indicated that the cost of maintaining a soldier in the Army is about £400 per year.

Mr. Swingler: It is more than £500.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I would rather under-estimate the figure than overestimate it, for that reinforces my argument. If there are at present 214,000 National Service men—the bulk of them are just aching for the day when their two-year period of service ends—the cost of keeping them in the Army is about £85 million per annum on the basis of £400 per man.
I am convinced that a little mental exercise would enable us to get better value for the £85 million. If we cut down the number of National Service men by 100,000 and spent twice as much on the remainder in order to persuade them to remain in the Army longer, we should be getting very much better value from them than we are getting from the present 200,000 who are not in the slightest degree interested in the Army and are simply pining for the day of their release.
The Government have not considered as carefully as they ought to have done the social and economic effects of the continuation of the two-year period. It has had all kinds of undesirable social and economic effects which have to be balanced against the other demands which are made upon our manpower.
A lad of 17 was charged at Bromley Magistrates' Court the other day with being found drunk and incapable. He was employed as a plasterer's tacker. The probation officer revealed that the lad had been on probation for two years and that he had been concerned about the lad during that time because he was earning about £18 per week erecting plasterboard ceilings. By reason of economic factors into which it would be out of order for me to delve too deeply, the 17-year-old lad was drawing the equivalent of the pay and allowances of a married captain in the Army. What use will a man like that be when at 18 he is called into the Army to do his National Service and receives the pay and allowances of a National Service man? My forecast is that he will be useless.
There is also the other extreme, of the young fellows from 15 to 18, who drift endlessly from job to job. I have had many cases among my constituents. They have difficulty in finding worthwhile jobs because employers know that

at the age of 18 these lads will disappear into the Army to do their National Service and are not likely to come back. So a lad will drift from one job to another, and one gets episodes of vandalism in clubland, similar to the one at Camberwell recently. The head of the particular club, Mr. Butterworth, expressed the opinion that this was a deplorable piece of vandalism, and put peace-time conscription high among the causes, because when a boy reaches the age of 16 he says, "What does it matter, I have to go into the forces?"
I know that that will not prove palatable to some hon. Gentlemen, or to those who think that in any circumstances it is not fair to attribute juvenile delinquency to conscription, or to unite it with the lowering of moral standards which have been noticed by social workers, but which in the opinion of some cannot be attributed to the continuation of compulsory National Service in peace-time. We in this country are making the heaviest and most burdensome contribution to defence of all the countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation by continuing a two-year period of National Service longer than any country in the Commonwealth or in N.A.T.O.

Mr. Swingler: Would my hon. and gallant Friend not draw attention to the moral effect of conscription which has been mentioned in correspondence in "The Times" by very distinguished members of the Upper House, in which particular attention has been put on juvenile delinquency? I am sure we ought to devote our attention to that aspect.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I am aware that more authoritative persons share the view I am expressing, but as time is getting short I have not had an opportunity of weighing up all the evidence of witnesses who can be stated to be in support of the argument I am seeking to adduce.
In the Memorandum which accompanied the Estimates last year, we were given some information about courses for illiterates. There is no reference to those in this year's Memorandum, except in paragraph 145, where there is a bald statement that educational activities continue on the same lines. I hope they do.


I should like to have some more information from the Under-Secretary on that point. Last year we were informed that there were five preliminary educational centres in the United Kingdom at which about 1,400 recruits a year were given instruction. These 1,400 men, who otherwise would have been rejected, are being raised to a standard of education which will enable them to be accepted into the Regular Army. Whatever may be the causes of this illiteracy or near-illiteracy, the Army education authorities are doing an excellent job in seeking to tackle the problem. As a result, they are making these men not only better soldiers but also better citizens. I hope the Undersecretary will be able to assure us that this useful activity is being continued and that it will be developed while the need for it exists.
I was particularly interested in the comments of several hon. Members opposite who said we needed more staff officers. The hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Colonel Harrison) expressed that view, and one of his reasons was the need for some counterpoise to or supervision of the new German divisions which we have agreed may be formed.
It strikes me as odd that the prospect of acquiring 12 German divisions to strengthen the European Defence Community should be regarded as a reason for increasing the number of our staff officers or for raising additional forces to act as a counterproise to the German contribution. This is not mentioned in the Estimates, but it is relevant: when the Government agreed that the Germans should contribute 12 divisions to European defence, other consequences inevitably followed. In my view, the European Defence Community will never come into being unless this country is prepared to join it. That will be an essential pre-requsite before France and possibly other countries will pull their full weight.

Mr. Swingler: Where does my hon. and gallant Friend get the figure of 12 divisions? It has been stated from Germany that they intend to raise at least 15 divisions, six to be Panzer divisions.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: That may well be. From the West German point of view 12 divisions probably represent merely a token force by comparison with what they would like to produce and are

capable of producing. My hon. Friend's argument cuts both ways, because if they produce 15 to 20 divisions it may well be that we shall have to have more staff officers and a stronger contribution from this country and other Western countries to act as the counterpoise to which the Prime Minister has referred as essential in the present circumstances. If the Government mean business for Western defence, what they must say is how many ships, how many divisions, how many aircraft we intend to place under the command of the European Defence Community and what part we shall take in that command. That is a very apposite question which will have to be answered, and which may well have an interesting effect upon these Estimates.
Other hon. Gentlemen have been trying to find out for some time about the possible cost of our occupation forces in Germany. But their efforts so far have been unsuccessful. The only certain prognostication I can make is that when the time comes on 30th June, 1954; or some other date in the period we are now discussing, figures will emerge which are going to knock these Estimates sideways. It is no use trying to ride off on that issue, because the Under-Secretary knows as well as anyone that at some time or another there will be a very substantial addition to the expenses that this country-will have to undertake. Various figures have been quoted. I have seen figures up to £120 million. I do not know what the figure is. I do not know whether the Under-Secretary knows. Perhaps no one knows; but there is certainly going to be a figure which will have a very unsatisfactory effect upon the financial equilibrium of the country.
For some time I have been trying to find out about various constructions that have been going on at a place called München Gladbach in Germany, and it was with very great pleasure I saw some reference to this in paragraph 71 of the Memorandum. It is worth looking at, because it announces this for the first time, although I have asked questions on previous occasions and have had evasive replies. It states:
The new joint headquarters for the commanders of the naval, land and air forces is making remarkable progress. It is intended to move into the new location in the late summer. This will permit the evacuation of large numbers of requisitioned premises in other parts of Germany. The project will on


completion provide a satisfactory scale of amenity and there is every reason to be satisfied with the numbers, design and furnishing of the married quarters we are building, within the limits of size imposed by the need for economy.
It appears that at this place west of the Rhine we are building married quarters, but I would remind the Undersecretary that he gave me some peculiar replies when I tried to find out about it. A year ago when we were debating the Supplementary Estimates I drew attention to the fact that it had come to my knowledge that a new headquarters for B.A.O.R. was being constructed at a cost of some £12½ million. On 9th December, 1952, I tried to find out from the Secretary of State for War to what extent the cost of this particular job was going to fall on the British taxpayer, and the answer I got was:
That is dependent upon a certain number of factors into which I cannot go now."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th December, 1952; Vol. 509, c. 220.]
It looks as though these various mysterious factors have been gone into to some extent by someone, otherwise we should not have had this paragraph in the Memorandum accompanying the Estimates. This headquarters is to provide quarters for anything up to 8,000 people, so it will be an extensive sort of place. The figure I had when I raised the question in 1953 was £2 million. That is not the whole story, because the Under-Secretary endeavoured to answer when he wound up the debate on the Supplementary Estimate. He said:
The answer to his question is very simple. It is that we are not at present paying anything at all, but that the cost is being borne at present entirely by the West German Government. That is why he has heard so little about it."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th January, 1953; Vol. 510, c. 973.]
I hope that we shall hear a little bit more about it, because it is referred to in the Memorandum. I should like to be directed to the appropriate item in the Estimates, if it appears there, or to the figures within which this transaction has been buried for the time being. It is now time for the whole business to come to light and for us to be given some information about it. I hope that that information will be forthcoming.
I turn to another topic in which I think that reorganisation is required and in

which considerable economies could be effected. I refer to the medical services. I appreciate that special medical services have to be provided outside this country, but even there arrangements can be made, and are, I believe, being made, which would make it unnecessary for the Service Departments to construct entirely new hospitals of their own.
I see that, according to paragraph 40 of the Defence White Paper, there is a statement which is confirmed by paragraph 98 of the Memorandum. It is that a Committee has been set up to go into this problem. The reason for the difficulty is the shortage:
of regular medical officers and particularly of specialists and surgeons …
In the view of the authorities, that has presented a most difficult problem. We are now told that:
Lord Waverley"—
that gentleman always willing to accept the chairmanship of committees—
has generously accepted the chairmanship of a committee to review the arrangements for providing medical and dental services for the Armed Services at home and abroad, in peace and war.
The point I should like to make is that— [Interruption.] I am sorry if I awakened an hon. Member opposite. If I did, I apologise to him. He may now relapse into his slumbers and leave the rest of the world in peace. The point I wish to make is that the National Health Ser vice at home is capable of providing all the medical and surgical treatment of which troops stationed at home may find themselves in need. It is quite unnecessary, so far as troops stationed at home are concerned, to have separate military hospitals, R.A.M.C. officers and the whole paraphernalia of a separate hospital organisation. To a certain extent, it is even unnecessary to have such an arrangement abroad, and I was very pleased to see that the Service authorities—

Mr. Baird: On a point of order. This is a very important subject, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and there is no Government spokesman at all on the Treasury Bench. Could we move to report Progress until one arrives?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): We do not report Progress in the House, and an hon. Member is in the middle of a speech.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Then I shall have to do the best I can. I should like to thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, but I do not think it makes very much difference whether Government representatives are present or not. They might just as well go home and allow the Opposition to give expression to the needs of the situation and to discuss the problems involved in the statesmanlike manner expected of hon. Members on this side of the House. Therefore, I make no objection. However, I am glad to see that the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has come in. I only wish he had done so a little earlier.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Anthony Nutting): I was here.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: There is evidently a muster of forces taking place, and I apologise to the Joint Under-Secretary, who I know has a difficult time. Perhaps the Prime Minister himself will turn up in a minute, and then indeed we shall be a happy family party.
To return to the question of the Hertford British Hospital in Paris, about which I asked a Question a few weeks ago, because I had reason to believe— I am indeed flattered that the Secretary of State for War himself has arrived.

Mr. Ede: The eternal triangle.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I heard that negotiations of some kind were taking place with the committee of management of the Hertford British Hospital in Paris. The hospital has been going through a difficult time. It received an offer from Sir Bernard Docker, which it refused, and it has found itself in a situation of some financial embarrassment.
Here, I think, the Service Departments have been wise. I do not know to what extent hospital accommodation is required for British Service personnel in Paris, but if such accommodation and treatment is required in that city for our men, then, of course, much the more sensible thing to do is not to build another military hospital of our own, but to make use of existing services.
According to the answer I received from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, it will cost about £100,000 to put this hospital in order.

The committee of management is to contribute £20,000, and the Service Departments, presumably, will find the other £80,000. As a result, certain beds will be available to Service men, and a small allocation of beds will continue to be available to British civilians residing in Paris.
I shall be glad if the Under-Secretary of State for War can say, if not today, then at some future date, how many beds are going to be made available to British Service personnel as a result of this expenditure of £80,000, which, I am quite sure, is far less than it would cost to build a British military hospital in Paris. I understand that the French Government are also placing at our disposal a small section of a French hospital at Fontainebleau for the use of British Service personnel. It looks at if we are going to save some money at any rate by not constructing a new hospital. I see that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence has now arrived. We now have almost the whole bag of tricks here—and what a bag of tricks they are.
The point I am making is this. What is good for us in Paris is good for us in this country. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] That remark appears to have been received by hon. Members opposite with approbation. It is probably the first thing I have said which has received their approval. The same principle could well be applied here in this country, and the cost of the Army medical services considerably reduced by making use of the facilities available to the general body of citizens under the National Health Service scheme.
We heard an eloquent speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) about the moral care and welfare of young men in the Forces. It is quite true that when parents read about certain things they have a right to be anxious about the welfare of their young lads of 18 who are taken away from home and placed in other surroundings for two years.
In that connection, I suggest to the War Office that it should exercise some better care in the kind of books which are apparently distributed through the N.A.A.F.I. organisation to Service men— books which, in the opinion of some people, are obscene and which should not be circulated through official channels to


the young men serving in the Army today. We have no control over what goes on through unofficial channels, but at least the official channels of distribution should not be used for the dissemination of literature which cannot be regarded as of high moral value.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley drew attention to the very curious chop-and-change tactics adopted by the Government in respect of pay and allowances. The Code of Pay now resembles the arm of a drug fiend with hypodermic syringe marks all along the arm. The hypodermic syringe is injecting a boost from time to time for different purposes. That is what the Government are doing with their differential pay schemes announced at almost regular intervals.
The result of this process must be this. I should imagine that there can hardly be a battalion in the British Army where there are two men drawing the same rate of pay. What the problem must be to the unfortunate clerk in the company office and the poor officer who has got to do the regimental accounts, heaven only knows. The position is becoming quite fantastic, as will be seen if hon. Members trouble to examine this document entitled "Service Emoluments."
The War Office and the other Service Departments are injecting differentials into the pay code at frequent intervals, and these selective improvements must, of course, give rise to very serious complications; because in respect of these selective improvements the White Paper on Service emoluments admits that each Service has somewhat differing problems and requirements, and there are, therefore, some variations in the form and incidence of the improvements.
That sounds a very easy thing to say, but there are unfortunate clerks and officers in the Royal Army Pay Corps and in the equivalent units in the other two Services who have to administer all this, and the position is becoming increasingly complicated. The time will soon be reached when a man, in order to find out exactly what he is entitled to by way of pay and allowances, will have to consult an accountant and a lawyer, possibly under the Army Legal Aid Scheme, or by some other provision

which will enable him to know exactly where he is. Last year in the Memorandum which accompanied the Estimates we got up to the six-star private. This year a seven-star private has now appeared on the scene, and we have also Group A and Group B tradesmen, Class 1 and Class B, and now a new group is being devised, Group X, Group X1, and there is probably a Group X2.
My sympathies go out to the people who, in the various Army pay and record offices, have to administer this complicated phantasmagoria. Even the most experienced warrant officers can become completely bamboozled by this very complicated structure that has now been devised, and I can best illustrate my point by quoting an example of a warrant officer, one of my constituents, who retired from the Army recently after doing 21 years' service or thereabouts. It is interesting, because I want the House to know how complicated this situation is, and how unjustly these long-service Regulars are treated when the time comes for them to take their discharge and how they are misled and what a disastrous effect it has upon recruiting.
This man, who enlisted in August, 1932, was discharged in 1953 after 21 years' Regular service with the Army, without the usual 28 days' terminal leave to which he considered he was entitled. I took up the matter with the War Office, and it took all the resources of the War Office about a month to work out the sum. And, if it takes the War Office a month to work out the sum, how much longer would it take someone in the Pay Office or in the company office of a lower formation—

Mr. Mikardo: A fortnight less.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: That may well be, and in those circumstances I am sorry that I took up the matter with the Undersecretary of State for War. Nevertheless, let us get back to the facts of the situation. They are these. He was discharged under the old Pay Code and he was informed, both by his unit and by a letter from the Record Office, that he would not be eligible for terminal leave. They had done their stuff. But, unfortunately, he was discharged under an authority which entitled him to terminal leave, so that by mistake on the part of someone in the Record Office responsible for quoting the exact authority under which he


was discharged, he got the 28 days' terminal leave to which otherwise he might not have been entitled.
While this battle was going on to let him have his 28 days' terminal leave after 21 years' service, he suddenly received another letter from the Service authorities to inform him that he was retired under the old rate of pension of £1 a week less than he otherwise would have received and that his terminal grant of £275 to which he had looked forward would not be paid to him.
It is true that he did not complete the 22 years' service which would have enabled him to receive the higher rate of pension and terminal grant. He was misled because he had either to have served continuously for 21 years or have had a total of 22 years' completed service. There is no point in going into the details. [HON. MEMBERS: "GO on."] This man joined up in 1932 and was discharged into the Reserve in August, 1939. For a period of two days between his relegation to the Reserve and the outbreak of war he was in the Reserve, and it is those two days that have knocked him off the new code which would have entitled him to the new pension.
The War Office has thought out a remarkable and generous proposition The authorities there inquired and discovered that this man enlisted for 12 years in August, 1932, seven years with the Colours and five with the Reserve. He transferred to the Reserve on 8th July, 1939, before his full period of 12 years was completed, and then was mobilised again on 2nd September, 1939. In August, 1944, he re-engaged to complete his 21 years' service. On 31st March. 1953, he re-engaged to complete 22 years' service. The reason he re-engaged was that he thought lie could cover the period just before the war when he was in the Reserve. He thought that he would thus establish his 21 years' reckonable service.
Unfortunately, the War Office discovered that by taking his discharge in November, 1952, he neither had 22 years' full-pay service nor the alternative qualification of 21 years' continuous service. Here is this poor warrant officer with a long record of useful work, who has tried to plan his affairs within the regulations as he understood them after consulting his company officer. He is home and has

a job, and the War Office then say that the only way in which he can be helped is to allow him to apply for re-enlistment for one year's service and thus complete 22 years' full-pay service to earn the new pension and terminal grant.
The War Office says that it must be understood, of course, that his acceptance for re-enlistment must be subject to his medical fitness. If he re-enlists he will then be sent back to rejoin his unit, which is at present in the Middle East. That is the dilemma which faces my unfortunate constituent. He goes back to qualify for higher pension for which he thought he was qualified. He is now privileged to rejoin for another year and to go back to the Middle East, if he is medically fit, to qualify for the full pension under the new code.
My constituent, who is a decent fellow, has pointed out that his pension on the present basis is 28s. 11d. after 21 years' service with the Army, whilst his father, an unskilled labourer on the railway for 10 years, get 19s. 10d. The question he put to me, to which there is no answer, was: "Surely the service I have given to my country is just as much, in proportion, as the service rendered by my father as an unskilled labourer on the railways for 10 years, as a result of which he gets a pension almost approaching the one I am drawing now."
I hope that the Under-Secretary, with whom I have had a certain amount of correspondence on this matter, will take a sympathetic view and not treat an old Service man in this way. I know the hon. Gentleman is entitled to the strict letter of the law and to adopt the course he has followed, but the damage done to recruiting prospects in a neighbourhood where a man goes about for the rest of his life with a grievance of this kind far outweighs the small additional expense which I am asking the War Office as an act of grace, without any liability, to incur in this case.
A further point requires to be mentioned before I sit down. It relates to what has been a very long-standing grievance on the part of the Musician's Union about the competition to which they are subjected by Service military bands. It is an old story and the Labour Government did their best to deal with the grievance. It may be of interest to hon. Members


to know that in 1909 this union arranged for a barge to float past the House of Commons with a civilian military band playing while Parliament was assembled in order to draw attention to their grievances, which were manifest as long ago as that. I am informed by the union that the police were very active in restraining demonstrations after that.
The field of military band music is now entirely controlled by Service military bands and similar State-subsidised bands. Until 1943 there was a B.B.C. military band, which was recognised as the finest in the country, but it was disbanded in March, 1943, and the B.B.C. now use, almost exclusively, Service military bands and popular brass bands. During the 1939–1945 war the need for entertainment in the Services was very great and there was a substantial enrolment of civilian musicians into the Services, which resulted in a very large rise in Service dance bands. Some of them have become well-known. They include the "Squadronaires," the "Sky Rockets" and the "Blue Rockets," which have performed on the music halls and the B.B.C. from time to time.
In 1942 an Army Council Instruction was issued to clarify the situation. The object of the instruction was to regularise the activities of military bands, concert parties, and things of that kind. Now this Army Council Instruction laid it down, as a statement of policy, that it was not the function of the Army to entertain the public, and that such activities should be kept down to a minimum. That was the A.C.I, of 1942, but the position again became difficult after the war because, under that A.C.I., bands were not permitted to accept fees; and if fees were paid, they had to go direct to the welfare funds of the particular unit. But after the war practically every regimental band produced a dance band, and these undertook civilian engagements. A protest was made to the Secretary of State for War, and there followed discussions between the Musicians' Union and the War Office and A.C.I. 221 of 1949 was consequently produced and reinforced by a letter dated 6th April, 1949, which put these Service dance bands on the basis where they were permitted to continue civilian engagements for payment.
This A.C.I, of 1949 stated, as to the conditions for accepting that payment, that a careful discretion would have to be exercised before entering into a contract. The bands would not, for example, be allowed to assist any political party, although I think there have been instances of Service bands being employed in such a manner. It was further laid down that they should not become engaged in partisan or controversial activities. But, this A.C.I, has not been so scrupulously observed as some of us would have wished. The other provision in this A.C.I, is that the proposed fee would not be at a rate below the commercial scale appropriate to, and acceptable to, the locality, and which might be offered to a civilian band of equal strength. It was further agreed that the Service band would not replace a civilian band on strike, nor cut its fees against any other Service band.
Now all this sounds like a reasonable lot of provisions—if observed. But these provisions, set out in the A.C.I, to which I have referred, and backed up by a War Office letter, were not properly carried out. They were not followed at all faithfully. They did not have the effect of seeing that the restrictions were carried out in so far as the outside engagements were concerned; and I am informed that the Musicians' Union made innumerable protests to the War Office, asking that this A.C.I, should be more closely observed; that this type of engagement should be kept to a minimum, and pointing out that these dance bands were not obtaining engagements, as was intended, from past and present members of their parent regiments. Another ground for complaint was that the spirit of the A.C.I., which was the avoidance of displacing a civilian band, was not being kept. That Instruction was intended, in the view of the Musicians' Union, to mean that Service bands should not accept engagements where there was a long record of civilian bands having been employed. I propose to quote one or two actual instances to prove my point that the complaints of the Musicians' Union are not without foundation.
Between June, 1951, and August, 1952, the Royal Artillery Band at Woolwich performed engagements which represented a possible loss of employment to members of civilian bands which in earnings


was in excess of £8,000. The other case to which I must refer is that of the Weymouth Corporation, which engaged military bands from June to September, although for the previous five years civilian bands had been exclusively employed. That represented a loss to the civilian musicians of approximately £4,500.
I think the complaints of the Musicians' Union are abundantly justified. It is not in the interest of individual Service men. The Service Departments have accepted the proposition that the comprehensive fee charged for any civilian engagement should be equated to the current Musicians' Union rate of pay. Therefore it is wrong to allow a state of affairs to continue in which these Army bands receive less than is appropriate to the trade union rate for the engagement they are fulfilling.
The Union is not only protecting the civilian musician but also the position of the Service musician who does not stay in the Army all his life. It will be a poor consolation to him to find when he returns to civil life that his rate of pay is being undercut by Army bands. If Service bands are to continue to undertake civilian work in competition with civilian bands, I consider that there is no logical reason why other Service trade groups should not be given similar facilities.
The hospitals are short-staffed, so why not put in a few R.A.M.C. personnel at cut prices to help them? Or perhaps the engineers or Army drivers could do a little job at an undercutting price when the opportunity presented itself, apart, of course, from times of national emergency when other considerations would apply. The War Office letter of April, 1949, made it quite clear.
Commanding Officers and officers administering bands will, therefore, keep this type of engagement to the minimum. They will take care to avoid displacing a civilian combination that has a long standing record of previous employment for the particular occasion. Dance bands should so far as possible obtain their engagements from past and present members of their regiments and from associations "—

Mr. Swingler: Is my hon. and gallant Friend aware that this complaint has been made before by the Musicians' Union year after year, but we have never heard whether the War Office has ever done anything about it?

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Yes. And it looks as if no action will be taken, as will be seen from the further evidence I am going to provide.
I was quoting from the War Office letter of April, 1949. I do not know whether I completed my final sentence, which was as follows, if I may go back to the beginning:
Dance bands should, so far as possible, obtain their engagements from past and present members of their regiments and from associations formed there from and not indulge in unrestricted competition with civilian dance bands.
Service bands are, I believe, the only branch of the Services which are permitted by the regulations to undertake civilian employment again. That is generally accepted. It is unfortunately the fact that, despite those Army Council Instructions, and despite the War Office letter to which I referred, which sets out the position in reasonably specific terms, civilian musicians are displaced and suffer loss of earnings as a result of the acceptance of civilian engagements by Service dance bands in particular.
I propose to quote three very recent cases in which there is clear evidence of unfair competition: that is to say, undercutting of established and agreed rates of pay, unrestricted competition from a Service band, or displacement of civilian musicians by a Service band.
In the first case a complaint was made to the War Office in August, 1953, against the band of the Royal Engineers which had accepted a military band engagement for one week at Scarborough during the summer season at a comprehensive fee—I should like the House to note this—representing an undercutting of agreed trade union rates of pay by £112 10s.
The rates of pay are agreed between the Musicians' Union and the Association of Health and Pleasure Resorts, of which Scarborough is a member. I ask the House also to note that these rates of pay were known to the War Office. Despite that, the War Office accepted as satisfactory a certificate issued to the director of music of the band by the authorities at Scarborough.
I know what the War Office mind is like. The War Office will say that the band of the Royal Engineers cannot be


held responsible for non-compliance with the terms of any agreement to which it was not a party. We know that the band was not a party to any agreement between the Musicians' Union and the Scarborough local authority, but surely it is somebody's job—or it should be—to see that Service bands are not used as blackleg labour to cut the ground from under the feet of civilian musicians.
It is not good enough that the War Office should shelter behind a technicality of that kind. The War Office says that it is not its legal responsibility. Nevertheless, there is evidence of undercutting and evasion of the regulations and yet the War Office, under its present management, regards it as a matter which does not merit any interest or action on its part.

Mr. Wigg: My hon. and gallant Friend keeps looking in this direction, but I hope that he and the House realise that the enemy is on the Government side of the House. That is where we shall find the enemy of trade unionism which is deliberately trying to do down the Musicians' Union.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I hope that my hon. Friend did not think that because I was looking at him in the course of some of my remarks I was holding him responsible in some way for what is going on. I know that the enemy is on the Government side of the House. I have become rather tired of looking at the Government side of the Chamber since about 3.30 p.m. yesterday, and I decided to direct my gaze elsewhere in order to relieve the monotony.
A further complaint was made to the War Office that the band of the Worcestershire Regiment was entering into unrestricted competition with civilian bandsmen in the neighbourhood. This particular band had included 23 civilian engagements in 17 months, which was not apparently regarded by the War Office as unrestricted competition. In any event, the War Office attitude was that the interpretation or definition of unrestricted competition referred to in the Army Council Instruction was a matter for them alone. They would not accept it, nor agree to any further discussion of the matter. In those circumstances,

the War Office decided that no further action should be taken.
The third and last case I am going to quote is of a Service band which, in spite of vigorous protests by local musicians, accepted engagements at Darlington and Morecambe, and as a result of the failure of the War Office to honour the Army Council Instruction civilian members of the union of long standing record of employment have had to have recourse to the only action remaining to them and tell the employers that no civilian bands would accept an offer of employment. We do not want this hostility between the Service and civilian bands. We like to see Service bands doing their stuff at the proper rate of pay, but the local dance hall in Darlington or Morecambe cannot always rely on the Service band coming back. If the Labour Party conference ever goes back to Morecambe, we shall have to look into this.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That part of the argument has nothing to do with the Estimates.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I agree.

Mr. J. Johnson: Before my hon. Friend leaves this fascinating story, can he tell us whether there is a share out of the fees, or do they go into a regimental pool?

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: According to the Army Council Instruction of 1949, which still governs the situation, the position about fees is as follows:
No fee will be charged for parades and entertainments held as part of Army duty.
That is the first thing.
Second, no fee is charged where any profits are applied wholly to the Army Benevolent Fund, or where the band plays at any Government sponsored scheme for a national object.
Out of pocket expenses only are not charged where the purpose is wholly for the benefit of a bona fide Service (past or present) charity like S.S.A.F.A., or for regimental functions.
Full rate of fees will be charged on all other occasions, unless special War Office authority has been obtained to the contrary.
I must have a look at some other part of the Army Council Instruction to find out where the money goes. It is not clear in the A.C.I, where the proceeds of the fees go when full rates are charged. It does not appear in the Army Council Instruction.

Mr. Johnson: Ask the Under-Secretary if he is prepared to give that information.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I am sure that the Under-Secretary knows the answer to the question and will be able to give us all the information we may require, but it is not by job to go through all the regulations to try to interpret them or to explain the curious motives which possibly account for the attitude which has been adopted by the War Office in this matter.
It should be remembered that prior to 1939–45 the present regulations covered only the acceptance of employment by Service military bands, and other Services were prohibited from accepting paid engagements at all. Service dance bands are now apparently placed on the establishment and permitted to accept paid engagements under the regulations.
It is therefore evident that the original intention of the regulations has been extended and that competition experienced by civilian bandsmen has been intensified. I think it is very reasonable on the part of the Musicians' Union to suggest that the authority at present given to Service bands to accept civilian engagements should be withdrawn and the bands restricted to the purpose for which they were originally formed, namely, entertaining the troops and marching at the head of military processions.
I hope that the Under-Secretary is taking counsel on this point and will be able to make an announcement which will provide some satisfaction to many hundreds, if not thousands, of decent men and women, loyal subjects of Her Majesty, in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, who have a definite grievance as a result of the way in which the War Office is apparently subsidising unfair competition and undercutting the wage rates of a useful section of the population which makes a contribution to the pleasure of many citizens throughout the country.
There are many other points I should like to mention, but time is getting on and I do not want to deprive some of my hon. Friends, who have trains to catch on Saturday night, of the opportunity of making their contributions to what so far has been a very valuable debate and which I am sure, by reason of the further contributions which will be made, will be even more valuable and instructive to the authorities in charge of the British Army.

8.24 a.m.

Mr. Ian Mikardo: My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton), at the beginning of his speech, which, with an effort, I can just recall, made some complaint about the fact that praise had earlier been heaped on the Secretary of State for War for his speech. My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), who spoke earlier, also seemed to take umbrage at the fact that the right hon. Gentleman had been praised for the speech with which he opened the debate. I hasten to reassure my hon. Friends by reminding them that, at least from this side of the House, the Secretary of State was praised for the manner and not the matter of his speech, not for what he said but for being able to remember to say it all.
Having said that, I want to praise him, not for his speech but for the Memorandum with which the Estimates have been accompanied, which is a worthy effort, not so much intrinsically but by comparison with the parallel efforts of the Secretary of State for Air and the First Lord of the Admiralty. By comparison with these other two documents this Memorandum is much more interesting, informative and evocative than those dealing with the work of the First Lord or the Secretary of State for Air. It is also written in much better English and it has a better style. If it is in fact the work of its signatory—although one must not inquire too closely about that—I should like to suggest to him, without threatening a split in the Government, that he offers his services to his colleagues as a "ghost" writer of their Memoranda. By that means the Memoranda accompanying the Navy and Air Estimates will be greatly improved.
Although this is an interesting, instructive and evocative document, it will be generally agreed that the most interesting, instructive and evocative part is not so much the text written in the right hon. Gentleman's impeccable style but the map which accompanies the document. That map is spotted all over with red in a manner which brings home more vividly than ever before, even to those who have expert knowledge of the Army and its dispositions, how far flung indeed are our commitments and how, in fact, the Army is distributed in penny packets


far too thinly over far too long a line for anyone's comfort, including the comfort of the Secretary of State.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I do not want my hon. Friend to be misled. This map is not absolutely complete. The halfpenny and farthing packets about the world are not mentioned at all, including the unit at Akabar.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. and gallant Gentleman must not make another speech.

Mr. Mikardo: I take my hon. and gallant Friend's point. If the map is not complete I take it that is not because the right hon. Gentleman wanted to deceive us but only because if he had tried to add anything further the map would have been totally indecipherable. Here we see confirmed as never before the arguments of all those of my hon. Friends who have been saying over the last five years or more that we really will not get any sense out of our defence policy unless we stop behaving like a frog trying to blow itself up into an ox.
We are trying to pretend to be a first-class Power of the order of the United States or the Soviet Union. We have not got the material resources for that. What we have done is to build ourselves an enormous shop window and put all our goods in the window and to leave the counters and shelves totally bare. That has been done to pretend that our shop is as good and as well stocked as that of Mr. America and Mr. Russia, and that pretence really does not come off.
There is a section of the Memorandum, covering paragraphs 116 to 132, which is headed "Armaments and Stores." Here I think the right hon. Gentleman has been rather less informative than he might have been, and less informative than his other Service colleagues have been. Although the Secretary of State describes the work of his Department in this field, he does not say, as his two colleagues said of their Departments, whether the production of armaments and stores in the past year was up to what had been planned; or, if not, by how much it fell short, and why.
I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that he is less than fair to the House

because of this omission. To an ever-increasing extent, as he knows better than I, the tasks which he has are dependent for their fulfilment on his ability correctly to estimate needs in armaments, stores and equipment, and his ability to get those needs fulfilled. It really is a vital question for anybody who desires to consider the defensive position of the country to have some indication, such as we have had from the Secretary of State for Air and the First Lord of the Admiralty, whether what has been planned has actually been forthcoming or, if not, why not and by how much actual output has fallen short of what had been planned. We cannot know in detail precisely what is being planned, because in order to tell that the right hon. Gentleman would have to reveal information which doubtless he would want to withhold from a potential enemy.
I was glad that the hon. Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher) mentioned—he was the only speaker in the debate who did mention it—the brief and perfunctory reference to the Home Guard in a single paragraph of the Memorandum. It is a force of which I have some very pleasant and lively memories and in which I learned a great deal, including a number of card games I had not come across before. It is a force in which, as a result of several years of blind devotion to duty and unfaithful obedience to my officers, I rose to the rank of private.
The paragraph on the Home Guard is an evasive one. It leaves a lot of questions unanswered. We are told that the numbers now are 62,000, of which 34,000 are in the Home Guard and 28,000 are in a Reserve Roll. The hon. Member for Hitchin gave us a microcosm of the picture drawn in this paragraph from his own experience in his own county. He gave some indication of the extent to which recruitment for the Home Guard has fallen short of what was expected and wanted, and of the extent to which even the recruits that are there only partially fulfil their duty.
The Secretary of State owes it to the House to fill in for the whole country the picture that the hon. Member drew for his own county. What proportion of the establishment, or of the total at which the right hon. Gentleman was aiming, is


represented by this 62,000 or by the 34,000 which is the active Home Guard? Alternatively, by whatever is the figure that measures the number of members of the Home Guard who are actually turning up for their duties less than 34,000?
The right hon. Gentleman owes it to the House to tell us whether he has given up the Home Guard as a bad job and is prepared to see it vanish and is merely continuing it as a sort of face-saver because he dare not say, for one reason or another, that he has given it up as a bad job. I note with interest that there is a fall in the Vote from last year compared with the coming year on the provision for the Home Guard from £703,000 to £616,000. That is over 12 per cent., and at that rate it would not take many years for the provision for the Home Guard to vanish altogether.
I ask the right hon. Gentleman to "come clean" with the House about this, and to tell us what has gone wrong with the Home Guard. Is it merely, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley suggested, that the people are not enrolling because they are disillusioned about the rearmament of Germany against which they enrolled to fight the last time, or is it, as I rather suspect, because they do not see what their function is going to be?
The enthusiasm with which the original L.D.V., which later became the Home Guard, was enrolled was due not merely to the imminence of war, but to the fact that the people who enrolled in it were given a job to do. We all know that a man reacts very well when he is told, "Here is a job for you. Get on with it." The job which the L.D.V. was told to do, at the period when we were expecting an airborne German invasion, was to watch for paratroops and to offer the first resistance to them when they came.
That was something which they could picture in their mind's eye. What is the Home Guard recruit to picture in his mind's eye today as the task for which he is being enrolled? We have the Government's word for it that a war would start with a terrific atomic attack, doubtless both ways, in which the Home Guard could play no role. In the event of such a war, any major role in that phase of it would be played by the Civil Defence service, if we had one, which,

as the Select Committee on Estimates recently demonstrated, we have not.
Therefore, there would be no function in that phase of the war for the Home Guard. Then we are told that when that phase is over we shall have a period of "broken-backed" war, whatever that may mean. I am not sure, but I think it is fairly clear that no Home Guard can be sure what it means, and, therefore, no Home Guard can derive from that phrase any evocation of any role which he would be expected to play. I suspect that no recruits are coming forward because men do not know what they are being asked to join for, and unless and until the Government can tell them—and I suspect that they cannot tell them while they adhere to the theory of the future war as laid down in the Defence White Paper —there will be no improvement in the recruitment situation.
One of the things which lead me to believe that the Government are, in fact, going to permit this force to die and that they are merely keeping it on the record as a face-saving device, is the existence of this so-called Home Guard Reserve Roll. Under Vote 2, there is an explanatory note on this, which ends as follows:
The names of volunteers who, for any reason, cannot be enrolled in peace are borne on the Home Guard Reserve Roll, which is a roll of individuals who have been earmarked for enrolment in an emergency.
I ask the Government spokesman who is to reply to this debate whether he really expects us to swallow this. Here are these men who are not being enrolled at all. This is just a list of names. They are not being called up for training. What they are going to be like when they are called up, one does not know. I should be perfectly prepared to wager that, in common with most of their fellow citizens, they will forget to notify the Home Guard Reserve Roll whenever they change their address. I am perfectly sure that when it comes to it, if it ever does, we shall find that these 28,000 men consist partly of people who have vanished into thin air, or partly of people who for other reasons will be unable to enrol, or who, because they have had no training, will not be of much use if they do. I beg the Government to be frank with us about this matter.
I have one other general point to make before I deal with the Army Estimates. It is a point with which I will deal very briefly, not because I do not think it is important—indeed, it is very important— but because I dealt with it at some length in the debate on the Air Estimates and it so happened that the Secretary of State for War and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence were present during that debate. I think they will have taken what little value there may have been in my observations on the subject at that time, so that I do not need to repeat them now.
The point relates to the inter-Departmental charges. There has been a tremendous amount of accounting work, as one will see from examination of the Service Estimates, merely to render charges from one Department to another. I am bound to say that it does not appear to be so bad in the Army Estimates as it does in the Estimates for the other two Services. The Navy seems to be the worst offender of the three, because it insists on working out oncosts, which are always difficult and complicated to calculate.
I am glad to have the opportunity of putting this matter to a representative of the Ministry of Defence rather than to one of the Services because it seems to me to be a matter which could best be tackled by the Ministry of Defence. I should like to know whether some small expert committee, perhaps assisted by some people from the Organisation and Methods Division of the Treasury and some accountants from outside, could be set up to see whether some of these inter-Departmental charges can be abolished; and, secondly, whether some of those that must remain can be done on a greater basis of approximation than is being done at present.
I want to mention five small points of detail on the Estimates themselves. We had a Ruling from Mr. Speaker when this debate began, and this is our opportunity for raising the detailed points on Votes other than Vote A, because they cannot be discussed in any other way. The first of these points is really of the greatest importance. It has already been mentioned once or twice by one or two of my hon. Friends who have asked for

information about it. I want to add reinforcement to their plea because this is something that the House must be told.
At the beginning of the Army Estimates, on page 6, there appear these words:
Local procurement in Germany. The Army's local requirements in Germany are obtained generally at the expense of the German Federal Government. No provision is made in Army Estimates for requirements so met.
As I said in an intervention some time ago, we are all aware that the moment the Bonn Contractual Agreements and the E.D.C. Treaty come into force, this note ceases to be true. From that moment we shall not only have to pay for the Army's local requirements in Germany, but we shall have to pay for them in a currency which is hard and which every day is becoming increasingly harder. It may transpire that these Agreements will come into force during the year which we have under discussion, and in that case there will be an additional amount to pay over and above this Estimate.
Nobody can blame the Secretary of State for War for not making provision for such a contingency, because although I suspect that he has a pretty shrewed idea of what will be the annual rate of costs in this connection, he cannot possibly have any idea at all, nor can anybody else, of the date from which this cost will start to be incurred, or indeed whether it will begin to be incurred in the year under discussion. But although, because of these reasons, he cannot provide in the Estimates for this, he must surely have had this question very much in mind, and so must the other two Service Departments, especially the Air Force.
Here we have had hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House and my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley making a plea to do more and more of the training of our strategic Reserve in Germany, and every time they make that plea they are, in fact, making making a plea for more and more of our Service expenditure to be paid for in hard currency. I make this point because, in the economics of the relationships between the defence burden and the other burdens on our economy, this aspect plays an important part.
When we discussed this matter a little while ago there were some hon. Members,


I think on both sides of the House, who argued that whatever the disadvantages and the military repercussions of the build-up of the German defence forces, we should get some economies out of the fact that Germany would now have to devote some of its engineering resources to armaments, which it does not do at the moment, and, therefore, we should be to that extent relieved, and British manufacturers would not be so hardly hit in export markets by German competition. There is a great deal of truth in that, but if our exporters are relieved by that means from competition in export markets, and, therefore, do more business, the first £100 million or £150 million of extra business they do in a year will have to go to meet the Deutschmark cost of these expenses in Germany.
I hope that the Government spokesman who replies to the debate will give the House the best idea he can form of these costs—we cannot expect it to be precise. I can only say to the hon. Gentleman that in Western Germany they are saying that they will get from us, when these Agreements come into force, something of the order of 150 million Deutschmarks a month, which is roughly £150 million sterling per annum. Is that about right, and if so, is that going to be, firstly, an additional charge over and above this Vote? Secondly, am I right in assuming that it will have to be paid in hard currency? If so, does not that throw quite a light different from that which we were led to expect on the economic effect upon us of the build-up of arms in Western Germany?
I pass to another point which arises on Vote 1. I want to ask a question about this because it illustrates a point which I have made already. Amongst the appropriations-in-aid are receipts for the services of soldiers employed temporarily on civil work of urgent national importance. I take it that the sort of thing here included is the kind of work which some units of the Army did, and did magnificently, in dealing with the flood damage which we had on the East Coast a year ago. If that is the kind of thing, then what on earth is the sense of charging for it?
Here we had the Government announcing and reiterating several times that a matter of emergency like that was to be

treated as a national matter, that we could not ask the local authorities to bear the cost of it, and so Government money was made available in considerable amounts. What is the sense of the Government generously giving money to deal with that emergency situation on the one hand and then on the other sending a bill from the Army debiting Lowestoft Borough Council for the services of soldiers and the cost of so many sandbags? Where is the sense of all that when, in the end, the money comes out of the same pocket?
There is another point in relation to Vote 3. The Secretary of State for War, in introducing the Estimates, made the announcement, which was greeted with approval from both sides of the House, that he was proposing to reduce the amount of paper work. It looks to me from what little evidence one can obtain about future trends from these Votes, that the right hon. Gentleman does not expect the reduction in paper work to result in much saving in personnel.
I greatly admire the assiduity with which the Under-Secretary of State for War has listened to this debate and made notes of a long series of questions that have been asked of him. Will he add this question to his list: what is a paper keeper? In several places in these Estimates where personnel are listed there are people called paper keepers. They are not filing clerks, because they are not included under that head. They are not included in the clerical staff, and I adjudge that they do not keep things like archives or serious documents, because they are not included among librarians.
What are paper keepers? What sort of papers do they keep? Is it cigarette papers? If the Secretary of State is going on a paper chase to reduce the amount of paper, may I ask why, for example, among the civilian staff of the Department of his Permanent Under-Secretary of State there will be in the coming year not a decrease but an increase in the number of paper keepers? Presumably he would not have more paper keepers unless they have more paper to keep. How does the Under-Secretary of State reconcile this fact with the statement of his right hon. Friend that there will be some reduction in paper work this year?
The House will be relieved to hear that I have only two further points to


make. One is in connection with Vote 6, Subhead A—"Food and Ration Allowance." I find no difficulty in understanding the first item under that Subhead relating to food, but I am a little puzzled by the second item devoted to ration allowance. I cannot understand why a sharp increase is forecast of more than £1 million, which is rather more than 10 per cent. The explanatory note states:
Ration allowance based on retail prices is issued to personnel who are entitled to rations, and to whom no ration in kind is issued; the rates of ration allowance vary with the appropriate ration scales at home and abroad and are revised periodically to meet changes in prices, etc.
When I began to wonder why the global amount of the ration allowance had gone up, the first thing that occurred to me was that prices had gone up. But, of course, as we have been so frequently told by the Chancellor and other Ministers, and indeed by the Prime Minister in letters written to Conservative candidates at by-elections, I then remembered that the cost of living and prices are not going up. Therefore, this increase in ration allowance cannot possibly be due to an increase in the price of food.
Does it come from an increase in the number of people to whom an allowance is made? The answer is "No," because we are told in the Memorandum that in the coming year the number of men in the Army will be 13,000 fewer than in the present year. So far as I am aware, there is no change in the incidence of leaves for which ration allowances are made. I ask the Under-Secretary if he can solve the mystery and explain why it is that, in a situation in which food prices, as we are told, are not rising, it costs £1 million more to give ration allowances to 13,000 fewer men.
Finally, I wish to raise a matter which I raised the other day on the Navy Estimates. I did not get any reply from the Admiralty, but I am quite sure that I shall get one from the hon. Gentleman because he would not show such discourtesy as not to reply to an important point like this. I ask, as I asked his colleague, by what right does the Army imagine that it is a better judge than the officer concerned as to when and whether it is right for an officer to get

married? How can the hon. Gentleman justify the provision of a marriage allowance for an officer who is 25 years of age, or more, and no allowance for an officer who marries before the age of 25?
I put it to the hon. Gentleman that this is really a hangover from the days of the Duke of Wellington. It is a hangover from the days when officers were not just discouraged from marrying before a certain age, but were actually forbidden in some of the regiments of the Army, I understand, to marry before a certain age. That was in the days of advanced Victorian paternalism, when each generation thought it knew better than the generation coming on about what was good for the generation that was coming on. We have now abandoned all that and, as we have been told, have got a considerable majority of men in the Army under the age of 25. We have been told, and we have heard it with pleasure, that a much higher level of intelligence, knowledge and responsibility is evinced by the young officer than was the case even a few years ago.
Is the War Office really saying that a young man, into whose hands it will trust not merely hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of equipment, but dozens and perhaps hundreds of invaluable lives, cannot be trusted until the magic day on which he passes from being 24 and 364 days old to being 25 years and nought days old to decide for himself the sort of girl he ought to marry? This is a piece of arrogance on the part of the Army which has no justification. I shall be delighted to hear from the hon. Gentleman that he will ask his colleagues to see if they can depart from the rigid habit and prejudice which has led them to that conclusion.

8.59 a.m.

Mr. Stephen Swingler: This is probably the last Parliamentary day on which we shall have an opportunity of a free discussion of the Service Estimates without being crushed by the Guillotine. Some hours ago the Secretary of State for War made a remarkable speech. I thought it was a remarkable speech for the head of a Service Department, because he cut out all the customary cant and complacency we usually get from the Ministers of the Service Departments. He addressed himself seriously to the matter of what has


became a barrage of criticism of the Service Departments because they are demanding from the nation a total of more than £1,600 million this year.
There is one thing the right hon. Gentleman omitted to say. He said nothing about the programme and plan of expenditure on the Army during last year, or the two previous years. He passed over completely the position and place of the Army in the three years' rearmament programme adopted in 1951. I should like to draw attention to what has happened to that, because I believe that that is the correct starting point for consideration of this claim of the Army for more than £620 millions this year.
Three years ago there was adopted the so-called £4,700 million re-armament programme. It was for all three Services, and the Army's share in that total sum was said to be £767 million. Of course, we were told by the political spokesmen for the Army at that time that that was the absolute minimum expenditure necessary for the Army and its equipment, and that this expenditure had been thoroughly thought out; we were told that a balance had been struck between the amount of manpower and equipment required by the Army for its commitments, and to prepare it for global war. That sum was passed by the House without dissent, although not without criticism of the War Office.
What has happened to that "absolute minimum" of £767 million demanded by the Army for the period 1951 to 1954? The first answer is that the Army has been unable, despite strenuous efforts, to spend more than £616 million, so that there has been an underspending of just over £150 million in those three years. It is interesting to note that if that expenditure is converted into value; ruling in 1950 when this plan of expenditure was first adopted, we find that the worth of this expenditure of £616 million since 1951 is actually £525 million worth of men, materials and equipment.
So the real "cut" in three years in this programme of what was held out to the House as an absolute minimum of expenditure for the Army is £240 million, and we are now told by the Minister of Supply: "Of course that programme of expenditure was wholly unrealistic, and not in accord with the capacity of the time."I think that that

should be the starting point from now on for all consideration of Service Estimates, because the Service Department got the approval for the money from Parliament year by year virtually by fraud.
What we wish to hear from the Undersecretary is something we did not hear from the Minister when he made his defensive speech in opening this debate —an explanation of how this expenditure has been so scaled down. On what has it been scaled down? How can the right hon. Gentleman claim there is a proper balance between expenditure on manpower and expenditure on equipment, if in fact there was any competence about the figure of £767 million that the Army demanded in 1951? Either those who planned the 1951–54 programme for the Army were incompetent or else, since we know that more men have been demanded year by year, the scaling down of the expenditure has been at the expense of equipment, so that by now the whole thing must be completely out of balance.
There is another thing which the Secretary of State did not mention and which the heads of the Service Departments seem to be very reluctant to mention, although they insert into their White Papers and speeches vague clichés about Commonwealth and N.A.T.O. cooperation. They are less frank than the Chancellor of the Exchequer, although he had to go to the other side of the world to be frank at the Sydney Conference. He revealed that this country carries the heaviest defence burden of any country in the world. The demand on the population of this country is higher in proportion than on any of our allies in N.A.T.O. or the Commonwealth countries.
In most of those countries there is no system of conscription. In the Army of the United Kingdom we have 87 per cent, of the total population. In Australia the estimate represents 32 per cent., in Canada, 34 per cent., in New Zealand, 20 per cent., and in South Africa, 036 per cent. I hope that the Under-Secretary will note that this country has twice the proportion of its population in the Army by comparison with any other Commonwealth country. It is time that the Army, the principal user of manpower, and the principal


reason for this long period of conscription, revealed these facts to the nation and attempted to produce some justification for maintaining such an excessive manpower burden.
We have had running through the debate the same assumptions about defence policy that we had in previous debates. I find the assumptions no more acceptable in this debate on the Army than they were in the case of the debates on the Navy, the Royal Air Force, or defence as a whole.
We were told in the Defence White Paper that the great deterrent to aggressors was the atomic bomb and we were supposed to be preparing for a possible war in which atomic weapons would be used on both sides. However, the Secretary of State knows better than anybody else does that in the abandonment of the three-year rearmament programme the major cut that has been made has been in industrial production and equipment. In fact, reading between the lines of the Secretary of State's speech, one can see his fear that the programme of production and equipment has been cut so low that there is now a dangerous relationship between expenditure on manpower and expenditure on equipment.
The assumption about atomic war which is put forward does not reflect itself in any way in the Government's policy for civil defence. The Government gaily assume in the White Paper the possibilty of war with atomic weapons on both sides but give to the defence of the civil population the lowest priority, and in its management of the rearmament programme adopted in 1951 it has continually scaled down the production of modern weapons while maintaining the same high level of expenditure on manpower.
The second assumption is that the creation of a German Army will strengthen the position of our Armed Forces in the West. But we are warned by the Prime Minister—we have now been warned by other Service Ministers—that the German Army, with its 15 divisions or whatever the number may be, is something against which we must create a counterpoise.
The Secretary of State knows—he disclosed it in his speech—the extremely

dangerous situation which is created by this policy because of the fact that 80 per cent. of the Army's fighting formations are distributed across the globe carrying out commitments which have nothing whatever to do with the defence of the West. Yet the Secretary of State has no proposals for cutting down those commitments. In fact, he is faced with the grave possibility that the Colonial Secretary is just about to create another commitment for him which will call for the use of troops still further away from the defence of Western Europe.
We thus have a double demand presented to us. We have the prospect that the Government are deliberately pursuing a policy to create German armed forces in the West which, precisely because of the global commitments of the British Army, must within a short time become the most powerful army in Western Europe. The Government have no policy which could possibly prevent that.
Secondly, that policy inevitably involves an extra commitment being placed upon the British taxpayer, the amount of which is not disclosed to us. I hope that the Under-Secretary will be more forthcoming than the Minister was on this point. My hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) interrupted the Secretary of State yesterday and said:
What are the plans about quarters in Germany? When the Germans rearm, will they take over their own barracks? Are we to put up brand new barracks? Or are these questions being left to be answered when German rearmament starts?
The Secretary of State replied:
No. We have thought carefully about that. However, I do not think the House wants me to go into the details."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th March, 1954; Vol. 524, c. 2478.]
I do not know what evidence the Secretary of State had for thinking the House did not want him to tell us and the citizens of this country what would be the extra cost to the taxpayer of going ahead with the policy of German rearmament, and what would happen about the distribution of barrack accommodation when the German war units were created. We may have to face this situation in this financial year, and the Secretary of State may be compelled to bring forward a Supplementary Estimate at the end of the year because of the implications of the policy.
I should have thought that if it is true that the Secretary of State and his other Service colleagues had carefully thought about the question of barracks and the payments involved, it was their bounden duty to tell us what the extra cost would be, where the extra accommodation would come from and how the programme would work out. I hope that the Under-Secretary has a powerful note of this point, because if we fail to get a satisfactory answer in the winding-up speech, it will be necessary to raise the question again in Committee when we come to Vote A.
There is a particular to which I would draw the attention of the Secretary of State. He made no mention of it in his speech, but it is a policy that he has advocated strongly in the past. Last year in his Memorandum accompanying the Estimates the right hon. Gentleman put in a special paragraph with reference to the substitution of civilians for soldiers.
If a job can be done as well by a civilian as by a man in uniform it is our policy to employ a civilian, subject to financial and manpower limitations and to certain other considerations of policy which I need not detail here.
The Secretary of State made many speeches when he was in Opposition strongly advocating that where possible military manpower should be saved by the employment of more civilians.
There have been the Templer and Callender Committees. What has happened to the reports of those Committees? When one looks at the Royal Army Pay Corps and the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, about which strong recommendations were made by those committees, we find that nothing has been done about them at all. The Templer Committee recommended that 1,900 posts should be given to civilians to relieve the pressure on military manpower. We should like to know why more progress has not been made in this sphere. Statements have been made that the Army Council accepted the principle enunciated by the Templer Committee, but in the Pay and Ordnance Corps the main recommendations of these Committees have not been carried out. There has been considerable resistance to the policy, and we find that in the Memorandum with these Estimates mention is no longer made of it.
Apparently the right hon. Gentleman has now dropped the policy which he supported so strongly last year—the policy that if a job could be done as well by a civilian as by a man in uniform, he preferred to employ the civilian. Has the policy of "civilianisation," so-called, been abandoned or not? What has happened to the Reports of the two Committees? Is anything happening in the principal corps to which the inquiry related—the Pay Corps and the Ordnance Corps—to carry out the recommendations?

Mr. Head: As a result of the two Committees, 10,000 men have gone from the tail to the teeth and there has been a cut of about 10 per cent, at the War Office.

Mr. Swingler: The right hon. Gentleman will have some difficulty in substantiating that statement, because if he analyses the military and civilian manpower figures under the War Office Votes he will find that the figure of 10,000 transferred from military to civilian employment is not reflected in them.

Mr. Head: I said, from the tail to the teeth.

Mr. Swingler: That is not the point I am making. It is not a question of from the tail to the teeth but of the policy specifically outlined in paragraph 68 of last year's Memorandum—the substitution of civilians for soldiers, not the transfer of soldiers from the tail to the teeth. This is a question of the employment of civilians as pay clerks or in the Ordnance Corps in order to replace men in uniform. We can judge how far that has gone by looking at the figure of the number of civilians employed. We can see the change in the civilian percentage of the manpower on the War Office Votes. I have worked it out, and there is an alteration of 04 per cent.; it was 256 per cent, last year and is 2602 per cent, this year. That is the total transfer. In view of the recommendations of the two Committees, that does not show that great progress has been made in the substitution of civilians for soldiers

Mr. Head: The year before gave the relevant figure. I am getting rather tired of the hon. Gentleman misrepresenting the situation. The two Committees reported in 1951, and we went ahead then with civilianisation. To give a fair picture,


the recommendations of the increased number of civilians should be considered in relation to the year before these proposals.

Mr. Swingler: If the right hon. Gentleman wishes us to be able to consider this problem he must be more forthcoming in telling us the facts. We have to dig out the facts for ourselves. I did not suggest that nothing had been done. That would have been entirely wrong. It is true that some of the recommendations of the Committees have been carried out and some progress has been made, but it is nothing like as great as the right hon. Gentleman suggests. I am asking why that is so.
If we take the figures in the recommendations of the Templer and Callender Committees and compare them with the number of transfers which have taken place, comparatively little progress has been made. In the case of non-industrial workers, the two Committees recommended that 1,493 posts should be transferred to civilians, and the progress has been the transfer of 833. In the case of industrial workers, the Committees recommended 2,127 possible transfers, and progress has been 1,431. The Secretary of State has said that this has been going on now for two or three years, but I assert that greater progress should have been made, and I should like to know what the difficulties have been. What is the objection of the R.A.P.C. and the R.A.O.C. to carrying out in full the manpower recommendations of these two Committees?
I recognise that the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary may be getting rather tired, but nevertheless we have a job to do when the Army is asking for a Vote of £628 million, and more than 500,000 men. It is one of the few occasions on which we get an opportunity of cross-examination and can insist upon answers from the Ministers. The Army is the principal Department concerned. The procedure enforces upon us these prolonged sittings because, as the Secretary of State knows very well, there is no way of avoiding them under the procedure now adopted, and I hope we are going to get full and detailed replies to these many important questions that have been raised so that it will not be necessary to prolong the discussion when we get to Vote A.

9.27 a.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I have listened to most of the speeches in this debate, as I have listened to many in debates on Army Estimates now for a good many years. I usually come along in what the Secretary of State has described as the "tail." I have listened to many gentlemen and distinguished Gentlemen giving their very interesting experiences upon military matters. Among them, of course, I listened for many years to the right hon. Gentleman who is now the Secretary of State, and I cordially agree with every commendation that has been made about his courtesy and his ability in matters of military detail.
If I were a Conservative Prime Minister, I should say that the right hon. Gentleman was the best of the brigadiers and the best of the brigadiers that could be chosen for the job. I have a high respect for the others including the hon. and gallant Member for Totnes (Brigadier Rayner), the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke), the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer).

Mr. Crossman: And the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Low).

Mr. Hughes: Mine is a universal commendation of all the brigadiers, even including the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West, because there is always a chance of the greatest sinner repenting. In view of the progress that I have made with the Labour Party, I am quite sure if I am in this House for 20 years I shall hear the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth asking some of the questions which I put in 1948. I also wish to pay a tribute to the Undersecretary of State, who has been assiduous in his duty and has been the very embodiment of informativeness in the debate.
I have a high opinion of the colonels. I have a high regard for the hon. and gallant Member for Ayr (Sir T. Moore) and the hon. and gallant Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel Gomme-Duncan). I have a great appreciation of the knowledge of the colonels, and on this side of the House I have a special regard for the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), and


a particular regard for the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton), who sometimes advises me confidentially on some of those abstruse military matters.
Nevertheless, I think of all the speeches that I have listened to during the last eight years and of all the calculations and prophecies that have come from these military gentlemen and of how many of them have been absolutely wrong. Therefore, I am forced to the conclusion that the ordinary civilian like myself, who never rose above the rank of private in a detention barracks, can make a useful contribution. My career may be epitomised in this way: I was Private 53075 of A Company, 3rd Welch Battalion, charged with refusing to obey orders given by a superior officer.
When we try to understand these matters and how they affect the country and our constituents, there is a very strong case for the purely civilian approach. I listen very carefully and respectfully to those Members with much experience, but I always remember that events change, that military ideas change and that conceptions of what are likely to be our strategy and the tactics of the next war have to be judged by the ordinary civilian like myself, very ready to learn but always sceptical of these professional authorities.
There should always be somebody in this House ready to criticise the Military Estimates, and especially the Army Estimates, just as there have been critics for many years past. I recall that one of the first books I read in which there was detailed a struggle between the civilian and the military expert was "The Life of Lord Randolph Churchill" by the present Prime Minister. I remember—I often quoted it with great enthusiasm— that when Lord Randolph Churchill was Chancellor of the Exchequer he had a terrific fight with the War Office because he thought that the War Office was asking for too much.
However much the War Office might have asked in those days, it was infinitesimal compared with the gigantic sums which are now being asked. Over and over again in our debates it has been estimated that we are spending about £560 million to £600 million annually. Although, unfortunately, we may have caused some inconvenience to hon. Members and to servants of the House, which

incidentally we very much regret from the point of view of their personal comfort and convenience, there will be people who will say, "Yes, those people who are challenging these gigantic Estimates are doing a national service."
It is quite right that a vigilant scrutiny should be exercised on all of them, especially when they grow more astronomical as the years go by and we remember that this means a heavy burden on our national economy. This expenditure has to be paid by poor people. When we spend £1,600 million on the Services —£500 million to £600 million on the Army—we are inflicting a heavy burden on old-age pensioners and on people with low incomes, and we are injuring the economy of the nation.
I do not represent what is termed a military constituency, except that my unfortunate constituents are called up for this activity which hon. Members describe as National Service, but which I prefer to call forced labour. Because my constituents are very vitally affected by the demands that are periodically made upon them by the Services, I have to speak on their behalf.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: And also on behalf of the National Farmers' Union.

Mr. Hughes: Certainly. That is quite correct; I do represent a great number of farmers, and the greater the number of demands that are made for manpower by the War Office, the greater are the attempts made to call up the farming population. I have frequently had to call the attention of the Minister of Labour and of the Secretary of State for War in this House to the calling up of farm-workers in my constituency. It is quite true, as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Brixton says, that the farming community of this country is also keeping a very watchful eye on the War Office and its never-ceasing demands for more men.
What are the problems with which the military experts at the War Office have been perplexing the military experts in this debate, which has lasted so long? They are worried about recruiting. I have taken a great deal of interest in the debates of recent years, when hon. and gallant Gentlemen have said that what we needed in order to get more recruits


was a more enthusiastic recruiting campaign.
I remember the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), when he was Secretary of State for War, coming along and speaking very conscientiously and faithfully from his brief prepared by the War Office. He assured the House that what was needed was a really thoroughgoing recruiting campaign. When I used to put Questions to him after the campaign had been running for six weeks or so, asking about its results and what we were getting for our money, he used to say, "Wait. In due course the recruiting campaign will bring the recruits, and the result will be that the British Army will grow from strength to strength."
I remember one particular recruiting campaign which the right hon. Gentleman conducted in Aberystwith. I remember calling his attention to it in the early hours of the morning. I believe he went, full of enthusiasm, to open that campaign. He was quite confident that the recruits would come in shoals. He went to address the students, and I remember reading in a local newspaper that they all turned up in black ties and bowler hats. At a certain point in the proceedings, they solemnly walked out.
The right hon. Gentleman got no male recruits in that campaign, the cost of which to the nation was £40. But the right hon. Gentleman had a certain amount of success. The sum total of his efforts was that two girls joined the A.T.S. I remember saying at the time that it was due not so much to the oratory of the Minister as to his sex appeal. That was the result. All these recruits who were going to swell the ranks of the British Army never materialised.
We have heard all sorts of hints about how to get recruits, and I have made some of them in my time, but unfortunately the hints that I made were never adopted by the War Office. I remember offering the suggestion that far more recruits were likely to join the Army if they were able to retire on giving a month's notice. I did not see anything particularly wrong in that, and even now I am prepared to hand that suggestion over to the Secretary of State for War. Unfortunately, he relies upon these mass

sentimental appeals that appear on the hoardings. I remember the Kitchener campaign; there was a magnificent picture of Kitchener pointing and saying "Kitchener wants you."

Brigadier Clarke: What did the hon. Gentleman do about it? Nothing.

Mr. Hughes: It frightened me. In fact, I never recovered from it.
What are the kinds of recruiting campaigns that are being conducted today? I use a certain Tube station, and I see two great big recruiting posters when I enter the gate of that station. They have not given up hope of attracting me yet. They are very captivating posters, and underneath them is the slogan, "You are somebody in the Army today." The words "today" are in black letters and bigger print, implying that "You are somebody in the Army today but you were nobody in the Army the day before yesterday"—which was the time when I was conscripted into military service.
It should be remembered that an enormous amount of public money has been spent upon a poster which no intelligent person who has been in the Army for 24 hours really believes. The attempt to convince the young men of today that the Army is a cross between a technical school and a nursing home simply does not carry conviction. Why is there this reluctance among people who have been in the Army as National Service men to rejoin the Army? It is simply because they have seen what modern war is like. They have seen Korea, Malaya, the Suez Canal and a good many other places. They know that the Army is not the sort of beautiful idyllic career that it is represented to be on these recruiting posters.
I suggest that the Secretary of State for War and his publicity experts are spending a lot of our money on recruiting appeals which simply do not convince in these days, when the people have a good idea from their own experiences and the experiences of their lathers and relatives what the Army is like. The fact is that in these days people are not likely to make the Army a career to the extent that the Government wish. Of course, there are always hon. and gallant Members who come from distinguished military families and


who will follow the family tradition and go into the Army.
But there is no rush by the ordinary people of this country to join the Army today. I have little doubt, and the figures prove it, that after the people who are being dragged into the Army have had two years of it, they have had enough. We must also remember that young people are reading and listening to the wireless and following events on the radio and television as they have never done before, and they are asking, what were the last two wars about? We have had two wars in my generation to destroy German militarism, and many of the young people who have been students at our colleges and universities and have read the memoirs of the statesmen and the politicians and the soldiers know what happened in those two wars.
They have read the late Lloyd George's story of Passchendaele, and no one who has read his memoirs could have a very great admiration for the military profession. Indeed, the military profession have always been very candid about their own job. It was the Duke of Wellington who said quite accurately, "The military profession is a damnable profession."
Now we are asking people to go into the Army, not to take part in the defence of their homes because, as the Defence White Paper tells us, the next war is not going to be a war against militarism but a war against world Communism. A lot of young people are asking, "Why should we go into a war against world Communism and can world Communism be destroyed by a war?" If young people read the defence debate and the debates on these Estimates, and hear the various opinions of hon. and gallant Members on their idea of a future war, they come to the conclusion that hon. and gallant Members are no wiser than they are, and of course they are right. Because in the old days war was a comparatively simple affair. People went into the Army in defence of their homes—

Brigadier Rayner: They might do so still.

Mr. Hughes: I agree, but the hon. and gallant Gentleman is 50 years behind the times because, if he were a young man today and joined the Army and was landed out in the Suez Canal, he might be there when somebody dropped an

atom bomb on Totnes, so he would not be defending his home at all. That is the dilemma in which ordinary sensible people find themselves.
There has been one predominant thought voiced on all sides of the House in this debate, that we only have a very small number of soldiers to defend this country against enemy invasion. We have even been told that when soldiers were sent to British Guiana, they had to be taken away from Balmoral, so that if a Russian parachute division had descended upon Balmoral that week-end, we do not know what sort of moral victory it would have achieved.
It is not easy to defend military expenditure these days on the ground of defending our homes. Then there was the old idea—which still remains in some parts of the world—that captivated the ideals of youth in the time of the French and Russian revolutions, that these were great revolutionary wars to liberate humanity. But in these days, when the atom bomb has come, we must revise all our conceptions about war.
The result is that every sensible person, every Government in the world, is so stupefied over the possibilities of the next war that they will not go into the next war because they are afraid of what will happen. That is the situation. There are no clear ideas in the minds of the Government of any country in the world, and least of all in the mind of the Government of this country. That was clearly illustrated in the speech of the Secretary of State for War yesterday.
Where are the soldiers who should be protecting the hon. and gallant Member for Totnes (Brigadier Rayner)? I am certainly obliged, as must be many other hon. Members, for the map which the Government have circulated. It gives details about various parts of the world and it is the best piece of publicity that the War Office has carried out. I hope that it will be sent to every recruiting office in the country so that recruits will know exactly which of the 21 places they can go to if they wish to defend their country.
Some of the places where our soldiers are at present located are shown in rectangles on this map of the world. Suez is one of them. We have heard a great deal in this debate about Suez. I do not wish to elaborate on what has been said,


except to say that, after listening to the debate, I am more than ever convinced that the greatest military genius who ever meddled in the affairs of Egypt was Moses. He led the people out. He did not bother about the intricacies of the base. He said that he would lead his people out of the land of bondage. If the Government did that they would regain the popularity which they have lost recently.

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: Will my hon. Friend also recollect that Moses led his people into the land of Israel and that there is a very good case now for leading our men and our base into that land?

Mr. Speaker: I do not think that Moses is in the Army Estimates.

Mr. Hughes: Moses was a very great military leader who operated a great strategic movement in that part of the world, but I will not follow that subject beyond the bounds of order.
I am not so sure about the thesis that Suez is one of the reasons why people do not join the Army. In my part of the world one of the reasons, much more than Suez, is Korea. Can the Under-Secretary of State for war tell us how long Scottish and other soldiers are to remain in Korea? I was one of the people—I believe that I was one of two—who did not agree to our going into Korea.
I remember that when the suggestion was made by the then Prime Minister that we should join in the Korean campaign it was explained to us that it was not a war at all but a police action. It was many months before we could get out of the heads of Front Bench people, including the present United States Government, the idea that Korea was being fought by the police. But now everybody realises that Korea was not quite the beautiful, altruistic campaign which the nations rushed into in its early days.
When we consider what our soldiers were involved in in Korea and speculate on what they are doing there today, I am quite convinced that a war under the auspices of the United Nations, which is called a respectable international police war, can be as disastrous as any type of war in the past. I should be very glad if the Under-Secretary of State announced that we were coming out of Korea. I

do not know what is likely to happen in Korea if we do come out, except that I have a very shrewd idea that even after all the blood, tears and destruction in Korea the forces of history will move there and ultimately we shall find that, as a result of the destruction of the existing society, Communism has risen in its place.
I do not for a moment accept the thesis that we can destroy Communism by war. I am not by any means a Communist or a 100 per cent, admirer of the Soviet Union. I may be a Communist in the sense that the early Christians were Communists or Sir Thomas More, the Utopian, was a Communist, but, as people have prophesied, my life under a Communist Government would be "a short life and a gay one." When an hon. and gallant Member said of me, "That is the voice of Moscow," I replied, "I wish I were." I hold no brief at all for the Communist countries, except that I regard the people living under Communist rule as human beings who are just as anxious for peace and just as anxious to live their lives in their own way as the so-called democracies of the West.
I want to say one or two things about our soldiers in Germany. I have seen a great deal of them. I would say of the British soldiers in Berlin—I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) will agree —that they are respected, and that the people of Berlin hold the highest opinion of them. I am quite sure, too, that our soldiers in Berlin look around them and do some serious thinking. I am not so sure that being in Berlin is good for their morale because they see around them all the horror, destruction and futility of the last war. I am sure that a soldier who has been in the Army of Occupation in Berlin is quite convinced that he does not want to see a war of that kind engulfing Europe.
I wonder how far we have got in our progress—if we can call it progress— towards rearming the Germans. I have no hatred of the Germans at all. Some of the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) were so anti-German that, as an international Socialist, I repudiate them. The Germans have suffered intensely as a result of two world wars, and there is a strong body


of public opinion in Germany itself against the rearming of Germany. When I say that our soldiers should not be in that set-up at all, I am glad to see that that is also the opinion of the German Socialists.
I am not at all satisfied, as some hon. Members are, that N.A.T.O. is such an excellent organisation as it is held out by the Secretary of State to be. When the North Atlantic Treaty came up for consideration in this House, I was one of the Tellers against it. I happen to be the only one who survived, and I well remember the look of affection with which Ernie Bevin and the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) greeted me when they saw that I was telling against the official Labour Whip.
But today, I look back on that beginning of the so-called North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; and what were the arguments of the late Ernest Bevin in introducing it to the House? He persuaded the great majority of people here to accept the Treaty. I was a great admirer of Ernest Bevin as a trade union leader, but not as a Foreign Secretary, and I recall him standing at that Box and saying that if we had this North Atlantic Treaty we should cut our military expenditure. His argument was that if we all united in a great co-operative effort we should not have to pay so much for armaments. But our armaments bill is going up and up, and N.A.T.O. is not reducing it.
There is the danger that when we have established a military vested interest, we find that the very excellent military gentlemen have been given a permanent interest in maintaining the set-up which gives them their military jobs. I cannot see these illustrious military men coming along and saying that they have been wrong. The people will have to re-assert themselves over the military will so that every Government in western Europe may reflect the views of the ordinary people.
I have heard the argument about the 12 divisions; but they seem to be growing to 50. I have carefully followed what General Gruenther has said in his Press interviews because we have accepted the idea of these 12 divisions in order to improve our strength in western Europe. But what does General Gruenther say?

He points out that as a result of the rearmament of western Europe, there are now about 70 extra divisions in the satellite countries.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is really getting too wide of the Estimates. These matters about N.A.T.O. are in the field of foreign affairs; they are not matters for the Estimates.

Mr. Hughes: I apologise, Mr. Speaker, but the N.A.T.O. forces are mentioned in the Memorandum to the Estimates, and one of the little rectangles on the map at the end of the Memorandum is over Germany; and now we are in Germany, I presume, not unilaterally, but as part of the N.A.T.O. agreement. But I will move away from this point, because I have not studied military strategy for so long without realising that one must sometimes retreat to a new defence line.
We are supposed to be afraid of the Russians. They have 175 divisions, which represent an enormous military power. Furthermore, Russia has a most formidable manpower which may be organised into her armies. What can we do about that? Russia has this huge population, and the West has not, and the more soldiers we put into western Europe, the result is that more divisions are created on the other side.
I talked in Berlin to a Polish military attaché the occasion was the recent four-Power Conference. I asked him, "What do you think of the Eden Plan?" He replied, "It is quite irresponsible that the British Foreign Secretary should ask us to take risks for democracy in Europe. If the Foreign Secretary had seen Warsaw being burned and sacked by the Germans he would not have been so enthusiastic about the possibility of German rearmament."

Mr. Speaker: Order. I thought that the hon. Member was moving to other positions which he had previously prepared. He seems to me to be hanging on the same vulnerable ridge on which I attacked him earlier.

Mr. Hughes: Like Horatius, I cannot stand on the bridge alone, Mr. Speaker, so I must execute another retreat—[HON. MEMBERS: "Ridge."] I thought Mr. Speaker said "Bridge."
I cannot see any justification for the expenditure outlined in these Estimates for our armies in Germany.
Then I look at some of the other places where British soldiers are stationed. There is British Guiana. I asked some questions of the Secretary of State about British Guiana during his speech. I wish to know how long the Scottish and the Welsh soldiers will remain there. There are the Welch Fusiliers and an Argyll and Sutherland regiment in British Guiana. Presumably, they are there to maintain law and order, and not, as they are in Germany, to fight for free elections. They are in British Guiana to suppress them.
I wish to know exactly how these proposals for our soldiers outlined in the Minister's speech apply, especially to the Scottish soldiers in British Guiana. Are they to be brought home or are their wives and children to be sent out there? Would it not be common sense to cut our commitments and send these Scottish and Welsh soldiers home? If we had an intelligent foreign policy, which I am not now allowed to discuss, we should succeed in cutting many of our commitments, with the result that we should not have this huge bill for the Army.
I should like to know something about the colonial forces in British Somaliland. Exactly who are they? And what about the colonial forces in Mauritius and the local levies in the Persian Gulf? Those are some of our commitments. Concerning Malaya, I have recently been more enthusiastic about General Templer than I have been for a very long time, as a result of his activities in the State of Perak, in which he has been investigating certain economic conditions and finding out how the middlemen exploit the consumers.

Mr. Godfrey Nicholson: Pronounce "Perak" properly.

Mr. Hughes: I admit that I do not know how to pronounce the name of that State but I know the reality behind it
There are all these other places, including Gibraltar. What is to happen there? I imagine that there will be some difficulty about Gibraltar, but I will not discuss that as I do not want to be on the side of General Franco. I should like to know what are our responsibilities there and at Malta, Cyrenaica, Tripoli and Trieste. In all these little pockets there are numbers of British soldiers, presumably in order to give us better

security, and the whole thing boils down to fantastic nonsense. If the argument is that conscription is necessary in order to maintain the Army here to defend us against invasion, I reply that we simply have not got that Army. My main criticism has never been seriously answered throughout the debate.
Then there is the question of Cyprus. I was in Cyprus for a short time. I do not believe that there is any enthusiasm in Cyprus for the British soldier. If there were free elections tomorrow in Cyprus, we should go out. We cannot pretend that British soldiers are the instruments of democracy in Germany and the instruments of the other thing in Cyprus. Cyprus is in exactly the same situation as British Guiana.
The patchwork of our military commitments throughout the world does not make sense. As we go on from year to year this will become more and more obvious to the people of this country. Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite may think that my hon. Friends and I have been nuisances in pressing all these issues in debate, but we are doing a great service to the country, and in the future our people will thank us for our activities.

10.12 a.m.

Mr. Michael Stewart: I was very interested to learn from the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes') that he now has an admiration for General Templer and that in his wide charity he embraces all brigadiers and colonels in the House. Speaking as a mere captain, I was sorry to discern what I can only regard as a vein of military snobbery in my hon. Friend. My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), who was a wing commander, feels equally strongly on the matter. I fear that my hon. Friend may have caught this from some of the people with whom he has been associating.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I apologise very humbly to my hon. Friend. I will make proper amends when we come to discuss Vote A.

Mr. Stewart: That is a thought on which we may all wish to reflect rather quietly.
We have by now, in the course of a long and very interesting debate, discussed most of the issues which are raised in the Army Estimates, and, indeed, a number that are not. Certain propositions arise from the debate which I do not think will be disputed anywhere. If we desire value for the money which we shall shortly, in Committee of Supply, be asked to vote for the Army, we should have regard to six considerations.
First, the Army should contain a Regular element of high quality, and for that element to be of high quality it must contain a sufficient percentage of men of experience and reasonably long service.
Secondly, such National Service element as there is in the Army should be there primarily for the purpose of training a reserve—

Mr. J. R. H Hutchison: Training a reserve?

Mr. Stewart: Yes. Those men should do their National Service primarily as a means of training them so that they may subsequently be a reserve.
The other purpose to which National Service men are unfortunately put, that of being used as trained soldiers even in fields of warlike operations, is something that we ought to regard as a use of National Service which we want to cut down as speedily and as effectively as possible. I am not going to pretend that that aspect of National Service can be immediately wiped out; that would be completely unrealistic—but one must say with equal emphasis that it must be our policy to get that element out of National Service and get National Service back to the function it was first intended to perform. I think it is necessary that it should perform that task so that in the due process of time there will be a properly trained reserve.
My third consideration arises from the second, and it is that we have to see that in this country we have a considerable reserve of men who can be mobilised very quickly indeed. There is in this respect what I think it is an elementary and extremely important consideration which at times we are inclined to lose sight of, and that is that the method of modern communication and warfare do not give a lapse of time such as we had at the

beginning of the First World War and, to a certain extent, in the second. The speed with which Reserves are to be mobilised if the country is to survive, should the worst come to the worst, must be greater than ever before.
My fourth consideration is that an Army composed of Regular and National Service elements ought not to be stretched over the world as is the case today. History has made us the heir to an Empire which today is a heritage more of problems than of advantages, and we have difficulty in reconciling that historical inheritance with our present resources and position in the world. We must try to see that our Army is so disposed that it will not be excessively stretched and leaves us without a strategic reserve in this country, or possibly as one hon. Gentleman suggested, that Germany might be a place where that reserve could be collected. Obviously when one says that one could not be thinking in terms of a permanent arrangement in this country's defence.
The fifth consideration I have in mind is that the Army is to be provided as far as resources allow with the most modern weapons, equipment and transport it can get. Otherwise it is largely a waste of money. The sixth consideration is that in deciding the size of the Army one must consider it as part of the defence budget and weigh it in its proper proportion with the other items; and then consider the defence budget as part of the national economy. If we look at these six considerations which are vital to an understanding of this problem, then I am afraid we find, in the light of the information given to us, ground for anxiety on almost every one.
I regret that I cannot join in the compliments to the Secretary of State, and I hope he will forgive me for that. I am sure he made a good speech with the minimum of notes, but things have come to a pretty pass when a Minister is congratulated because he does not read his speech. I could not feel that the matter of the speech gave all that ground for compliments.
Let us look at my first consideration— the importance of a Regular element in the Army in which there is a considerable percentage of men with experience and a reasonably long service. To meet that


we have to see that recruiting is going properly, and it is quite clear from the Secretary of State's own anxieties and his Memorandum that he is worried about recruiting, although I freely confess that no one has yet found out what is the answer to the question of how to persuade a larger proportion of our young men to take up the profession of Regular soldier. No doubt pay has something to do with it, but nobody has yet stated in precise terms what is the co-relation between pay and the number of people who come forward.
As for the recent pay proposals, 1 am bound to say that I found it rather surprising that they were thrust on the House in the middle of the defence debate and that the White Paper which describes them does not mention—unless I have read carelessly, and I do not think I have —what is the total sum of money which they will cost the nation. We rely for that on the statement made by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, and it was not until his second shot that he got it right. We have still been unable—and perhaps we may now be told—to discover how much of the £16½ million is the Army's share. Are we to take it—as I think we must—that these figures are additional to the Estimates which we shall be discussing as soon as you, Mr. Speaker, have left the Chair and we go into Committee of Supply?
We have a Supplementary Estimate, as it were, which has been presented practically simultaneously with the main Estimate. I feel that the House should have had earlier notice of what was intended so that we could have had more opportunity for the consideration of these proposals and for studying their effect. If I say that about the explanation in Parliament, there is another body to whom they have to be explained—the troops themselves. I do not necessarily quarrel with this, for it may be unavoidable, but inevitably the proposals make the pay structure yet again more complex. It is most important, as the Undersecretary will no doubt agree, that there should be adequate publicity to the troops as to what the pay structure will be after these modifications have been made, in order that the ordinary soldier may find out with the least possible diffi-

culty what he should receive. As hon. Members who have studied the concluding pages of the Estimates Book and the White Paper on Service Emoluments no doubt know, it is not easy even for those of us who are used to studying public documents to find out at once how much a certain staff sergeant of so many years' service should be receiving.
As a matter concerning recruiting apart from pay, we have to consider the conditions of life. Recruiting must worry the Secretary of State, although he does not seem particularly worried about anything at the moment; at any rate, recruiting, which ought to worry the right hon. Gentleman, has two aspects. There is that of getting men who have been Regular soldiers for a certain period to continue in the Army, and there is that of getting from each intake of National Service men a certain number who are prepared for the first time to turn themselves into Regular soldiers.
If we look at the matters which are of concern to the man who is already a Regular soldier and is considering whether he shall continue and make that his career, possibly for the greater part of his life, we must realise that that kind of man looks to the future and to the present needs of his family. It is for that type of man that steps which have been adumbrated about the provision of education for the soldier's children, where he is serving overseas, and the provision for him to have a house when he leaves the Army, may be useful steps if we can know a little more of what is proposed.
I do not think I am doing the Secretary of State an injustice if I say that he described quite lucidly the problem of the Regular soldier who has come to the end of his time and has to find a house in the middle of the present housing shortage. But having described that problem, he did not tell us the measures he had in mind for solving it. It is not an easy matter, I agree. He has to consider first of all that it is a problem concentrated in certain areas of the country where there are large concentrations of married quarters for Regular soldiers, and it may be a matter of first approaching the local authorities in those areas. Indeed, I know in the past some approaches to certain local authorities have been made successfully.
This matter was raised quite recently in another place by Lord Lucan, and the Minister of Defence's reply can really be described in terms of three initials— N.B.I.—which stand for "notice board information." His reply was to the effect that by means of notice board information the Regular soldier is told what he ought to do by way of getting into touch with the local authority if he wants a house on getting out of the Army. Lord Lucan pointed out that this was an inadequate approach to the problem. Side by side with an approach to the local authority, I hope the right hon. Gentleman will take every possible step to ensure that officers see to it that men under their command are likely to be in this position, even some years ahead, are fully informed what is the best way of proceeding. I hope in due course we shall be able to hear a little more about what can be done in that field.
I should like to express agreement with the anxieties expressed by the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) about the education of children of soldiers of all ranks serving overseas, and if the Secretary of State can lure the Minister of Education away from the practice, for example, of sabotaging the London School Plan, and the other things occupying her attention at the moment, and direct her energies to more constructive work, it will be to the advantage of the Army and the nation.
Mention of education reminds me of a Question which I asked the right hon. Gentleman a few weeks ago. It seems to me unfortunate that the Director of Army Education should be of a lower rank than his opposites in the other two Services, because a great deal of the work of Service education has to be done conjointly with the three Services, and the lion's share is done by the Army. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will be able to find some solution of that difficulty. With regard to attracting into the Army young National Service men who have not yet decided to become Regular soldiers, there I think the War Office have to look at certain matters of Army discipline, and there are two things I have in mind.
First of all there is the discipline quite frequently imposed on men joining the Army. National Service recruits often find that the Army greets them determined to show just how tough and strict

discipline can be. I do not mind it being strict provided that every requirement it makes is sensible and is not just a case of looking for things to be strict about for the sake of strictness. I think that if the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues on the Army Council look closely enough they will find there is still a too unintelligent approach. Let him remember that the type of man he is seeking to attract into the Army is skilled, shrewd and sophisticated.
I think he will find that there are perhaps still too many senior N.C. Os. who feel that it is good for a young man on first entering the Army to have it made clear that far from being "somebody" he is as insignificant as a human being can be. There may be those for whom that may be suitable, but I doubt it. But, in any case, it does not apply to the present day, and particularly not to the kind of man whom the Army wants to attract.
The fault of the discipline I have been describing is perhaps due to over zeal. It is not to be compared with the scandalous abuse of discipline to which my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) and my hon. Friend the Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) referred. It is true that gross abuses of disciplinary power either by officers or N.C. Os. are extremely rare, but when they do occur the news is likely to spread far and wide and to have a most disastrous effect on recruiting.
My hon. Friend the Member for Jarrow mentioned certain abuses to which publicity had been given in the "Daily Mirror." I read that reference and was glad that the newspaper said that it was going to supply the Secretary of State with the information by which he could identify the cases. That is what any responsible person who has such information will do. I hope that, whenever the right hon. Gentleman is given good grounds for believing that abuses of discipline are occurring, he will investigate them and deal with them very heavily indeed. In my judgment, an abuse of power by an officer or N.C.O. is a far greater outrage on discipline than is insubordination by a private soldier. It does very much more harm to the Army and to recruiting.
I have spoken at length on the Regular commitment. I now want to take


together two or three other considerations which I mentioned at the beginning of my speech. There is the consideration of National Service and the training of the Reserves. The other consideration—the disposition of the Army all over the world—is closely bound up with those two.
When we ask ourselves how speedily can we reach the point where we no longer have to use National Service men as trained soldiers but can put National Service to its proper use as a means of building up a reserve, our minds are driven inevitably to the Egyptian commitment. So much has already been said about that since yesterday afternoon that I do not need to add very much.
I would, however, beg the Government not to be dissuaded from trying to seek —if only for the sake of the troops in Suez—a reasonable solution of the Egyptian problem; and not to be deterred by the attitude of some of their own supporters. I will not make any comment on that dissident group on the benches opposite, because I think that adequate comment was made by the noble Lord the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lamb-ton). Speaking of that dissident element, he said:
I believe that this is an association of different elements, and that there are some among those who oppose what I am saying who have acted with the best of intentions and who have the highest possible moral integrity, and also a religious belief in the Empire. But there are others who have done it because they think it is a step up the ladder. I think that the third group about which I have spoken have done this because they have not been included in Her Majesty's present Government."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th December, 1953; Vol. 522, c. 625.]
Against that comment I invite the Government to weigh this passage from the Memorandum:
During the period from 15th May and 15th November, 1953, there were no less than 885 incidents in the Canal Zone directed against our men or their families. During 1953 there were 127 attacks with firearms, 34 attacks with knives and 93 attacks with other weapons
To me that is too high a price to pay for the appeasement of the group so accurately described by the noble Lord the Member for Berwick-on-Tweed.
The importance of the Egyptian question is that once we are free of that

commitment those who are responsible for the organisation of the Army gain at least some room to breathe. Reducing the National Service element in the Army by reducing the length of service then becomes realistic to them. I do not want to overstate the case, but we are free of that commitment it becomes realistic to begin to plan a reduction in the length of National Service.
I am glad to see that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) is still in the House, because in this connection—both in this and our earlier debate on defence—he referred to the relationship between the period of a man's full-time National Service with the Regular Army and the period of time thereafter which he spends each year on his training during his Territorial liability. The hon. Member said:
… we may have to reconsider the spread of National Service time as between the Regular Army and the Reserve forces."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd March, 1954; Vol. 524, c. 1079.]
We, on this side, might have expressed more vigorously our view about the time spent with the Regular Army, but I will simply invite the Government to consider the interesting contribution made to that defence debate and to this present debate by an hon. Member who sits on their own benches.
In the debate on these matters last year, I suggested that it was at least worth while the Government considering —as a beginning—a cut of three months in the period of full-time National Service and the raising of the annual training thereafter from two weeks to three. The argument of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Wycombe—and I think of others—was that, to make the Reserve efficient we ought to increase the amount of annual training time. But every one knows that the National Service man could not possibly be asked to accept that added burden unless his liability was cut somewhere else.

Mr. Ian Harvey: It is not just a question of the National Service men. It is the Territorial Army which has to train these men and it cannot be expected to do three weeks annual training.

Mr. Stewart: With great respect, I was putting it to the consideration of the Government. I know the hon. Gentleman's experience in this, but I think that the Secretary of State can call on


people with even wider experience and greater knowledge of the problem involved, if I may say so.
I know that it is a big problem. It is much easier for me to call attention to it than for the Government to sort out the difficulties involved. But that arises from our comparative positions in the House. It is our duty to make constructive and intelligent suggestions. It is, I fear, only too often the Government's part to tell us repeatedly that they cannot be put into operation. All I say is that I want them to look at this one very hard indeed because, from whatever angle we look at this problem, we seem to be driven back to the consideration that, sooner or later, we must reduce the period of full-time National Service.
If we start by looking at Egypt merely as a foreign affairs issue—if that were in order in this debate. Sir—and if we find here a commitment which positively does us harm militarily, the conclusion is that here is a way of giving ourselves elbow room to do something about National Service. If we are worried about the training of National Service men we shall not find it possible to do more for their training time without making some relaxation elsewhere of the burden on the National Service men.
If we look at the later considerations in the listed six which I gave at the beginning of my speech, the disposition of our Forces over the globe, and if we want to get a better disposition, that action is bound up with the length of the period of National Service. One of the reasons for the period being what it is today is the terrible overstretch of our Armed Forces.
If we look at the question of weapons and equipment, why is it, as was pointed out by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler), that we know that in the defence programme as a whole there has been a steady shortfall on the amount of money that should have been spent on equipment year after year since 1951? It is because, in effect, manpower has eaten it up, and we shall not get the Forces properly equipped with up-to-date weapons unless we can somehow reduce the amount of money we are spending on manpower. We are led to this in every direction.
I would mention two minor points on manpower. One is that the War Office should look at this Home Guard business. The hon. Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher) gave us an account of the Home Guard in his area. I am sure he will agree that it was not very inspiring?

Mr. Fisher: indicated assent.

Mr. Stewart: I wonder if the Secretary of State would not have been wiser to have listened to the advice which the Opposition gave him when this Bill was before the House early in this Parliament? He has got so many unavoidable manpower problems on his plate— the Regular recruiting, the National Service men, the necessary Reserve forces. Here is another little one, but it uses up men. Men are needed to administer it, for paper work, for administration. It seems to me that the Minister ought to be trying to cut down everywhere as much unnecessary administration in paper as he can, and he should address himself afresh to the question of the Home Guard. Is it really worth it, in view of the many other more important tasks that press immediately on him?
The other small point about manpower is that my hon. Friend the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) mentioned misfits in the Army. I have heard it calculated—and I expect it is correct— that half the time of the medical officers in the Army is taken up by about 10 per cent, of the men and probably about half the time of the military policemen and provost officers is also consumed by 10 or 5 per cent, of the men in the Army. It is a question of whether, if the Army did not require some higher medical and, particularly, psychological standard for its men, it would not actually find that it was, paradoxically, saving its manpower by admitting rather fewer men. I think it still admits a certain number of men—it is not their fault—who constitutionally cannot make a go of Army life and they are, from the point of view of manpower, a minus quantity and not a real addition to the strength of the Army. I shall say no more, but the problem is worth consideration.
Now if I may turn to the fourth consideration in my list, that of trying to get the Army less severely stretched. That is, I suppose, more a political than a


military problem; how much more is brought home to us by a single phrase in paragraph 25 of the Memorandum which accompanies these Estimates. It is there describing the activities of the enemy in Malaya, and it says:
he is still able to obtain all the recruits he wants.
I do not attempt to put any political blame on anyone, but this is the situation, apparently, after the efforts both of this Government and of their predecessor; after the Briggs plan and after the Templer plan, the enemy in Malaya is still able to obtain all the recruits he wants. That points, I think, inescapably to the conclusion that while we must have armed force to deal with terrorism, we cannot deal with a situation like that in Malaya by armed force alone.
My hon. Friend the hon. Member for South Ayrshire argued that we cannot deal with ideas toy force of arms. I must make a modification of what he said. If an idea takes the form either of Hitlerism, as it did in the last war, or the form it is now taking in Malaya, I do not see how we can defeat it without the use of force, but I agree that we cannot do it by the use of force alone, and the right hon. Gentleman and his comrades at the Admiralty and the Air Ministry ought to be repeatedly emphasising, and getting the Minister of Defence to emphasise in the Cabinet that the Services cannot be continually expected to underwrite a failure of political imagination on the part of other members of the Government.
I mentioned, fifthly, the importance of modern weapons and equipment. That is a matter on which it is always the case that we can only be inadequately informed for unavoidable security reasons. And consequently I am afraid one does get, when one reads the part of the Memorandum that deals with weapons and equipment, a certain sense of unreality.
In paragraph 120, for example,
Artillery—The only new weapon of major importance which has been introduced during the past year is the new light anti-aircraft gun for defence against low-flying aircraft.
Very valuable up to a point, but those of us who read the impressive articles of the late Chester Wilmot—and I do not

think anyone will doubt that they were well informed—as to the kind of problem we have to face in air may well wonder whether a sentence like that has much relevance to the problem with which we are faced.

Mr. Head: I think that the Chester Wilmot articles were concerned with guided missiles, which come under the Royal Air Force.

Mr. Stewart: Yes, but my point is that one of the reasons why we are not spending as much on research as we should is because, out of the total defence budget, the Service for which the right hon. Gentleman is responsible takes the largest share. This in a country that is supposed to have a great naval tradition and at a time when everyone agrees on the enormous importance of air power. My point is that this problem of getting down the manpower, which is mainly an Army problem, has to be solved if we are ever to have funds available for the development of research.
Before saying a little more on that point, I want to comment on one other matter affecting equipment. It is the matter of the Belgian rifle, about which we have had some exchanges before in this House. The Memorandum describes the decision to adopt the Belgian rifle. Hon. Members may remember the debate on that matter. In the course of that debate there were two speeches made from the Front Bench, one by the Prime Minister, the other by the Secretary of State for War. I do not think it will be disputed that the effect of the Prime Minister's speech on everybody who heard it on that topic was to convince us that he was quite unacquainted with what was at issue in the matter.
The only argument of any importance that was adduced during the whole of the debate was right at the end by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, and that was not an argument concerning the comparative merits of the two rifles. It consisted of leading the House to suppose that at a certain date the American Government had agreed to the 280 calibre and that, on the strength of that, the late Government in this country had agreed to the Belgian rifle. That was the impression given to the House, and very effective it was in swaying the debate. We now know


beyond doubt that neither of those statements was true, and I am interested to observe—

Mr. Head: The statement of the hon. Gentleman is not true either, because he said that I told the House that the Government had agreed to this and I was particularly at pains to say "the War Office," so he might be accurate.

Mr. Stewart: That is not true either. The right hon. Gentleman pointed directly across to my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), who had been Minister of Defence at the time, and said: "You did." It was a direct accusation of a political decision.

Mr. Head: I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman wants to continue this, because it is all rather old stuff. In actual fact, that was said in answer to an interruption by the right hon. Member for Easington when he asked: "Was it the Americans who did this?" I said: "You did "—like that.

Mr. Stewart: The right hon. Gentleman has now repeated exactly what I said. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] He pointed across to my right hon. Friend. If the right hon. Gentleman is saying now that the late Government did not make that decision—and if his correction means anything it means that the late Government did not make that decision —I am perfectly certain that nobody in the House supposed at the time that the right hon. Gentleman was suggesting anything but that the Government made that decision.

Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman goes on with this, and it is rather boring. I do not mind telling him that I said "The War Office did it." Later on the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) got up and said that he accepted full responsibility, as the then Secretary of State for War, for what the War Office did then. I said all along that the War Office did it. That was in the telegram. The right hon. Gentleman subsequently said: "I accept full responsibility, because I was Secretary of State at the time." I did not say "The Government"; I said "The War Office."

Mr. Stewart: No. If the right hon. Gentleman will turn up what he said he will find that he began by saying: "This was a decision of right hon. Gentlemen

opposite." The whole thing was based on a false premise to begin with, because the right hon. Gentleman led us to suppose that this followed from a decision by the American Government to accept the 280 calibre. He had subsequently to admit to me in answer to a question that the American Government never accepted that calibre. He tried to dodge out of that one by the use of the ambiguous term "Americans." I invite him to say whether, when he says in paragraph 125 of his Memorandum:
The Americans …are showing a great interest in the weapon,
he means the American Government. What does he mean?

Mr. Head: I mean the American Army.

Mr. Stewart: I am bound to say that that is the deliberate choice of an ambiguous word. It is treating the House with a lack of candour which comes very unworthily from somebody in the right hon. Gentleman's position. It is the more significant because this ambiguous and misleading statement was the only argument of substance about the Belgian rifle that emerged from the whole debate. The reason why I stress the matter is because it establishes what I think the House ought to be aware of, that there is in the Secretary of State's handling of important matters a lack of the candour that we are entitled to expect from him.

Mr. Head: The hon. Member ought to be ashamed of himself.

Mr. Stewart: The right hon. Gentleman is the very last person who should make that remark. I shall never have a feeling of shame at any reproach from the right hon. Gentleman, after the way in which he has behaved in this matter. The House will realise that I have laid some stress on this because it illustrates the kind of statement and the kind of conduct that we must expect, even on important matters, from the Secretary of State for War.
I come to my final point. The fact that the Army takes the largest share of the three Services out of the defence budget has a damaging effect upon the development of research. That is particularly important at the present time, because if one looks at the history of military invention one finds that in


certain periods the offensive seems to have the advantage while at other periods the defence seems to have the advantage. At the moment in air warfare we are in the period when the offensive seems to have very much the advantage.
It may well be true that after a great war the offensive has an advantage. That fact is more serious and more disadvantageous to this country than to any other country in the world because we are more vulnerable to attack by means of guided missiles, air rockets and atomic weapons than any other country. It is therefore very greatly to our interest to advance research to the point where the defence will again enjoy an advantage.
The point I am making is that the promotion of research for defence against guided missiles is of more importance to Great Britain than to any other country. We cannot promote it unless we are able to devote a greater proportion of our resources to research, and since we cannot afford a greater total defence budget we must cut down other items in that budget and. in particular, manpower.
I should like to quote one paragraph from the Memorandum with which I think we shall all be in agreement. When I criticise the numbers of men in the Army no one, I think, will misunderstand that as being any criticism of the behaviour or of the quality of the men themselves. The last paragraph of the Memorandum says:
The Army carried on its various and difficult duties all over the world in an exemplary manner.
A few weeks ago the hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke) suggested that it might be appropriate for this House, perhaps by the passing of a Resolution, to express its appreciation of the services which the men in the Army have rendered to this country. The Prime Minister expressed sympathetic interest in the proposal. Indeed, I hope that we shall hear more of it. While we must have the very highest regard for the services of the men of differing ages and of all ranks in the Army without whose endurance all our foreign policy would be nonsense, I could wish that we had equal confidence in the general framework of defence within which they have to work and risk their lives.

10.58 a.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison): A day or so ago, my right hon. Friend made, as it seemed to me, an excellent, clear and balanced survey of what is proposed in the Army Estimates for our expenditure and our planning for the coming year. It was greeted with a chorus of approval. I do not think I have ever listened to a speech from either side of the House which seemed to command such general respect and appreciation, automatically and immediately. Later, hon. Gentlemen opposite tried to denigrate and reduce the effect that my right hon. Friend's speech had made.
If any Minister is anxious to make a balanced and sonorous speech in this House I certainly advise him not to try to do it at the end of, and in winding up, an Estimates debate. We have rummaged through such an immense area of question, problem and thought as these presented themselves to hon. Members on both sides of the House, that it is extremely difficult, though it is my aim, to collect the answers. As one goes along in the Tube nowadays one sees advertisements about how to cure what is called "The grasshopper mind"; which is nevertheless an extremely valuable adjunct to one's mentality when one has to change from one subject to another with very great rapidity.
Now I turn to the impressive collection of questions which I have made. I thought I had reached high-water mark last year in the corresponding debate, but this debate has gone much further. The trouble about a prolonged debate is that it tends to defeat its own purpose, because the mass of questions fired pretty rapidly at a Minister becomes so voluminous and comes so fast that no system of being briefed at the Box, or relying on one's own memory, will give complete satisfaction. Not only that, but it is asking a relatively tired mind to deal with a number of very intricate problems. So the House will, I am afraid, have to accept the fact that there will be hiatuses, owing to these two factors, in the answers which I can give.
I should like to deal with the questions as chronologically as I can. The first came in the form of a question or interruption of my right hon. Friend by the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) on


what we were doing in the matter of helicopters. That has been a question which has been exercising our minds for quite a time. It is true that we have no helicopters belonging to the Army, but some are provided by the R.A.F., and one such flight is under the operational control of the Army. We are examining the project of having an experimental flight to see just how far the use of helicopters and, indeed, other forms of aircraft, mentioned later in the debate, can be of use to us. The Royal Navy, in Malaya, and the R.A.F. have given great assistance to the Army in this matter of helicopters.
Then there was the speech of the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey). He started by saying that he thought—and I am sure he is right in this—that we were right when my right hon. Friend introduced the three-year engagement and the 22-year engagement. At that time, recruiting was certainly not going well, and my right hon. Friend has shown that it has recovered, although I think he knows, and so do I, what the hon. Gentleman for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has often said, that that has still to be proved. The acid test has still to come. It is in order to ensure that the test shall be successful that my right hon. Friend has introduced this new increase in pay and in bounty to persuade a man who is engaged initially for 22 years to jump the three-year hurdle and, better still, to jump the six-year hurdle, which is extremely important to us, and not to contract out, as he has the right to do, at that time.
I should like, although it was not mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman in his speech, to say a little—on the question of recruitment and staying in the Army—about our resettlement plan. I think that one of the factors which the soldier knows too little about is the chance of his getting a job when he leaves the Army after his three years' or six-years' engagement at a reasonable age.
I should like to say a little about what the Services' resettlement scheme, under the National Association for the employment of Regular Soldiers and Airmen, has been able to do. It is a well-known agency for finding employment, and it assists Regular officers and other ranks. It seeks out vacancies and recommends to employers men and women of all

trades. The overall ratio of registration of places found in the last recruiting year was 74 per cent. I wish that could be more known, because it shows that, out of 32,000 individuals who used this service in order to try to get employment in civil life after leaving the Army, no fewer than 24,000 were so placed.
That is only one agency. There is also the Ministry of Labour which does a great deal to help men coming out of the Army to get all kinds of jobs. The list of vacancies found or situations created has been extremely impressive. It is a factor, I believe, in persuading a man not to clear out of the Army because of the fear that if he stays in after the age of 21 or 24 it will be extremely difficult for him to get a job in private life.
The next point which the right hon. Gentleman made was about Egypt. I do not propose to say anything about Egypt, because there was a debate on the living conditions in the Canal Zone which ranged so wide that many hon. Members found themselves out of order. It did, in fact, cover almost every facet of the Egyptian problem. I would only say that so far as the policy of withdrawing or staying is concerned, that is not a matter for which I am responsible; indeed, it is a matter of Government policy, certainly not a subject for which the Under-Secretary of State for War has to accept full responsibility.
The right hon. Gentleman went on to talk about the strategic reserves, and differentiated between the two conceptions of strategic reserves—a mobile brigade or brigade group, or my right hon. Friend's ultimate conception, the ideal conception, of having about one-half of our fighting units at home in this country. Then there was the theme, later in debate, as to whether it would be better or not to place it in Germany, a differentiation on which I do not propose to comment.
The strategic reserve which we normally talk about is not a little thing like a brigade. It is a very much bigger force than that, as my right hon. Friend has stated. He aims at something like one-half the total strength. Then the right hon. Gentleman wanted to increase the Territorial bounty or said that this question should be examined. I am doubtful of the effect of that. I am not


convinced that the Territorial is as greatly concerned about the amount of the bounty as one might imagine. We are thinking about this matter, and are examining a proposal. It might be as well to point out that at the present time we have still to get a good deal of evidence on this matter and other considerations concerning the Territorial problem.
Then there was the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for North Fylde (Mr. Stanley) about men in the Territorial Army living near their units, and about making it as easy as possible for the men living a long way from their units to get to their week-end camps. That is a very difficult problem. I once commanded a Yeomanry regiment, and the other day the present commanding officer in Scotland sent me a list of the officers and where they were living. Only about one-quarter were in fact living in Scotland. The others were scattered all over England.
These officers can be of very little value unless they can attend week-end camps as well as their annual training. This is a problem which we are examining. My hon. Friend suggested that there should be a break of two months after camp when no training should be done at all, and then we might go flat out, as it were, on training again from the month of March. That is a question, I think, that only the commanding officer of a unit can decide for himself. All kinds of separate considerations come into this matter, depending on the locality, the scattered nature of area in which the officers are living and so on. Of course, if it can be done in that way that would be perfectly acceptable to us.
Then my hon. Friend asked whether or not there was a good deal of non-essential training and his argument led to the question of a fitness test. Such training is in fact eliminated already so far as possible. All these points will be borne in mind. He also referred to cutting down paper work. We are striving to do that now and instructions to that end have gone out. I think that these were the only points to which my hon. Friend asked me to reply, and I apologise to him if I have omitted some.
Then there was the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton

(Mr. Paget). I should like to thank him for his kind and flattering remarks, and as Mr. Adlai Stevenson said,
Flattery is fine if you don't inhale.
I know that I inhaled and liked it. I know that the hon. and learned Member is sincere, and that kindness is a hallmark of his character.
He asked what would be the cost of trebling the new re-engagement bounty. He is not now in his place—probably very wisely—but I can say that the extra cost would be about £1½ million for the same number of men. That assumes that the number of men to whom the bounty would apply would not be increased at once if it were trebled.
The hon. and learned Member was critical of the value of anti-aircraft defence, but he entirely left out of his calculations the advent of the guided missile, which is a factor about which many people are thinking just now, and which some consider to be of very great importance. He also put forward a very interesting theory about the development of armoured vehicles and tanks, and suggested that they are now passing into a range where their weight and power would slow them down to a point at which they would become more vulnerable than a more lightly armed and faster vehicle. There are three categories of tanks, and each has its separate rôle to play. The hon. and learned Member was probably thinking of the heaviest tank with which we are provided, and there may be something in his argument there; I do not know. His point will be considered.
He doubted whether the National Service man would ever become a sufficiently trained and effective soldier in a period of two years. That was rather a new thought on this question. All I can say in reply is that we have been very agreeably surprised at the way in which the National Service man has carried out his role thoroughly and efficiently, wherever he has been asked to go.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Totnes (Brigadier Rayner) made two points which I have noted. He said that recruits appeared to have no self-reliance under the Welfare State. If that is so, they are certainly taught a very great deal during their period of National Service. There is too great a


tendency for everybody to assume that National Service has only bad effects. That is not so. If hon. Members were to ask a number of National Service men who had completed their period of training I am certain that those men would agree that their training had done a great deal of good in certain directions, such as mental development, the knowledge of how other people live, the understanding of other people's characters, the provision of educational chances. In the matter of physical development they have certainly had nothing but benefit.
My hon. and gallant Friend suggested that we might bring forward the call-up age, because of that difficult period after a lad has left school and is wondering what sort of employment he should take up, when he tends to drift a little. My hon. and gallant Friend wondered if we could commence training the National Service man at the age of 17½. I do not think we could. We have had a good deal of discussion at different times whether just over the age of 18 years was not a rather early age at which to ask a lad to go into action, and it is doubtful whether it would be acceptable to the country to move the age forward by a further six months.
The hon. Member for Ladywood (Mr. Yates) was appalled at the bill we were asked to meet. He objected to paying £561 million, and asked what it was for. I should like to ask him how far he would go in expending money on the security of this country. He said—and this was the theme of many speeches afterwards—that we could not destroy Communism by purely military means. That is true. I do not think that any of my right hon. or hon. Friends would disassociate themselves from the view that we are engaged both in an ideological and a military war, but if we do not stop militant Communism destroying us we shall undoubtedly be destroyed by it. To say that we could stop the campaigns in Malaya or Korea by purely ideological means is fantastically and dangerously wrong.
The hon. Gentleman also referred to the terrible prospects of the atom bomb, and asked why we should waste all this money. Surely one of the aims of the recent Berlin Conference was to bring about on both sides a scaling down ultimately, if not immediately, of the expen-

diture on weapons such as atomic bombs. It is no use the hon. Member saying that we must take unilateral action to get rid of a weapon, when by doing so we should leave a potential aggressor in full possession of all that he wants to provide himself with.
I now turn to a theme which I wanted to leave to the end of my remarks. This is the question of commitments. It came into 50 per cent, of the speeches to which I have listened. I must make it abundantly clear that the commitments in which the Army is involved are not the exclusive prerogative of the War Office, and decisions in these matters do not lie exclusively in its hands. The War Office is the agent for the policy which is ultimately decided upon by the nation, through Parliament, and the Government. The War Office is left with the obligation to carry out that policy.
The hon. Member for Walthamstow, East (Mr. Wallace) made an agreeably short speech, during which he asked only one substantial question. He asked why we insisted upon a difference in rates of pay between the Regular soldier and the National Service man. The answer is that we have to attract the Regular soldier. He is going to devote his life—at least, he thinks so when he joins —to being a soldier. He is much more liable to be disturbed and moved about the world, and he is generally a man of greater experience. For those reasons we think that we are justified in our policy of paying him a higher rate of pay—as a professional rather than as an amateur.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Eye (Colonel J. H. Harrison) and other hon. Members wanted to be sure that we were training enough of our Reserve and Territorial officers as staff officers to be able to meet the needs of an expanded Army and the quick mobilisation which would be necessary in an emergency. For the Territorial Army we are doing that at the Senior Officers' School. Courses have been held there, and there was also a short course for Territorial Army officers at the Staff College last year.
For ex-Regular Reserve officers who will be re-employed on the staff on mobilisation, a special refresher course was run last year at the Senior Officers' School, and a course was also held for


staff officers on regimental duty. That is to say, those officers who are now doing regimental duty had a course to keep them trained and ready for staff work in an emergency.
My hon. and gallant Friend wanted us to commit ourselves to a token force under E.D.C. That is not a question for me to decide. There are a great many arguments for and against his suggestion, but his views are noted.
He then underlined the importance of getting men to carry on in their Regular engagements for six or 12 years. He asked whether such men could be, or were ever, sent to a wholly Regular unit. The answer is "No." There is no unit which consists exclusively of Regular soldiers and which has no National Service component at all. If the hon. and gallant Member stops to think about it, he will realise that what he asks is really impossible, at any rate on any scale. If we put all our Regular soldiers into purely Regular units, we should be left with National Service men exclusively to compose a National Service unit, and that would not be worth while because we must have the experience of the Regular N.C.O. welded in with the National Service men.
Then the hon. and gallant Member brought up the question, on which I have already touched, of whether the strategic reserve would be better held in Germany or this country. It all depends on the circumstances that one considers one will have to meet. There are pros and cons. Without having examined the question more deeply than I have had a chance to do since his speech, I should have thought that there was an almost unanswerable case for having it in this country. However, that is my own opinion.
I turn to the speech of the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot). He is a model of pertinacity. He has put endless Questions and has initiated one or two Adjournment debates about Plymouth Hoe. As he said, he arranged a meeting between the Civil Lord and myself and representatives of the Plymouth Town Council. I hoped that he would be present —indeed, he asked if he might be—but he was noticeably absent. If he had been there he would have realised that the Plymouth representatives who attended

were tolerably satisfied. We could not, of course, give them all that they wanted, but we leaned over backwards to try to meet some of the more reasonable demands that they made.
The hon. Gentleman asks us to give back to Plymouth the Hoe and Drake's Island. His policy must be the aphorism of Oscar Wilde, who said that nothing succeeds like excess, because the hon. Member puts fantastically big demands to us. As I have told him before, if we could give up the Hoe, which we cannot, it would, in any case, belong to the Crown Commissioners. Anyhow, we could not hand it back to the town of Plymouth.

Mr. Foot: The hon. Gentleman has several times said that there are great difficulties and that the Hoe would have to be handed back to the Crown Commissioners. Let him do that, and I will then take the matter up with the Crown Commissioners.

Mr. Hutchison: I suggest that the hon. Gentleman first gets a pledge from the Crown Commissioners and then comes back to us.
The hon. Gentleman went on to talk about the strategic reserve. I have already dealt with the question of the strategic reserve, its size, where it might be held, and so on. The hon. Gentleman then went back to Neguib, back to the famous Suez Canal, and there I can leave him, because everything that can be said on the Suez Canal question has been said and answered by my right hon. Friend.
One more point which the hon. Member made was that this question required a political solution. Surely all military questions eventually require a political solution. To begin with, the military do not become involved until a political decision has been taken. Equally, it requires a political decision to end the military sphere of activity.
I was also asked what provision was being made in this year's Estimates in respect of the recovery of costs from Germany, assuming that the E.D.C. Convention is signed. I am afraid that I shall disappoint hon. Members here. All I can do is to repeat what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said a very short time ago. In reply to a


similar Question, the Foreign Secretary said:
Under an agreement negotiated last year we are assured that the local costs of our forces in Germany will be met by contributions by the Federal Republic, whatever the date of ratification, until 30th June, 1954. The position after that date is subject to negotiation.
My right hon. Friend went on to answer a further Question as follows:
We hope very shortly to engage in negotiations to cover our local costs until the end of this year. The figure for the following year—1955—is something I cannot at present estimate or give a figure for."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March. 1954; Vol. 524, c. 1722.]
I am in no better position to give a figure than was my right hon. Friend.

Mr. Crossman: May we clearly understand what the hon. Gentleman has said? Are we now being told that from next June onwards it will be absolutely open as to who will pay the £130 million to £180 million? Is it the case, in other words, that we may have to pay? Is the hon. Gentleman telling us that from June onwards it may fall to the British Government to bear the whole cost? Shall we have to rely at the last moment upon the negotiating skill of the British Foreign Secretary in persuading the Germans to pay for the British troops after we cease to occupy the country?

Mr. Hutchison: I cannot say more than my right hon. Friend did.

Mr. Crossman: The hon. Gentleman cannot say much less.

Mr. Hutchison: That may be, but I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman must be content with that. My right hon. Friend is the authority, and I am not, and my right hon. Friend has already given the answer.
There was also a speech by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer). He asked me no questions, but he made a number of points which are certainly under consideration. He talked about education and the means of providing for the education of children whose fathers are in the Army. He and I have considered this together, and I do not think I am out of order in saying that the matter has also been considered in Committee upstairs. This matter does not lie in the hands of the War Office. I thoroughly agree with my hon. and gallant Friend's view and the views of

hon. Members opposite who desire to bring this about, but neither the War Office nor any other Government Department has power to impose this obligation on local authorities under existing legislation.

Mr. Mikardo: But we pay for it.

Mr. Hutchison: The problem is not that of payment; it is to get local authorities to give the children an educational status and to accept them on the school roll.

Mr. Wigg: Does the hon. Gentleman rule out legislation?

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: My hon. Friend has missed my point completely. I do not want to go through it again, so would he be kind enough to read my speech when he has an opportunity, for he will then see what I meant?

Mr. Hutchison: Yes, I will do so. The lateness of the hour probably accounts for my missing the point.
The hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson) made a constructive and interesting speech, but, so far as I and most of my hon. Friends are concerned, he was speaking to the converted. He wanted to know what progress has been made in the matter of colonial troops. The answer to that question was given by my right hon. Friend when he engaged in his annual tussle with the hon. Member for Dudley. My right hon. Friend is anxious that I should put right a small point which he put wrongly in the answer which he gave. He said that the four and one-third Federation of Malaya battalions were to be set on foot between January, 1954, and April, 1955. The actual formation of those units will not then have been started. I do not want the hon. Member to be under any misapprehension.
As for the general theme, we want to step up our colonial forces but the difficulty concerns the provision of officers and N.C. Os. We are taking steps to overcome it; at Sandhurst there are certain officers who are destined to hold commissions in the colonial forces, but we must walk slowly in these matters for we cannot decide to have a regiment next year and then find the officers and N.C. Os. ready made for it. We are desperately short of officers who can be spared from this country.

Mr. J. Johnson: I also asked another question. In the light of the statement last year that in the three-year cycle from 1952 to 1955 the Government would have another 19 battalions—five, eight and six—I looked at Vote A this year, but I found that the total had fallen from 68,000 men to 65,000 men and that next year, the third year of the cycle, the number would be 63,000. Will the Minister explain that?

Mr. Hutchison: I cannot explain it now but I will look into the matter. There will be another opportunity for the hon. Gentleman to put a question on the subject. If not, I will write to him about it.

Mr. Wigg: If the hon. Gentleman is writing to anyone, would he be kind enough to write to me, and would he add a postscript to tell us at what date he became converted and became aware of these great difficulties? We never had a word of them from the Secretary of State when he was on this side of the House.

Mr. Hutchison: We shall see that the hon. Member is kept informed.
In Malaya they have a system of training their own officers locally—finding suitable material and training it so that officers are available for this rô1e.
I come now to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies). He supported a plea made by the hon. Member for Rugby. He also told me that he had had information only this morning—now yesterday morning—about the conditions in the Canal Zone, and I asked him how old his information was, because a good deal has been going on in the Canal Zone recently. I rather think that my hon. Friend's information was received before the latest steps had been taken.
The N.A.A.F.I., which is the main purveyor out there—almost the sole purveyor—has been faced with a desperately difficult task. On one night or so its staff was cut from 3,000 to 250. Soldiers' wives and sergeants' wives helped to try to keep the N.A.A.F.I. going, but there was an additional difficulty in that the Egyptian Government have cut off the supplies for the native shops. Not only was the N.A.A.F.I.'s own staff taken away but it had to try to take over the work of supplies for the

native shops, which were deprived of anything to sell.
The speech of the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop) was almost entirely on education. He was concerned mainly with secondary education in B.A.O.R. and education in the Colonies. I have a lot of information for him on that point but he courteously sent me a note saying that he would not be able to be present for the reply, and since it is highly technical and highly complicated information, it is probably better that I should write to him. We are taking action to step up secondary education in B.A.O.R. and to make provision for the education of children in the Colonies.

Mr. Delargy: It is a pity that other hon. Members did not have the courtesy to write to the Under-Secretary of State.

Mr. Hutchison: It certainly would have helped.
My hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Mr. Alport) made a constructive and helpful speech. He asked whether our whole conception of the equipment and training of the Army was not in need of revision. He said that the tasks of approximately half the Army seemed to be mainly policing, or at any rate required different training and different equipment from anything likely to be found in Germany.
I do not think we could split the Army into units of specialists designed to carry out particular types of fighting, with one battalion for Kenya, another for Korea, and so on. We could not give them different training, from the beginning, and different equipment. There must be a common basic training with certain common weapons, like the personal weapon, the rifle, which all men in all units will have. As we have done in Korea, Malaya and Kenya, we subsequently give men specialised training when they go out to these theatres—for instance, jungle training.
My hon. Friend spoke about air transport and its use to move the strategic reserve. He asked from where we would get it. Of course, if there were an outbreak of war all we need would be obtained, if it existed. He spoke particularly of the need to get the aircraft of the independent charter companies or, indeed, of B.O.A.C. The Army is


becoming increasingly air-minded. The Blackburn Beverley has been mentioned, with its tail loading, through which we can load vehicles. The Prestwick Pioneer and the helicopter have also been mentioned.
The next speech was by the hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons). True to his usual form, he wanted to make a critical and minute examination. Have I the pleasure of the hon. Member's presence? Apparently not. He wanted to know about the employment of more civilians in barracks. Indeed, the question of the employment of civilians cropped up in other speeches. The Templer Committee and the Callender Committee recommended the use of civilians in certain jobs where they could replace soldiers, and those recommendations have been partly implemented. They have not been implemented in toto because all of them could not be carried out. We have to find civilians in the place where they are needed.
There was a further committee, the chairman of which was Sir James Reid Young, managing director of Vickers. Having decided that we should employ more civilian labour, we asked this committee to examine how we could economise in the number of civilians needed to carry out various jobs. The hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) also wanted to know what we were doing about this problem. For instance, we might decide to replace 20 soldiers by 20 civilians, and then the Young Committee might say, "If you put in a conveyor belt you will need not 20 civilians but five." The number of civilians on the pay roll increased last year. The increase throughout all the Army's activities was in the neighbourhood of 2,000, but increases were in part counterbalanced by reductions.
The hon. Member for Brierley Hill talked about the "top brass" in the War Office. In fact, that has been reduced. He complained that the National Service grant was not administered by us. I do not think there is much importance in that point; the National Service grant is administered very well by the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke) doubted the wisdom of a base in

Cyprus. Cyprus is not, at any rate at this stage, to be a kind of second Canal base. He said our Army should have a liaison with Jordan and Israel. We have close liaison with Jordan at the present time. My hon. and gallant Friend believes in an Army air arm. I am glad that he does. It is a big departure from the past set-up, but it needs to be considered.
The hon. Gentleman the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr G. Thomas) paid a tribute to the "civilians dressed up in uniform," as he called the National Service men. I agree with him that they have done a magnificent job. They are probably the best ambassadors Britain has anywhere. I think that probably Tommy, the National Service man, or the Regular soldier, does more than the British Council or any such institution or any delegation of M.P.s to popularise the British way of life and the British point of view.

Mr. Mikardo: That is not very difficult.

Mr. Hutchison: Not all hon. Members will agree with the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. G. Thomas: Is the hon. Gentleman going to say nothing about posting? Will he say nothing about seeing if compassionate posting can be reintroduced?

Mr. Hutchison: I am sorry I missed that point. The answer is that I do not think we can. It is not that we would not like to. I spend all my time saying "No" about things I should like to do, but the hon. Gentleman will understand that certain things are impossible. The practice of compassionate posting was abandoned in 1947. It was becoming quite unworkable. Naturally, a lad wants to be as near home as possible, or a lad's parents want him as near home as possible. The question is, where do we stop if we try to meet those wishes? We should send nobody abroad at all.
If we start by giving a compassionate posting to one man how could we refuse it to others? It is surprising how many soldiers there are in the Army whose relatives fall ill, or who have other good reasons for wanting to be near home, but if we were to try to meet all those individual wishes we should make nonsense of Army service. I am afraid we cannot do it.
My hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) drew attention to the fact that subalterns may get less pay than their platoon sergeants. It would be possible for a subaltern to receive less pay than his platoon sergeant, but he would have to be very new, and the platoon sergeant would have had a great deal of experience and been in the Army a long time. However, it is not so revolutionary as my hon. Friend imagines. It happens in the Civil Service, in which we may find some higher paid but lower-ranking official accepting orders from a lower-paid but higher ranking official. It seems to work all right.
There was also a question about an Army boarding school, but I cannot answer that just now, and I pass to the remarks of the hon. Member for Lich-field and Tamworth (Mr. Snow), who suggested the use of prefabricated married quarters. I cannot quite see what advantage there is in a prefabricated quarter. We have been doing fairly well up to date with married quarters in this country. Abroad we do far better by using, for instance, a locally built hut in Cyprus or a bungalow in Singapore, than we should by carting prefabricated buildings about the world.
The hon. Gentleman asked me whether we have a predictor capable of picking up the most modern aircraft. I am afraid I cannot answer that query because there we come to security questions, but the most modern equipment is now going into Anti-Aircraft Command.
The hon. Gentleman then brought up a constituency case. He is not here at present, but I hope he will excuse me if I do not deal with it now. Quite a lot of constituency cases were mentioned during the debate. They ought to be dealt with by correspondence or personal interview, and not hold up the business of the House.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin (Mr. Fisher) talked about badly-administered discipline in many units. It is not good enough to present us with a problem in that way. My hon. Friend must give us chapter and verse, and then we can examine the complaint. Of course, if there should be any badly-administered discipline, if discipline

should be lax or too severe, it should be corrected.
My hon. Friend also said there was a large number of complaints about food. I do not think there have been any complaints about its quantity. I have heard no serious criticism well supported by evidence about that, but there has been some criticism, not of the quantity or of the quality of the food, but of its presentation. I know that my right hon. Friend desires that anything that can be done shall be done to ensure satisfactory cooking and serving.
My hon. Friend complained about a mobile recruiting van and some unfair recruiting bait. Both my right hon. Friend and I are strongly against that sort of thing. It is not beneficial to the Army. It is not fair to the Army unfairly or by undue pressure to persuade a man to become a Regular soldier. If by such means a man is induced to join up, the Army finds in the end that it has an unsatisfied individual in its midst, and nobody benefits by that man's recruitment. I shall be very glad if my hon. Friend will give me particulars of the incident which he complained about.
My hon. Friend thought that for recruiting we ought to use a high-powered publicist. He thought he should be a person like Billy Graham. I understand that Billy Graham draws about 15,000 people a night. I think we should be embarrassed if we had anything like that sort of success.
The subject of camps for the Territorial Army is a very important one, I thoroughly agree. Before a camp can be popular it has to provide a considerable number of desiderata. Men like variety, and do not always want to go to the same place every year. They like to be in pleasant country or by the seaside, and they want some feminine society. I know the Territorial soldier very well, and I know that these considerations are pretty acutely in his mind when he goes off to camp.
The Home Guard has a role to play. It is composed of keen and efficient members. We have not had the increase in numbers that we wanted, but we have been up against the unholy alliance between the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) and some of the Press, that, I think, has not helped us to get the numbers


we should have liked to have had. However, the Home Guard has a role to play, and it is starting a spring and summer recruiting campaign.
There was a speech by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mr. Baird). I hope I am not wearying the House, but the House wearied me for a considerable time, and I am trying to get back part of my pound of flesh. The hon. Gentleman wanted a unified medical service for all three Services. That is part of a large question which the Waverley Committee is looking into just now. There are great complications, but something of that sort may possibly emerge.
The hon. Gentleman said we should use the National Health Service much more than we do. I ask the hon. Gentleman to consider what would happen to the Army doctors, of whom we already have too few, if they were all asked to go abroad, for if we were to use the doctors and dentists in the National Health Service for the Army in this country, automatically we should demand that all the doctors and dentists in the Army should spend all their time on foreign service. I do not think we should get them to do it.
I am trying to answer the questions and arguments of all the hon. Members who have spoken. I am speeding up—

Mr. Driberg: Do not be unfair to the rest of us.

Mr. Hutchison: All hon. Members will have their turn.
My hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, North (Mr. F. Harris) made an interesting speech about Kenya. I was glad of what he said about our troops there, especially where he indicated that there was a tendency for the public to lose their sense of perspective about things happening in that country. The gallantry of our troops did not get proportionately the publicity that some less reputable and very rare incidents got. Happiness is rarely news. My hon. Friend asked me a question about the Mackinnon Road base, which is in Kenya, and the answer to that is that everything useful in the Mackinnon Road base has been removed.
The hon. Member for Thurrock (Mr. Delargy) asked me why it was that the

Roman Catholic Assistant-Chaplain was paid less than the Deputy Chaplain-General. The answer is that he gets £300 a year less as he is unmarried and gets no marriage allowance.
The hon. Member also asked me a question about payment for film work. The Army does some high-level film stuff. I think it was the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) who asked me some time ago about the film "Rob Roy." When we lend such technical experts as soldiers in full dress we make a charge for them.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: How much?

Mr. Hutchison: A little more than it costs perhaps. The soldier gets his fun and the public gets the money.
In passing, I should say that questions have been addressed to me tonight which are matters for the Minister of Transport, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Minister of Housing and Local Government. The Under-Secretary of State for War is supposed to reply to all these points. I cannot tell the hon. Member anything about third-class travel to his constituency, and I do not think the War Office would be prepared to take over that responsibility.
The hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Glover) asked me about staff colleges and suggested a non-residential staff college to which Territorial Army officers could go on about two or three nights a week to get staff training. I should like to think about that, but I do not think it is a workable proposition. Other staff training, to which I have already referred, is going on.
Then there was a speech by the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg). He asked about the pressure by warrant officers on soldiers so as to prevent them writing to M. Ps. I do not believe that it exists much.

Mr. Driberg: Of course it does.

Mr. Hutchison: I do not think so. In the past—and I am referring to the distant past—it was illegal for them to write, but it has been made abundantly clear in recent times by my right hon. Friend and also by the right hon. Member for Dundee. West (Mr. Strachey) when he was at the War Office, that there is every entitlement for a soldier to write


to his M.P., and we are careful to see that no victimisation takes place as a result of him doing so. We drop on victimisation like a ton of bricks if we find it. I might add, however, that writing to his M.P. is not always in the interests of a soldier, because the matter could be much more quickly dealt with through the proper military channels instead of by him writing to his M.P., who writes to me, and I have to refer back to the soldier's commanding officer.
Then the hon. Member told me a story about men draining oil from motor cars and doing other such work and being fined for getting their clothes dirty. I would like to get particulars of that because it is obviously unfair if it happens the way the hon. Member puts it.
Then there was the question of the notification to the next-of-kin of a soldier having been killed. Again I should like to deal with that point with the hon. Member himself. Something has gone off the rails there. Next the hon Member raised the question of counter-indoctrination, but I can tell him there is none of that.

Mr. Driberg: It was prosecution proceedings I was referring to.

Mr. Hutchison: I thought it was counter-indoctrination. The prosecution question has not been definitely decided on yet.

Mr. Driberg: Could the hon. Gentleman say a word about the ration allowance to prisoners-of-war being retrospective?

Mr. Hutchison: I am afraid that is not possible either. The hon. Gentleman will remember that we on this side of the House when in Opposition had the same sort of battle over prisoners-of-war in Japanese hands, and the then Government refused steadfastly to grant the ration allowance. The Geneva Convention says that prisoners-of-war are to get the rations of the troops of the detaining countries. Sometimes they are of a low standard, but if they do not get even that one can complain to the detaining country. None of them was on the starvation level though the rations were not good.

Mr. Driberg: What about Cyprus?

Mr. Hutchison: We will bear that point in mind.
The hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) complained about the differentiation between the National Service man and the Regulars, and I have already replied to that in answer to another question. He also put a question about defending this country against Communism by ideological methods, and I have already answered that.

Mr. Crossman: What about the tins of meat?

Mr. Hutchison: I thought my right hon. Friend answered that straight away from this Box. [HON. MEMBERS: "No"] I have nothing more to say on it.
Then there was the question of the colonial battalions, which was raised by the hon. Member for Dudley. I have answered that, and also his question about recruiting. I do not think his speech will help very much in solving our recruiting problems. He wanted to know about our mobilisation plan. There is a mobilisation plan, but I thought he was asking that there should be a new conception of it, and his theme was it ought to include stocks on the other side of the Channel.

Mr. Wigg: The hon. Member has not got my point. What I was putting to him was the point made by the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) that he ought to look at the question of training reserves. The right hon. Gentleman was barren of ideas and he asked me what I would do.

Mr. Hutchison: I should like now to pass to the speech made by the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut. -Colonel Lipton). He spoke as if the Regular Army has gone down, but if he will consult the Memorandum he will, in fact, see that the Regular Army has gone up, not by very much, but in the last three years there has been a step up. He talked about the preliminary education centres and pointed to the fact that there was no reduction in numbers at these education centres.
The hon. and gallant Member went on to speak about the social effects of National Service. As I have said, everything


is not on the debit side. There are certain things which benefit men in National Service. The hon. and gallant Member surveyed the world for subjects and landed up in Paris, an agreeable place in which to land. He referred to the Hertford Hospital, but that is a question for the Ministry of Defence and not for me.
He told me about a constituent's case, about which I will be very glad to talk further with him. Then he went into a long diatribe about the ill-treatment of the Musicians' Union. We do not ill-treat them. We are perfectly prepared to work with them. He suggested that we should be amicable, but he should remember that the Army Council instructions are perfectly clear.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: What about the £12 million headquarters in Germany?

Mr. Hutchison: That is entirely paid for by the Germans and is not a charge on this year's Estimates. I think that is the answer which I gave the hon. and gallant Member a year ago.
Then there was a speech by the hon. Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo).

Mr. Mikardo: A most constructive and helpful speech.

Mr. Hutchison: If the hon. Member likes to describe it as such that is all right by me, but I was getting too tired to see anything constructive in it. He did ask me what a paper keeper was. He keeps paper. He keeps the registry, the files and other public papers, and acts as the custodian. He is recruited from among our messengers.
The hon. Member also asked about inter-Departmental adjustments. We lend personnel to other Government Departments and they lend to us. Obviously there must be accounting for the time and money spent in that interchange and, therefore, there must be a costing adjustment.

Mr. Mikardo: What about the increase of £1 million in the rationing allowance?

Mr. Hutchison: I am afraid that I cannot remember the answer to that. I will write to the hon. Member about it.
The hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme brought a new theme to the

debate when he asked about the Army's share of expenditure in the three-year programme, which was originally shown as £767 million and later as £625 million. That difference is due to the long-haul policy. Instead of the curve of the graph of purchasing going up to a high peak in the three-year period it was flattened out to last for a longer time. That, and failure of deliveries owing to production being disappointing, were the factors which accounted for the change.

Mr. Swingler: Will the hon. Gentleman give the relevant figures for production and manpower?

Mr. Hutchison: I am afraid that 1 did not know that the hon. Member wanted those figures. I will obtain them some other time if the hon. Member thinksthat they are important.
The hon. Member for South Ayrshire gave us an amusing speech. He ran true to type. His speech was a spasm of comic relief which I much welcomed at that hour. He introduced two new Ministries into the debate. He wanted to know about the call-up of agricultural labour. That is the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour conjointly with the Ministry of Agriculture, so I am afraid that I cannot help him on that subject. He also wanted to know when his Welsh and Scottish friends in British Guiana were coming home. I cannot say. Until our commitment there is withdrawn they will have to stay. I also hope that it will not be for very long.
The hon. Member for Fulham, East (Mr. M. Stewart) laid down six important factors in considering our problem, and I thought it very clever of him to be able to summarise them at that time of the morning. I can say for my part, and I think that my right hon. Friend will agree, that we can accept the whole of those desiderata as a starting point. At the starting-off point we are at the same mark.
The hon. Member asked what was the Army's share of the figure of £165 million for pay increases. It is between £6 million and £7 million. I agreed with him when he said that there should be adequate publicity, and that there should


be an explanation to the troops of the new pay rates and how they will affect each individual. With regard to the rank of the Director of Army Education, the matter is still under consideration. We must leave it at that.
The hon. Member also asked how soon we could get the National Service men back to their proper r½1e, which was not to be stationed all over the world but to be a reserve near at hand. That depends upon the time when our commitments are reduced. The hon. Member also asked about the Home Guard and whether we had not made a mistake in making a small but nevertheless further call on manpower for it. This policy makes practically no call at all, because the adjutant quartermasters who play a large part in the Home Guard are men who have gone into retirement already. The commanding officers are civilians and the Territorial Associations administer, so the drain on manpower is virtually negligible.
I have come to the end of this long, long road. Because it is so important to a proper conception of what we should be doing and what hon. Members have underlined to my right hon. Friend and myself, I want to emphasise again that commitments are things over which we as a Department have no control. The Army is controlled by the Government, Parliament and the nation. Parliament and the nation give us the task. Today I hope that they will also give us the tools.
Our attitude is brilliantly illuminated by the famous despatch from Earl Alexander of Tunis to the Prime Minister in which he said:
Sir, The orders you gave me on August 15th, 1942, have been fulfilled. His Majesty's enemies, together with their impedimenta, have been completely eliminated from Egypt, Cyrenaica, Libya and Tripolitania. I now await your further instructions.
So do we.

Supply accordingly considered in Committee.

[SIR RHYS HOPKIN MORRIS in the Chair]

ARMY ESTIMATES. 1954–55

VOTE A. NUMBER OF LAND FORCES

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 549,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1955.

12.7 p.m.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: I do not wish to detain the House very long, because I think that the Under-Secretary of State for War has answered what might have been an extremely long discussion on Vote A. We have a perfect right and duty on the general debate to discuss this Vote and all other Votes, but we know what happens when we do. There are one or two points still left over, however, which I should like to raise with the hon. Gentleman and the Secretary of State for War. This Vote deals with manpower, and manpower has been the theme of our debate throughout last night and this morning.
The longer this debate has gone on the more confusing and less convincing I have found the Secretary of State's speech. I think that the Under-Secretary was a little disappointed that after hon. Members had thought the Secretary of State had done well they criticised him. We thought that the right hon. Gentleman's speech was a clever speech, but he did not convince us on this question of manpower. On the central thesis he said that he must have a strategic reserve but he showed himself unconvinced that he could obtain it and demonstrated that no distribution of forces in the strategic reserve is possible under the Government's existing policy. Therefore, the right hon. Gentleman was virtually saying, first, that he must have the forces and, second, that he could not possibly have them. He said that we must have a larger proportion of Regulars and then indicated, rightly, that regular recruiting would fail.
I should like to ask the Secretary of State, however, about the British Army of the Rhine in Germany. I should like to quote the right hon. Gentleman's words on the subject in answer to an


intervention of mine when I asked about quarters for British troops in Germany. He said:
We have thought carefully about that. However, I do not think the House wants me to go into the details. That eventuality will by no means take us by surprise, and we have already taken a good many preliminary steps towards meeting it.
The right hon. Gentleman went on to say,
I could talk half an hour on that subject, … "—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th March, 1954; Vol. 524, c. 2478.]
I should like the Secretary of State to talk today for half an hour on the British Army of the Rhine and what will happen when German rearmament occurs.
The present British Army of the Rhine is employing tens of thousands of Germans both as drivers and as skilled workers in tank repair depots. As the Secretary of State knows, a very large amount of the labour employed by the British Army, which normally would be British military labour, is now German labour. I ask him quite specifically to tell me what will happen. How shall we replace that labour in the event of German rearmament and—as we are assured that every plan has been prepared and he is absolutely ready for the job—I do not see why he should not give us the answer.
I must refer to the astonishing reply of the Under-Secretary on the subject of cost of troops and the number of our troops in that area related to cost.

The Deputy-Chairman: I am afraid that the question of cost does not arise.

Mr. Crossman: I appreciate that we are dealing with the number, but clearly cost is a function of number and one must relate number to cost. One may say that 100,000 cost so many millions and that 200,000 cost so many millions more, so that one may express the number of troops in terms of millions of pounds. I could say that we have in Germany £100 million worth of troops. It is another way of saying the number; we number them in pounds, shillings and pence.

The Deputy-Chairman: The hon. Member is being subtle, but this is an argument on the next Vote.

Mr. Crossman: We all know what is going to happen to the next Vote. It will be guillotined.

The Deputy-Chairman: Whatever happens to the next Vote, it cannot be discussed on this Vote.

Mr. Crossman: I must return to the question of numbers.

Mr. Wigg: Obviously my hon. Friend is trying to make up his mind whether he is justified in voting for these numbers or not. In order to come to that decision he must not dilate on the question, but, with respect, he has a right to make reference to cost. Otherwise a discussion of numbers would be absolute nonsense.

The Deputy-Chairman: I was not concerned with the hon. Member's mind, but with his argument.

Mr. Crossman: With the assistance of my hon. Friend, we are trying to deal with the number and manpower of the British Army of the Rhine. I have asked the first question about the replacement of German labour. The second question is what is to happen to that manpower. Will it leave when the Germans take over the barracks? Are new barracks to be built for the German troops, or for ourselves?
I do not understand why neither the Secretary of State nor the Undersecretary has been prepared to tell us any of the detailed plans they say that they have ready for the take-over. The House is entitled to know from the financial side and from the sheer side of organisation what it is intended to do in what will be a fundamental reorganisation of the troops in Germany. I congratulate the Under-Secretary on shortening the debate by his answers to the questions which were put to him.

12.13 p.m.

Mr. Mikardo: I have one question and one point to make, and I can put them both in a very small number of minutes. The Memorandum presented by the Secretary of State, in paragraph 82 on page 14, says that the total numbers of the Army will be 13,000 less in the year under review than in the last year, but Vote A of the Estimates does not show this figure of 13,000 at all. Nor can I trace or deduce it in any way by addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division from the basic data contained in


Vote A. There seems to be an inconsistency, and I should be grateful if the hon. Gentleman could explain it to me.
The point I want to put is that clearly we could manage to fulfil all the functions which the Army has with less manpower if we could find some way of getting better use out of every man. In this connection, I put it to the Undersecretary that, notwithstanding the improvements in recent years, there is still some evidence that we are not getting the best value out of the manpower, because frequently we are putting round pegs into square holes and vice versa. I suggest that there is still some way to go before we can be satisfied that there is a proper examination of the aptitudes, the attitudes and attainments of entrants in order to see where they can best be used and to see in what posting they will be of most value to the Army. I repeat that this is important as affecting manpower because, if one can get a 3 per cent., 4 per cent., or 5 per cent, improvement in the utilisation of each man on the average, we can reduce manpower to that extent without loss of functioning capacity.
I know that most people who go into the Army, like most people who come into this House, do not minimise their own valuation of themselves. They all think, not only that they have field marshal's batons in their knapsacks, but that those batons ought to be produced within a very short time. Therefore, one cannot take them at their own valuation and assume that their complaints are justified. Furthermore, one knows that if every man went into the arm for which he opted there would not be sufficient in some whilst there would be great over-establishment in others. But, allowing for all that and for the fact that there has been some improvement in recent years, I repeat that there is still a strong case for saying that people are not properly utilised.
I call to mind two young men in my constituency who were recently called up together. They had been at school together and they had remained friends from the time of leaving school until the time of their call-up. One was a boy with a passion for motors, as so many have. He went into a garage and worked all his time in a garage since leaving school, tinkering with motors. The other

boy had no particular ambition and became an errand boy in a department store.
Both boys went on the same day for their medical and were called up on the same day. The boy with a passion for motors, who had been three years in a garage, was put into the Royal Berkshire Regiment and the boy who was an errand boy and did not know the front end of a carburettor, and did not care, was put in the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. Both wanted to change, but neither was allowed to do so. I am sure that there is a great deal of that kind of thing and, if real attention were given to these matters, we could make great progress.

12.18 p.m.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I think this is going to be the shortest speech on the Service Estimates debate. I want to put a question to the Under-Secretary in the hope that he will answer it. He will see in Vote A that the total number for the year 1954–55 is 549,000. The latest figure we have of the strength of the Army is for 31st December, 1953, when the total was 440,000. Is the Undersecretary asking us to believe that there is a possibility of the strength of the Army going up during the year 1954–55 to the extent of 109,000 men, women and boys more than it is at present? That seems an unreal figure, which of course will reflect itself in the ancillary Estimates that will come later. I should like the hon. Gentleman to reconcile what seems to me a very wide margin between the actuality of the case and what he is asking the Committee to provide for.

12.20 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. J. R. H. Hutchison): I shall try to answer the three questions put to me, first by the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman). I cannot tell the hon. Gentleman during this delicate period of negotiation what will be the outcome of the replacement of German labour. The situation will alter, how much I do not know. We have to negotiate with Germany, and at this stage I cannot go further.

Mr. Crossman: This was the point on which the Secretary of State said he could talk to us for half an hour. Surely


something must have been decided as to what is to happen to replace the tens of thousands of German personnel? This is not negotiation, but a decision on what is to be done. If there is a half-hour's talk on the subject, this must be one of the first sentences.

Mr. Hutchison: It is true that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said he could perfectly well extend the theme for half an hour—

Mr. Crossman: Where is he?

Mr. Hutchison: —but at this stage my right hon. Friend is prevented from doing it by negotiations. I think that the story, if he was going to tell it, might take half an hour, nevertheless he cannot go into it and I cannot go into it at this stage.

Mr. Crossman: Am I to understand that negotiations are now going on on this subject?

Mr. Hutchison: It depends on when the negotiations start but, as the hon. Gentleman knows, we have been in touch with the West German Government for a very long time on a large number of matters, including this one.

Mr. Crossman: This is a serious point because it would imply that the detailed preparations for German rearmament are taking place before the ratification of the Treaty. If it is really suggested that we are now negotiating for the replacement of these men, then we are taking for granted something which has still to be decided in the French Assembly. I believe this is a matter for the Foreign Secretary. Is it really true that there are negotiations on this subject?

Mr. Hutchison: Perhaps "negotiations" is the wrong word, but the hon. Gentleman knows as well as I do the situation that has obtained for some years in connection with E.D.C., and he knows that E.D.C., and the Western German attitude to it, dominates the question as to who will pay for these costs and where we are to get the manpower. The hon. Gentleman knows as much as I do about what is going on and, were he in my position, I think he would say that this is not a time to state what we are going to do and what is going to become of the manpower situation,

the German service organisation and analogous questions. It can be called negotiating or thinking forward—I do not mind.

Mr. Crossman: But surely we have the right to hear about this.

Mr. Hutchison: If the hon. Gentleman is going to talk about rights, he must go to the Foreign Office, because this is a question of negotiation at some stage and not my responsibility.

Mr. Crossman: Here is the Secretary of State returning. The right hon. Gentleman talked very differently from his hon. Friend. About 14 hours ago he said:
We have thought carefully about that … I could talk half an hour on that subject, but the House would not want me to.—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th March, 1954; Vol. 524, c. 2478.]
Now his hon. Friend says that he could talk for half an hour but that the Foreign Office would not want him to do so. I want to know who is right. I should like to hear for an hour from the Secretary of State, particularly on these two points, one about barracks and the other about what is to happen about the thousands of German personnel now in the Service of B.A.O.R.? How are they to be replaced? The Under-Secretary of State has told me that this is under negotiation, and I should like confirmation from the Minister that it is under negotiation or, if he prefers it, thinking ahead. The British people are extremely interested in what is to happen to B.A.O.R. if the Germans are to rearm. It is the most interesting thing we are discussing, so we should like half an hour's talk any time he likes.

Mr. Head: I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for allowing me to intervene. I said in the extract which he read out that I could talk for half an hour on that subject; indeed, I could probably talk for an hour or even one and a half hours if I put my mind to it. As I pointed out, we have thought about this and we have made arrangements and plans on certain hypotheses about barracks, and also what will happen about the German service organisation. But those are our own thoughts and ideas, conditional on the entry of Germany into E.D.C. I would point out that it would be most improper for me to give our own ideas of what might happen in that eventuality.

Mr. Crossman: So it is clear that there was an error made?

Mr. Hutchison: I admitted that.
Now, if I may turn to the question of barracks. We do not anticipate any shortage of them. I am not sure what other information the hon. Gentleman wanted than what I have said already. In reply to the question on accommodation and buildings, we do not anticipate any shortage both for rearming Western Germany and for our own requirements.
Then there was the question of the hon. Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) which puzzled me and still does to a certain extent. He asked me to reconcile the fall of 13,000 in 1954–55 stated in the Memorandum with the total shown in Vote A. I am informed that the totals in Vote A are all maximum figures which do not relate to the figure he quoted. The hon. Member for Brixton—

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: May I put the question again briefly? The strength of the Army is shown in the Memorandum as 440,990 on 31st December, 1953. Under Vote A the Parliamentary Secretary is asking us to provide him with 549,000–109,000 more than in the Army at the present time. Does he not think that this is an unreal increase to look forward to in the year 1954–55?

Mr. Hutchison: It would be unreal if the hon. and gallant Gentleman were comparing like with like. I realise that it is misleading on first sight, but Vote A includes colonial manpower and a number of other entries that do not appear in the other calculation.

Mr. James Hudson: I have only one brief point to put, and I sympathise with the hon. Gentleman, who has been very fair to the House, so I should not like to keep him long. However, there is an important point arising out of the Explanatory Memorandum which says that the figures of the total number of troops include a certain number of enlisted boys, and 5,200 are mentioned. I would like enlightenment on this point because I am sure that is not the full figure. There has been a development recently in Leeds, where cadets in the schools are having their service in the Army considerably extended by permission to go out to Germany during the summer period, and

I understand that financial provision is being made for them. In Leeds, very strong protests have been made.
If these boys have willingly gone into the Cadet Corps, perhaps I am not in a position to say that they should not go to Germany. But according to Vote A a very considerable extension is being made in the policy of boys in public school Cadet Corps having part of their Service training by way of a visit to Germany during the summer months. There, I understand—although I seek information on this—they will be taking part in the military exercises arranged for men of a greater age. It is only on a point of information and protest that I raise the matter now.

Mr. Hutchison: I think that the hon. Member is confusing boys in cadet organisations with the boys, of whom there are about 5.000, who are whole-time in the Army. Those boys could perhaps be called young Regular soldiers. The cadets from schools are unpaid— and only part-time anyhow. These boys are members of boys' battalions and organisations within the Army.

Mr. Hudson: Are the Government increasing the total number of boys to be trained under arms—boy auxiliaries from the schools—who for quite a period in the summer are to be engaged in armed service in Germany?

Mr. Hutchison: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will allow me to write to him on this point. It is rather complicated. There has been a small increase in the boys' Army units.

Resolved,
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 549,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1955.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report the Resolution, and ask leave to sit again."— [Mr. T. G. D. Galbraith.]

12.29 p.m.

Mr. Swingler: I certainly think that we ought to report Progress. Although I know that everyone is very tired, and particularly the Ministers who have been


on the Front Bench so long, I should like to make one point to the Leader of the House.
In all these Estimates debates we have been under some difficulty this year. One difficulty has been the uncertainty about procedure. That uncertainty has now been removed by Mr. Speaker's Ruling yesterday—and by your own Ruling, Sir Charles—as to what is in order in these debates. But that produces the situation where these debates must inevitably consist of speeches that are partly Second Reading and partly Committee speeches. That makes it extremely difficult for Ministers, and for the spokesmen for the Opposition to wind up.
It would help if an assurance were given before the debates began that there could be a genuine Committee stage. It would not then be necessary to make the main Estimate debates so long in order to include Committee points as well as general points on the Service Estimates themselves. But so long as there is a threat of reporting Progress plus the Guillotine procedure which is going to apply next week, it is inevitable that Estimates debates must become very long so as to include Second Reading and Committee speeches.
I do not expect the Leader of the House, in the light of Mr. Speaker's Ruling yesterday, to be able immediately to give us enlightenment on this, but the Government ought to consider it. To me the case is overwhelmingly made out for at least two Parliamentary days to be properly allocated to each Service Estimate. It is really fantastic to carry on trying to rush these Votes through in one day.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crook-shank): There is nothing in the world to prevent the Opposition asking for those days out of Supply Days.

Mr. Swingler: The Leader of the House knows that the Opposition has only a limited number of Supply Days and a large number of questions to raise. I do not think that he would really argue that the Service Votes are Opposition questions. This is obviously Government business. I should have thought that the Leader of the House would agree that these Estimates are now of sufficient importance—involving so much money and such big questions—as to warrant a day

for the general aspect and the next day for details arising on the Votes.
We now have a debate which includes the general speeches on the Estimate and detailed matters arising from the Vote all mixed up together, because there is no opportunity at all of having a proper Committee stage on the Votes on the agenda. If we could have an assurance that we could have a proper debate on the Service Estimates, divided from the Committee stage on the Votes, the debates would probably be much less harassing, much more coherent and carried through in a much more reasonable time.

12.35 p.m.

Mr. Foot: I think it right that I should add a few words to what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler). In the previous debates whenever the Leader of the House, the Patronage Secretary, or those acting for him, have moved to report Progress after taking Vote A, the Leader of the House has said in defence of the Government's action that he was carrying out the normal practice followed since the new system was introduced in 1948.
I am sure that the Leader of the House made that statement to the House in good faith. Indeed, when he made the statement he was perfectly well aware that other hon. Gentlemen on this side had said much the same thing, because they also believed that it was the normal practice—since the new system was introduced in 1948—to report Progress immediately after Vote A was taken. But in 1949 no such Motion was moved after Vote A. We went through all the Votes on that occasion. In the Navy and Air Force Estimates in 1950 there was no such Motion, although it was moved on the Army Estimates. In 1951 no such Motion was moved after Vote A. Therefore, on only one occasion out of a possible nine under the previous Government was the Motion moved in the fashion which the Leader of the House moved it, although in the debate on the Navy Estimates he said he was following normal practice.
If it is proved—and the Leader of the House can check these facts—that, quite under a misapprehension, he thought that he was carrying out normal practice,


that seems to me a further argument why he should reconsider the whole question of the Estimates, as my hon. Friend has suggested, and make a statement to the House. It might avoid a Sitting which continues through the night, and give hon. Members a better opportunity to examine in detail—as is their right—the Estimates presented to the House.

12.38 p.m.

Mr. Mikardo: The Rulings which you, Sir Charles, and Mr. Speaker have given have greatly facilitated the conduct of the debate on the Army Estimates as compared with the difficulties we experienced in the two previous Estimates debates. Those Rulings naturally clarify the position only on the assumption that the Standing Order of 1948 stands and that it will be interpreted and executed by the Government in the manner adopted this year.
We have now had the experience of conducting the Air and Navy Estimates with the operation of procedure of the Leader of the House without the benefit of your Ruling, and on the Army Estimates with that benefit. I invite the Lord Privy Seal to consider whether next year—as Leader of the House charged with the duty—and of course desiring— of getting the business of the House done as expeditiously as possible, it would not be advantageous for him to propose an Amendment of the 1948 procedure. Alternatively, to cease to operate the 1948 procedure on the basis that report Progress must be moved immediately after Vote A.
I want to call in aid the words of the Under-Secretary, whose speech was the best advocacy of what my right hon. Friends and I are putting forward. I think I got down accurately what he said, except, possibly, the last few words. He said, and we all sympathise with him: "The trouble with a long debate like this is that it defeats its own purpose, because the mass of questions comes so thick and so fast that it is impossible to arrange them in any sort of order."
I am not complaining about the speech of the Under-Secretary; it reflected the very greatest credit on him, not merely because he made the speech, but because he sat in the House all those

hours, leaving only very occasionally for the odd minute to swallow a cup of tea. He annotated every question that was put to him and went to all the trouble to try to answer them, a courtesy which we have not had from the spokesmen of the Navy and the Air Force.
As the hon. Gentleman said in his opening sentence, however, he was in an absolutely impossible position. The reason for this is that he was replying to a debate in which one hon. Member would get up and talk generally about strategy, a second Member would talk about Vote 8, a third about Germany, the fourth about Votes 3, 7 and 10, and so on. There was the poor Parliamentary Secretary, having to mass all that lot together and give a reply.
I put this in all seriousness to the Lord Privy Seal. I have sat through the whole of these three all-night sittings. 1 have watched them carefully and participated in them. I am quite satisfied from what I have heard that if the debate had been chopped up—had we had a general debate on the Motion, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair" and then separate debates on a number, if not all, of the Votes—there would not have been any more aggregate time taken than in fact was taken. In this debate we were going until five or six o'clock this morning one for one on both sides of the House, and hon. Members opposite made valuable contributions. But what I feel about these debates is that hon. Members on both sides, who had something to say and wanted to say it, managed to get in and say it. They said no more and no less than they wanted to say, and I do not think they took any less time because they had to muck it all together than they would have taken had they been able to deal with one point at a time.
One of the evidences of that is that both on Wednesday morning and this morning, we have had very short debates on Vote A. On each occasion two or three hon. Members put points in speeches all of which were less than five minutes, and the Minister was able to reply in less than five minutes. If we could have done that, not merely for Vote A, but for Votes 1, 2, 3 and the rest, we should have got through with a succession of very short debates instead


of one very long and one very short one. I repeat that I do not believe the aggregate time taken would have been any more.
Therefore, I invite the Lord Privy Seal —he is not called upon to answer now; he has a whole year to think about it —to look through those parts of the debate which he has not heard or read and to consider whether on another occasion we could not have an intelligent debate with no greater expenditure of time. The total time taken in the case of the Air Force was roughly 12 hours; in the case of the Navy, 12 hours, and in the case of the Army, about 20 hours. Whether the right hon. Gentleman thinks that this total time in each case is better taken by one day shift and one night shift together or by two day shifts, is a matter for him to decide. The only point I make now is that I do not think the aggregate would be increased if we had a proper debate, with separate debates on the separate Votes. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will consider this before this time next year.

12.45 p.m.

Mr. Glenvil Hall: I have no wish to detain the Committee, but I should like to say how much I, for one, support what my hon. Friends have said. They have not been talking purely for the sake of wasting time in what they have just said. AH the evidence is that the time allotted at present is insufficient. I rise to make one observation only.
In the brief reply which the Lord Privy Seal gave, I thought I saw the assumption that the suggested change was purely for the convenience of Members on this side of the House. That is not so. The right hon. Gentleman also said that we could use Supply days. But why should we? During the debates that we have had on the Services on these three days, as many Members have got up from the Government side as from this side, and there is no reason whatever why the Opposition should supply time for Members on the Government side very properly to exercise their functions as critics of the Estimates.

Mr. Ian Harvey: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman does not wish to mislead the Committee, but all the speeches since four o'clock have been from his side of the House. The right hon. Gentleman must be speaking

from a brief, because this is the first appearance he has made.

12.47 p.m.

Mr. John Strachey: I certainly wish to add a word in support of what my hon. Friends are saying. After all, we have had enough experience of this. It was Mr. Speaker's Ruling, in his wisdom, that the system which we had on the first two Estimates debates would not suffice. My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) was able to call Mr. Speaker's attention to the need for the modification which we tried out last night and this morning; and none of us, I think, regards it as wholly satisfactory.
Wherever hon. Members may feel that blame lies in this, surely that is a strong argument that this is not a very good system. Before next year it would be worth while for the Leader of the House to look into one or other of these solutions of having either a second day or a Committee stage debate. That, surely, is a satisfactory way of doing it. The general debate could be limited as a normal Second Reading debate, going, perhaps, until 4 o'clock in the morning, unless hon. Members opposite wish to prolong it. These debates would have come to an end then had there been an assurance of a reasonable amount of Committee time. Having been here through the debate and watched it from the Opposition Front Bench, that seems to me the lesson we must derive from it, and it would be worth while for the Leader of the House to consider it.

12.48 p.m.

Mr. Crookshank: I hope that the Committee will now be prepared to report Progress, because I am quite seized of the point. Several hon. Members have made it, and the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) has reinforced it. I am not sure that anything more can he said about it, because it was amplified on the earlier days. The difference on this occasion was that Mr. Speaker had given his Ruling and, therefore, tonight the alternative method was tried out.
It is my duty to listen to what anybody says, from any quarter of the House, on matters dealing with practice and procedure so far as it comes within my function as its Leader for the time being.


But I have not had any representation from anybody about this suggestion. It has emerged during the course of the debate. It would be wrong if I tried now to give any ruling or to express any kind of opinion. Of course, in matters of this kind 1 generally await representations from the Leader of the Opposition, who speaks for his party, but if other hon. Members, in whatever quarter of the House they sit, also like to put points to me, naturally I take them into consideration.
I do not think that after this very long debate the Committee would wish me to take this matter any further, and as I cannot believe that there is anything fresh to be said about this topic, I hope that the Committee will now agree to the Motion. We have sat for a very long time, to the inconvenience of a great number of hon. Members, at any rate on this side of the Committee, and to all the staff.

The Chairman: The Question is—

12.50 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: No, Sir Charles. Members of this House have rights, irrespective of certain little arrangements that are come to between the two Front Benches. Those who have taken part in this debate have staked a claim for the rights of Members on both sides of the House, which is more important than some of these nice little arrangements which may prevent discussion.
If the Leader of the House had been as considerate in his tone a few nights ago as he has been now, a good deal of this trouble could have been avoided. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] I do not agree with

the Members who are shouting at me now, and I intend to assert the rights of this House. An hon. Member opposite made the point that the only speeches from four o'clock onwards were made from this side of the House. That might have been due to pressure exerted on Members opposite, who would have spoken freely otherwise.

Mr. Ian Harvey: The hon. Member is completely misinformed. No such pressure has been exerted on anybody.

Mr. Hughes: Hon. Members on the other side can judge of that for themselves.
We should judge the procedure of 1948 in the light of 1954. These are enormous sums that we are passing without proper discussion—sums of £1,600 million, and £600 million is being rushed through without proper discussion. We have acted in as conciliatory a manner as possible, but we were taking the side of the rights of hon. Members of this House against the Front Benches of this House.

Resolution to be received upon Monday next.

Committee to sit again upon Monday next.

ADJOURNMENT

Resolved,
That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Legh.]

Adjourned accordingly at Seven Minutes to One o'Clock p.m., Friday, 12th March, till Monday next, pursuant to the Resolution of the House, this day.